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ii 
Summary 
Realising socio-economic rights is significant for improving the socio-economic 
conditions of Africa’s people and ensuring that people have access to socio-economic 
services and a dignified life. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights both 
explicitly and implicitly protects a wide range of socio-economic rights. Interpreting these 
socio-economic rights in a manner that guarantees their efficacy and improves peoples’ 
socio-economic conditions is essential on the African Continent. Supervisory organs 
have, however, been inconsistent in their interpretive approaches to the socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter. 
This dissertation investigates the extent to which the teleological approach to 
interpretation can assist supervisory organs in interpreting socio-economic rights in a 
manner that ensures their efficacy. The study identifies the need to advance a coherent 
methodology for the application of the teleological approach. Thereafter, it develops a 
methodology that engages a wide range of interpretative tools both within and beyond 
the African Charter. This methodology can assist supervisory organs to coherently 
elaborate on the African Charter’s object and purpose to generate the meaning, scope, 
and content of socio-economic rights and their related obligations.  
Advancing socio-economic rights in Africa necessitates a model of review grounded 
in the teleological approach to interpretation. Supervisory organs, in particular the 
African Commission, have applied various models of review to assess States’ 
compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations. This dissertation develops the 
reasonableness model of review, which incorporates minimum core standards and 
proportionality. It is argued that this model can assist supervisory organs in assessing 
States’ compliance with their progressive and immediate socio-economic rights 
obligations. Furthermore, it can provide a basis for evaluating the justification for 
limitations imposed by States’ on socio-economic rights.  
Advancing the teleological approach to interpreting the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter can therefore assist supervisory organs to make a meaningful 
contribution to protecting socio-economic rights on the African Continent. 
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iii 
Opsomming 
Die verwesenliking van sosio-ekonomiese regte is belangrik om die sosio-
ekonomiese welstand van Afrika se mense te verbeter en persone se toegang tot sosio-
ekonomiese dienste en ‘n waardige lewe te verseker. Die Afrika Handves vir 
Menseregte en die Regte van Volkere verleen aan ŉ verskeidenheid sosio-ekonomiese 
regte beide eksplisiete en implisiete beskerming. Dit is noodsaaklik om sosio-
ekonomiese regte op ŉ wyse te interpreteer wat hul doeltreffenheid waarborg en volkere 
op die Afrika Vasteland se sosio-ekonomiese omstandighede verbeter. Toesighoudende 
organe se uitlegsbenaderings ten opsigte van die sosio-ekonomiese regte in die Afrika 
Handves is egter inkonsekwent. 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die mate waartoe die teleologiese uitlegsbenadering 
toesighoudende organe kan bystaan om sosio-ekonomiese regte, op ŉ  wyse wat hul 
doeltreffendheid verseker, te interpreteer. Die studie identifiseer die behoefte om ŉ 
samehangende metodologie vir die toepassing van die teleologiese uitlegsbenadering te 
bevorder. Vervolgens ontwikkel dit ŉ metodologie wat ŉ verskeidenheid 
uitlegsmeganismes binne en verder as die Afrika Handves in beslag neem. Hierdie 
metodologie kan toesighoudende organe help om die oogmerk en doelwit van die Afrika 
Handves samehangend uit te brei om sodoende die betekenis, omvang, en inhoud van 
sosio-ekonomiese regte en hul verwante verpligtinge te ontwikkel. 
Die vooruitgang van sosio-ekonomiese regte in Afrika noodsaak ŉ hersieningsmodel 
wat op die teleologiese uitlegsbenadering gegrond is. Toesighoudende organe, veral die 
Afrika Kommissie, pas verskeie hersieningsmodelle vir die assessering van State se 
nakoming van hul sosio-ekonomiese regte verpligtinge toe. Hierdie proefskrif ontwikkel 
die model van redelikheidshersiening, wat minimumkernstandaarde en proporsionaliteit 
inkorporeer. Dit voer aan dat hierdie model toesighoudende organe in hul assessering 
van State se nakoming van hul toenemende en onmiddellike sosio-ekonomiese regte 
verpligtinge kan bystaan. Dit kan ook as ŉ evalueringsbasis vir die beperkings wat State 
op sosio-ekonomiese regte oplê dien. 
Die bevordering van die teleologiese uitlegsbenadering ten opsigte van die sosio-
ekonomiese regte in die Afrika Handves kan dus toesighoudende organe bystaan om ŉ 
betekenisvolle bydrae tot die beskerming van sosio-ekonomiese regte op die Afrika 
Vasteland te maak. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 1 Background 
Realising socio-economic rights1 is significant for improving the living conditions of 
Africa’s people, as these rights help to ensure individuals’ access to socio-economic 
services2 and a dignified life.3 Despite their significance, millions of Africans are still 
denied access to socio-economic rights,4 and socio-economic rights violations are a 
daily concern.5 Since independence, there have been frequent and serious incidences of 
socio-economic rights violations all over the continent.6 Africa’s colonial and postcolonial 
legacy continues to manifest in widespread incidences of mass impoverishment, 
disease, unemployment and under-development, as well as other socio-economic rights 
violations. 7  The continent also faces many challenges to the enjoyment of socio-
economic rights, such as insufficient access to clean water, food insecurity, inadequate 
shelter, poor health care,8 and inadequate housing.9  																																																								
1 Socio-economic rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights include explicit rights to: 
property (art 14), work (art 15), health (art 16), education (art 17), family (18), as well as the collective 
socio-economic rights to freely dispose of wealth (art 21), development (art 22), and a general satisfactory 
environment (art 24). They also include the implicit rights to social security and adequate standard of living 
(including food, water and housing) These rights are discussed in chapter five, part 5 5 2. Based on the 
peculiarity and broad nature of their context and jurisprudence, this dissertation does not discuss the 
cultural rights recognised in article 17(2) and (3) of the African Charter. This does not mean that this 
dissertation de-emphasises the importance of this category of rights, but rather these rights will be 
discussed only to the extent that they shed light to the socio-economic rights.  The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 I.L.M 58 (1982) was adopted on 
27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986.  
2 MA Baderin “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights in Africa” in MA Baderin & R Mccorquodale (eds) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Action (2007) 139 139. 
3  M Ssenyonjo “Analysing the economic, social and cultural rights jurisprudence of the African 
Commission: 30 years since the adoption of the African Charter” (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 358 359. 
4 Baderin “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Economic, social and cultural rights 
in action 144. 
5 JC Mubangizi “The constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in selected African countries: A 
comparative evaluation” (2006) 2 African Journal of Legal Studies 1 2. 
6 NJ Udombana “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never” (2000) 
3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 86. 
7 CA Odinkalu “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
System in Practice 1986-2000 (2002) 178 180-181. 
8 SB Keetharuth “Major African legal instruments” in A Bosl & J Diescho (eds) Human Rights in Africa: 
Legal Perspectives in their Protection and Promotion (2009) 163 180. 
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2 
In its 2004 Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (‘Resolution 
on SERs’), 10  the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African 
Commission’)11 noted that apart from the consensus on the notion of the indivisibility of 
human rights among African States, socio-economic rights are still marginalised.12 
According to the African Commission, States’ failure to adequately realise socio-
economic rights sustains their continued violation.13 In 2015 the United Nations (‘UN’)14 
Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (‘FAO’)15 report on the State of Food Insecurity in 
the World (‘Food Insecurity Report’)16 stated that nearly 220 million people in Sub-
Saharan Africa experienced hunger.17 According to the FAO, this represents the highest 
degree of food shortage in any region.18 It also notes that, as a sub-region, East Africa 
faces an acute hunger problem affecting approximately 124 million people.19 
The realisation of socio-economic rights and human development are directly linked, 
as these rights enable people to actively engage in various social and economic 
development activities. Socio-economic rights also assist people in accessing resources 
and services in support of their economic development.20 States’ protection of these 
rights, through employment opportunities and access to essential socio-economic 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
9 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 50. 
10  The Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa was adopted by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 36th Ordinary Session in Dakar Senegal on 7 
December 2004. See The African Commission Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Africa (2004) ACHPR/Res.73 (XXXVI)04. 
11 The African Commission was established in terms of article 30 of the African Charter. For a discussion 
on the African Commission and its mandate regarding the protection and interpretation of socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter see in chapter four, parts 4 2 - 4 3. 
12 Resolution on SERs para 4. 
13 Para 5. 
14 The United Nations Organisation was officially recognised and established in San Fransisco on 24 
October 1945 with the mandate to keep world peace <http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-
nations> (accessed 25-03-2017). 
15 FAO was founded on 16th October, 1945 in Quebec, Canada with the purpose of eradicating hunger 
and malnutrition, as well as effective management of world’s food system <http://www.fao.org/world-food-
day/history/en> (accessed 25-03-2017). 
16 The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Meeting the 2015 International Hunger Targets: Taking Stock 
of uneven Progress 2015 <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf> (accessed 17-02-2016). 
17 12. 
18 12. 
19 13. 
20 S Khoza “The link between development, social and economic rights: Are socio-economic rights 
development rights?” (2002) Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community Law Centre (‘CLC’), University of 
the Western Cape (‘UWC’) 1 4. A paper presented at the Networking for change conference: Equality and 
justice – Gains and challenges, (2002) Cape Town, see <aihr-
resourcescenter.org/administrator/upload/documents/link.pdf> (accessed 06-05-2017). 
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services, promotes the involvement of people in economic development. 21  In its 
Declaration on the Right to Development (‘Declaration on Development’)22  the UN 
requires States to protect socio-economic rights as a means of ensuring human 
development.23 According to the Declaration on Development, realising the right to 
development requires States to ensure equality of access to socio-economic rights, 
resources, education, health services, food, housing, and employment, as well as the 
fair distribution of income.24 Conversely, socio-economic rights violations give rise to 
poor economic development and poverty.25 
In Africa, poverty is directly connected to both the enjoyment and violation of socio-
economic rights.26 In its 2012 Africa Hunger and Poverty Facts (‘Hunger and Poverty 
Facts’)27 FAO demonstrated that poverty is the key source of hunger in Africa, because 
many people cannot afford to buy food.28 Poverty is prevalent in many African countries 
and characterised by hunger, inadequate access to safe drinking water, and a general 
lack of the socio-economic goods needed for improved standards of living and a 
dignified life.29 A human rights approach to poverty alleviation can assist in improving 
peoples’ socio-economic conditions: 
“The human rights approach offers an explicit normative framework - that of 
international human rights. Underpinned by universally recognised moral values and 
reinforced by legal obligations, international human rights provide a compelling 
normative framework for the formulation of national and international policies 
including poverty reduction strategies. One reason why this framework is compelling 
in the context of poverty reduction is that the norms and values enshrined in it have 
the potential to empower the poor.”30 
																																																								
21 4. 
22 UN Declaration on the Right to Development 1986 A/RES/41/128 adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on 4 December 1986.  
23 Art 6(3). 
24 Art 8(1). 
25 Khoza (2002) Socio-Economic Rights Project, CLC, UWC 4. 
26 Baderin “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 156. 
27 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation Africa hunger and poverty facts (2012) 
(http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn_africa_hunger_facts.htm) (accessed 11-08-2013). 
28 2. 
29 W Nderitu “The United Nations and the advancement of human rights in Africa” in A Bosl & J Diescho 
(eds) Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection and Promotion (2009) 81 82. 
30 Principles and Guidelines for a human rights approach to poverty reduction strategies HR/PUB/06/12 
paras 16 & 18 see <http://www..ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Poverty/Strategiesen.pdf> (accessed 
27-03-2017) . 
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Foreign investment in Africa is also directly linked to socio-economic rights violations 
as economic growth is often promoted by large-scale external investments engineered 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). Investment by 
globalised economic sources is predominantly applicable to select projects, such as the 
construction of dams, roads, and runways or the creation of large-scale commercial 
farms. As a result, areas such as primary health care, clean drinking water, and basic 
education are often neglected on the continent.31 Due to deregulation, powerful foreign 
direct investments in Africa also negatively affect individuals’ enjoyment of human rights, 
including socio-economic rights.32 The FAO reports, for instance, that investments have 
significantly contributed to the growth of Tanzania’s average annual Gross Domestic 
Product (‘GDP’) since the beginning of the 1990s.33 Despite this economic growth, 
people in Tanzania still faced food insecurity.34 Discrepancies between economic growth 
and food insecurity are attributed to the ineffective regulation of foreign investment.35 
The FAO also notes that Tanzania’s investment sector requires an improved regulatory 
framework.36  
Moreover, engagements by foreign direct investors have resulted in environmental 
disasters and violations of the rights to food and an adequate standard of living in States 
such as Nigeria. 37  Scholars have confirmed socio-economic rights violations by 
investors. In relation to individual’s labour rights, Kinley and Tadaki observe that 
investors have been paying “unfair and inadequate wages”, while subjecting workers to 
poor working conditions and “unreasonable overtime”. 38  Doyle emphasises foreign 
investors’ systemic violations of the socio-economic rights of indigenous peoples.39 
Ssenyonjo argues that the privatisation of sectors relating to health, education, water 
supply, and electricity encourages many African States to relinquish their obligations 
regarding the realisation of socio-economic rights to non-state actors. Privatisation 																																																								
31 R McCorquodale & R Fairbrother “Globalisation and human rights” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
735 743. 
32 D Kinley & J Tadaki “From talk to walk: The emergence of international human rights responsibilities for 
corporations at international law” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931 933. 
33 FAO 2015 Food Insecurity Report 30. 
34 30. 
35 30. 
36 30. 
37 Kinley & Tadaki (2004) Virginia Journal of International Law 934. 
38 933-934. 
39 CM Doyle “Business and human rights: Indigenous peoples’ experiences with access to remedy: An 
introduction” in CM Doyle (ed) Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Access to Remedy: Case Studies 
from Africa, Asia and Latin America (2015) 1 1. 
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raises the possibility of non-state actors violating socio-economic rights, particularly 
those of women and other vulnerable members of society.40 A Report of the Sessional 
Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations 
(‘Report on Methods of Transnational Corporations’) affirms that the operations of 
foreign investors in developing countries have negatively impacted on the realisation of 
socio-economic rights.41  
Socio-economic rights violations by both State and non-state actors raise the need 
for interpreting these rights and their related obligations in a manner that strengthens the 
legal accountability of these institutions.42 Effective protection of socio-economic rights, 
therefore, depends on the performance of various interpretative approaches by the 
supervisory organs of the African Charter.43 Odinkalu argues that a coherent approach 
to the interpretation of socio-economic rights by the supervisory organs of the African 
Charter can assist States to realise these rights effectively.44 
Accordingly, this dissertation aims to develop a coherent approach that can 
effectively assist the African Charter’s supervisory organs to interpret socio-economic 
rights and guarantee their protection. 
1 2 Motivation 
1 2 1 Using the teleological approach to interpret socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter 
The underlying object and purpose of the African45 Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘African Charter’) is to promote and protect human rights including the socio-
economic rights.46 Scholars have, however, stressed the continuous violations of these 																																																								
40 M Ssenyonjo “Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter” in M Ssenyonjo (ed) The 
African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (2012) 55 89. 
41 Report of the Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational 
Corporations on its Fourth Session, Sub-Commission E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13 (2002) para 12. 
42 C Jochnik “Confronting the impunity of non-state actors: New fields for the promotion of human rights” 
(1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56 61. 
43 CA Odinkalu “Analysis of paralysis or paralysis by analysis? Implementing economic, social, and 
cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2001) 23 Human Rights 
Quarterly 327 366. 
44 367-369. 
45 In relation to the interpretation of the socio-economic rights, the term “African” in the African Charter 
relates to the interpretive tools, such as the notion of African philosophy and the formulation of the rights in 
the African Charter, which does not establish a dichotomy between civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights (unlike treaties such as the ICESCR). 
46 Preamble to the African Charter para 11. 
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rights since the adoption of the African Charter.47 This curtails the effective protection of 
human rights as envisioned by the African Charter. Supervisory organs’ interpretation of 
human rights is considered a useful mechanism for guaranteeing the effective protection 
and enjoyment of these rights.48 The underlying motivation of this dissertation is thus to 
investigate how the teleological approach49 can be applied to interpret socio-economic 
rights in a manner that ensures their effective protection for beneficiaries. 
1 2 2 General formulation and omission of certain socio-economic rights provisions in 
the African Charter  
While the African Charter substantially formulates socio-economic rights to 
property, 50  work, 51  health, 52  education, 53  family, 54  freely dispose of wealth, 55 
development,56 and a general satisfactory environment,57 it critically leaves out the rights 
to social security and an adequate standard of living (including food, water, and 
housing).58 Omitting these socio-economic rights provisions raises uncertainty regarding 
their recognition in the African Charter. Moreover, the African Charter leaves out the 
internal qualifiers of “progressive realisation” and “within available resources” in the 																																																								
47 See Baderin “The African Commissionon Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 144; and Mubangizi (2002) African Journal of Legal Studies 2. 
48 L Chenwi “An appraisal of international law mechanisms for litigating socio-economic rights, with a 
particular focus on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and The African Commission and Court” (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 683 684. 
49 The teleological approach argued for in this dissertation is not unique to the African Charter and its 
supervisory organs. The other supervisory organs such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
the European Court of Human Rights have also been applying this approach. Uniquely, the methodology 
for the application of the teleological approach developed in this dissertation draws from the interpretive 
tools such as “African philosophy’ and ‘inter-dependence of the rights’ to interpret socio-economic rights in 
a manner that corresponds with African realities. 
50 Art 14 of the African Charter. There is a scholarly debate regarding the consideration of the right to 
property as a socio-economic right. For a discussion of the scholars’ arguments against the right to 
property as a socio-economic right and the counter-arguments that consider this right a socio-economic 
right, see chapter three, part 3 3 4 1. 
51 Art 15 of the African Charter. 
52 Art 16. 
53 Art 17. 
54 Art 18. 
55 Art 21. 
56 Art 22. 
57 Art 24. 
58 These rights are enshrined in arts 9 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights respectively. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly through its resolution 2200A (XX1) of 16 December 1966 and 
entered into force on 3 January, 1976. See The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
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formulated socio-economic rights.59 This omission gives rise to uncertainty regarding the 
precise nature of States’ duties. Phrased differently, the question arises whether these 
rights have immediate effect – which raises numerous practical and resource-based 
problems – or whether they should be realised progressively.60 In addition, the African 
Charter formulates socio-economic rights broadly, which give rise to uncertainties 
regarding their definitive scope, content, and concomitant obligations. Accordingly, this 
dissertation is motivated by the need to investigate the implications of a teleological 
approach interpretation on the scope and content of socio-economic rights and their 
concomitant obligations. 
1 2 3 Uncertainties regarding the interpretive and remedial mandate of supervisory 
organs 
Two major supervisory organs are tasked with developing the normative scope and 
content of socio-economic rights through interpretation. While the African Charter 
establishes the African Commission, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘African Court Protocol’),61 establishes the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘African Court’).62 Both instruments vest in these organs a mandate to interpret 
the socio-economic rights formulated in the African Charter.63 
Article 45(3) grants the African Commission a mandate to interpret the socio-
economic rights embedded in the African Charter. Additionally, article 45(1) read in 
conjunction with article 53 requires the African Commission to make recommendations 
in the event that it finds a socio-economic rights violation. It is important to note, 
however, that the legal status of the African Commission’s recommendations is 
																																																								
59 These internal qualifiers are recognised in art 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
60 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication No 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003) para 
84. 
61 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc.OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) was adopted on 9 
June 1998 and entered into force on 25 January 2004. A total of 24 States have ratified the African Court 
Protocol, 25 States have signed but not yet ratified it, and 5 States have neither signed nor ratified the 
African Court Protocol <www.achpr.org/instruments/Court-establishment/ratifications> (accessed 07-11-
2016). See footnote 411 in chapter four for the States that have deposited declaration acknowledging the 
competence of the African Court over cases submitted by individuals. 
62 Art 30 of the African Charter establishes the African Commission while art 1 of the African Court 
Protocol establishes the African Court. 
63 Art 45(3) of the African Charter and Art 3 of the African Court Protocol. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
8 
uncertain, which, may adversely affect the interpretation of socio-economic rights as 
States regard the recommendations as non-binding.64 The African Charter does not 
expressly formulate provisions regarding the African Commission’s mandate to 
determine communications submitted in the public interest. The African Charter’s 
formulation of the provision regarding the admissibility of communications is also strict.65 
This strict formulation raises the argument that complainants of socio-economic rights 
violations are obliged to fulfil all of the admissibility requirements.66 In addition, the 
African Charter is silent regarding the African Commission’s mandate to issue 
provisional measures, remedies, and follow-up mechanisms to monitor States’ 
compliance with its decisions. Lack of express provisions regarding the identified 
mandate is problematic, as it raises uncertainties regarding the effective protection of 
socio-economic rights. 
The African Court’s mandate to interpret socio-economic rights provisions is 
grounded in article 3 of the African Court Protocol and elaborated on in Rule 26 of the 
Rules of Court (‘African Court Rules’)67. This mandate is, however, limited by article 5 of 
the African Court Protocol when read in conjunction with article 34(6) and Rule 33 of the 
African Court Rules, as they limit individuals’ access to the African Court.68 These 
articles require States to deposit a declaration recognising the competence of the 
African Court to hear direct individual complaints. Despite these provisions, there are a 
very low number of declarations made by States under article 34(6).69 The limitation may 
affect the African Court’s mandate to interpret the socio-economic rights as individual 
victims may not be able to access the African Court directly. It should be noted that the 
																																																								
64 SA Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human 
Rights System: Theories, Laws, Practices and Prospects (2011) 176. 
65 Art 56 of the African Charter. This article is analysed in depth in chapter four, part 4 3 4. 
66 See art 56 of the African Charter. 
67 African Court Rules were adopted in April 2010 after the harmonisation of the Interim Rules of Court 
and the Commission to replace the Interim Rules of Procedure of 20 June 2008. 
68 Art 5(3) of the African Court Protocol grants individuals the power to institute cases directly before the 
African Court in accordance with the provisions of art 34(6). However, art 34(6) limits the African Court’s 
mandate to receive any petition under art 5(3) involving a State Party that has not made a declaration 
accepting the competence of the African Court to receive cases under art 5(3). 
69 The States that have deposited the declaration include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Rwanda and Cote d’Ivoire <http://en.african-court.org/index.php/news/press-releases/item/69-
benin-makes-the-declaration-to-allow-ngos-and-individuals-to-directly-access-the-african-court-on-human-
and-peoples-rights> (accessed 18-05-2017). 
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African Court in its first few judgements70 has already declared a lack of jurisdiction on 
cases submitted by individual victims whose States have not deposited a declaration.  
Closely linked to the African Court’s interpretive mandate is its authority to apply the 
provisions of the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments as granted 
by article 7 of the African Court Protocol.71 This mandate raises uncertainty as to 
whether the African Court has the authority to interpret other human rights instruments.72 
While the African Court Protocol vests the African Court with a mandate to issue 
provisional measures,73 the legal binding status of such measures is questionable.74 
Moreover, the provisions regarding the remedial mandate of the African Court are also 
challenged for being non-elaborate.75 
This dissertation is thus further motivated by the need for a teleological interpretation 
to help clarify the interpretative and remedial mandate of the supervisory organs of the 
African Charter. 
1 2 4 Inconsistencies regarding supervisory organs’ interpretative approaches  
The interpretative approach of the African Charter’s supervisory organs when 
generating the meaning of socio-economic rights is unclear. On different occasions, the 
African Commission has inconsistently applied the textual, “golden thread”,76 and the 
teleological approaches in interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
This approach has led to some jurisprudential inconsistencies.  
For instance, by using the textual approach the African Commission confines itself to 
the ordinary meaning of provisions, which leads to a narrow interpretation. In contrast, 																																																								
70 Recent decisions of the African Court include: Urban Mkandawire v The Republic of Malawi Application 
No 003/2011 Abdoulaye Nikiema, Ernest Zongo, Blaise IIboudo & Burkinabe Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Movement v The Republic of Burkina Faso Application No 013/2011 and Rev Christopher R Mtikila v The 
United Republic of Tanzania Application No 011/2011 <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2012-
03-04-06-06-00/finalised-cases-closed> (accessed 07-11-2016). 
71 Art 7 of the African Court Protocol states: 
“The Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by 
the State concerned.” 
72 See GJ Naldi & K Magliveras “Reinforcing the African system of human rights: The Protocol on the 
establishment of a regional court of human and peoples’ rights” (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 431 435. 
73 Art 27(2) of the African Court Protocol. 
74 The mandate of the African Court to issue provisional measures and the legal status of these measures 
is discussed in chapter four, part 4 4 4. 
75 Naldi & Magliveras (1998) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 450. 
76 F Viljoen “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The travaux preparatoires in the light of 
subsequent practice” (2004) 25 Human Rights Law Journal 313 325, where Viljoen defines the “golden 
thread” as an interpretation of rights that favours the individual and peoples’ human rights. 
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by applying a teleological approach, the African Commission goes beyond the ordinary 
meaning and inquiries into the object and purpose of provisions as intended by the 
parties to the African Charter.77 This dissertation seeks to address both the appropriate 
approach to interpretation and the methodology for its application that can assist in 
developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights. Accordingly, this 
dissertation is motivated by a recognition for the need to adopt an appropriate approach 
to interpretation. The dissertation is further motivated by the need to adopt a 
methodology for the application of such an appropriate interpretative approach in order 
to achieve the effective interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter 
and the obligations they impose. 
1 2 5 Inconsistencies regarding models of review 
There are inconsistencies regarding the models of review applied by the African 
Commission to hold States accountable for the socio-economic rights obligations 
imposed by the African Charter.78 These inconsistencies include the use of various 
concepts such as minimum core obligations (of varying interpretations), 79  the 
reasonableness model of review,80 and the concept of concrete and targeted steps.81 
The African Commission has failed to apply a uniform model of review that holds States 
accountable and establishes jurisprudential consistency. This lack of consistency is 
problematic, as it hinders the establishment of positive duties imposed on States by the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter.82 This dissertation seeks to develop an 
appropriate model of review consistent with the teleological approach that can assist the 
supervisory organs of the African Charter to monitor States’ compliance with the 
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. 
																																																								
77 A Abass International Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2012) 102-103. 
78 Chenwi (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 694. 
79 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication No 156/96, (2001) 
AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
80 Para 52. See also Centre for the Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication No 276/2003 (2009) 
AHLRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009) para 172.  
81 Purohit para 84. 
82 DM Chirwa “African Regional Human Rights System: The promise of recent jurisprudence on social 
rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (2008) 323 326. 
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1 3 Scope of dissertation 
Although various rights are embedded in the African Charter, this dissertation 
focuses on socio-economic rights provisions,83 given the controversy surrounding the 
interpretation of these rights. These rights include explicit socio-economic rights to 
property, 84  work, 85  health, 86  education, 87  and family. 88  In addition, the dissertation 
extends its scope to include implicit socio-economic rights to social security and an 
adequate standard of living including food, water, and housing.89 The dissertation also 
considers on the collective socio-economic rights to freely dispose of wealth,90 the right 
to development,91 and the right to a satisfactory environment.92 
Socio-economic rights can be interpreted through both contentious and non-
contentious mechanisms. This dissertation does not focus, on the non-contentious 
mechanisms under the African Charter, such as the State reporting mechanism.93 It only 
refers to them insofar as they shed light or indicate problems in the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights through contentious mechanisms. Furthermore, since this 
dissertation concerns the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter, it 
also focuses on the African Charter’s supervisory organs which are vested with the 
mandate to interpret these rights. These supervisory organs are the African Commission 
and the African Court.94 In particular this dissertation focuses on the interpretative and 
remedial mandate of these organs. 																																																								
83 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2. According to Yeshanew the term 
of socio-economic rights can also be referred to as the social rights. 
84 Art 14 of the African Charter. 
85 Art 15. 
86 Art 16. 
87 Art 17. 
88 Art 18. 
89 See chapter five, part 5 5 2. 
90 Art 21 of the African Charter. 
91 Art 22 of the African Charter provides, for instance, that all peoples shall have the right to their 
economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. In addition, art 24 provides that all peoples shall have the 
right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development. The African Charter also 
enshrines the peoples’ right to existence in Art 20. This right, however, not analysed in this dissertation will 
only be referred in so far as it affects the collective socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
92 Art 24 of the African Charter. 
93 Art 62. 
94 The African Court was established by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU 
Doc.OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) which was adopted on 9 June 1998 and entered into force on 25 
January 2004. However, the African Court was invalidated by article 1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
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The scope of this dissertation includes an analysis of supervisory organs’ 
jurisprudence. Due to the fact that, at the date of submitting this dissertation for 
examination, the African Court has yet to decide on the merits95 of a socio-economic 
rights case, this dissertation focuses mainly on the socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
developed through the non-state communications of the African Commission.96 The 
dissertation does not, however, analyse State communications as the only State 
communication decided at the time of writing this dissertation does not deal with socio-
economic rights.97 
The dissertation recognises the significance of other international, regional, sub-
regional, and national legal instruments and jurisprudence based on their relevance for 
the interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. The significance is 
evident in the instruments’ similarity regarding the formulation of rights; regional location, 
reference to international human rights law when conceived, and the use of the 
teleological approach to interpretation. These legal sources are utilised throughout the 
dissertation for comparative reasons. The application of these sources seeks to illustrate 
how the supervisory organs can draw inspiration98 from them to further a teleological 
approach to the interpretation of the socio-economic rights and the development of their 
substantive content. These sources include the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’),99 the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (‘Women’s Protocol’),100 and the 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
Human Rights was adopted on 1 July 2008. It establishes the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
in article 2. However, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is not in operation as the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights has not yet entered into force. See 
<http://www.au.int/web/en/treaties/protocol-statute-African-court-justice-and-human-right> (accessed 10-
05-2017). 
95 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012 
was decided a few days after the submission of this dissertation for examination. Based on the fact that 
this case was decided after the cut-off date of analysing the jurisprudence that is 24 May 2017 and after 
the submission of this dissertation for examination but before the final corrections, the case is briefly 
discussed in a postscript to the dissertation. 
96 Non-state communications as used in this dissertation entail individual communications, alleging the 
violations of the socio-economic rights, covered in articles 55-59 of the African Charter. 
97 Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda Communication No 227/99 (2004) 
AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2004). 
98 Arts 60 and 61 of the African Charter, and art 7 of the African Court Protocol. 
99 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and 
entered into force on 3 January, 1976. 
100 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
CAB/LEG/66.6 was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 25 November 2005. 
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African Charter on the Rights and the Welfare of the Child (‘Children’s Charter’).101 Other 
sources include the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Committee of Social Rights (‘ECSR’), the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (‘IACHR’) and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well as African national constitutional 
jurisprudence such as the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court.  
1 4 Research question 
The overarching research question of this dissertation concerns the nature and 
implications of the teleological approach to human rights treaty interpretation for the 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights provisions in the African Charter by its 
supervisory organs.  
1 5 Research aims and hypotheses 
This dissertation examines the extent to which the teleological approach can assist 
supervisory organs to develop an interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter, which is both coherent and gives effect to the object and purpose of the African 
Charter. The hypothesis underlying this research aim is that a teleological approach to 
interpretation can assist supervisory organs in interpreting the socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter. 
Based on the elements of the teleological approach to interpretation, chapter two 
aims to develop an appropriate and coherent methodology for its application. The 
corresponding hypothesis is that a systematic consideration of the elements of text, 
historical and philosophical background, international and other legal sources, as well as 
the principle of effectiveness can guide the development of a teleological approach to 
interpreting socio-economic rights in the African Charter, and lead to a more coherent 
and substantive jurisprudence by its supervisory organs. 
This dissertation also aims, in pursuance of the teleological approach, to conduct a 
historical and philosophical analysis of the adoption of the African Charter with a view of 
examining how it can assist supervisory organs to interpret socio-economic rights. The 
hypothesis in this regard is that the historical and philosophical background to the 
																																																								
101 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1999) was adopted on 
11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
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adoption of the African Charter can provide significant insight into the optimal 
interpretive approach to the relevant socio-economic rights. 
Furthermore, this dissertation seeks to analyse the textual formulation of the socio-
economic rights provisions in the African Charter and the interpretive mandate of its 
supervisory organs. The hypothesis regarding this aim is that the textual formulation of 
socio-economic rights and the interpretive mandate of the supervisory organs are 
sufficient for the interpretation of socio-economic rights. 
The dissertation also aims, in the respective chapters, to analyse relevant 
international and other legal sources such as regional, sub-regional, and national laws 
and jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of socio-economic rights from which 
supervisory organs can draw inspiration. The purpose of this analysis is to ascertain how 
these sources can further a teleological interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. The hypothesis is that relevant international and other legal sources, 
relating to the interpretation of the socio-economic rights, can facilitate a teleological 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter and help to give 
substance to these rights. 
This dissertation also analyses and evaluates the socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence of the supervisory organs of the African Charter with the aim of identifying 
its strengths and weaknesses. The corresponding hypothesis is that the supervisory 
organs’ current interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter is 
inconsistent and does not give full effect to the object and purpose of the African 
Charter. The dissertation also develops a coherent methodology that can assist the 
supervisory organs to align their jurisprudence with the teleological approach. 
1 6 Methodology  
This dissertation employs a legal research methodology, as interpreting the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter is a legal matter, which is specifically concerned 
with assigning appropriate meaning to the socio-economic rights provisions of the 
African Charter. This dissertation analyses and contextualises the primary and 
secondary legal sources relevant to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. 
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1 6 1 the teleological approach to interpretation and a methodology for its application 
This dissertation analyses the teleological approach to interpretation and its tenets,102 
as formulated by the Harvard Research in International Law programme and Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice and as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna 
Convention’).103 Furthermore, it analyses debates surrounding this approach including 
the textual theory debate and the intention of the parties’ debate.104 Given the relevance 
of the teleological approach for interpreting human rights treaties, various scholars have 
suggested its application for human rights interpretation.105  Based on the literature 
survey, however, there is no specific research that has focused on how the teleological 
approach can be applied to interpret the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
Moreover, there appears to be no research that has developed the methodology for its 
application in the context of the African Charter’s socio-economic rights.  
1 6 2 Preparatory work of the African Charter relating to socio-economic rights 
This dissertation critically analyses and contextualises both external and internal 
preparatory work leading to the adoption of the African Charter. Significantly, this 
preparatory work gives insights into the objectives of the supervisory organs and how 
they should interpret socio-economic rights. They also establish the values that should 
be upheld in the realisation and protection of socio-economic rights.  
Although the preparatory work provides these fundamental insights, secondary 
literature shows that supervisory organs have not yet fully explored the potential of this 																																																								
102 The main scholarship relied on is the Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, as developed 
by the Harvard Law School between the late 1920s and early 1930s; two articles by Sir Fitzmaurice 
namely: GG Fitzmaurice “The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty interpretation 
and certain other treaty points” (1951) 28 British Year Book of International Law 1 1-2 & GG Fitzmaurice 
“The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty interpretation and certain other 
treaty points” (1957) 33 British Year Book of International Law 203 207-209; and the Vienna Convention 
on Law of Treaties (1969) as adopted on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980.  
103 Arts 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
104  FG Jacobs “Varieties of approach to treaty interpretation: With special reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Conference” (1969) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 318 319. According to Jacobs subjective theory interprets a treaty by focusing 
mainly on the real intentions of the parties to the treaty at the moment of the adoption of the final text. 
105 See D Rietiker “The principle of “effectiveness” in the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Its different dimensions and its consistency with public international law – No need for the 
concept of treaty sui generis” (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 245 255, H Senden 
Interpretation of fundamental rights in a multilevel legal system: An analysis of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union (2011) 16; and M Ssenyonjo “Economic, 
social and cultural rights in the African Charter” in M Ssenyonjo (ed) The African Regional Human Rights 
System: 30 Years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2012) 55 59. 
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source in developing socio-economic rights jurisprudence. In addition to the preparatory 
work, this dissertation analyses relevant primary and secondary sources and 
jurisprudence regarding the significance of the preparatory work of the African Charter. 
This analysis can assist supervisory organs in understanding the historical context in 
which socio-economic rights were formulated in the African Charter in order to ascertain 
their objects and purposes. 
1 6 3 Textual formulation of socio-economic rights and other relevant provisions in the 
African Charter  
The dissertation critically analyses the textual formulation of the socio-economic 
rights articles and other relevant provisions protecting these rights read in conjunction 
with the operative provisions of the African Charter. 106  Significantly, the analysis 
demonstrates the implications of the textual formulation for the interpretation of socio-
economic rights. 
1 6 4 Interpretive mandate of supervisory organs 
In this dissertation the interpretative and remedial mandate of the supervisory organs 
of the African Charter are analysed. The analysis focuses on the establishment of these 
organs and their jurisdiction regarding admissibility of complaints, provisional measures, 
status of their findings, remedial powers and enforcement of the remedies. The analysis 
aims at demonstrating the implications of the interpretative and remedial mandate 
provisions in the African Charter for the protection of socio-economic rights therein. 
1 6 5 African Commission’s jurisprudence 
The dissertation also examines and evaluates the African Commission’s 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights, focusing on relevant communications. This 
analysis seeks to illustrate the implications of the jurisprudence for subsequent 
interpretation by the African Commission and ultimately the African Court. 
1 6 6 An appropriate and coherent interpretative methodology for socio-economic rights 
This dissertation advances an appropriate and coherent methodology for aligning the 
supervisory organs’ jurisprudence with the teleological approach to interpretation.  																																																								
106 This includes art 1 of the African Charter that provides for the obligations imposed by the socio-
economic rights. For a discussion of this art see chapter three, parts 3 3 3 – 3 3 3 5. 
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1 7 Significance of the dissertation 
This dissertation is significant as it focuses on developing a methodology for the 
application of the teleological approach, which can guide the supervisory organs of the 
African Charter to interpret socio-economic rights in a manner that fosters the African 
Charter’s object and purpose. This teleological methodology encompasses systematic 
interpretive tools that can enable supervisory organs to develop the normative scope 
and content of socio-economic rights and their related obligations. Instead of focusing 
exclusively on the individual socio-economic rights provision of the treaty being 
interpreted, the teleological methodology combines various interpretive tools, including 
the treaty as a whole, to generate the meaning of the socio-economic rights provisions 
being interpreted. Thus, the methodology can help supervisory organs to consistently 
and coherently develop socio-economic rights jurisprudence. In this way, it can also 
assist supervisory organs to explore the adequate formulation of the African Charter 
regarding socio-economic rights’ provisions and develop socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence that advances the object and purpose of the African Charter. Furthermore, 
this dissertation aims to demonstrate the adequacy of the African Charter in protecting 
socio-economic rights. The dissertation also develops a model of review to be applied by 
supervisory organs for monitoring States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights 
obligations. 
1 8 Overview of chapters 
Chapter 2 analyses the teleological approach to interpretation and its tenets,107 as 
well as the debates surrounding this approach. In particular, the chapter examines three 
major approaches to interpretation, namely the intention of the parties approach, the 
textual approach, and the teleological approach. The chapter demonstrates that the 
intention of the parties and the textual approaches are insufficient for the interpretation 
of socio-economic rights. The chapter demonstrates that the teleological approach to 
interpretation is the appropriate approach for the interpretation of socio-economic rights. 
Significantly, the chapter develops the methodology for applying the teleological 
approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights that supervisory organs should 
use. This teleological methodology can assist supervisory organs in generating the 
																																																								
107 See n 102 in part 1 6 1 above.  
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meaning of socio-economic rights in light of the object and purpose of the African 
Charter. 
Pursuant to the teleological approach to interpretation, chapter 3 analyses the 
historical and philosophical background to the adoption of the African Charter, as well as 
the textual formulation of socio-economic rights and other relevant provisions in the 
African Charter. The chapter examines various preparatory work of the African Charter, 
including the external and the internal initiatives to its adoption. Regarding the textual 
formulation the chapter analyses socio-economic rights provisions and other relevant 
provisions in the African Charter. The analysis of the textual formulation of socio-
economic rights and other relevant provisions attempts to show the interpretive potential 
found in these provisions of the African Charter, as a whole, and their relevance to the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights.  
Chapter 4 analyses the interpretative mandate of the supervisory organs of the 
African Charter namely the African Commission and the African Court. Chapter 4 
specifically examines significant aspects relating to the interpretive mandate of these 
supervisory organs. These aspects include the locus standi of individuals before the 
supervisory organs, admissibility requirements and a mandate to issue provisional 
measures, the nature and legal status of the decisions of the supervisory organs, and a 
remedial mandate. The analysis assists in identifying the strengths of the interpretation 
of socio-economic rights by the supervisory organs through these interpretative aspects. 
In the same spirit of identifying the strengths of the supervisory organs, the chapter also 
examines the complementarity between these supervisory organs.  
Chapter 5 analyses the jurisprudence of the supervisory organs of the African 
Charter. The chapter attempts to show the strengths and shortfalls of this jurisprudence 
in relation to the development of the scope and content of socio-economic rights and 
their related obligations. The chapter demonstrates that supervisory organs have been 
inconsistent regarding the approach to interpretation they apply in interpreting socio-
economic rights. The chapter also shows that these organs’ use of the teleological 
approach to interpretation is inconsistent and inappropriate. The chapter attempts to 
show that supervisory organs have also been inconsistent regarding the model of review 
applied to monitor States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations.  
Chapter 6 develops an appropriate and coherent approach that can assist the 
supervisory organs to coherently align their jurisprudence with the teleological approach 
to interpretation and develop the scope and content of socio-economic rights and their 
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concomitant obligations. The approach is significant for the supervisory organs’ future 
interpretation of socio-economic rights in a manner that fosters the object and purpose 
of the African Charter regarding these rights. Moreover, as an aspect of the coherent 
approach, chapter 6 develops the appropriate model of review that can assist these 
supervisory organs to govern States’ compliance with their obligations imposed by 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. It is postulated that the model of review 
developed in this chapter can also significantly help States to efficiently fulfil their 
obligations regarding realisation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
The dissertation includes a postscript that analyses the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ first socio-economic judgment on merits. This recent case, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya was decided a 
few days after the submission of this dissertation for examination but before the final 
submission. The discussion shows that the African Charter has attempted to broadly 
interpret the socio-economic rights in this landmark case. However, it implicitly applies 
both textual approach, and some aspects of the teleological approach to interpretation. 
Moreover, the application of these aspects is inappropriate. 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. The benefits of advancing the teleological 
methodology developed in this dissertation are summarised and recommendations are 
made regarding its value for the supervisory organs of the African Charter, Member 
States of the African Charter, non-state actors, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(‘NGOs’), legal practitioners in the field of African human rights particularly, socio-
economic rights, and human rights students.  
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Chapter 2 
The appropriateness and methodology of a teleological approach  
2 1 Introduction 
The meaningful effect of the socio-economic rights1 in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Charter’) 2  depends on their interpretation by the 
interpretive organs of the African Charter.3 This interpretation should be able to address 
the socio-economic needs of the African people.4  While agreeing with the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Commission’) that all human rights 
in the African Charter can be made effective,5 this chapter demonstrates how such 
efficacy can be achieved in the specific context of rights with a socio-economic 
character. Viljoen contends that in interpreting human and peoples’ rights under the 
African Charter, the African Commission has applied an inconsistent approach to treaty 																																																								
1 The term socio-economic rights has been defined by various authors in different ways. Some define it to 
encompass three components (namely: economic, social and cultural rights) as reflected in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. Other authors have given separate definitions of these three components. See EVO 
Dankwa “Working paper on article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights” (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 230 239-240; C Scott & P Macklem Constitutional ropes of sand 
or justiciable guarantee? Social rights in a new South African Constitution (1992) 141 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1 9. M Langford “The justiciability of social rights: From practice to theory” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 
3. SA Yeshanew The Jjusticiability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human 
Rights: Theories, Laws, Practices and Prospects (2011) 1-2. For the purpose of this dissertation socio-
economic rights are defined as the rights that protect and improve the material living conditions of all 
human beings in their individual capacity and in groups. They include: the rights to property, work, health, 
education, family, social security, adequate standard of living including water, food and housing, as well as 
the rights to freely dispose wealth, development and general satisfactory environment. See chapter three, 
parts 3 3 4 1 – 3 3 4 8 and chapter five, part 5 5 2. 
2 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/rev 5, 21 I.L.M 58 
(1982) adopted on 27th June 1981 and entered into force on 21st October 1986. The African Charter has 
been ratified by 53 out of 54 African States <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ 
African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%20Rights.pdf> (accessed 26-06-2014). 
3 For the purpose of this dissertation the interpretive organs of the African Charter refer to: The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. It should be noted that the African Court was replaced by 
article 1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted in 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, 1 July 2008 which establishes the African Court of Justice under article 2. 
However, the African Court of Justice is not in operation as the African Court of Justice Protocol has not 
yet entered into force. 
4 EA Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures (1996) 
111. 
5 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication No 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 
60 (ACHPR 2001) para 68. 
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interpretation.6 This has led to socio-economic rights being ineffective in the sense that 
their scope and content is not transparent or predictable in offering meaningful guidance 
to beneficiaries and States Parties. Based on Viljoen’s observation, this chapter 
suggests that an appropriate way to achieve the effectiveness of socio-economic rights 
under the African Charter is by adopting the teleological approach to treaty interpretation 
and consistently applying it when interpreting these rights.  
The chapter applies the model of the teleological approach to treaty interpretation as 
formulated by the Harvard Research in International Law programme7 and Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice,8 and codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna 
Convention’).9 As will be elaborated in this chapter, these sources lay the foundations for 
the interpretation of a treaty in the light of its object and purpose. An interpretation based 
on the object and purpose of a treaty strives to reveal the aim of such a treaty in relation 
to its substantive provisions. In this regard, the object and purpose of the African Charter 
can help to identify its specific purposes and goals in relation to the socio-economic 
rights.  
Although the main focus of this chapter is to analyse the teleological approach as the 
lens through which socio-economic rights should be interpreted, an examination of other 
approaches to treaty interpretation is also important. This analysis can assist in 
demonstrating the appropriateness of the teleological approach over other approaches 
to interpreting the socio-economic rights. The following part analyses the major 
approaches to treaty interpretation.  
																																																								
6 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 2 ed (2012) 323-324. 
7 The Harvard Research in International Law was a programme of research into international law carried 
out under the auspices of the Harvard Law School between late 1920s and early 1930s. Through this 
programme the Harvard Law School developed the Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties is attached as an appendice in the Report on the Law of 
Treaties by JL Brierly, Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties A/CN.4/23 
legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_23.pdf (accessed 10-05-2017). 
8 At the time of writing his two articles: GG Fitzmaurice “The law and procedure of the International Court 
of Justice: Treaty interpretation and certain other Treaty points” (1951) 28 British Year Book of 
International Law 1 1-2 & GG Fitzmaurice “The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1951-4: Treaty interpretation and certain other treaty points” (1957) 33 British Year Book of International 
Law 203 207-209, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice was the United Kingdom Counsel to the International Court of 
Justice. Through these two articles Fitzmaurice ascertained that there existed three major approaches to 
treaty interpretation: the intention of the parties, the textual, and the teleological approaches. 
9 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8I.L.M 679 (1969) was adopted on 23 May 1969 and 
entered into force on 27 January 1980. 
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2 2 Theoretical approaches to treaty interpretation 
The evolution of theoretical approaches to treaty interpretation resulted from debates 
between two groups of scholars. The first group is represented by scholars who reject 
the use of systematic approaches to treaty interpretation, while the second argues for 
the use of systematic approaches to treaty interpretation.10 Stone argues that treaties 
can be interpreted without using any systematic approach to treaty interpretation.11 The 
first group argues that systematic approaches to treaty interpretation render the 
interpretation process inconsistent,12 as some of the approaches limit the scope of 
interpretation, while others broaden it.13 As a means to discard the use of systematic 
approaches to interpretation, Fitzmaurice suggests that the interpretation of a treaty 
relies on the common sense and intelligence of judges.14 Scholars, such as Stone, 
however, who reject the use of systematic approaches to treaty interpretation do not 
demonstrate which approaches limit or broaden the scope of interpretation. They also 
did not show the extent to which the various approaches to treaty interpretation are 
inconsistent. Accordingly, this chapter analyses the approaches to treaty interpretation 
that limit or broaden the scope of interpretation. 
While the first group of scholars denied the utility of interpretational approaches, the 
second group developed different approaches to treaty interpretation. Grotius15 and 
Vattel,16 for example, developed the ordinary meaning approach, McNair developed the 
intention of the parties approach17 and the Harvard Research in International Law 
programme18 developed the teleological approach to treaty interpretation.19 International 
																																																								
10 IM Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1973) 69. 
11 J Stone “Fictional elements in treaty interpretation – A study in the international judicial process” (1955) 
1 Sydney Law Review 344 347. 
12 H Lauterpacht “Restrictive interpretation and the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of 
treaties” (1949) 26 British Year Book of International Law 48 52. 
13 52. 
14 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 3. 
15 Grotius “On Interpretation” Book II, ch. xiv of De Jure Belli ac Pacis as quoted in Lauterpacht (1949) 
British Year Book of International Law 48. H Grotius published a book on the law of war and peace De jure 
belli ac pacis in 1625 which was translated by AC Campbell in 1864. In his work Grotius devoted a chapter 
on treaty interpretation.  
16 Vattel “The interpretation of treaties” vol. i, ch. xvii of Le Droit des Gens, as quoted in Lauterpacht 
(1949) British Year Book of International Law 48. Vattel published various works in the field of international 
law. His work “The law of nations” he is quoted in R Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (2008) 55 where Vattel 
developed the general maxim on treaty interpretation that, ‘it is not permissible to interpret what has no 
need of interpretation’. 
17 L McNair The Law of Treaties (1961) 365. 
18 See footnote 7 above. 
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tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’)20 were, however, inconsistent 
in their utilisation of these approaches. 21  Such inconsistencies necessitated the 
codification of the fixed interpretational approaches to treaty interpretation.22 Fitzmaurice 
codified the three pertinent approaches to treaty interpretation in 1951, based on his 
experience as the UK Counsel at the ICJ. These approaches are ‘the intention of the 
parties’, ‘the textual approach’ and ‘the teleological approach’. 23  These respective 
approaches are analysed below. 
2 2 1 Intention of the parties approach 
The intention of the parties approach posits that a treaty should be interpreted by 
using the common intention of the parties to the treaty.24 The underlying objective of this 
approach is to discover what the parties intended with regard to the provisions of the 
treaty.25  This approach specifically questions: the intention of the parties to a treaty in 
formulating the provision to be interpreted.26 According to Lauterpacht, the answer to 
this question may be obtained by exclusively relying on the preparatory work of the 
treaty in question.27 Hence, this approach emphasises the preparatory work of the treaty 
in illuminating the meaning of the terms of the treaty concluded by the parties.28  
The intention of the parties approach is based on an inadequate hypothesis that the 
meaning of a treaty can be found exclusively in its preparatory work. While the 
preparatory work represents an important aspect of treaty interpretation, exclusive 
dependence on it undermines the significance of the actual terms of the treaty 																																																																																																																																																																																			
19 Art 19(a) of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) 29 AJIL Supp 971, as quoted in FG 
Jacobs “Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on 
the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference” (1969) 18 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 318 344. 
20 The International Court of Justice was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations, 
with the mandate to determine legal disputes, in accordance with international law, submitted by States. 
See The Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI; and <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1> (accessed 28-03-2017). 
21 RP Schaffer “Current trends in treaty interpretation and the South African approach” (1977) Australian 
Year Book of International Law 129 130. 
22 130. 
23 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 1. 
24 M Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of human rights treaties” in D Shelton (ed) International Human Rights 
Law (2013) 739 745.  
25 745.  
26 Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year Book of International Law 204. 
27 This was the proposal prepared by Lauterpacht. See Art 2(2)(a) of the Resolution on the Interpretation 
of Treaties Adopted by the Institute of International Law (1956). Art 2(2)(a) provides that “[a]mongst the 
legitimate means of interpretation is [r]ecourse to the preparatory work”. 
28 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of human rights treaties” in International Human Rights Law 745. 
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considered in their context. By relying exclusively on the preparatory work, this approach 
limits the interpretation of a treaty to external factors that existed prior to the adoption of 
the treaty.  
Departing from this approach, I argue below that the intention of the parties can also 
be found within the treaty.29 As Schaffer observes, the intention of the parties to a treaty 
should be discerned from the treaty as a whole.30  
Moreover, the assumption that treaties are mainly bilateral is another flaw of the 
‘intention of the parties’ approach. Fitzmaurice notes that this approach is more relevant 
in bilateral treaties than in multilateral treaties.31 While bilateral treaties signify treaties 
that bring together two parties with a definite intention, multilateral treaties are formed by 
a number of parties with mixed intentions.32 In this regard, it can be difficult to establish 
the common intention that cuts across many parties to a treaty. Additionally, Lauterpacht 
observes that, there are scenarios where the provisions of the treaty do not incorporate 
the common intention of the parties.33  
Reflecting on the non-existence of a common intention, Lauterpacht posited that in 
situations where parties to a treaty fail to agree on the common meaning of the 
provisions of the treaty, they formulate those provisions in general terms. 34  This 
argument resonates with the reasoning prevalent during the adoption of the African 
Charter, namely that the African Charter’s provisions were formulated in general terms in 
order to allow the interpretive organs flexibility in interpretation.35 Based on the fact that 
some treaty provisions are formulated in general terms, Lauterpacht conceded that in 
such situations, the teleological approach can be applied to interpret those provisions.36 
The teleological approach applies both the intention of the parties as well as other 
sources relevant in treaty interpretation.37 Recourse to only one set of factors relevant to 
the treaty concerned, as is advanced by the intention of the parties approach, is 
insufficient for the effective interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter.  																																																								
29 See part 2 3 3 2 below. 
30 Schaffer (1977) Australian Year Book of International Law 131. See also Lauterpacht (1949) British 
Year Book of International Law 76. See also Lauterpacht (1949) British Year Book of International Law 76. 
31 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 3. 
32 3. 
33 Lauterpacht (1949) British Year Book of International Law 76. 
34 77. 
35 Report of the rapporteur on the Dakar draft CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt. Rpt(II) Rev.4 para 13. This report is 
analysed in depth in chapter three, part 3 2 3 7. 
36 Lauterpacht (1949) British Year Book of International Law 76. 
37 The teleological approach to interpretation is discussed in part 2 2 3 below. 
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Apart from the intention of the parties approach, another approach to treaty 
interpretation is the textual approach. This approach to interpretation is analysed below.  
2 2 2 Textual approach 
The textual approach (sometimes referred to as the ‘ordinary meaning’ approach) is 
the dominant approach to treaty interpretation.38 The main characteristic of this method 
lies in the fact that the meaning of the text of a treaty should be derived from the text 
itself.39 This approach to interpretation posits that external sources of interpretation 
cannot be applied to give meaning to the text of the treaty.40 Furthermore, the textual 
approach does not allow the use of external sources to fill in the gaps found in the 
treaty.41 Thus, the key question that arises is: what does the text in question mean as it 
appears in the treaty?42 
The stance of the textual approach, namely that the words of the text are clear and 
contain only one true meaning is a theoretical flaw. This is due to the fact that such an 
assumption does not apply to human rights treaties, which are mainly formulated in 
general terms. The postulations of Killander, Sinclair, and Anzilotti J are important in 
justifying this premise. As Killander aptly observes, human rights treaties are not 
formulated in clear terms to allow the interpretive organs to use only the textual 
																																																								
38 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations of 3 March 
1950, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1950 para 8: 
“The first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour 
to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant 
words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context that is the end of the matter.” 
Sir Fitzmaurice observes: 
“A sounder and more scientific method of approach would seem, while not exactly ignoring the question of 
intentions, lays the chief emphasis elsewhere, or alternatively attempts to give effect to intentions by methods 
other than a direct investigation of them as such. To put the matter in epigrammatic form, the question is, on 
this view, not so much one of what meaning is to be attributed to the text in the light of the intentions of the 
parties, as of what the intentions of the parties must be presumed to have been in the light of the meaning of 
the text they drew up. If this were not the case, it would logically involve that, after only a cursory reading of the 
text, interpretation would begin with an independent investigation, ab extra, of the intentions of the parties; and 
only after these had been ascertained and established would the text be seriously considered, and its meaning 
and effect finally determined. In actual fact this is never the modus operandi. Interpretation starts, as it must, 
with careful consideration of the text to be interpreted. This is so because the text is the expression of the will 
and intention of the parties. To elucidate its meaning, therefore, is ex hypothesi, to give effect to that will and 
intention. If the text is not clear, recourse must be had to extraneous sources of interpretation: but the object is 
still the same - to find out what the text means or must be taken to mean.”  
See Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year Book of International Law 207. 
39 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 7. 
40 7.  
41 7.  
42 7. 
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context.43 It is therefore insufficient to assume that the text of the treaty is clear and 
contains only one true meaning.44  Moreover, Killander notes that it is rare for an 
interpretive organ to construe the meaning of the text in isolation from the entire treaty.45 
In a similar vein, Sinclair argues that even in circumstances where the text appears clear 
on the face of it, its true meaning still requires a thorough investigation into its context in 
light of the object and purpose it was meant to serve. 46  As Anzilotti J states in 
Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning the Employment of Women 
Working during the Night (‘Women Working during the Night’),47 the text of a treaty 
cannot be clear in itself until the interpretive organ establishes the object and purpose of 
that treaty in relation to the text being interpreted. According to him, the clear meaning of 
the text of a treaty is obtained in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.48 
Another questionable assumption of the textual approach is that treaties are self-
sufficient. It does not allow recourse to other external sources to give meaning to the 
treaty. It is on this basis that the textual approach fails to take into account that some 
treaties do not encompass each and every provision relevant to ascertaining their 
meaning. As a result, they require recourse to external sources to comprehend their 
meaning fully. As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, for example, the African 
Charter omits a significant number of socio-economic rights in its express formulation.49 
The textual approach would accordingly not be amenable to reading into the treaty the 
supplementary rights that are not explicitly mentioned in the text.  
Senden argues that the textual approach is inadequate in that it fails to broadly 
construct the provisions of the text.50 The judgement in Johnston v Ireland (‘Johnston’)51 
justifies that argument. In this case the first and second applicants alleged that the 
omission of the right to divorce in the European Convention on Human Rights 
																																																								
43 M Killander “Interpreting regional human rights treaties” (2010) 7 International Journal on Human Rights 
144 146. 
44 M Dixon Textbook on International Law (2007) 71. 
45 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 146. 
46 Sinclair The Vienna Convention 72. 
47 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning the Employment of Women Working During the 
Night PCIJ Rep Series A/B No. 50. 
48 383. 
49 See chapter three, part 3 3 4. 
50 H Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System: An Analysis of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union (2011) 52. 
51 Johnston and Others v Ireland (1986) Series A No. 112. 
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(‘European Convention’)52 resulted in the violation of their right to marry, found under 
article 12.53 The issue before the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) was thus 
whether the applicants can derive a right to divorce from the right to marry.54 Relying 
purely on the textual approach, the ECHR held that “the ordinary meaning of the words 
‘right to marry’ is clear in the sense that they cover the formation of marital relationships 
but not their dissolution”.55 The ECHR further held that it cannot read into the provisions 
of article 12 a right that was not expressly formulated by the European Convention.56 
Fitzmaurice convincingly argues that this reliance on the textual approach by the ECHR 
is inadequate in the sense that it apparently restricts the broadening of the scope and 
meaning of the right to marry to include the right to divorce.57  
In this regard, the textual approach can arguably limit the effective interpretation of 
the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. Sole recourse to the textual approach 
may result in interpretive organs being reluctant to read into the African Charter rights 
which are not explicitly incorporated.58 Exclusive reliance on the text of the treaty during 
the interpretation process thus undermines the potential that can be offered by factors 
external to a treaty in the interpretation process. It is therefore necessary, when 
interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter, to consider other external 
factors in order to broaden the scope and meaning of these rights. Senden correctly 
contends that in cases where the treaty does not precisely formulate its provisions, 
recourse to other external factors is required to provide the sufficient meaning of the 
provisions.59 Accordingly, there is a need for an interpretative approach that takes into 
consideration both the text and certain external factors. This approach is examined in 
the ensuing part.  
																																																								
52  Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amemded by Protocols Nos 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
53 Article 12 of the European Convention states: 
“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found family, according to the national 
laws governing the exercise of this right.” 
54 Para 51. 
55 Para 52. 
56 Para 53. 
57 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of human rights treaties” in International Human Rights Law 762. 
58 TO Elias The Modern Law of Treaties (1974) 73. 
59 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 52. 
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2 2 3 Teleological approach 
It is claimed that the teleological approach is influenced by American jurisprudence 
and practices.60 It emerged in international law in 1935 through article 19(a) of the 
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Harvard Draft’)61 formulated by the 
Harvard Research in International Law programme.62 Article 19(a) of the Harvard Draft 
states: 
“A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which it intended to 
serve. The historical background of the treaty, travaux preparatoires, the 
circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in 
these circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in 
applying the provisions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time 
interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection with the general 
purpose which the treaty is intended to serve.” 
As this excerpt demonstrates, the Harvard Draft treats the general purpose of a treaty 
as a focal point in the interpretation of treaties. In this regard, the teleological approach 
allows the interpretive organs to use various sources from within and outside the treaty 
in order to ascertain the purpose of the treaty. According to the Harvard Draft, these 
sources include: the treaty’s historical background and its preparatory work; the 
circumstances at the time of the adoption of the treaty; any change in these 
circumstances that the parties sought to effect; the subsequent conduct of the parties in 
applying the provisions of the treaty; and the conditions prevailing at the time the treaty 
is interpreted.  
In spite of the fact that the Harvard Draft highlighted these elements of the 
teleological approach, it did not elaborate on the scope and content of these elements. It 
simply listed them.63 Moreover, it relied mainly on the external factors before, during and 
after the adoption of the treaty. It did not refer to the treaty in question as a source of 
interpretation. Thus, the Harvard Draft must be supplemented by allowing the application 
of other factors, specifically pertaining to those internal to the treaty when read as a 
whole. This development can be effected through the teleological approach as 
developed by Fitzmaurice and the Vienna Convention. By merging the Harvard Draft’s 																																																								
60 Schaffer (1977) Australian Year Book of International Law 133. 
61 Art 19 (a) of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) 29 American Journal of International 
Law Supp 971. 
62  Within the context of this dissertation, the work of the Harvard Research in International Law 
programme is significant, as it contributed to the process of the codification of the law of treaties and 
particularly the teleological approach to treaty interpretation. 
63 Schaffer (1977) Australian Year Book of International Law 129 134. 
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formulation with Fitzmaurice’s and the Vienna Convention’s formulation, other elements 
internal to the treaty can be used as significant elements in the interpretation of the 
treaty.  
In 1951, Fitzmaurice elaborated the teleological approach through his classification of 
the various approaches to treaty interpretation. According to him, the teleological 
approach applies mostly to multilateral treaties such as human rights treaties. 64 
Fitzmaurice argues that the primary objective of the teleological approach is to discover 
the general object and purpose65 of the treaty itself and interpret the text of the treaty in 
the light of such object and purpose.66 He also emphasised that the object and purpose 
of the treaty may be deduced from a treaty’s preamble.67 Fitzmaurice advanced that the 
preamble is composed of two characteristics, namely: its interpretive and binding 
characters. Regarding the interpretive character of the preamble, he observes that the 
preamble to the treaty enshrines and elaborates its object and purpose.68 This inclusion 
renders it a useful interpretative tool for elaborating the meaning of a treaty’s provisions, 
as well as clarifying the context in which such provisions should be construed.69  
In relation to the binding character of the preamble, Fitzmaurice argues that when 
applied as an interpretive aid the preamble becomes binding just like any other treaty 
provision.70 It is for this reason that statements of the parties contained in the preamble 
to the treaty must be treated as relevant when interpreting the treaty in question.71 For 
example, the preamble to the treaty as a source of the object and purpose of a treaty 
was used by Anzilotti J in the Women Working during the Night case.72 In his dissenting 
opinion the judge remarks that in interpreting a provision of a treaty the first thing to 
address is the object and purpose of such a treaty in relation to the provision being 
interpreted.73 Referring to part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles (‘Versailles Treaty’) which 
applied to the Women Working during the Night Convention, Anzilotti J states that the 																																																								
64 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 2. See also Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year 
Book of International Law 207. 
65 J Klabbers “Some problems regarding the object and purpose of treaties” (1999) 8 Finnish Year Book of 
International Law 138-160 quoted in Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
45. Klabbers identifies object and purpose of a treaty as a “comprehensive blanket term” referring to the 
“aims, nature and end” of a treaty and it applies to a treaty “as a whole rather than to its parts or articles.”  
66 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 1-2. 
67 10.  
68 25 
69 25 
70 Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year Book of International Law 229. 
71 229. 
72 Women Working During the Night 384-387. 
73 383. 
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preamble to the Versailles Treaty indicates its object and purpose to improve the 
working conditions of the working class.74 This teleological interpretation enabled women 
working at night to be included within the scope of article 3 of the Women Working 
during the Night Convention.  
Apart from the preamble, Fitzmaurice briefly discusses the subsequent practice of the 
parties to a treaty as a source of the object and purpose of a treaty.75 According to him, 
the subsequent conduct of the parties includes the decisions of the interpretive organs,76 
and the rules of procedure formulated by these interpretive organs to interpret the 
treaty. 77  Fitzmaurice emphasises that recourse to such practices during the 
interpretation process is significant in that it assists in ascertaining the effective meaning 
of the treaty.78  
Besides mentioning other elements such as the general theme of the treaty, the 
circumstances in which it was adopted, and the place of the treaty in international law,79 
Fitzmaurice failed to elaborate upon these elements.80 This chapter seeks to elaborate 
on two specific elements in order to supplement the teleological approach articulated by 
the Harvard Draft and Fitzmaurice. The two elements to be analysed are the general 
theme of a treaty and the circumstances in which it was adopted as illuminated by the 
role of the preparatory work referred to in the Vienna Convention. 81  Since these 
elements elaborate on the circumstances in which a treaty was adopted, as well as 
processes that occurred mainly at the time of preparation and formation of a treaty, they 
can thus be accommodated in the preparatory work of the treaty. Essentially, 
preparatory work includes “exchanges among the parties and with the drafting body, 
treaty drafts, negotiation records, minutes of commission and plenary proceedings, 
drafters of a treaty worked, if any”.82  
																																																								
74 385. 
75 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 9. See also Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year 
Book of International Law 210-211. 
76 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 9. See also Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year 
Book of International Law 211. 
77 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 9. See also Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year 
Book of International Law 211. 
78 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 9. See also Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year 
Book of International Law 211. 
79 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 2. 
80 As was the case with the Harvard Draft. 
81 These two elements are discussed in part 2 3 below. 
82 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 52. 
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Fitzmaurice argues, however, that all the elements of the teleological approach 
identified above embody the principle of effectiveness.83 In his reasoning, the principle of 
effectiveness presumes that texts are formulated to fulfil a specific effect. Accordingly, 
they should be interpreted to make them effective rather than ineffective.84 The principle 
requires the text to be interpreted in light of the declared or apparent object and purpose 
of the treaty, in a manner that gives such a text its effective meaning consistent with the 
words used to formulate it and with the other provisions of the treaty.85 In order to assign 
effective meaning to the text, the principle of effectiveness allows the interpretive organs 
to consider and apply different possibilities of interpretation which will safeguard the 
effectiveness of the text.86 Fitzmaurice provides, however, only a general evaluation of 
the principle of effectiveness.87 He does not elaborate on the various dimensions of this 
principle that can help generate different interpretive possibilities.  
This insufficiency can be supplemented by the work of Rietiker who elaborates on 
different dimensions of this principle of effectiveness.  
In addition to the general dimension of the principle of effectiveness discussed by 
Fitzmaurice, Rietiker identifies three further dimensions. These dimensions are the 
substantive, temporal, and systemic dimensions. According to Rietiker, the principle of 
effectiveness in its substantive dimension requires interpretive organs to interpret the 
rights enshrined in a treaty broadly.88 It also requires the limitations of such rights to be 
interpreted narrowly.89  
The implication of the substantive dimension of the principle of effectiveness, 
particularly for the human rights treaties, is twofold. The first implication was given by 
Killander, who wrote in the context of the interpretation of regional human rights 
treaties.90 According to Killander, the principle of effectiveness means that the texts of 
human rights treaties should be interpreted broadly.91 Craven has elaborated on the 																																																								
83 Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year Book of International Law 203 & 211. The principle of effectiveness is 
sometimes referred to as ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 
84 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 8. 
85 Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year Book of International Law 211. 
86 D Rietiker “The principle of “effectiveness” in the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Its different dimensions and its consistency with public international law – No need for the concept 
of treaty sui generis” (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 245 256. 
87 256. Rietiker calls this general evaluation of the principle of effectiveness as a narrow dimension of this 
principle. 
88 259. 
89 259. 
90 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 147. 
91 147. 
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second implication of the principle of effectiveness. He notes that the principle of 
effectiveness requires the limitations and restrictions to the human rights provisions in 
the treaty to be interpreted narrowly.92  
In its temporal dimension,93 the principle of effectiveness considers a treaty as a 
living instrument.94 This means that a treaty should be interpreted in light of present-day 
conditions prevalent in society. 95  As Kanstantsin notes writing on the European 
Convention, in its temporal dimension the principle of effectiveness “keeps the meaning 
of the rights both contemporary and effective”.96 This is significant, as it promotes an 
interpretation of the rights that takes into account the living conditions of people at the 
time of the interpretation of the treaty. In this regard, the interpretive organs can consider 
the conditions that were not foreseen by the treaty parties at the time of its conception. 
Accordingly, this interpretation considers both the protection against the violations 
prevalent at the time of interpretation and at the time of the adoption of a treaty.97  
This dimension was adopted by the ICJ in Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (‘Namibia’). 98  In clarifying the legal 
consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, even after the 
termination of South Africa’s mandate to administer Namibia in 1966, the ICJ held that 
the terms the “strenuous conditions of the modern world”, the “well-being and 
development of such peoples”, and “sacred trust” contained in article 22(1) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations99 were not static. Rather, they were evolutionary, 
and the parties must be presumed to have accepted the evolution.100 The ICJ held that 
although the right of independence was not envisaged at the time the Covenant of the 
																																																								
92 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its 
Development (1995) 3. 
93 Rietiker (2010) Nordic Journal of International Law 261. According to Rietiker temporal dimension is 
sometimes referred to as “dynamic” or “evolutive” approach. 
94 261. 
95 261. 
96 K Dzehtsiarou “European consensus and the evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1730 1730. 
97 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 151.  
98 Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory Opinion of 21 July 1971 ICJ 
Judgment 16. 
99 The Covenant of the League of Nations 255 CTS 195 was adopted 28 June 1919 and entered into force 
10 January 1920.  
100 Namibia para 53. 
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League of Nations was adopted, the “ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-
determination and independence of the peoples concerned”.101  
In the case of Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v 
Nicaragua) (‘Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights),102 the ICJ elaborated 
the conditions upon which the temporal dimension may be applied. It held that the 
temporal dimension can be applied if: 
“The parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been 
aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the 
treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’.”103 
As Killander notes, the African Commission has not applied this dimension of the 
principle of effectiveness in its decisions.104 Specifically, Ssenyonjo argues that the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter require an innovative interpretation that is 
capable of addressing the relevant socio-economic needs at the time of interpretation.105 
This innovative interpretation is significant as peoples’ socio-economic conditions 
change with time. Hence, the interpretation of the socio-economic rights should be 
responsive to these changes. Helmersen confirms the evolving nature of the socio-
economic circumstances. 106  According to him, an interpretation that considers the 
evolving socio-economic conditions renders the rights relevant and effective.107  
The temporal dimension, as elaborated in the ICJ judgments discussed above and 
Rietiker’s analysis, renders the teleological interpretation significant to this dissertation. 
The significance is twofold. Firstly, it can help to interpret the socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter in a manner that is consistent with the prevalent socio-economic 
conditions at the time of interpretation. This is vital, the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter are mainly formulated in general terms.108 Secondly, it can assist in 
																																																								
101 Para 53. 
102 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Rep 
2009. 
103 Para 66. 
104 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 149. 
105  M Ssenyonjo “Analysing the economic, social and cultural rights jurisprudence of the African 
Commission: 30 years since the adoption of the African Charter” (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 358 363. 
106 ST Helmersen “Evolutive treaty interpretation: Legality, semantics and distinctions” (2013) 6 European 
Journal of Legal Studies 126 129-130. 
107 130. 
108 See chapter three, part 3 3. 
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interpreting the scope and content of the socio-economic rights where the circumstances 
in which they are applied change over time.  
The systemic dimension represents another facet of the principle of effectiveness. 
This dimension consists of both the internal and external coherence dimensions.109 
According to Rietiker, the internal coherence dimension emphasises a form of 
interpretation that reads the treaty as a whole in a manner that advances internal 
consistency and harmony among the various provisions of the treaty.110 In relation to 
external coherence, the principle of effectiveness focuses on interpreting a treaty 
through other comparative legal sources. As the ICJ held in the Namibia case, a treaty 
should be interpreted in light of other relevant international legal sources.111 As such, 
interpretive organs should interpret the treaty in light of other relevant international 
instruments.112  This dimension is significant as it gives the interpretive organs the 
latitude to interpret the socio-economic rights in the African Charter in a manner that 
harmonises with the normative provisions in other relevant human rights instruments.  
This dissertation thus contends that the application of the teleological approach, in a 
manner that integrates the dimensions of the principle of effectiveness, can enhance the 
interpretation of the text of a treaty. Focusing on the object and purpose of the treaty can 
guarantee the effective interpretation of the text of the treaty.113 In accordance with 
Fitzmaurice and Rietiker, this chapter demonstrates below that the principle of 
effectiveness can be applied in the interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter.114 
The following part explores the place of the teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation in the Vienna Convention. 
2 3 Place of the teleological approach to interpretation in the Vienna Convention  
While scholars have developed three distinct approaches to treaty interpretation,115 
the Vienna Convention adopts a single authoritative rule of interpretation under articles 
31 and 32. There are, however, competing arguments among scholars and institutions 
regarding the place of the teleological approach in the codified rule of interpretation 																																																								
109 Rietiker (2010) Nordic Journal of International Law 267-275. 
110 267. 
111 Namibia para 53. 
112 Rietiker (2010) Nordic Journal of International Law 271. 
113 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 147. 
114 See part 2 5 2 4 below. 
115 See part 2 2 above. 
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under the Vienna Convention. For instance, the United Nations Conference on the Law 
of Treaties (‘UN Conference’) in its first session declared that, in adopting the Vienna 
Convention, the International Law Commission (‘ILC’)116 considered the phrase “object 
and purpose” in article 31(1) as merely a significant interpretive tool and not as an 
independent teleological approach.117 According to the UN Conference, the teleological 
interpretation is not incorporated in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention because it 
could distort the interpretation of provisions of the treaty.118 In a similar vein, Gardiner 
argues that only the textual approach is incorporated as an independent interpretative 
approach in article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and not the teleological approach.119 
According to Gardiner, article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention merely incorporates the 
teleological element of interpretation as an interpretive means that sheds light on the 
textual meaning.120  
The harnessing of the three approaches to interpretation into one general rule of 
interpretation, which is the codification of these perspectives, raises an important 
question relevant to this dissertation: Is the teleological approach incorporated in the 
codified rule of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention? In this part, I argue 
that the codification of approaches to treaty interpretation endorses the teleological 
approach and establishes it as the primary method of treaty interpretation. The Vienna 
Convention endorses the teleological approach as developed by the Harvard Research 
in International Law programme and Fitzmaurice and grants it legitimacy to interpret 
international treaties.121 An analysis of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
supports this argument. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides:  
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light to its 
object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 																																																								
116 The International Law Commission was established in 1947 by the UN General Assembly, with the 
mandate to initiate studies and make relevant recommendations regarding the progressive development 
of international law and its codification <http://legal.un.org/ilc> (accessed 28-03-2017). 
117 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna 26 March-24 May 1968, 
Official Records 170. 
118 170. 
119 R Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (2008) 189-190. 
120 189-190. 
121 See part 2 3 3 below. 
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(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.” 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention reads: 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
It is argued that the codification of approaches to treaty interpretation under article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention gives primacy to the textual approach over other 
approaches. For example, the ILC Commentaries on its draft article 27, (which was later 
approved as article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention) seem to indicate the primacy of the 
text as an authentic authority in treaty interpretation. 122  A number of international 
tribunals also give primacy to the textual approach over the teleological approach. In 
RSM Production Corporation v Grenada (‘RSM’), for instance, the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) held that the Vienna Convention, through 
its rule of interpretation, considers the teleological approach as a supplementary 
approach that can only be applied when the textual approach is insufficient.123 
In contrast, I argue that article 31(1) requires the interpretation of the text to occur in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty in question. The effective meaning 
of the text in dispute cannot be ascertained if the treaty’s object and purpose in relation 
to such text is not considered. From this perspective, article 31(1) does not establish the 
primacy of the textual approach over the teleological approach. Additionally, article 31(1) 
does not establish hierarchy among these incorporated elements which would imply the 																																																								
122 ILC (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 220 para 11. See also A Orakhelashvili 
“Restrictive interpretation of human rights treaties in the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 529 533. 
123 RSM Production Corporation v Grenada ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14 Award 383 (13 March 2009) para 
383. 
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primacy of one element over the other. Instead, article 31(1) demonstrates that the 
interpretation of a treaty is a single combined process.124 In the interpretation process, 
the text of the treaty and its context, as well as its object and purpose should be 
examined together. 125  While the text is considered the logical starting point, 126  its 
effective meaning should always be obtained in the context it was formulated and in light 
of its object and purpose.127  
Aust rightly argues that the ordinary meaning of the text cannot be ascertained in 
abstract, but rather through the context of the treaty as well as its object and purpose.128 
The deliberate combined approach adopted by the Vienna ensures that the object and 
purpose of a treaty is taken into account whenever a treaty is interpreted. 129 
Commenting particularly on human rights treaties, Scheinin argues that article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention requires the interpretation of these treaties to be performed in a 
manner that commits the parties to respecting the object and purpose enshrined 
therein.130 In doing so, this article implies that the interpretation of human rights treaties 
should give due regard to their object and purpose.  
As is the case with the Harvard Draft and Fitzmaurice’s formulation, the general rule 
of interpretation under article 31(1) positions the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
significant aspect in its interpretation. It requires, rather than permits, recourse to the 
object and purpose of the treaty as a significant approach in the interpretation of the 
treaty. It should be noted that the object and purpose of a treaty is the major assumption 
underlying the teleological approach. 131  The inclusion of the phrase, “object and 
purpose” under article 31 of the Vienna Convention, therefore, reflects the recognition of 
the teleological approach to interpretation. As Jacobs notes, the incorporation of the 
phrase “in the light of its object and purpose” confirms the inclusion of the teleological 
																																																								
124 ILC (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 219-220 para 8. 
125 K Mechlem “Treaty bodies and the interpretation of human rights” (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 905 911. 
126 911. 
127 Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
128 A Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000) 188. 
129 Schaffer (1977) Australian Year Book of International Law 139.  
130 M Scheinin “Characteristics of human rights norms” in C Krause and M Scheinin (eds) International 
Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2012) 19 21. 
131 See part 2 2 3 above. 
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approach in article 31.132 In this regard, treaty interpretation will not be effective if 
reference to the object and purpose of such a treaty is not made.133  
According to the Vienna Convention, the object and purpose should be deduced from 
the context within which the treaty was adopted.134 The context of the treaty includes the 
text, preamble, subsequent agreements or practices, and the relevant rules of 
international law.135 These are the elements of the teleological approach as developed 
by the Harvard Research in International Law programme and Fitzmaurice. As such, the 
inclusion of these elements under article 31 confirms that the teleological approach to 
treaty interpretation is incorporated in the Vienna Convention. In order to show the link 
between the teleological approach to treaty interpretation as developed by the Harvard 
Research in International Law and Fitzmaurice, as well as the elements in the Vienna 
Convention, there is a need to provide a brief discussion of these elements. 
As the ILC observes, the preamble is an integral part of the treaty in the process of 
treaty interpretation.136 The Vienna Convention confirms the interpretive significance of 
the preamble to the treaty by incorporating it in article 31.137 According to Fitzmaurice, 
the statements enshrined in a treaty’s preamble are viable indicators of its object and 
purpose.138 These preambular statements are significant in the sense that they shed 
light on the manner in which the meaning of the provisions of the treaty should be 
ascertained.139 In addition, Gardiner argues that statements in the preamble disclose the 
motivations, goals, and objectives of a treaty in relation to its substantive provisions.140 
He further asserts that, by stating the treaty’s goals and objectives, the preamble 
becomes an integral element of the teleological approach to interpretation suitable for 
the interpretation of the provisions of such treaty.141  
In line with the Harvard Draft and Fitzmaurice, the Vienna Convention endorses and 
elaborates on the element of subsequent conduct of the parties to a treaty. According to 
the Vienna Convention, the subsequent conduct of the parties may take two forms: 																																																								
132 Jacobs (1969) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 337. See also Yeshanew The Justiciability 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 45; and Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 55. 
133 I Van Damme “Treaty interpretation by the WTO Appellate body” (2010) 21 European Journal of 
International Law 1 8. 
134 Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
135 Art 31(2) – (3) of the Vienna Convention. 
136 ILC (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 221 para 13. 
137 Art 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. 
138 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 10. 
139 10. 
140 Gardiner Treaty Interpretation 186. 
141 186. See also Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 100. 
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subsequent agreements and practices of the parties. 142  Significantly, the Vienna 
Convention endorses this element as mandatory in the process of treaty interpretation. 
Through the formulation of article 31(3)(a) and (b), the Vienna Convention requires 
interpretive organs to consider the subsequent agreements and practices of the parties 
as a primary source in establishing the object and purpose of the treaty in the 
interpretation process. However, neither the Vienna Convention nor the ILC demonstrate 
how to establish the subsequent agreement and practice of the parties as enshrined in 
the treaty. For this reason, I draw on the ideas advanced by Fitzmaurice, Roberts, and 
Killander to illustrate how the subsequent agreements and practices of the parties can 
be established.  
Fitzmaurice notes that the subsequent practices of the parties to a treaty may be 
found in the rules of procedure and decisions formulated by interpretive organs.143 
Gardiner elaborates that the decisions of interpretive organs are accepted by the parties 
as binding.144 Consecutive decisions by interpretive organs on the same provisions of a 
treaty establish parties’ consistent practice, in that the parties accept to be bound by 
these findings.145 In this regard, the consistent practices of the parties establish a means 
in which interpretation of the treaty can be determined.146 As a result, the consistent 
practices form the basis of subsequent practices of the parties.147  
Elaborating further on subsequent practices in the context of human rights treaties, 
Scheinin argues that the parties’ enforcement of the decisions of interpretive organs 
establishes the subsequent practices of the parties.148  According to Scheinin, such 
subsequent practices can be applied in the subsequent interpretation of the human 
rights treaties. In the same vein, Roberts notes that while a subsequent agreement 
focuses “on the fact of an agreement between the treaty parties,” 149  “subsequent 
practice includes executive, legislative and judicial acts.”150 Through the subsequent 
agreements and practices of the parties, the teleological approach creates space for 
interpretive organs to apply the attitudes of States to interpret the treaty. These elements 																																																								
142 Art 31(3)(a)-(b) of the Vienna Convention. 
143 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 9. 
144 Gardiner Treaty Interpretation 229. 
145 229. 
146 229-230. 
147 229-230. 
148 Scheinin “Characteristics of human rights norms” in International Protection of Human Rights 21. 
149 A Roberts “Power and persuasion in investment treaty interpretation: The dual role of States” (2010) 
104 American Journal of International Law 179 199. 
150 200. 
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allow interpretive organs to apply their precedents to interpret the text in question. As 
Killander expresses, subsequent agreements and practices provide the interpretive 
organs with a mandate to rely on their precedents.151  
This insight is significant for this dissertation, as it can enrich the jurisprudence of the 
interpretive organs of the African Charter and States’ subsequent practices in protecting 
socio-economic rights in Africa. It allows the application of decisions of the interpretive 
organs, as well as States’ undertakings such as subsequent treaties and protocols, in 
the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter.  
The ‘relevant rules of international law’ is another element of the teleological 
approach to the interpretation of treaties endorsed by the Vienna Convention. This 
element is formulated as a primary source that enables the interpretive organs to 
establish the object and purpose of the treaty in question.152 The ILC identifies that 
recourse to the relevant rules of international law in article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
requires a treaty to be interpreted in light of other international law treaties of a similar 
nature.153 The rules of international law in article 31 encompass both customary and 
general international law related to the interpreted treaty.154  
Through this formulation, the Vienna Convention develops Fitzmaurice’s approach to 
teleological treaty interpretation. The formulation in article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
is important, as it enables the socio-economic rights in the African Charter to be 
interpreted with reference to other relevant international human rights instruments. This 
is significant as the interpretive organs of the African Charter will be able to clarify the 
scope and content of these rights in the light of other international instruments. As 
Yeshanew observes: 
“While their special nature should be taken into account, human rights treaties 
cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and only in their own context. They should be 
interpreted in the wider context of and in harmony with general international law, of 																																																								
151 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 149. 
152 Art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. It should be noted that interpretation of a treaty in the light of 
other treaties codified in article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention is also referred to as systemic approach 
to interpretation or systemic integration. See also International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of 
international law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’, Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 58th session (2006) A/CN.4/L.682) Chapter F, 
Systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention para 413. 
153  International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of international law: Difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of international law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, 58th session (2006) A/CN.4/L.682) Chapter F, Systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention paras 410-480.  
154 461. 
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which they form part. The requirement of reference to binding rules concerning the 
subject-matter of a treaty in question is premised on the assumption that parties do 
not intend to act inconsistently in the various treaties they enter.”155  
As discussed above, 156  recourse to the above sources is to ensure effective 
interpretation. Unlike Fitzmaurice’s formulation, the interpretive provisions of the Vienna 
Convention do not explicitly articulate the principle of effectiveness explained above.157 
However, it can be argued that the principle of effectiveness is implicitly incorporated in 
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention through the terms, “object and purpose” and 
the “preamble”, “preparatory work”, “subsequent agreement and practices of the parties” 
as well as the “rules of international law”. As was elaborated above,158 the principle of 
effectiveness requires an interpretation that promotes the achievement of the object and 
purpose of the particular treaty. The provisions of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention allow recourse to various sources to establish the object and purpose of the 
treaty. These sources include: the preamble to the treaty, the subsequent agreements 
and the subsequent practices of the parties, the relevant rules of international law, and 
the preparatory work of the treaty. In this regard, these sources can be used in the 
interpretation process to achieve the object and purpose of the treaty. As Senden notes, 
the principle of effectiveness focuses on the means according to which the teleological 
approach is applied.159 Hence, the omission of the Vienna Convention to refer explicitly 
to the principle of effectiveness can be cured by reading this principle as a component of 
the “object and purpose” of the treaty in article 31(1). As the ILC notes in its 
commentary, the principle of effectiveness is embodied in the provisions of article 27(1) 
(now article 31(1)) through the phrase “in the light of its object and purpose”. This 
comment by the ILC is to the effect that the principle of effectiveness is part of the object 
and purpose of the treaty.160 The interpretive organs can use the phrase “in the light of 
object and purpose of the treaty” to broadly encompass the principle of effectiveness 
and apply it in the interpretation of a treaty. 
Another element of the teleological approach endorsed by the Vienna Convention is 
the preparatory work of the treaty. Unlike the Harvard Research in International Law and 
Fitzmaurice, the Vienna Convention endorses preparatory work (travaux preparatoires) 																																																								
155 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 51. 
156 See part 2 2 3 above. 
157 See part 2 2 3 above. 
158 See part 2 2 3 above. 
159 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 84. 
160 ILC (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 219 para 6. 
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as a supplementary element of treaty interpretation. This notion of regarding preparatory 
work as a supplementary element implies that the interpretive organs can draw on this 
element only as a peripheral element of the treaty interpretation.  
It is contended that the preparatory work should be treated as a central element in 
interpreting the African Charter. This understanding is important for interpreting the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter, as its preparatory work incorporates 
significant historical background pertaining to the inclusion of these rights. This historical 
background is important as it helps to identify the object and purpose of the African 
Charter. The preparatory work of the African Charter also enshrines and elaborates the 
object and purpose of the African Charter regarding the socio-economic rights it 
recognises.161  
It should be noted that article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention require the text to be 
interpreted in light of its object and purpose. It can be argued that this requirement 
logically allows the consideration of the preparatory work of the African Charter which 
enshrines its object and purpose. Interpreting the socio-economic provisions in the 
African Charter, in light of its object and purpose therefore requires considering the 
preparatory work that embodies the object and purpose relating to these rights as a 
primary interpretative tool. As Yeshanew rightly observes, in some international treaties, 
a treaty’s preparatory work forms part of the relevant law and it cannot be treated as a 
supplementary means of interpretation.162  
Accordingly, this part has established that the Vienna Convention endorses the 
teleological approach to treaty interpretation in articles 31 and 32. I have also 
demonstrated that these provisions require the meaning of a treaty’s provisions be 
developed with reference to its object and purposes. This aspect gives the teleological 
approach a significant place in the Vienna Convention. 
 However, the formulations by the Harvard Research in International Law 
programme, Fitzmaurice, and the Vienna Convention only indicate how the object and 
purpose of the treaty is to be discovered. They do not elaborate on the precise content 
and scope of this notion. The latter can play a significant role in interpreting the socio-
economic rights provisions in the African Charter. In the following part I proceed to 
analyse the concept of the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty in greater depth.  
																																																								
161 See parts 2 5 2 2 below, and chapter three, parts 3 2, 3 2 2 and 3 2 3. 
162 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 52. 
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2 3 1 Meaning of the concept ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty 
2 3 1 1 Introduction 
The failure to define the object and purpose of a treaty adversely impacts on the 
interpretation process as it endangers clarity of meaning.163 The notion of the object and 
purpose of a treaty can be a useful element in interpreting many international treaties, 
including the African Charter.164 For this reason, analysing the meaning of this concept 
can guide interpretive organs in identifying the object and purpose of a particular treaty 
they are required to interpret.  
The meaning of the object and purpose of a treaty is surrounded by two key 
concerns. The first is whether object and purpose is a single concept or two distinct 
concepts. The second is whether the notion requires a specific definition or a general 
definition. This part thus seeks to shed light on the nature of the object and purpose of a 
treaty, and its implications for treaty interpretation.  
2 3 1 2 Object and purpose of a treaty: Single or two distinct concepts? 
International tribunals and the scholars have been using the term, “object and 
purpose” either as a single concept or as two distinct concepts. In the International 
Status of South-West Africa (‘South-West Africa’), for example, the ICJ only used the 
word “purpose”. 165  In the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘Reservations to the Genocide Convention’)166 
the ICJ used the phrase “object and purpose” interchangeably. This implies that the ICJ 
sometimes uses one concept to mean the other or to re-ordering them.167  
Scholars also refer to these concepts interchangeably and inconsistently. For 
instance, Bernhardt uses “object” and “purpose” interchangeably.168  Ress uses the 
																																																								
163 DS Jonas & TN Saunders “The object and purpose of a treaty: Three interpretive methods” (2010) 43 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 565 569. 
164 567. 
165 International Status of South-West Africa Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950 ICJ Reports 1950 136. 
166 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ICJ 
Reports 1951.  
167 The ICJ stated that: 
“It is also a generally recognised principle that a multilateral Convention is the result of an agreement freely 
concluded upon its clauses and that consequently none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or 
impair, by means of unilateral decisions or particular agreements, the purpose and raison d’être’ of the 
Convention.”  
168 I Buffard & K Zemanek “The “object and purpose” of a treaty: An enigma?” (1998) 3 Austrian Review of 
International and European Law 311 323. 
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word, “object” to also include the term, “purpose”,169 while Jennings considers the object 
and purpose of a treaty as a single concept.170 On the other hand, Duguit and Bonnard, 
Rousseau and Weckel consider the “object and purpose” as two distinct concepts. 
Weckel, for example, explains the object of a treaty as a goal the parties to a treaty want 
to achieve. He identifies the purpose of a treaty as the motive to achieve the goal of the 
treaty. It is therefore significant to ascertain the nature of the phrase, “object and 
purpose” of the treaty. Senden rightly notes that the clarity of the object and purpose of a 
treaty can help to establish whether or not the teleological approach is correctly applied 
in its interpretation.171   
While the ICJ and scholars regard the object and purpose of a treaty as different 
concepts and use them inconsistently, I follow the approach adopted in the Vienna 
Convention, which treats “object and purpose” as a single discursive concept:- 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”172  
The term “object and purpose” in the Vienna Convention focuses on an interpretation 
that attains the general goal of the treaty as a whole, as opposed to the goals of the 
specific provisions to be interpreted.173 Buffard and Zemanek advance that treating the 
object and purpose of the treaty as a single notion, connects the provisions of the treaty 
with the general goal of the treaty.174 The phrase “in the light of its object and purpose” 
suggests that the Vienna Convention treats the term “object and purpose” as a single 
concept. Therefore, treating the object and purpose of the treaty as two distinct concepts 
is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention’s approach. As Jonas and Saunders affirm, 
the Vienna Convention formulates it as a single concept.175  Buffard and Zemanek 																																																								
169 323. 
170 RY Jennings “Treaties” in M Bedjaoui (ed) International Law: Achievements and Prospects Vol. I, 
UNESCO, Paris 1991 135 145 quoted in Buffard & Zemanek (1998) Australian Review of International 
and European Law 324. Jennings states that: 
“A treaty is an agreed, authoritative text, normally drafted with care in the choice of terms, and it is the resulting 
text that States elect to accept, or not to accept ... The qualification ‘in good faith’ is the central component of 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda: it comprises and qualifies inter alia the principle of effectiveness – ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat. The ‘terms of the treaty ... in their context’, that is so to say the text, is indeed in 
primary place, but viewed ‘in the light of’ the object and purpose of the treaty.” 
171 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 97. 
172 Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
173 Jonas & Saunders (2010) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 579. 
174 Buffard & Zemanek (1998) Australian Review of International and European Law 332. 
175 Jonas & Saunders (2010) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 579. 
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emphasise that the object and purpose of the treaty, as a single concept, underlies the 
teleological approach to treaty interpretation, in that it regards the object and purpose of 
the treaty as a whole.176  
Senden identifies three teleological elements that legitimatise the object and purpose 
of the treaty as a single concept. Firstly, the notion “object and purpose” of the treaty 
establishes interpretive references to which the interpretive organs should make 
recourse to, in interpreting all provisions of the treaty.177 Secondly, the term, “object and 
purpose” of the treaty, creates space for interpretive organs to clarify to parties that the 
meaning they assign to the provisions are embedded in the relevant treaty.178 Thirdly, as 
a single concept the “object and purpose” helps the interpretive organs to demonstrate 
that the decisions made were intended by the parties to the relevant treaty.179 Treating 
the notion “object and purpose” as two distinct concepts is thus inconsistent with article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention.180 Since this dissertation argues for the teleological 
approach as codified in the Vienna Convention, it uses “object and purpose” as a single 
concept.  
2 3 1 3 Does the ‘object and purpose’ require a specific fixed or general meaning? 
Another concern is whether the term “object and purpose” requires a specific or 
general meaning. Scholars adopt different approaches to this question. Buffard and 
Zemanek, for example, regard the term as a specific fixed concept constituting a 
collection of only certain provisions of a treaty that can assist in achieving the goals of a 
treaty.181 This definition treats certain provisions as irrelevant in establishing the object 
and purpose of a treaty. According to this definition, not all provisions of the treaty are 
appropriate to establish its object and purpose. This implies that interpretive organs are 
limited to utilising only some provisions of a treaty to establish its object and purpose.  
However, Buffard and Zemanek do not demonstrate how the interpretive organs can 
identify the relevant provisions and context of a treaty in order to establish its object and 
purpose. Regarding the object and purpose of a treaty as a fixed concept can have a 
negative impact in interpreting the socio-economic rights of the African Charter. Limiting 																																																								
176 Buffard & Zemanek (1998) Australian Review of International and European Law 332. 
177 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 204. 
178 205. 
179 205. 
180 U Linderfalk On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2007) 209. 
181 Buffard & Zemanek (1998) Australian Review of International and European Law 343. 
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the object and purpose to a fixed concept may confine supervisory organs to an 
interpretation of socio-economic rights that takes into account the circumstances at time 
the rights were enacted rather than the time of interpretation. The circumstances in 
which the socio-economic rights are interpreted change. As such, regarding object and 
purpose as a fixed concept limits the consideration of the context of the socio-economic 
rights at the time of interpretation. According to Senden, the context in which the 
provisions of the treaty should be interpreted change over time.182 In turn, this change of 
context influences the object and purpose of the treaty.183 Treating object and purpose 
as a fixed concept would thus hinder the interpretation that addresses the conditions 
prevalent at the time of interpretation. 
While Buffard and Zemanek view “object and purpose” as a fixed concept, Linderfalk, 
as well as Jonas and Saunders, define it in a general form. According to Linderfalk, the 
concept, “object and purpose” of a treaty means the reasons for the existence of the 
treaty.184 He explains further that the object and purpose entails only the reasons that 
reflect the conditions intended by the parties to a treaty, 185  and that reveal the 
expectations of the parties to a treaty.186 According to Linderfalk, the reasons intended 
by the parties are different from the ones that led to the adoption of the treaty.187 He 
identifies the reasons that caused the adoption of a treaty as the “cause for the 
treaty”.188 This “cause for the treaty” entails the conditions prevailing before the adoption 
of the treaty.189 He argues that the concept, “object and purpose” under article 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention does not include the “cause for a treaty”.190 The ‘cause for the 
treaty’, as Linderfalk puts it, is covered under article 32 of the Vienna Convention.191  
Linderfalk’s definition of the “object and purpose” is general and offers an insufficient 
understanding of this concept. It limits the meaning of object and purpose only to the 
provisions of the treaty and the subsequent practices of the parties to a treaty. The 
appropriate meaning of the object and purpose of a treaty should, however, allow 
flexibility to invoke different interpretive aids. The reliance only on the provisions of a 																																																								
182 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 98-99. 
183 98-99. 
184 Linderfalk On the Interpretation of Treaties 204. 
185 205. 
186 206. 
187 206. 
188 206. 
189 206. 
190 206-207. 
191 207. 
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treaty curtails the flexibility inherent in the concept of the object and purpose of a treaty 
to draw on other elements relevant to the interpretation of a treaty. These other 
elements include, for example, the preamble to the treaty, the concept of the 
“interdependence of rights”,192  and the “preparatory work” of a treaty. As Klabbers 
observes, the meaning of the term, “object and purpose” should accommodate different 
elements relevant to the interpretation of the treaty.193  
Moreover, reliance on only the treaty provisions can diminish the understanding of 
the object and purpose under the teleological approach. As noted above, the term, 
“object and purpose” under the teleological approach interprets a treaty as a whole. 
Discerning the meaning of the object and purpose of a treaty, focusing only on its 
individual provisions confines the interpretation of the treaty to a textual approach. 
Klabbers points out that such an approach can limit the stance of the concept the “object 
and purpose” of a treaty to interpret a treaty as a whole.194 
Linderfalk’s general definition of the “object and purpose” also does not allow scope 
for a conception of the “object and purpose” through an understanding of the conditions 
existing at the time of treaty’s, since its scope excludes the preparatory work. As 
discussed above, the interpretive aids under article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, 
which elaborate on the object and purpose, do not replace the preparatory work.195 
According to Yeshanew, article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention should not be interpreted 
in such a way as to diminish the significance of the preparatory work in establishing the 
“object and purpose” of a treaty.196 Instead, the preparatory work of a treaty can be 
regarded as a significant element of the teleological approach that can assist the 
interpretive organs in discovering the object and purpose of a treaty. It can be used to 
establish the goals meant to be achieved by the treaty and the means to do so.197 
Therefore, excluding the preparatory work from the scope of the “object and purpose” 
can render the interpretation of a treaty ineffective.  																																																								
192  Scott defines interdependence of rights in two senses: “organic interdependence” and “related 
interdependence”. According to Scott, organic interdependence refers to a situation where “one right 
forms part of another right and may therefore be incorporated into that latter right”. In the related 
dimension, interdependence of rights means that all rights, civil and political, as well as socio-economic 
are equally important yet separate. C Scott “The interdependence and permeability of human rights 
norms: Towards a partial fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights” (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 769 779-783.  
193 Klabbers (1997) Finnish Year Book of International Law 159. 
194 157. 
195 See part 2 3 above. 
196 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 52. 
197 52. 
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Similar to Linderfalk, Jonas and Saunders proffer a general definition of the object 
and purpose of a treaty, allowing for flexibility in its meaning. According to Jonas and 
Saunders, the “object and purpose” means any essential goals of a treaty that can 
elaborate its effective meaning.198 Their definition provides scope for the interpretive 
organs to consider all the potential elements that can explain the goals to be achieved 
by the treaty.  
I argue that the efficacy of treaty interpretation requires the notion, “object and 
purpose” of a treaty to be defined with this form of flexibility. As Klabbers highlights, the 
meaning of “object and purpose” should not be limited to a specific fixed meaning,199 
since the content of the treaties change on a regular basis.200 By drawing on Jonas’ and 
Saunders’ definition, the interpretive organs can apply various elements such as the 
preparatory work, preamble to the treaty, provisions of the treaty, subsequent 
agreements and practices of the parties to a treaty, relevant rules of international law, 
and the principle of effectiveness. Klabbers’ observation reveals that flexibility allows the 
use of different interpretive aids to achieve an effective meaning of a treaty.201 
This dissertation adopts the general and flexible definition of “object and purpose” 
suggested by Jonas and Saunders in the context of elaborating on an interpretive 
approach to the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. This definition can enable 
the interpretive organs of the African Charter to flexibly apply the tenets of the 
teleological approach analysed above to address the socio-economic conditions of 
African people. This stance aligns with Klabbers’ observation that the flexible meaning of 
“object and purpose” can help address different needs and circumstances.202 
This part argued that the concept of “object and purpose”, as endorsed in the Vienna 
Convention, which is central to the teleological approach and best understood as a 
single concept. Moreover, the “object and purpose” of a treaty should be viewed as a 
general and flexible concept that includes all the essential goals of a treaty in order to 
develop its effective meaning. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Vienna 
Convention applies to all international law treaties with some specific rules and 
applications in the context of international human rights law treaties.203 The following 																																																								
198 Jonas & Saunders (2010) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 567. 
199 Klabbers (1997) Finnish Year Book of International Law 141. 
200 C McLachlan “The principle of systemic integration and Article 31-(3)-(c) of the Vienna Convention” 
(2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279 282. 
201 Klabbers (1997) Finnish Year Book of International Law 141. 
202 159. 
203 M Scheinin “Characteristics of human rights norms” in International Protection of Human Rights 21. 
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part seeks to ascertain how the teleological approach endorsed in the Vienna 
Convention should be applied in the context of international human rights treaties, 
particularly the African Charter.  
2 3 2 Applicability of the teleological approach in the interpretation of human rights 
treaties 
The applicability of the teleological approach, as codified in the Vienna Convention, 
in the interpretation of human rights has been challenged.204 The challenge centres on 
two primary arguments. First, there is an argument that the Vienna Convention does not 
apply to the human rights treaties. For example, Scheinin argues that the Vienna 
Convention is a State-centred instrument governing only the general international law 
treaties hence it does not cover human rights treaties. 205  Particularly, Yeshanew 
observes that it is believed the general rule of interpretation in articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention applies only to the general international law treaties. 206  This 
argument implies that the teleological approach covered in the Vienna Convention is not 
applicable to the interpretation of human rights treaties.  
Second, the argument that human rights treaties have special features that require 
distinct approaches to interpretation - different from that enshrined in the Vienna 
Convention - is common in international law scholarship. For example, Craven argues 
that human rights treaties have a distinctive legal character which necessitates distinct 
approaches to interpretation different from the general rule of interpretation under the 
Vienna Convention.207  
These challenges raise three major questions relevant to this dissertation. The first 
concerns whether human rights treaties are covered within the scope of treaties 
contemplated by the interpretation articles of the Vienna Convention. The second 
question considered in this part is whether human rights treaties possess special 
features distinct from general international law treaties. Third, if human rights treaties do 
have special features, whether such features disqualify the application of the teleological 
approach as found in the Vienna Convention. It is important to address these issues in 
order to ascertain the legitimacy of the teleological approach in the interpretation of the 																																																								
204 M Craven “Legal differentiation and the concept of the human rights treaty in international law” (200) 11 
European Journal of International Law 489 491. 
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socio-economic rights in the African Charter. In the next part, I discuss the applicability 
of the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of human rights treaties.  
2 3 2 1 Are human rights treaties covered by the Vienna Convention? 
In order to ascertain whether the human rights treaties are covered by the Vienna 
Convention, it is important to analyse the scope of the Vienna Convention and the 
meaning of a treaty as stated in the Vienna Convention. Article 1 of the Vienna 
Convention outlines the scope of the Vienna Convention by stating that the Vienna 
Convention is applicable to “treaties between parties”. 
The provisions of article 1 of the Vienna Convention imply that the Vienna 
Convention governs all treaties concluded between States, including human rights 
treaties. According to McLachlan, the treaties that govern relations between States form 
part of the general international law in that, regardless of their subject matter, these 
treaties are limited within the scope of the Vienna Convention.208 In a similar vein, the 
ILC pinpoints that there is no treaty between States that is excluded from the scope of 
the Vienna Convention.209 In order to understand the scope of the Vienna Convention, 
the provisions of article 1 should be read in conjunction with articles 2(1)(a), and 42 of 
the Vienna Convention. While article 2(1)(a) defines the term, “treaty”, article 42 
elaborates the extent to which the Vienna Convention cover treaties. As was 
emphasised by the ILC, the provisions of articles 1 and 2(1)(a) of the Vienna 
Conventions should be read together, and that all other provisions of the Vienna 
Convention, including article 42, elaborate the treaties concluded between States.210 
Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention defines the term, “treaty”. This article reads: 
“treaty means an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two 
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” 
These provisions define the term, “treaty” in a general form. They simply define a 
treaty as an international agreement in a written form concluded between contracting 
States and governed by international law. The provisions do not distinguish categories of 
treaties by reference to their specific subject matter. 211  Koskenniemi argues that 																																																								
208 McLachlan (2005) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279 280. 
209 ILC Fragmentation Report para 193. 
210 ILC (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 187 para 1. 
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particular terms such as human rights are merely labels which express forms of 
professional specialisation.212  
Article 42(1) of the Vienna Convention reads: 
“The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be 
impeached only through the application of the present Convention.” 
According to the ILC, article 42 of the Vienna Convention covers important aspects of 
all treaties including the human rights treaties.213 These aspects include the principles 
that govern the validity of the treaties, including their establishment.214 The Vienna 
Convention also influences the interpretation of the treaties, in that it provides the 
interpretive guidance through articles 31 and 32. 215  The ILC emphasises that the 
provisions of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention enshrine the interpretive 
guidance for all treaties including human rights treaties.216 Given that the provisions of 
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention do not categorically distinguish treaties on 
the basis of their subject matter, it can be convincingly argued that the Vienna 
Convention also applies to human rights treaties.217  Since there is no established 
theoretical foundation which distinguishes human rights treaties from the umbrella of 
other general treaties,218 we can conclude that human rights treaties are accommodated 
within the definition of a treaty as articulated by the Vienna Convention.219  
Writing on treaty bodies and their mandate to interpret human rights instruments, 
Mechlem rightly argues that the interpretive organs are bound to apply the general rule 
of interpretation under the Vienna Convention.220 Similarly, Killander argues that the 
Vienna Convention’s general rule of interpretation applies to human rights treaties in the 
same manner it applies to customary international law treaties.221 Yeshanew also argues 
that the Vienna Convention’s general rule of interpretation is not exclusive to general 
international law treaties, but also applies to human rights treaties.222  
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These scholarly observations are significant for applying the teleological approach to 
the interpretation of human rights treaties. These observations imply that the teleological 
approach enshrined in the interpretive provisions of the Vienna Convention is applicable 
to human rights treaties. Senden confirms the viability of the teleological approach in 
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention in the interpretation of human rights 
treaties. 223  Based on the foregoing observations, I maintain that the teleological 
approach, as enshrined in the Vienna Convention, applies to human rights treaties 
including the African Charter. This understanding is significant to the interpretation of the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter as it allows the interpretive organs to apply 
the teleological approach formulated in the Vienna Convention. 
However, human rights treaties are said to possess certain special features which 
exclude some rules of international law such as the general rule of interpretation.224 For 
example, in the case of Belilos v Switzerland (‘Belilos’)225 the ECHR had to decide on 
the declaration made by Switzerland that the application of article 6(1) of the European 
Convention is incompatible with the general international law obligations assumed by 
Switzerland.226 The ECHR held Switzerland to be bound by the obligations under the 
European Convention rather than the obligations under the general international law.227 
The ECHR thus held this declaration by Switzerland to be incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the European Convention.228  
In a similar vein, in the case of Loizidou v Turkey (‘Loizidou’)229 the ECHR stated that 
a difference exists between the treaties governing the international court and those 
governing the ECHR.230 According to the ECHR the difference between these treaties 
concerns the subject matter addressed by these treaties. 231 The ECHR stated that the 
complaint before any International Court may fall within the scope of any general 
international law, but the subject matter of the complaint before the ECHR is exclusively 
within the scope of the European Convention.232 It thus held that such a difference in the 
subject matter between the treaties of the International Court and ECHR allows the 																																																								
223 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 392. 
224 Craven (2000) European Journal of International Law 491. 
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ECHR to distinguish the European Convention from the general international law.233 
Based on this distinction the interpretive organs, such as the ECHR and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) have been applying different approaches to 
treaty interpretation.234  The approaches include: the autonomous and the evolutive 
interpretations, and the principle of effectiveness.235 While the principle of effectiveness 
and the evolutive interpretation have been discussed above, 236  this part briefly 
elaborates the autonomous interpretation. 
The aim of the autonomous interpretation is to achieve the uniform understanding of 
the treaty applicable to all parties, rather than the meaning accepted by individual States 
at the domestic level.237 The autonomous interpretation is significant in that it helps 
parties to have a common understanding of the provisions of the treaty.238 Particularly in 
relation to human rights treaties, the common understanding gained from the 
autonomous interpretation ensures the effective protection of the rights contained in 
these treaties.239 In order to establish the common meaning of the treaty among the 
parties an inquiry as to the object and purpose of the treaty is required. In the case of 
Engel v the Netherlands (‘Engel’)240 the ECHR held that although the parties have the 
discretion to interpret the treaty in accordance with their domestic laws, this discretion 
should be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.241 This argument, that 
human rights treaties are immune to the general rule of interpretation, directly affects the 
application of the teleological approach to the interpretation of human rights treaties. 
Therefore, an examination that ascertains the applicability of the teleological approach to 
human rights treaties is required. I turn to this examination in the following part.  
2 3 2 2 Do human rights treaties have distinctive features from other international 
law treaties?  
While the preceding part has established that the Vienna Convention defines a treaty 
in wide terms to cover the human rights treaties it has been argued that the Vienna 																																																								
233 Paras 83-85. 
234 F Vanneste General International Law before Human Rights Courts: Assessing the Specialty Claims of 
International Human Rights Law (2010) 227-334. 
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237 Vanneste General International Law 229.  
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Convention does not address the peculiarities of these treaties. For example, Rietiker in 
his work on the principle of effectiveness argues that, with the exception of article 
60(5),242 the Vienna Convention does not consider the specificities of the human rights 
treaties.243 According to the provisions of article 60 (5) of the Vienna Convention the 
parties to the “treaties of a humanitarian character” that enumerate “provisions relating 
to the protection of the human person” are prohibited from suspending or terminating the 
enforcement of these treaties in their jurisdictions as a result of the breach of the treaty 
by one of the parties. As Schutter rightly notes, the prohibition in article 60(5) is 
necessary since in human rights treaties it is the individuals who are the beneficiaries of 
rights rather than the parties.244 Craven observes that the article is significant in the 
sense that parties to a human rights treaty are required to ensure the protection of the 
individuals’ human rights at all times.245 In this part, I argue that the human rights 
treaties have special features distinct from other international law treaties. 
Understanding of the special features of the human rights treaties is significant to this 
dissertation, as they influence the approach to interpretation which the interpretive 
organs should apply. As Fitzmaurice rightly notes, the special nature of human rights 
determines how these treaties should be interpreted.246 
The major factor in which the special legal character of human rights treaties can be 
demonstrated is their non-reciprocal nature. This means, each party to a human rights 
treaty should perform its obligations irrespective of what other parties to a treaty may be 
doing. In this regard, Fitzmaurice observes that the nature of human rights treaties 
centres on the absolute performance of States’ obligations, independent of the 
performance by other contracting States.247 According to Fitzmaurice, non-reciprocity is 
the most significant legal character which differentiates human rights treaties from other 
international law treaties.248 It is worth noting that the general international law treaties 
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embrace the reciprocal nature of treaties by maintaining mutual obligations and 
entitlements among contracting States.249  
The non-reciprocal character of human rights treaties explained above is expressed 
through States’ paramount obligation to protect the human rights of individuals.250 Unlike 
the general international law treaties which safeguard the interests of the States, the 
object and purpose of human rights treaties is to protect the rights of individuals within 
the jurisdiction of States. Schutter argues that the non-reciprocity of human rights is 
objective in nature, in that the parties are placed with the obligations to protect the rights 
of the individuals. 251  While rendering its advisory opinion on Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Convention 
(‘Reservations to the Genocide Convention’),252 the ICJ noted that, in human rights 
treaties such as the Genocide Convention, States do not have their own interests, but 
rather have the duty to fulfil the object and purpose embodied in such treaties which is 
the protection of human rights.253 In the same vein, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (‘Human Rights Committee’)254 in its General Comment 24255 noted that the 
human rights treaties are not concerned with the exchange of mutual obligations among 
contracting States, but rather with the endowment of individuals with rights.256  
																																																								
249 Scheinin “Characteristics of human rights norms” in International protection of human rights 19. 
250 19. 
251 De Schutter “The status of human rights” in International protection of human rights 53. 
252 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion of 28 May 1951. 
253 Page 12. The ICJ stated that:  
“The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilising purpose. It is indeed difficult 
to imagine a Convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one 
hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other hand to confirm and endorse 
the most elementary principles of morality. In such Convention the contracting States do not have any interests 
of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high 
purposes which are the raison d’etre of the Convention. Consequently, in a Convention of this type one cannot 
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual 
balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the 
common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions.” 
254 United Nations Human Rights Committee is a supervisory body comprising of independent experts with 
a mandate to monitor the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its 
Member States. (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx) (accessed 29-03-
2017).  
255 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 General Comment on issues relating 
to reservation made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or Optional Protocol thereto, or in 
relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant (1994) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6. 
256 Para 17. See also Mapiripan Massacre v Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Judgment of 
September 15, 2005 Series C No. 134 para 104. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
56 
Thus the non-reciprocal character of human rights treaties vests States with 
obligations towards third-party beneficiaries. 257  Through this special feature, the 
approach applied to interpret human rights treaties should ensure the effective 
safeguarding of the individuals’ human rights.258 As the European Court noted in the 
case of Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (‘Rantsev’),259 the object and purpose of the 
European Convention requires its provisions to be construed in a manner that renders 
the protection envisaged therein practical and effective.260 Based on this perspective, 
Schutter notes that the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties requires the 
interpretive organs to interpret the human rights in an effective and practical manner.261 
In this part, I have established that human rights treaties possess peculiar features 
distinct from other international treaties. In the following part I consider whether these 
distinctive features require a departure from the teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation and whether other more appropriate interpretive approaches exist in 
respect of human rights treaties.  
2 3 2 3 Does the special nature of human rights treaties necessitate a departure 
from the teleological approach?  
Although it has been argued that special legal characteristics determine the manner 
in which human rights treaties should be interpreted,262 this does not necessarily mean 
that their interpretation should depart from the general rule of interpretation under 
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.263 As noted above,264 articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention embrace the teleological approach to interpretation. In this part, I 
argue that since the special legal character of the human rights treaties lies in their 
underlying object and purpose, the teleological approach that interprets a treaty in the 
light of its object and purpose becomes the most viable approach to be applied. As 
Fitzmaurice rightly notes, the special legal character of human rights treaties leads the 
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interpretive organs to apply the teleological approach of interpretation found in article 31 
of the Vienna Convention.265  
In particular, the specificity of human rights treaties requires them to be interpreted in 
a way that effectively protects the human rights of individuals.266 It was observed by the 
ILC in its commentaries on the draft articles of the Law of Treaties that the principle of 
effectiveness explained above,267 is embodied in the phrase “object and purpose of the 
treaty”.268 The inclusion of the principle of effectiveness in the object and purpose of the 
treaty renders it part of the teleological approach. Senden confirms the principle of 
effectiveness to be an aspect of the teleological approach.269 Since this principle of 
effectiveness is embraced in the teleological aspect of object and purpose found in the 
Vienna Convention, the teleological approach becomes appropriate for the interpretation 
of human rights treaties. Scheinin confirms the relevance of the teleological approach 
enshrined in the Vienna Convention in interpreting the human rights treaties.270  
In the same vein, Fitzmaurice emphasises that the teleological aspect embodied in 
the provisions of article 31(1) is the most appropriate approach for the interpretation of 
the human rights treaties.271 Its appropriateness centres on the fact that recourse to the 
object and purpose of these treaties enables the interpretive organs to ascertain the 
content and scope of the relevant provisions protecting human rights.272 Through the 
principle of effectiveness the interpretive organs can render the content and scope of the 
individuals’ rights practical and effective. This objective interpretation is significant in two 
respects. Firstly, it guarantees the importance of the individuals’ rights.273 Secondly, it 
interprets the treaty as a living instrument.274 
Moreover, the provisions of article 31(1) requiring a treaty to be interpreted in the light 
of its object and purpose are flexible in that they accommodate the application of 																																																								
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objective criteria of interpretation. This flexibility is compatible with the specificity 
underlying various human rights treaties.275 The objective criteria of interpretation allow 
the interpretive organs to take into account the real needs of the individuals at the time 
of the interpretation of the treaty.276  Thus, the interpretation creates space for the 
interpretive organs to ascertain the object and purpose of the treaty in relation to the 
rights being interpreted based on the conditions prevalent at the time of interpretation 
rather than the conditions at the time of the treaty’s adoption.277 In this regard, the 
objective criteria of interpretation allow the interpretation of a treaty as a living 
instrument. Writing on the European Convention, Dzehtsiarou confirms that this aspect 
of the objective criteria of interpretation provides the interpretive organs with flexibility to 
consider the socio-economic circumstances relevant to the interpretation of the 
individual’s rights.278 While this part has demonstrated that the peculiarity of human 
rights treaties does not discard the application of the teleological approach to 
interpretation but rather embraces it, the following part analyses the criticisms levelled 
against this approach.  
2 3 3 Criticisms of the teleological approach 
2 3 3 1 Does the teleological approach ignore the text and intention of the parties? 
Critics of the teleological approach contend that it ignores the text and intention of the 
parties to a treaty. Fitzmaurice, for instance, contends that in its extreme form, the 
teleological approach fails to properly regard the intentions of the parties in two respects. 
On the one hand, the teleological approach interprets a treaty by focusing only on the 
known or presumed object and purpose of the treaty or the subsequent conduct of the 
parties.279  On the other hand, it interprets the treaty by considering the emergent 
purpose280 and overrides the purpose that was intended by the parties at the time of the 
																																																								
275 Orakhelashvili (2003) European Journal of International Law 533-534. 
276 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 102. 
277 102. 
278 K Dzehtsiarou “European consensus and the evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1730 1731. 
279 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 4. 
280 Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 8. See also Fitzmaurice (1957) British Year 
Book of International Law 208. Fitzmaurice defines emergent purpose to mean an emerging or true 
purpose different from the original purpose intended by the parties to a treaty. According to Fitzmaurice, 
with emergent purpose a treaty is interpreted in the light of the purpose of the treaty at the time of 
interpretation as opposed to the purpose at the time of the adoption of the treaty. Based on the analysis of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
59 
adoption of the treaty.281 According to Fitzmaurice, the emergent purpose is the aim of 
the treaty that appears to exist at the time of interpretation.282 Jacobs takes it a step 
further and argues that, in general, the teleological approach seeks the object and 
purpose of the treaty without considering both the text itself and the original intention of 
the parties to a treaty.283 He argues that since the emergent purpose appears at the time 
of interpretation it is not identified either from the text or the original intention of the 
parties.284 
It should be noted that the teleological approach interprets a treaty in the light of its 
object and purpose. As discussed above, the object and purpose can be discovered by 
having recourse to a wide range of key elements such as the preamble, preparatory 
work, subsequent practices and subsequent agreements of the States parties, as well as 
the relevant rules of international law. Reference to textual elements such as the 
preamble, as analysed in part 2 2 3 as well as the construction of the text of the treaty as 
a whole, which the teleological approach requires, does not represent a neglect of the 
text of the treaty. The teleological approach aims at interpreting the preamble and the 
text in a coherent, integrated manner and in so doing engages with the text 
appropriately. Thus, instead of ignoring the text, the teleological approach gives the text 
the intended effective meaning by interpreting it in the light of object and purpose of the 
treaty as it appears in various provisions thereof. Moreover, the teleological approach, 
through requiring proper regard of the preparatory work of the treaty, accords due 
consideration to the intention of the parties to a treaty. It should be noted that the 
teleological approach applies preparatory work with the aim of identifying the apparent 
object and purpose of the treaty intended by the parties.285 Since the preparatory work 
reveals the object and purpose of the treaty as intended by the parties, the teleological 
interpretation using the preparatory work values the intentions of the parties.  
Furthermore, while Fitzmaurice and Jacobs treat the emergent purpose as a purpose 
which is not found within the text or intention of the parties, it is worth noting that the 
object and purpose of the treaty can be established through the subsequent practice and 																																																																																																																																																																																			
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agreement of the parties and the relevant rules of international law. These are significant 
elements for ensuring effective interpretation since the principle of effectiveness 
embodied within the teleological approach requires the treaty to be interpreted as a 
living document. In this way, the interpretive organs are able to address the actual 
circumstances and needs of the people at the time of interpretation of the treaty. Thus, 
the interpretive organs can apply these elements to identify the object and purpose of 
the treaty at the time of interpretation rather than confining their focus to the object and 
purpose existing at the adoption of the treaty. 
As Rietiker highlights, interpretation in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty 
is flexible in that it avails the interpretive organs with wide options to adopt different 
elements of interpretation.286 According to this understanding, the emergent purpose 
does not necessarily mean the identification of purposes beyond the scope of the text, 
but rather ascertaining the object and purpose of the text by reference to subsequent 
external sources relevant to the treaty. 
2 3 3 2 Does the teleological approach cause interpretive organs to usurp States 
Parties’ drafting mandate? 
It has been contended that by applying the teleological approach, the interpretive 
organs usurp the drafting powers of the parties to a treaty.287 For instance, Fitzmaurice 
argues that by reading into the treaty provisions that are not expressly included therein 
or expanding the scope and content of the texts and making corrections to the texts, the 
teleological approach usurps the powers of the parties to amend and make laws.288 In 
order to ensure that the interpretive organs do not encroach upon the parties’ drafting 
powers, Fitzmaurice argues for a restrictive application of the teleological approach.289 
According to him, if the teleological approach is restrained, it demonstrates the principle 
of effectiveness efficiently.290 In this part, I argue that Fitzmaurice’s suggestion can 
endanger the interpretation of the provisions of the treaties, particularly the socio-
economic rights provisions in the African Charter. This is because it does not take into 
consideration the significant sources that are crucial for the improvement of socio-
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economic conditions of the African people. In this way, the interpretive organs can limit a 
generous construction of the object and purpose of the African Charter.  
It is also necessary to point out that the thrust of the principle of effectiveness 
enshrined in the teleological approach is to ensure that the text of a treaty is interpreted 
in a way that guarantees the effective meaning of such particular text. The legal basis of 
the principle of effectiveness is found within the object and purpose of the treaty itself. In 
this regard, a restrictive interpretation of the individuals’ rights in a manner that favours 
the interests of the States is contrary to this principle of effectiveness. Particularly to the 
human rights treaties, as was discussed above,291 the interpretation that restricts the 
rights defeats the object and purpose which is to promote and protect human rights. As 
observed by Rietiker, the adoption of a restrictive interpretation of the individuals’ rights 
curtails the enjoyment of human rights and freedoms.292 For this reason a restrictive 
interpretation of the scope of human rights provisions is not an effective interpretive 
aid.293  The requirement (in the principle of effectiveness) that a treaty is a living 
instrument demands that it be interpreted in the light of the conditions prevalent at the 
time of interpretation. In this regard, the teleological approach does not result in the 
interpretive organs usurping the drafting powers of the parties but rather enables them, 
(through the principle of effectiveness) to give the treaty a meaning which is consistent 
with the text interpreted in the light of contemporary circumstances. As Viljoen rightly 
notes, as living instruments, treaties should be interpreted continuously in the light of the 
contemporary conditions prevalent in the society. 294  In this regard, the interpretive 
organs are required to interpret the rights of individuals in the light of present socio-
economic conditions.295 This aspect of the teleological approach enables the interpretive 
organs to render the rights of individuals practical and effective in a manner that 
responds to the individuals’ socio-economic changes.296 In addition, Vanneste argues 
that interpreting a treaty as a living instrument, requires an interpretation that ensures 
the improvement of individuals’ socio-economic conditions.297  Thus, the teleological 
approach enables the interpretive organs to perform their significant role of effectively 
assigning meaning to a treaty without usurping the drafting powers of the parties.   																																																								
291 See part 2 3 2 2 above. 
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294 Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 2 ed (2012) 308. 
295 Vanneste General International Law 243. 
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This part has assessed various criticisms against the teleological approach. The 
following part examines why the teleological approach is a particularly appropriate 
approach for the interpretation of the rights enshrined in the African Charter including the 
socio-economic rights. 
2 4 Appropriateness of the teleological approach for interpreting rights in the 
African Charter 
The African Charter is a law-making instrument in the sense that it focuses on 
achieving a common goal. According to Senden, the main goal of any law-making treaty 
of a human rights nature is to protect the individual’s rights.298 The parties’ object and 
purpose to protect individuals’ rights is non-reciprocal in that they undertake to 
safeguard the rights of the individuals rather than their own interests. This law-making 
aspect to protect human rights, both at individual and collective level, is also the core 
objective of the African Charter. The Preamble to the African Charter confirms the 
parties’ obligation to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights.299 The object and 
purpose to protect individual’s rights requires that interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the African Charter promotes this common goal. As Senden rightly notes, 
in the law-making treaties consideration of the object and purpose of the treaty is 
significant in establishing the meaning and scope of the provisions to be interpreted.300 
In this regard, the interpretive organs are required to accord a generous interpretation of 
the relevant rights in a manner that gives proper effect to parties’ obligations rather than 
given them a narrow or restrictive interpretation. In the case of Wemhoff v Germany 
(‘Wemhoff’)301 the ECHR, with regard to article 5 of the European Convention on the 
right to liberty and security of person, held that: 
“Given that it is a law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation 
that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the 
treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations 
undertaken by the Parties.”302 
Writing in the context of the European Convention, Rietiker confirms the suitability of 
the teleological approach in interpreting a law-making treaty of a human rights 																																																								
298 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 16. 
299 The preamble to the African Charter para 11. 
300 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 16. 
301 Wemhoff v Germany (1968) Series A No. 7. 
302 Para 8. See also Soering v The United Kingdom (1989), Series A No. 161 para 87. 
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character.303 As was elaborated above,304 the teleological approach that focuses on 
realising the object and purpose of the treaty becomes an appropriate approach for 
interpreting the rights enshrined in the African Charter including the socio-economic 
rights. 
As was analysed above, 305  through the object and purpose of the treaty the 
teleological approach interprets a treaty as a whole. It takes into account the preamble 
to the treaty as well as the systematic construction of the treaty in its entirety.306 This 
aspect of interpretation is appropriate in that the construction of the socio-economic 
rights can be done on the basis of various clauses of the preamble and the other 
provisions of the African Charter.  
The African Charter contains various statements in its preamble, as well as certain 
substantive provisions that can be used as interpretive guidelines. The statements in the 
preamble that enshrine the interpretive insight include: the parties’ commitment to 
uphold the values of freedom, equality, justice, and dignity, 307  the principle of 
interdependence of rights,308 the notion of African philosophy, the concept of the rights 
of “peoples”, and the performance of duties on the part of everyone.309 The significance 
of these interpretive elements in the context of interpreting socio-economic rights will be 
discussed in chapter three of this study. The substantive provisions of the African 
Charter that provide an interpretive guide include: the operative provisions, 310  the 
provisions that strengthen the values stated in the preamble to the African Charter,311 
and the duties provisions.312 Other provisions include articles 3, 4 and 5, as well as 
articles 60 and 61 (‘drawing inspiration clauses’) of the African Charter. Articles 60 and 
61 create space for the interpretive organs to draw inspiration from other relevant laws in 
interpreting the provisions of the African Charter. 
The provisions of human rights treaties are formulated in general terms making it 
difficult for the interpretive organs to ascertain their scope and content through the 
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textual approach.313 The African Charter is not immune from this general characteristic 
of the human rights treaties. As will be discussed in chapter three of this study, the 
African Charter formulates the socio-economic rights in a broad manner. The report of 
the Rapporteur to the Ministerial Meeting of the Organisation of the African Unity 
(‘Rapporteur’s OAU report’) 314 confirms the general nature of the socio-economic rights 
provisions.315 According to the Rapporteur, the human rights provisions were formulated 
in general terms in order to allow the interpretive organs the flexibility to interpret them 
by an appropriate approach to interpretation. Regarding the general formulation of the 
socio- economic rights’ provisions in the African Charter, Ssenyonjo suggests that an 
interpretive approach that takes into account the object and purpose of the treaty is 
required in the interpretation of these rights. 316  As elaborated above, 317  recourse 
exclusively to the intention of the parties or a narrow textual approach to treaty 
interpretation is incapable of assigning adequate meaning to the broadly formulated 
rights provisions.  
In Wemhoff the ECHR, while deciding on the meaning of article 5(3) of the European 
Convention, held that the application of the textual approach would lead to an 
interpretation which was contrary to the object and purpose of the European 
Convention.318 Given the nature of the broad formulation of the rights’ provisions in the 
African Charter, the teleological approach which utilises various interpretive elements 
and principles is required to ascertain their adequate meaning. Vanneste confirms the 
relevance of the teleological approach in ascertaining the scope and content of the 
broadly formulated provisions. 319  Although the text of the treaty is relevant in the 
interpretation of human rights provisions, based on their general nature, an approach to 
treaty interpretation that constructs the meaning of these rights through a number of 
interpretive tools is required.320 
As will be discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, the African Charter omits a 
significant number of the socio-economic rights as well as the remedies provisions. As 																																																								
313 Killander (2010) International Journal on Human Rights 146. 
314 Report of the Rapporteur, OAU Ministerial Meeting on the Draft African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Banjul Gambia, 9-15 June 1980, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Draft RPT.rpt (II). 
315 Para 13. 
316 M Ssenyonjo “Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter” in M Ssenyonjo (ed) The 
African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (2012) 55 59.  
317 See parts 2 2 1 and 2 2 2 above. 
318 Wemhoff paras 4-5. 
319 Vanneste General International Law 253. 
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was discussed above,321 the intention of the parties and the textual approaches are 
limited methods to derive rights not expressly included in the treaty. In this regard, an 
interpretive approach that interprets the provisions of the treaty as a whole is required. 
The teleological approach engages the provisions of the entire treaty to ascertain the 
meaning of the interpreted text. 322  As such, the teleological approach allows the 
interpretive organs to apply the provisions of articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter to 
read in it the omitted provisions. These articles create space for interpretive organs to 
draw inspiration from other relevant laws in interpreting the provisions of the African 
Charter. Interpreting the treaty in the light of other relevant instruments is an aspect of 
the teleological approach. Thus, this aspect of the teleological approach allows the 
interpretive organs to read in the African Charter the omitted socio-economic rights as 
well as the remedies provisions. As Yeshanew notes, the provisions of articles 60 and 
61 serve as an interpretive guide of the African Charter. 323  Chapter three of this 
dissertation will discuss these provisions. 
Having analysed the appropriateness of the teleological approach in interpreting the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter, the following part suggests a methodology 
for the teleological approach to be followed by interpretive organs in interpreting these 
rights. 
2 5 Applying the teleological approach to the interpretation of the African Charter: 
Methodology 
2 5 1 Introduction 
The foregoing analysis elaborated the teleological approach to interpretation. In 
particular, the analysis identified the elements of the teleological approach and the 
appropriateness of this approach in the interpretative process. This analysis is significant 
in two respects. Firstly, it elaborates the meaning of the teleological approach and its 
elements that should be taken into account in the interpretative process. Secondly, it 
identifies the appropriateness of the teleological approach in the interpretation of the 
human rights treaties. However, Senden notes the non-existence of a systematic 
methodology for the application of the teleological approach. 324  Accordingly, a 
																																																								
321 See parts 2 2 1 and 2 2 2 above. 
322 See part 2 2 3 above. 
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methodology for the application of the teleological approach to be followed by the 
interpretive organs is required. Thus, this part develops the methodological approach to 
be applied by the interpretive organs when interpreting the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. The methodology is significant in two ways. Firstly, it can guide the 
interpretive organs to apply the teleological approach appropriately. Secondly, it can 
help the interpretive organs to justify their decisions. As Tobin rightly observes, the 
appropriate application of the interpretive approach renders the interpretative process 
legitimate.325 As analysed in the foregoing parts, the teleological approach is enshrined 
in the interpretive provisions of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Although 
these provisions do not establish the methodology for application of the teleological 
approach, they are significant in the sense that they can guide the development of the 
required methodology.326  
The interpretive provisions of articles 31 and 32 will be engaged in developing the 
methodology for the application of the teleological approach which is discussed in the 
following sub-parts. Significantly, as was elaborated above,327 the Vienna Convention in 
article 31(1) requires a treaty to be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose. The 
following part explores this requirement in the context of the African Charter as a vital 
element for the methodology developed herein. 
2 5 2 Interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter in light of its object 
and purpose  
The preceding analysis of the teleological approach demonstrated that the apparent 
object and purpose of the treaty is the underlying premise of this interpretive approach. 
The object and purpose of the African Charter is vital in developing the effective 
meaning, scope and content of socio-economic rights and their related obligations 
enshrined therein. As Senden notes, the object and purpose of the treaty is significant in 
developing the meaning of the provisions of the treaty.328 Furthermore, in the Rantsev 
case, the ECHR held that the specific substantive provisions of the European 
Convention should not be the exclusive point of reference in the interpretative 
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process.329 According to the ECHR the provisions of the European Convention originate 
from its object and purpose. Hence, they should be interpreted in the light of the object 
and purpose of the European Convention.330 Commenting on Golder v The United 
Kingdom (‘Golder’) 331  Fitzmaurice notes that in the interpretative process the 
establishment of the object and purpose of the treaty is vital in developing the meaning 
of the provisions being interpreted.332 In a similar vein, Senden observes that the ECHR 
interprets the European Convention by ascertaining the object and purpose.333 This 
practice helps to demonstrate that the object and purpose of the treaty is the vital point 
of reference in the interpretative process. Thus, it can convincingly be argued that in 
interpreting socio-economic rights the supervisory organs of the African Charter should 
ascertain the object and purpose of the African Charter relating to these rights.  
The significance of ascertaining the object and purpose of the African Charter in 
interpreting socio-economic rights enshrined therein is threefold. Firstly, it can help the 
interpretive organs to identify the goals to be achieved, in relation to the substantive and 
procedural provisions being interpreted. Secondly, it can help the interpretive organs to 
identify the interpretive aids enshrined in the African Charter as a whole. As Swart 
correctly argues, the object and purpose of the treaty guides the interpretive organs to 
interpret the treaty in its entirety.334 Thirdly, it can assist the interpretive organs to 
identify appropriate external interpretive aids that can be consulted during the 
interpretative process. As Senden rightly observes, the interpretive organs establish the 
interpretive aids to support the interpretation of the treaty through the object and 
purpose. 335  Thus, referring to the object and purpose of the treaty requires the 
interpretive organs to take internal and external interpretive aids into account when 
interpreting such treaty. In the case of Rantsev the ECHR held that: 
“The court is required to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in 
their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which 
they are drawn. The Court must have regard to the fact that the context of the 
provisions is a treaty for the effective protection of individuals human rights and that 
the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to 
promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions. Account 																																																								
329 Rantsev para 273. 
330 Para 274. 
331 Golder v The United Kingdom Application no. 4451/70 ECHR (1975). 
332 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of human rights” in International Human Rights Law 761  
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must also be taken of any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable 
in relations between the Contracting Parties and the Convention should so far as 
possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part. Finally, the Court emphasises that the object and purpose of the 
Convention, as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings, requires 
that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical 
and effective.”336 
However, Jacobs points out the lack of a clear methodology for ascertaining the 
object and purpose of the treaty in relation to the provisions being interpreted.337 
According to Jacobs, it is uncertain how the interpretive organs should engage the 
internal and external interpretive aids in interpreting the text of the treaty.338 The concern 
by Jacobs indicates the need to develop a clear methodological sequence for 
ascertaining the object and purpose in relation to the provisions being interpreted. The 
sequence is significant in that it can help the interpretive organs to interpret the socio-
economic provisions in the African Charter in line with its object and purpose. The 
following parts discuss the suggested sequence. 
2 5 2 1 Textual synthesis 
The interpretive organs should start with the textual synthesis to identify the object 
and purpose of the treaty in relation to the provisions being interpreted. Through the 
textual synthesis the interpretive organs apply the key elements, emerging from the 
treaty read as a whole, to develop the meaning of the provisions in the treaty. These key 
elements include: the preamble, the operative provisions, the substantive socio-
economic rights provisions, and other related provisions. The interpretive organs are 
thus required to construe the provisions of the treaty in the light of other key elements 
found within a treaty.339 This sequence is justified within the provisions of article 31(1)-
(2) of the Vienna Convention. To engage these key elements the interpretive organs 
should begin with the preamble to the African Charter. It is significant to give prime 
weight to the preamble to the African Charter as it encompasses the goals to be 
protected, in relation to the provisions found therein. As Fennelly rightly observes, the 
preamble to the treaty enshrines the aspirations of the States embedded in the 
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provisions of the treaty.340 In a similar vein, Gittleman argues that the preamble guides 
the interpretive organs to understand the substantive provisions contained in the African 
Charter.341 Specifically, the preamble to the African Charter articulates the commitment 
of the States to “promote and protect human and peoples’ rights.”342 Moreover, the 
preamble to the African Charter contains various clauses that elaborate the goal to 
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights. For example, the statements in the 
preamble give the interpretive organs scope to draw on the “values of freedom, equality, 
justice, and dignity”, the principle of interdependence of human rights,’ “individual 
duties”, and adherence to other international treaties of a human rights nature in order to 
define the object and purpose of the African Charter. Fitzmaurice rightly argues that the 
preamble to the African Charter provides a wide context of the international treaties to 
be applied in the interpretative process.343 The values of freedom, equality, justice, and 
dignity referred to in the preamble are “essential objectives for the achievement of the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples”.344 This implies that the object and purpose 
of the African Charter is to ensure that the African people live with freedom, equality, 
justice, and dignity in order to achieve their socio-economic aspirations. Thus, the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter should promote these 
values.  
Furthermore, these values are elaborated in the substantive provisions of articles 1 to 
5 of the African Charter. Article 1 of the African Charter provides for the general 
obligations of the parties. Through this article the parties are required to “recognise the 
rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the African Charter” and “to adopt legislative or 
other measures to give effect” to these rights, duties and freedoms. The provisions of 
article 2 embody the principle of non-discrimination that is relevant in the interpretation 
of provisions of human rights, including the provisions of socio-economic rights. Article 3 
embodies the individual’s right to equality before the law, and the equal protection of the 
law, while article 4 provides for the right to life and article 5 provides for the right to 
dignity. As such the interpretive organs are required to engage these provisions in the 
interpretative process of the African Charter as a whole. These articles are significant in 																																																								
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that they strengthen the values stated in the preamble to the African Charter. 
Commenting on similar provisions in various international treaties, Tobin argues that the 
interpretation of the treaty as a whole requires the interpretive organs to engage these 
provisions in the interpretative process.345  
Odinkalu rightly notes that the provisions of articles 1 to 5 facilitate the construction of 
the socio-economic rights. 346  The application of these provisions can help the 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights in three ways. Firstly, it can ensure that 
States fulfil the obligations vested in them by the socio-economic rights. Secondly, it 
guarantees the realisation of the socio-economic rights on non-discriminatory, equitable 
grounds. Bulto confirms the significance of the right to equality in guaranteeing the 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights on an equitable basis.347 According to Bulto, the 
right to equality enables the equal distribution of public resources related to socio-
economic rights such as health, labour, and educational rights.348 Thirdly, it ensures that 
the socio-economic rights are realised in a manner that promotes the dignity of the 
individuals. For example, Heyns observes that the provision of poor quality food, and the 
denial of access to adequate medical care violate the right to dignity.349 In this regard, 
these operative provisions lay down the scope and content to be considered in achieving 
the object and purpose of the African Charter in relation to the socio-economic rights 
being interpreted.  
Furthermore, Bulto identifies two other ways in which these provisions can help the 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights.350 Firstly, they can be used to identify the 
implicit socio-economic rights in the African Charter through their socio-economic 
dimensions. Therefore, these provisions can give effect to the scope of the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter.351  Secondly, they can be used to further the 
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notion of the interdependence of rights. As Viljoen rightly argues, the socio-economic 
rights are inter-linked to the civil and political rights.352  
Furthermore, the textual synthesis creates room for the interpretive organs to engage 
other civil and political rights’ provisions to give meaning to the socio-economic rights 
being interpreted. These rights include: the rights to be heard, freedom of conscience, 
freedom of information, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
movement and residence, and equal access to public services.353 Bulto rightly argues 
that the use of these civil and political rights can help to enrich the scope and content of 
the socio-economic rights.354 Moreover, the textual synthesis provides the interpretive 
organs with the scope to engage the duties’ provisions to ascertain the object and 
purpose of the African Charter in relation to socio-economic rights. These provisions 
include articles 27 to 29 of the African Charter. These provisions provide for the 
individual’s duties to his or her family, “respect his or her fellow beings without 
discrimination”, and “preserve the harmonious development of the family”. The 
interpretive organs can utilise these provisions to interpret the socio-economic rights’ 
obligations of the non-state actors.  
As Chirwa rightly notes, the individual’s duties provisions in the African Charter are 
relevant in holding the non-state actors accountable for the violations of human rights.355 
Through the textual synthesis the interpretive organs can also employ the provisions of 
articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, and article 7 of the African Court Protocol to 
interpret the socio-economic rights in accordance with the object and purpose of the 
African Charter. The interpretive aspect of these provisions centres on the fact that they 
identify other African and international treaties, as well as national legal sources that can 
be applied to interpret the socio-economic provisions. The legal sources identified in 
these provisions will be discussed below.356 Moreover, the analysis of these provisions 
that demonstrate the textual possibilities to interpret the socio-economic rights is the 
subject of chapter three of this dissertation. 
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2 5 2 2 Preparatory work of the African Charter 
As previously discussed, the text of the treaty is the starting point of the interpretative 
process. As such, the interpretive organs should not treat the textual synthesis as an 
exclusive means of interpretation. At the second stage of the interpretative process the 
interpretive organs should consider the preparatory work of the treaty. As demonstrated 
above, 357  the Vienna Convention places the preparatory work of a treaty as a 
supplementary tool of interpretation.358 It therefore allows recourse to the preparatory 
work of the treaty in limited circumstances such as confirming the meaning from an 
application of article 31(1) or when the meaning according to article 31(1) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure or when the meaning leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.359 However, it was argued above360 that the fact that 
article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires the treaty to be interpreted in light of its 
object and purpose allows interpretative tools, which elaborate the object and purpose of 
the treaty, to be considered as primary interpretative sources. Thus, this understanding 
allows the preparatory work of the African Charter that embodies the object and purpose 
of the African Charter to be applied as a primary interpretative tool.  
There are six reasons to substantiate this consideration. Firstly, the preparatory work 
can clarify the scope of the object and purpose of the treaty embedded in the socio-
economic rights provisions when the textual synthesis is not amenable to give such 
clarity.361  
Secondly, the preparatory work can assist the interpretive organs to explain the 
scope and content of the rights that are formulated in general terms. As Tobin rightly 
argues, the preparatory work of the treaty clarifies the nature of the substantive rights’ 
formulation.362 In a similar vein, Fachiri had noted earlier on that the preparatory work of 
the treaty should be applied to solve the ambiguities found in the text of the treaty and 
explain the object and purpose of the treaty.363  Klabbers confirms this role of the 
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preparatory work to expound on the meaning of the substantive provisions of the 
treaty.364  
Thirdly, the preparatory work can guide the interpretive organs to fill the gaps of the 
omitted socio-economic rights in the African Charter. Fourthly, the interpretive organs 
can use preparatory work to clarify the text of the treaty. Aust confirms this corrective 
function of the preparatory work of the treaty.365 Fifthly, it can guide the interpretive 
organs to interpret the provisions related to remedies. Lastly, the preparatory work can 
assist the interpretive organs to identify other interpretive aids to be applied in the 
interpretative process. Yeshanew correctly notes that the preparatory work can be used 
to establish other interpretive sources that can inspire the interpretive organs.366  
However, Senden rejects the use of the preparatory work of the treaty to elaborate 
the object and purpose of the treaties with a human rights nature.367 According to 
Senden, some of the parties to such treaties did not take part in the preparatory 
stages.368 Therefore, such parties cannot be obliged to comply with the preparatory work 
of such treaties.369 This rejection is problematic in that it can cause uncertainty of the 
methodology for the application of the teleological approach. The uncertainty is based 
on the fact that the interpretive organs can be required to apply two distinct 
methodological approaches for interpreting the same treaty. One of the methodological 
approaches would be for negotiating States,370 and the other for States that did not take 
part in the negotiations for the adoption of the treaty. According to Merkouris, this 
methodological distinction can lead to the fragmentation of the treaties.371 Merkouris 
argues further that the application of two distinct sets of interpretive rules to member 
States of the same treaty contravenes the principle of legal certainty.372  
In support of the application of the preparatory work to the ratifying States, Merkouris 
identifies three significant considerations that the interpretive organs should take into 																																																								
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account. These considerations include the knowledge of the preparatory work by the 
ratifying States, the number of the States that have ratified the treaty, and the 
accessibility of the preparatory work to the States.373 With regard to the knowledge of 
the preparatory work, Lauterpacht argued earlier on that by signing or ratifying the final 
draft of the treaty, the parties demonstrate their acceptance to the treaty as it was 
finalised by the negotiating States. They also demonstrate their willingness for the 
consideration of the intention of the negotiating States regarding the treaty in interpreting 
it. 374 In a similar vein Shabtai observes that, by accepting the texts of the treaties, 
States express their knowledge of and consent to the use of the preparatory work of 
such treaties.375 Drawing on the argument advanced by Lauterpacht and Shabtai, I 
demonstrate that the States’ acceptance of the African Charter, by way of signature and 
ratification, express their knowledge and acceptance to comply with the overarching 
object and purpose of the treaty as envisaged by the drafters. These means of States’ 
acceptance of the terms of the treaty are provided for in article 63(1) of the African 
Charter. According to this article a State’s consent can be expressed by way of 
signature, ratification or adherence. 376  Through expression of their commitment to 
adhere to the terms of the treaty, the States become bound by the whole treaty. As Aust 
rightly argues, the term “adherence to a treaty” is a general way of demonstrating that a 
State has consented to be bound by the treaty.377 Articles 12(1)(a),378 14(1)(a),379 and 
16(1)(b)380 of the Vienna Convention, which are also applicable to human rights treaties 
including the African Charter, confirm the above-mentioned ways as the means to 
express parties’ consent to be bound by the treaty. As such, the States that have 
consented to be bound by the African Charter either by signature, ratification or 
																																																								
373 80-81. 
374 Lauterpacht (1935) Harvard Law Review 585. 
375  Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966) Vol. 1 Part II: Summary records of the 
eighteenth session 4 May – 19 July 1966 (A/CN.4/SR.A/1966) at 200 para 34. 
376 Art 63(1) of the African Charter. 
377 Aust Modern treaty law 91. 
378 Art 12(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention provides: 
“The consent of a state to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when: 
the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect.” 
379 Art 14(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention reads: 
“The consent of a state to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: 
the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification.” 
380 Art 16(1)(b) provides: 
“Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession establish 
the consent of a state to be bound by a treaty upon their deposit with the depositary”. 
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adherence,381 are required to comply with its apparent object and purpose. Article 18 of 
the Vienna Convention confirms the requirement for the parties to a treaty to comply with 
the object and purpose stated in the treaty. The article requires States to refrain from 
defeating the object and purpose of the treaty.382 According to Aust this requirement 
applies to both the negotiating States and the States that did not participate in the 
negotiation process.383  
For these reasons, it can be argued that the interpretive organs can apply the 
preparatory work as a means to elaborate the object and purpose of the African Charter 
to both categories of States.384 Significantly, the preparatory work of the African Charter 
is accessible to all State members. Yeshanew confirms the availability and accessibility 
of the documents used to adopt the African Charter.385  
2 5 2 3 Reference to the relevant international treaties and subsequent 
agreements and practices of the parties 
At the third stage of the interpretative process, the interpretive organs should have 
recourse to other relevant international treaties, the subsequent agreements and the 
subsequent conduct of the parties. The significance of applying the relevant international 
treaties at the third stage of the interpretative process is fourfold. Firstly, they fill in the 
lacunae in the African Charter which could not be solved by the application of the textual 
synthesis, and the preparatory work. The ILC notes that reference to other international 
treaties can be made when the treaty fails to explicitly or implicitly provide for some 
substantive provisions.386 Tobin confirms this role of international treaties to address the 
gaps found within a treaty being interpreted. 387  Secondly, they help to resolve 
ambiguities of the textual formulation of the provisions being interpreted. Thirdly, they 
guarantee international acceptance of the decisions by the interpretive organs. Fourthly, 																																																								
381 As noted in part 2 1 above 53 out of 54 African States have ratified and deposited the instruments of 
their ratification with the AU Secretary-General who is the depositary in accordance with the provisions of 
article 63(2) of the African Charter. 
382 Art 18 of the Vienna Convention provides: 
“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: 
it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or 
it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided 
that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.” 
383 Aust Modern Treaty Law 94. 
384 Lauterpacht (1935) Harvard Law Review 577. 
385 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 53. 
386 ILC Fragmentation Report para 465(a). 
387 Tobin (2010) Harvard Human Rights Journal 43-44. 
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they help to achieve external coherence388 so as to achieve maximum harmonisation 
between the interpretation of socio-economic rights provisions in the African Charter and 
the interpretation of the socio-economic rights in line with other international and 
regional treaties recognised by the African States. As Tobin rightly argues, the external 
coherence requires the decisions of the interpretive organs to be justified by other 
relevant international treaties.389  Fitzmaurice confirms the requirement to justify the 
meaning of the treaty with other international instruments.390 Deciding in the European 
context, the ECHR held in the Rantsev case that the meaning assigned to the text of the 
treaty should be in harmony with other relevant international treaties.391 The ILC had 
explained earlier on that the intention of the parties to a treaty is to ensure that their 
treaty is not inconsistent with other international instruments.392  In this regard, the 
international treaties become relevant at the third stage of the interpretative process. 
This stage of the interpretative process is justified by the provisions of article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention.  
Writing in the European context, Senden observes the lack of certainty of the 
relevant international treaties to be consulted.393 This observation raises the need to 
ascertain relevant international instruments to be applied in the interpretation of the 
African Charter. With regard to the requirement to ascertain the relevant international 
laws the ILC explained that: 
“It is a preliminary step to any act of applying the law that a prima facie view of the 
matter is formed. This includes, among other things, an initial assessment of what 
might be the applicable rules and principles. The result will be that a number of 
standards may seem prima facie relevant. A choice is needed, and a justification for 
having recourse to one instead of another.”394 
																																																								
388 The term ‘external coherence’ was used by Rietiker in his work on the principle of effectiveness to 
mean the interpretation of a treaty in the light of other relevant international sources. See Rietiker (2010) 
Nordic Journal of International Law 271. In this dissertation the term ‘external coherence’ is applied in the 
context envisaged by Rietiker and expand it to include relevant national legal sources. 
389 Tobin (2010) Harvard Human Rights Journal 29. 
390 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of human rights treaties” in International Human Rights Law 749. 
391 Rantsev para 274. 
392 ILC Fragmentation Report para 465(b). 
393 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 67. 
394 ILC Fragmentation Report para 36. 
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Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, as well as articles 3 and 7 of the African 
Court Protocol and article 31 of the African Court of Justice Protocol395 provide for the 
relevant laws to be applied.  
Article 60 of the African Charter reads: 
“The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and 
peoples’ rights, particularly from the provision of various African instruments on 
human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
instruments adopted within the specialised agencies of the United Nations of which 
the parties to the present Charter are members.” 
Article 61 of the African Charter states: 
“The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measure to 
determine the principles of law, other general or specialised international 
conventions laying down rules expressly recognised by member states of the 
Organisation of African Unity, African practices consistent with international norms 
on human and peoples’ rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles 
of law recognised by African States, as well as legal precedents and doctrines.” 
Article 3 of the African Court Protocol is relevant as it confers on the African Court the 
mandate to interpret and apply the provisions of the African Charter, and any other 
relevant international instruments.396 While the mandate to interpret gives the African 
Court the jurisdiction to assign meaning to the provisions of socio-economic rights in 
these relevant human rights instruments, the mandate to apply gives it the powers to 
enforce provisions of any relevant human rights instruments. The African Court’s 
jurisdiction in article 3 relates to article 7 of the African Court Protocol, as they both 																																																								
395 As it was pointed out in part 2 1 above the African Court of Justice Protocol has not yet entered into 
force. However, the discussion in this part is relevant in the understanding of art 31 of the African Court of 
Justice Protocol that provides for the laws that the African Court of Justice should be consulting in the 
interpretation of the African Charter. Art 31 of the African Court of Justice Protocol reads: 
“In carrying out its functions, the Court shall have regard to: 
a) The Constitutive Act; 
b) International treaties, whether general or particular, ratified by the contesting States; 
c) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
d) The general principles of law recognised universally or by African States; 
e) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, of Article 46 of the present Statute, judicial decisions and writings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations as well as the regulations, directives and decisions 
of the Union, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law; 
f) Any other law relevant to the determination of the case.”  
396 This part briefly explains the relevance of article 3 of the African Court Protocol and the extent to which 
it relates with article 7 of the African Court Protocol. It should be noted that there has been a scholarly 
debate regarding the formulation of article 3 of the African Protocol. The debates and a detailed 
discussion on the implications of the formulation of article 3 for the interpretation of the socio-economic 
rights is provided for in chapter four, part 4 4 1. 
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require the African Court to apply as sources of law the African Charter and any other 
relevant international human rights instrument. In order to establish the scope of the 
international instruments that the African Court can apply, the provisions of article 3 of 
the African Court Protocol should be read in conjunction with the provisions of article 7 
of the Protocol. 
Article 7 of the African Court Protocol reads: 
“The Court shall apply the provision of the Charter and any other relevant human 
rights instruments ratified by the States concerned.” 
The foregoing provisions identify the international treaties, African regional, and 
national legal instruments and jurisprudence recognised by the African States as 
relevant sources for interpretive purposes. Particularly, article 60 of the African Charter 
and article 7 of the African Court provide for the primary international sources to be 
applied. According to article 60 all the international treaties of a human rights nature are 
relevant for the interpretation of the African Charter. These treaties include the treaties 
adopted under the auspices of the UN and its agencies, as well as the African regional 
human rights treaties. Article 7 of the African Court Protocol is general in that it allows 
the African Court to apply any relevant human rights treaties. According to Harrington, 
the formulation of article 7 of the African Protocol is narrow in that it does not explicitly 
mention the international treaties to be applied.397 Harrington argues further that the 
African Court can resort to the provisions of articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter to 
broaden the scope of the relevant treaties to be applied. However, the scope of article 
60 is limited to the treaties of a human rights nature. As such, article 60 should be read 
in conjunction with article 31(3)(c) to establish other relevant international treaties to be 
applied. As Yeshenew rightly observes, the provisions of articles 60 and 61 of the 
African Charter do not replace the application of article 31 of the Vienna Convention.398 
According to the provisions of article 31(3)(c) the interpretive organs are required to take 
into account “any relevant rules of international law”. However, article 31(3)(c) is not 
elaborate in that it does not clearly mention the treaties to be consulted. Thus, the 
provisions of article 31(3)(c) should be read in conjunction with article 38(1)(a) and (b) of 
																																																								
397 J Harrington “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2000 (2002) 305 322-323. 
398 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 55. 
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the Statute of the ICJ (‘ICJ Statute’)399 that provides for the relevant laws to be applied in 
the interpretation of the treaties. Scheinin rightly argues that, since the human rights 
treaties are part of the normative framework of public international law, they should be 
interpreted in the light of the sources of public international law enumerated in article 
38(1)(a)-(d) of the ICJ Statute.400 Rietiker confirms the application of these provisions of 
the ICJ Statute in establishing the relevant international laws referred to in article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.401 Article 38(1)(a)-(d) of the ICJ Statute provides: 
“The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.” 
Moreover, the sources of public international law are relevant for the interpretation of 
the human rights treaties including the African Charter. As defined in the Vienna 
Convention, a treaty is an agreement between States that is governed by international 
law. 402  Through this definition of a treaty the Vienna Convention supports the 
applicability of the relevant sources of international law to the interpretation of human 
rights. Fitzmaurice confirms the avenue provided by article 2(1) of the Vienna 
Convention to apply sources of international public law in the interpretative process.403 
Another set of relevant legal sources is provided for in article 61 of the African 
Charter. These legal sources include the international treaties recognised by the African 
States, the African practices that are compatible with international human rights 
standards, the customs recognised as laws, the general principles of law applicable to 
African States, and the legal precedents. According to Scheinin, the general principles of 
law recognised by the States include the constitutions of such States. The legal sources 
in the provisions of article 61 accommodate the subsequent agreements and the 
subsequent conduct of the parties as relevant elements in the interpretative process. 																																																								
399 Statute of the ICJ is an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations. The underlying object and 
purpose of the Statute of the ICJ is to organise the composition and the functions of the ICJ. 
(http://www.icj.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2) (accessed 31-03-2017). 
400 Scheinin “Characteristics of human rights norms” in International Protection of Human Rights 20. 
401 Rietiker (2010) Nordic Journal of International Law 272. 
402 Art 2(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
403 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of human rights treaties” in International Human Rights Law 749. 
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These include legal sources such as the constitutions of the African States and legal 
precedents. According to Roberts, these subsequent practices are useful in the sense 
that they can provide the interpretive organs with an insight on how the treaty should be 
interpreted. 404  Arato argues further that the subsequent agreements and practices 
provide evidence for the interpretation of the treaty desired by the States.405  
Moreover, as discussed above, 406  the subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practices include: interpretive organs’ decisions, regulations, rules of procedure and 
resolutions, as well as the relevant laws and jurisprudence applicable in the African 
Countries, and decisions of the AU organs. Yeshanew confirms these sources as 
forming part of the subsequent agreements and subsequent practices of the parties.407 
The subsequent agreements and the subsequent practices of the parties are important 
in two respects. Firstly, they help to ascertain the consistency of the interpretive organs’ 
approach in relation to the socio-economic rights being interpreted. As Roberts rightly 
notes, through the subsequent agreements and the subsequent practices of the parties 
the interpretive organs establish the common and constant understanding of the terms 
of the treaty by the parties. 408  The subsequent agreements and the subsequent 
practices stand as evidence of the parties’ interpretation of the treaty.409 Secondly, they 
demonstrate the States’ acceptance to the decisions of the interpretive organs. 
However, Senden observes the lack of the order of application of the relevant 
international instruments by the interpretive organs. 410  According to Senden, each 
interpretive organ develops its own order of application of these sources.411 Writing on 
the African Commission, Viljoen argues that in some instances it has been applying only 
the non-African sources.412 For this reason an order of application of these sources to be 
followed by the interpretive organs of the African Charter is required. The suggested 
order of application considers both primary and subsidiary interpretive legal sources as 
follows: the interpretive organs should begin with treaties of a human rights nature. In 																																																								
404 A Roberts “The power and persuasion in Investment Treaty interpretation: The dual role of States” 
(2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 179 204. 
405 J Arato “Subsequent practice and evolutive interpretation: Techniques of treaty interpretation over time 
and their diverse consequences” (2010) 9 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 443 
458. 
406 See parts 2 2 3 & 2 3 above. 
407 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 46-49 
408 Roberts (2010) American Journal of International Law 200. 
409 200. 
410 Senden Interpretation of Fundamental Rights 112. 
411 112. 
412 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 327. 
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this category the interpretive organs should start with the African treaties followed by the 
international human rights treaties. At the second stage of application, recourse should 
be made to the general international treaties that shed light on the provisions being 
interpreted. According to Yeshanew, these are non-human rights treaties that are 
consistent with human rights standards.413 The ILC confirms this order of applying the 
specific treaties first followed by the general treaties at the second stage.414  
The interpretive organs should thereafter apply the African practices consistent with 
international human rights treaties followed by the international custom recognised as 
law by the African States. At the fourth stage the interpretive organs should apply the 
general principles of law recognised as law, and the legal precedents. According to 
Scheinin, the general principles of law include the domestic laws of the countries.415 
Moreover, the fourth stage creates room for the interpretive organs to apply the 
subsequent agreements and the subsequent practices of the parties including the legal 
precedents of the African Charter’s interpretive organs. According to Viljoen, the African 
Commission has not been constantly applying them.416 
2 5 2 4 Principle of effectiveness 
The principle of effectiveness as elaborated upon417 should be integrated throughout 
the above-mentioned interpretative process. Swart confirms the requirement to engage 
the principle of effectiveness in the entire interpretative process. This engagement is 
useful in ensuring that all the interpretive aids referred to by the interpretive organs 
assist in attaining the practical and effective meaning of the provisions being interpreted. 
As Fennelly rightly argues, the constant engagement of the principle of effectiveness 
ensures the effectiveness of the provisions of the treaty.418 The effectiveness of the 
provisions implies that the rights are broadly interpreted and their restrictions are 
interpreted narrowly.  
Moreover, the principle of effectiveness ensures consistency and uniformity in the 
interpretation of the treaty.419 This principle also guarantees the interpretation of the 
treaty that addresses the conditions prevalent at the time of interpretation. In this regard, 																																																								
413 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 57. 
414 ILC Fragmentation Report para 463. 
415 Scheinin “Characteristics of human rights norms” in International Protection of Human Rights 20. 
416 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 326. 
417 See parts 2 2 3 and 2 3 above. 
418 Fennelly (1996) Fordham International Law Journal 674. 
419 674. 
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all four dimensions420 of this principle should be engaged in the entire interpretative 
process. These dimensions include the general, substantive, temporal, and systemic 
dimensions.  
2 6 Conclusion 
The main research aims of this chapter were twofold. Firstly, the chapter aimed at 
demonstrating the appropriateness of the teleological approach in interpreting the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter. Secondly, the chapter intended to develop the 
methodology for application of the teleological approach that should be followed by the 
interpretive organs of the African Charter when interpreting the socio-economic rights.  
With regard to the appropriateness argument, the chapter has identified that the 
teleological approach is established as the primary method of interpretation in article 31 
of the Vienna Convention. This recognition by the Vienna Convention gives the 
teleological approach the legal basis for interpreting international treaties including the 
African Charter. Moreover, the appropriateness of the teleological approach centres on 
its utilisation of the object and purpose of the treaty to interpret treaties. The reference to 
the object and purpose of the treaty is useful for interpreting treaties whose underlying 
goal is the protection and promotion of human rights including the socio-economic rights. 
Through the utilisation of the object and purpose of the treaty, the interpretive organs 
can engage various internal and external interpretive elements to develop the meaning 
of the socio-economic rights provisions. The internal interpretive aids consist of the 
preamble to the African Charter, operative provisions, relevant civil and political rights, 
individual’s duties provisions, and the ‘drawing inspiration’ clauses. These elements can 
assist the interpretive organs to construe the meaning of the socio-economic rights in a 
manner that reads the African Charter as a whole. The external interpretive elements 
include the preparatory work of the African Charter, relevant international treaties and 
the subsequent agreements and practices of the African States. Moreover, the use of 
object and purpose of the treaty enables the interpretive organs to engage the principle 
of effectiveness in the interpretative process. Through the principle of effectiveness the 
interpretive organs can engage the identified interpretive elements in a manner that 
gives effect to the socio-economic rights provisions in the African Charter. 
This chapter also demonstrated the lack of methodology for the application of the 
teleological approach in the interpretation of treaties. In this regard, the chapter 																																																								
420 See part 2 2 3 above. 
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developed the methodology for application of the teleological approach to be followed by 
the interpretive organs of the African Charter. The methodology enables the interpretive 
organs to know when and how they should engage the interpretive elements of the 
teleological approach. Significantly, the methodology allows the interpretive organs to 
begin the interpretative process with the textual synthesis that engages the treaty as a 
whole. Furthermore, the methodology allows the interpretive organs to engage the 
historical and philosophical background of the African Charter embedded in its 
preparatory work, in order to elaborate the object and purpose. It is significant for the 
interpretive organs to consider other relevant international treaties and the subsequent 
agreement and practices of the parties at the third stage of the interpretative process. 
The engagement of these elements can ensure that the meaning of the African Charter 
is in harmony with other treaties, and the consistency of the decisions of the interpretive 
organs. Significantly, the interpretive organs should engage the principle of effectiveness 
in the entire interpretative process. The engagement of this principle can help the 
interpretive organs to ensure the meaning assigned to the socio-economic rights is 
practical and effective. 
The following chapter will seek to consider how the historical and philosophical 
background of the African Charter, that is embedded in its preparatory work, sheds light 
on the socio-economic rights provisions. Moreover, the chapter will seek to demonstrate 
the interpretive possibilities embedded in the African Charter as a whole, by discussing 
the relevant provisions of an interpretive character, as well as the provisions related to 
the interpretative mandate of the interpretive organs 
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Chapter 3 
The history and text of the African Charter 
3 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified the teleological approach as appropriate for 
interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 1  The discussion 
demonstrated that this approach applies the object and purpose of a treaty to develop 
the meaning of its provisions.2 This approach requires the treaty to be interpreted 
holistically by engaging all the relevant provisions of the text, as well as the preparatory 
work, to construe the meaning of the provisions being interpreted.3 In this regard, the 
analysis in the preceding chapter identified the text, as well as the preparatory work, as 
significant elements of the treaty.4 The preparatory work enshrines the historical and 
philosophical background of the treaty,5 as confirmed by Gardiner and Mortenson.6 
The methodology for applying the teleological approach, as developed in the 
previous chapter, demonstrates how the interpretive organs should apply these 
elements.7 This chapter analyses the historical background to the adoption of the African 
Charter in relation to the socio-economic rights and discusses the textual formulation of 
socio-economic rights and other relevant provisions, as well as the statements of the 
preamble. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate the implications of these elements 
for the interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter.  
3 2 Preparatory work of the African Charter and its implications for interpreting 
socio-economic rights 
3 2 1 Introduction 
The adoption of the African Charter was influenced by initiatives from inside and 
outside Africa. The external initiatives include the efforts of international institutions, 
such as the International Commission of Jurists (‘International Commission’) and the 																																																								
1 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 4. 
2 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
3 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 2. 
4 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 5 2 1, and 2 5 2 2. 
5 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
6 R Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (2008) 25; and JD Mortenson “The travaux of travaux: Is the Vienna 
Convention hostile to drafting history?” (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 780 780-781. 
7 See chapter two, part 2 5. 
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United Nations (‘UN’), 8  whereas the anti-colonial struggle and the efforts of the 
Organisation of African Unity (‘OAU’) (now the African Union ‘AU’) represent internal 
initiatives. This section takes stock of the historical and philosophical background to the 
adoption of the African Charter contained in its preparatory work and discusses its 
implications for the interpretation of socio-economic rights provisions.  
3 2 2 External historical initiatives 
The external efforts to adopt the African Charter started with the work of the 
International Commission in the early 1960s.9 In I961, the International Commission 
organised the African Conference on the Rule of Law in Lagos (‘Lagos Conference’). 
The Lagos Conference adopted a Declaration (‘Law of Lagos’),10 which required African 
leaders to adopt a human rights instrument for Africa. It states 
“[t]hat in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, this Conference invites the African Governments to study the possibility of 
adopting an African Convention of Human Rights in such a manner that the 
Conclusions of this Conference will be safeguarded by the creation of a court of 
appropriate jurisdiction and that recourse thereto be made available for all persons 
under the jurisdiction of the signatory States.”11 
The Law of Lagos is significant in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the intention of 
African leaders and scholars to protect human rights (including socio-economic rights) 
through an African human rights treaty. Although the Law of Lagos does not expressly 
contain provisions relating to socio-economic rights, its preamble gives insight into the 
participants’ intention to protect such rights. In particular, the Law of Lagos defines “rule 
of law” as a broad concept, which should be applied to protect both individuals’ political 
rights and the social, economic, educational, and cultural conditions for the achievement 
of their dignity.12  
																																																								
8 The organisation of the United Nations (‘UN’) was officially recognised and established in San Fransisco 
on 24 October 1945, with the mandate to keep world peace, see <http://www.un.org/en/ sections/history-
united-nations/> (accessed 25-03-2017). 
9 G Baricako “The African Charter and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in M Evans & 
R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2006 2 
ed (2008) 1 1. 
10  African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos, Nigeria (3-7 January 1961), A Report on the 
Proceedings of the Conference (1961) 9 (‘Law of Lagos’). 
11 Law of Lagos para 4. 
12 Preamble to the Law of Lagos. 
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The Lagos Conference was attended by nearly two hundred legal scholars from 
twenty-three African countries.13 This number is significant, as it provides insight into 
African leaders’ awareness of the protection of human rights, including socio-economic 
rights. As Rhyne observes, being the heads of important public institutions in their 
respective governments, the participants of the Lagos Conference had the power to 
influence African leaders to take action on human rights protection.14 Two years after the 
Lagos Conference, African leaders adopted the Charter of the Organisation of African 
Unity (‘OAU Charter’).15  
Secondly, the Law of Lagos is significant as it stresses the establishment of an 
African Court that is accessible to all individuals in Africa. This historical aspect is vital in 
that it demonstrates African leaders’ intention to guarantee a human rights enforcement 
mechanism that is accessible to every individual. 
In 1967, the Conference of the French-speaking African Jurists was held in Dakar 
under the auspices of the International Commission (‘Dakar Conference’). 16  This 
conference adopted the Declaration of Dakar (‘Dakar Declaration’), which was significant 
for the adoption of the African Charter in three respects. Firstly, it stressed the need to 
adopt an African treaty for the promotion and protection of human rights.17 Secondly, it 
required African States to establish the African Commission with a mandate to protect 
the human rights of individuals in Africa.18 Thirdly, it enumerated a small number of 
socio-economic rights to be promoted and protected by the prospective treaty.19  
Concerning the protection of human rights, the Dakar Conference highlighted that 
States’ efforts to construct the political and socio-economic conditions required for 
development projects can also endanger the enjoyment of individual’s rights. 20 
Accordingly, an equitable balance between the requirements of public well-being and 
																																																								
13 The African Conference on the Rule of Law consisted of 294 judges, practicing lawyers, and teachers of 
law from 23 African nations, as well as 9 countries from other continents. 
14 CH Rhyne “A report on the Lagos Conference” (1961) 47 American Bar Association Journal 685 686. 
15 The Organisation of the African Unity (‘OAU’) was formed by the African Leaders of 32 countries. The 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 13 September 1963 479 UNTS 39 (‘OAU Charter’). The 
contribution of the OAU Charter to the adoption of the African Charter is discussed in part 3 2 3 2 below. 
16 The Conference of French-speaking African Jurists met in Dakar, Senegal, from 5-9 January 1967 
under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists in collaboration with its French National 
Section Libre Justice, and the Association Senegalaise d’Etudes et de Recherches Juridiques 1-17 
reprinted in the Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists No. 29, March 1967.  
17 Art VI(3) of the Dakar Declaration. 
18 Art VI(3). 
19 Arts I-III. 
20 Dakar Declaration para 9.  
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individual’s rights is required. 21  Based on this background, the Dakar Declaration 
emphasised the protection of the rights to human dignity and non-discrimination of 
individuals.22 In addition, it stressed the significance of treating civil and political rights, 
as well as socio-economic rights, on equal footing.23 Based on these statements, the 
Dakar Declaration acknowledged a few rights of a socio-economic nature. 
Article I(1) of the Dakar Declaration required States to adopt legislative measures 
that prohibit  “oppressive labour contracts”, “obstructions placed in the way of a free 
choice of marital partner”, and “any abuse of parental authority, especially by exploiting 
the work of children”.24  The right to work encompassed the right to an adequate 
standard of living and placed an obligation on every individual to work.25 This right also 
included a prohibition on forced labour; the State’s obligation to create employment 
opportunities for individuals; freedom of choice of employment; and fair conditions of 
work.26 Others included the rights to fair remuneration; vocational training;27 and to join a 
trade union.28 States were urged to ratify the International Labour Conventions, as well 
as to enact relevant labour legislation.29  
These provisions are significant for interpreting the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter in three ways. Firstly, the provisions recognised the rights to dignity and 
non-discrimination, which are relevant in explicating the meaning of socio-economic 
rights. Secondly, the provisions enumerated some of the important socio-economic 
rights and their content. Thirdly, they demonstrate States’ obligations to protect these 
rights through legislation. Ouguergouz posits that the inclusion of these rights provisions 
in the Dakar Declaration sheds light on the scope and content of the rights of individuals 
in the African Charter.30  
In 1971, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (‘UN Economic 
Commission’) undertook another initiative. The Commission held a Conference of 
African Jurists on African Legal Process and the Individual in Addis Ababa (‘Addis 
																																																								
21 Para 9. 
22 Para 10. 
23 Para 11. 
24 Art I(1) of the Dakar Declaration. 
25 Art II(1). 
26 Art II(2). 
27 Art II(3). 
28 Art III(3)-(4). 
29 Arts II(4) and III(4) of the Dakar Declaration. 
30 F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003) 22. 
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Ababa Conference’).31  This conference recommended that African States adopt an 
African Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention on Human Rights’).32 According to 
the Addis Ababa Conference, the Convention on Human Rights was significant for the 
effective protection of all the rights of individuals.33  
In 1973, the UN commenced an initiative aimed at the adoption of the African 
Charter. The UN organised a seminar in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (‘Dar Es Salaam 
Seminar’).34 This seminar is significant, as its participants agreed to establish an African 
human rights treaty.35 The participants also stressed that this proposed African human 
rights treaty should focus on people’s socio-economic conditions.36 The Dar Es Salaam 
Seminar is important, as it articulated the intention of African leaders to adopt a treaty 
that protects rights of a socio-economic character. As Ouguergouz rightly observes, the 
Dar Es Salaam Seminar expressed African leaders’ concerns about the socio-economic 
conditions of the continent’s people.37  
This preparatory work of the African Charter gives vital insight into African leaders’ 
emphasis on protecting socio-economic rights. Secondly, it stresses the context within 
which these rights should be protected, namely in a flexible and evolutive way. This 
requirement demonstrates African leaders’ intention to protect African people against the 
past and subsequent violations of their socio-economic rights.  
The external initiatives discussed in this part were not directly successful in fostering 
the adoption of the African Charter, as African leaders did not implement them 
immediately. Although these initiatives were not directly successful, they were significant 
in two respects. Firstly, some resolutions made during various conferences elaborated 
the scope and content of a few socio-economic rights. This elaboration can provide 
interpretive organs with insight into the meaning and content of the socio-economic 
rights formulated in the African Charter.  
The external preparatory work emphasised the improvement and protection of the 
socio-economic conditions and welfare of African people. It also emphasised the values 																																																								
31 Conference of African jurists on the African Legal Process and the Individual, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
19-23 April 1971, E/CN.14/521 of 5 July 1971. 
32 Resolution 3(5)(ii) of the Addis Ababa Conference. 
33 Resolution 3(5). 
34 Seminar on the Study of New Ways and Means for Promoting Human Rights with Special Attention to 
the Problems and Needs of Africa, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 23 October-5 November 1973, UN Doc 
ST/TAO/HR/48, as quoted in BG Ramcharan “Human rights in Africa: Whither now?” (1975) 12 University 
of Ghana Law Journal 88 98. 
35 Dar Es Salaam Seminar para 111, as quoted in Ramcharan (1975) University of Ghana Law Journal 98. 
36 98. 
37 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 31. 
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of freedom, equality, justice, and dignity. The preparatory work also stressed individuals’ 
access to human rights enforcement mechanisms. As such, the interpretation of socio-
economic rights by supervisory organs should take into account these values in 
elaborating the scope and content of socio-economic rights. Furthermore, the 
interpretation should guarantee individuals complaining of human rights violations 
access to the supervisory organs for their complaints to be heard and determined.  
Secondly, the initiatives outlined above raised awareness among African leaders of 
the significance of adopting a human rights treaty for Africa.38 As Baricako notes, for 
instance, the external initiatives helped President Senghor of Senegal to persuade 
African leaders of the importance of adopting a mechanism for human rights 
protection.39 This initiative and other factors paved the way for the internal efforts of 
African leaders to adopt the African Charter. Ouguergouz explains that various efforts 
within Africa directly necessitated the decision by African leaders to adopt the African 
Charter.40 These internal efforts are discussed in the ensuing section.  
3 2 3 Internal historical initiatives 
3 2 3 1 Contribution of the anti-colonial struggle 
The struggle against colonialism in Africa contributed significantly to the adoption of 
the African Charter. The movements for decolonisation, particularly through Pan-African 
Congresses, emphasised the respect and protection of human rights in Africa.41 As 
Killander argues, human rights standards were used in Africa to fight colonialism.42 This 
part analyses the contribution of decolonisation movements to the adoption of the 
African Charter. 
The 1919 Pan-African Congress in Paris marked the beginning of African leaders’ 
efforts to protect the human rights of African people, which eventually contributed to the 
adoption of the African Charter. At this congress, Africans and African-descended 																																																								
38 In the Decision on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa AHG/Dec. 115 (XVI) Rev 1, 1979, for instance, 
African leaders refered to Resolution 24(XXIV) of the United Nations Human Rights Commission on 
Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
39 Baricako “The African Charter and African Commission” in The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 5. See also Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 36; and Viljoen 
International Human Rights Law 159. 
40 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 37. 
41 M Killander “African human rights law in theory and practice” in S Joseph & A McBeth (eds) Research 
Handbook on International Human Rights Law 389-391, see <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438555> 
(accessed 03-11-2015). See further Viljoen International Human Rights Law 151-156. 
42 Killander “African human rights law” Research Handbook on International Human Rights law 388 389. 
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activists tried to influence an agenda relating to the political and economic freedom of all 
African colonies. During the congress, participants from Africa requested changes in 
colonial policy relating to human rights, including socio-economic rights.  
In particular, African participants raised three significant concerns. Firstly, the need 
for land ownership and equitable economic development in a manner that allows African 
people to benefit from the sale and extraction of their natural resources. Secondly, 
provision for educational opportunities in industrial fields and in language programmes, 
as well as accessible health care, which was considered an effective tool for economic 
development. Thirdly, they requested the participation of African people in local 
government, as well as the independence of African colonies.43 These resolutions are 
significant in that they can give insight into the purpose, scope and content of the 
substantive provisions of socio-economic rights, particularly peoples’ socio-economic 
rights to development, free disposal of natural resources, and a healthy environment, as 
adopted in the African Charter.44  
The second Pan-African Congress was held in three different cities namely, London, 
Brussels, and Paris.45 This congress reiterated the three concerns that were raised at 
the 1919 Congress and added other concerns. In particular, it emphasised self-
determination and the protection of labour rights (especially the elimination of involuntary 
servitude, inadequate pay, and hard working conditions). The third and fourth Pan-
African Congresses took place in 1923 and 1927 respectively,46 and reiterated the 
concerns raised in the previous congresses.  
The fifth Pan-African Congress was held in Manchester in October 1945.47 It was 
convened by an influential pan-Africanist, George Padmore, and the President of 
Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah.48 The resolutions of the 1945 Congress emphasised the 
abolition of discriminatory land laws, as well as forced labour; the inclusion of the right to 
freedom from poverty; the right of Africans to develop their economic resources without 																																																								
43 1919 Pan-African Congress <www.diaspora.northwestern.edu> (accessed 21-10-2015). Pan-African 
Congress in 1919 www.diaspora.northwestern.edu (accessed 21-10-2015). 
44 These collective socio-economic rights are discussed in parts 3 3 4 6 to 3 3 4 8 below. 
45 1921 Pan-African Congress, see <www.diaspora.northwestern.edu> (accessed 21-10-2015). 
46 1923 Pan-African Congress and 1927 Pan-African Congress, see <www.diaspora.northwestern. edu> 
(accessed 21-10-2015). 
47 1945 Pan-African Congress, see <www.aaprp-intl.org> (accessed 03-11-2015). 
48  The Congress was attended by 90 delegates, among them 26 from Africa, including scholars, 
intellectuals, and political activists who later became influential leaders in their respective African 
countries. These African leaders included Jomo Kenyatta, who became the President of Kenya; Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, who became the President of Malawi; and Kwame Nkrumah, who became the President 
of Ghana. 
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hindrance; the right to freedom of association and assembly; the right to compulsory free 
education, including free uniforms, meals, books and school equipment; the right to 
health, including the rights to medical services, equality of access to health and welfare 
services; and the right to work, including the right to equal pay for equal work.49 These 
resolutions can assist the supervisory organs in developing the scope and content of the 
socio-economic rights to work, education, health, property, and food. 
In 1958, the All African People’s Conference was held in Accra and attended by 300 
delegates. This conference adopted a Resolution on Imperialism and Colonialism,50 
which extended fundamental human rights to all men and women in African countries, 
as well as the rights of African people to the fullest use and protection of their lands.51 
The resolution required independent African States to ensure fundamental human rights 
were extended within their States to serve as an example to the colonial nations who 
violated and ignored the rights of African people.52  
The discussion in this part demonstrates the influence of the anti-colonial struggle, 
through the Pan-African Congresses, on the socio-economic rights provisions in the 
African Charter. In particular, the resolutions passed by the Pan-African Congresses and 
the All African People’s Conference can give insight into the normative scope and 
content of the socio-economic rights to work, education, health, property, food, as well 
as the peoples’ socio-economic rights to freely dispose of their natural wealth, 
development, and a satisfactory environment (as enshrined in articles 21, 22, and 24 of 
the African Charter).53  
3 2 3 2 Organisation of African Unity Charter 
A few years after the Resolution on Imperialism and Colonialism, and after thirty-two 
African countries had achieved independence, African leaders 54  adopted the OAU 
																																																								
49  5th Pan-African Congress Resolutions and Declarations, see <www.13.+5th+PAC++resolutions+ 
and+declarations,+1945.pdf> (accessed 03-11-2015). 
50 Resolution on Imperialism and Colonialism, Accra, 5-13 December 1958, see <www.v1.sa history.org> 
(accessed 21-10-2015).  
51 5. 
52 7. 
53 The Pan-African Congresses greatly influenced the inclusion of peoples’ rights, as enshrined in arts 19-
24 of the African Charter. This dissertation will only analyse arts 21, 22, and 24, as they specifically 
concern peoples’ socio-economic rights. See parts 3 3 4 6 to 3 3 4 8 below. Other provisions regarding 
peoples’ rights will be discussed only to the extent that they are relevant to the socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter.  
54 The Organisation of African Unity (‘OAU’) was formed by the African Leaders of 32 countries. 
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Charter.55 Significantly, the OAU Charter contained provisions relevant to the protection 
of socio-economic rights. As Killander notes, the instrument fostered some human rights 
standards that African leaders stood for in their anti-colonial struggles.56 Through its 
preamble, African leaders declared the significance of the values of freedom, equality, 
justice, and dignity for the realisation of human rights.57 Furthermore, African leaders 
affirmed their adherence to the principles of human rights contained in the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’).58 According to African leaders, 
these principles ensured common cooperation among states. 59  Moreover they 
expressed the desire to protect the welfare and well-being of all individuals in Africa.60  
In addition, African leaders explicitly stated their purpose to achieve a better life for all 
individuals in Africa. 61  In order to achieve these goals, African leaders agreed to 
commonly cooperate in various areas related to human rights.62 These areas include 
economic, educational and cultural, as well as health, sanitation, and nutritional 
cooperation.63 These provisions are significant in that they can provide insight into the 
purpose, as well as the scope and content, of the substantive provisions of the socio-
economic rights adopted in the African Charter. These provisions can help ensure that 
socio-economic rights are interpreted in a manner that ensures equality in their 
enjoyment by individuals, as well as the guarantee of an individual’s dignity in the 
protection and enjoyment of such rights. As Ramcharan notes, these provisions are 
directly related to socio-economic rights.64  
3 2 3 3 Decision on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa  
The internal processes to adopt the African Charter continued in 1979 with the 
Summit of the African Leaders in Monrovia (‘Monrovia Summit’).65 During the Monrovia 																																																								
55 The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (‘Charter of the OAU’), entered into force 13 September 
1963, 479 UNTS 39. 
56 Killander “African human rights law” in Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law 390-
391. 
57 Preamble to the OAU Charter para 2. 
58 Preamble para 8.  
59 Para 8. 
60 Para 9. 
61 Art II(1)(b). 
62 Art II(2). 
63 Art II(2)(b)-(d). 
64 BG Ramcharan “Human rights in Africa: Whither now?” (1975) 12 University of Ghana Law Journal 88 
91. 
65 Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads States and Government, Monrovia Liberia, 
16-20 July 1979.  
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Summit, African leaders declared their commitment to protecting human rights and other 
principles related to human rights contained in the UN Charter.66  These principles 
include dignity, equality, and justice.67 Furthermore, the leaders stressed their goal to 
protect socio-economic rights on the same level as civil and political rights.68 African 
leaders agreed to give special attention to the socio-economic rights of individuals.69 
Based on this background, these leaders adopted a resolution (‘OAU Resolution’)70 that 
initiated the process to draft the African Charter. The OAU Resolution required the OAU 
Secretary-General to convene “a restricted meeting of highly qualified experts” who 
could formulate the “preliminary draft” of the African Charter, which establishes 
supervisory bodies with a mandate to promote and protect human rights at the individual 
and collective level. 
The OAU Resolution is significant for interpreting socio-economic rights in four ways. 
Firstly, it demonstrates the commitment of African leaders to protect the values of 
dignity, equality, and justice. Secondly, it shows the significance of socio-economic 
rights for improving the socio-economic conditions of individuals. Thirdly, the OAU 
Resolution recognises the principle of the interdependence of rights. Finally, it stresses 
that the adoption of the African Charter will protect these goals.  
Writing on the development of the African Charter, Ouguergouz notes that the OAU 
Resolution identifies the shared concerns of African leaders to protect human rights, 
including socio-economic rights.71 In this regard, the OAU Resolution can give insight 
into the manner in which the scope and content of socio-economic rights contained in 
the African Charter should be construed. Baricako confirms the significance of the OAU 
Resolution in the elaboration of the provisions of the African Charter.72  
Following the OAU Resolution, a meeting of experts was convened to draft the 
African Charter.73 Three documents are significant for this discussion. They include the 
opening speech by President Senghor;74 the Draft African Charter prepared by Keba 
																																																								
66 OAU Resolution para 1. 
67 Para 1. 
68 Para 4. 
69 Para 4.  
70 Decision on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa, Resolution AHG/Dec 115 (XIV) Rev 1, 1979. 
71 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 40. 
72 Baricako “The African Charter and African Commission” in The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 5. 
73 See part 3 2 3 4 below. 
74 See part 3 2 3 4 below. 
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M’Baye to guide the experts;75 and the Draft African Charter that was prepared by the 
experts.76 
3 2 3 4 Opening speech by President Senghor 
In response to the OAU Resolution, the OAU Secretary-General convened the 
Meeting of Experts in Dakar.77 This meeting was opened by the then President of 
Senegal, His Excellency Leopold Sedar Senghor.78 In his speech (‘Address by Senghor’ 
or ‘Senghor’s speech’), President Senghor highlighted the object and purpose of the 
African Charter to be adopted. According to him, the proposed African Charter should 
safeguard the values of dignity, equality, freedom, and justice,79 taking into account the 
needs of African people, including their socio-economic needs.80  
The concern for people’s socio-economic needs implies that the proposed African 
Charter should give effect to the interpretation of the socio-economic rights of the people 
in Africa. As Odinkalu notes, Senghor’s speech highlighted the need for an African 
Charter that protected socio-economic rights in such a manner that it would improve the 
socio-economic conditions of African people.81 This goal should be reflected in the 
drafting of the relevant socio-economic rights provisions. Moreover, Senghor’s speech 
stressed African leaders’ goal of protecting socio-economic rights, both at the individual 
and collective level.82  
President Senghor noted that the recognition of these rights in the African Charter 
was significant for the socio-economic development of all people in Africa. 83  He 
highlighted that African leaders considered socio-economic rights and civil and political 
rights as equally important.84 Thus, the African Charter should protect these categories 
																																																								
75 See part 3 2 3 5 below. 
76 See part 3 2 3 6 below. 
77 The Meeting of Experts to Draft the Preliminary Draft of the African Charter was held in Dakar, Senegal, 
from 28 November to 8 December 1979. 
78  Address delivered by Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/5 (‘Address by Senghor’). 
79 Para 3. 
80 Para 16. 
81 CA Odinkalu “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
The System In Practice 1986-2000 (2002) 178 187. See also Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 111. 
82 Address by Senghor para 19. 
83 Para 19. 
84 Para 20. 
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of rights equally.85 In relation to the protection of socio-economic rights, Senghor’s 
address emphasised the importance of the right to development, which embraces all 
rights of a socio-economic character. The full realisation of the right to development 
should be considered in a manner that improves the socio-economic conditions of 
individuals.86  
In his address, President Senghor also urged the experts to take African philosophy87 
into account when developing the African Charter: 
“Room should be made for this African tradition in our Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, while bathing in our philosophy, which consists in not alienating the 
subordination of the individual to the community, in co-existence, in giving everyone 
a certain number of rights and duties … In Africa, the individual and his rights are 
wrapped in the protection the family and other communities ensure everyone.”88 
These remarks imply that the notion of African philosophy enshrines three significant 
components. Firstly, the notion of African philosophy considers an individual as part and 
parcel of the collective community. Secondly, the African philosophy considers an 
individual as a person with rights, as well as obligations. Thirdly, the enjoyment of an 
individual’s rights is closely linked to the protection offered to him or her by members of 
the family, as well as by the entire community. As such, Senghor’s speech takes into 
account the fact that both States and non-state actors bear a certain number of 
obligations towards the realisation of human rights.89  
President Senghor’s emphasis on an individual as a duty bearer is significant for 
interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. It takes into consideration 
the fact that these rights can be violated by both States and non-state actors. As such, it 
implies that States bear an obligation to protect individuals from violations by non-state 
actors. It also suggests that States have an obligation to ensure that non-state actors 
respect individuals’ human rights. Moreover, President Senghor stressed the 
significance of drawing inspiration from other relevant international instruments related 
to the protection of human rights.90  
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the significance of President Senghor’s 
speech in relation to socio-economic rights. His address embraces three significant 																																																								
85 Para 20. 
86 Paras 21-22. 
87 The notion of African philosophy is analysed in part 3 2 4 2 below. 
88 Address by Senghor paras 27 and 29. 
89 Para 24. 
90 Para 30. 
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elements relevant for the interpretation of socio-economic rights. Firstly, it emphasises 
the protection of human rights as the main object and purpose of the African Charter. 
Secondly, it emphasises the interdependence of rights. 91  Thirdly, it insists on the 
promotion of African philosophy, as well as the values of dignity, equality, freedom and 
justice. As Ouguergouz argues, Senghor’s speech enshrines the philosophy surrounding 
the provisions of the African Charter.92 Thus, the socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter should be construed in a manner that embraces these identified elements.  
The recommendations in Senghor’s speech also influenced the manner in which the 
African Charter was drafted.93 Thus, Senghor’s speech is relevant in that it influenced 
both the drafting process and the adoption of the African Charter. As Yeshanew rightly 
notes, Senghor’s speech informed the subsequent deliberations in the adoption of the 
African Charter.94 
3 2 3 5 M’Baye’s Draft of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The preliminary draft of the African Charter was prepared by Keba M’Baye (‘M’Baye 
Draft’),95 who was the President of the Supreme Court of Senegal. The M’Baye Draft is 
significant as it was used as a framework for the African Charter. 96  According to 
Viljoen,97 and Yeshanew,98 the M’Baye Draft provided the foundation for deliberations by 
the experts who drafted the African Charter. The M’Baye Draft incorporated various 
provisions on socio-economic rights and other related rights.  
These provisions were similar99 to the provisions of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’),100 and the American Convention on 
																																																								
91 The concept of the interdependence of rights is discussed in part 3 3 2 2 below. 
92 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 41. See also Baricako “The African 
Charter and the African Commission” in The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 6. 
93 41. 
94 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 111. 
95 M’Baye Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1 (‘M’Baye Draft’). 
96 Introduction to the M’Baye Draft para 1. 
97 F Viljoen “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The travaux preparatoires in the light of 
subsequent practice” (2004) 25 Human Rights Law Journal 313 314. 
98 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 111. 
99 Introduction to the M’Baye Draft para 1.  
100 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (‘ICESCR’) was adopted by the UN General Assembly (‘GA’) on 16 December 1966 
and entered into force on 3 January 1976. The final provisions of the African Charter are, however, quite 
different from the ICESCR. See part 3 3 below. 
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Human Rights (‘American Convention’).101 This reference to the ICESCR is significant 
as it allows for the interpretive organs to refer to the ICESCR during the interpretative 
process. As is discussed below,102 it should be noted that in the end the formulation of 
the provisions of the African Charter is quite different from the ICESCR. Despite the 
contrast in formulation between the African Charter and the ICESCR, the teleological 
approach enables ICESCR provisions to be incorporated into the African Charter 
through interpretation. Through a teleological approach, supervisory organs can 
consider other relevant instruments in the interpretation of the provisions of the African 
Charter. As such, the supervisory organs can use the ICESCR to elaborate the socio-
economic rights provisions of the African Charter. 
The M’Baye Draft refers to socio-economic rights in three distinct provisions, namely 
the preambular clauses; the general provisions; and the specific socio-economic rights 
provisions. Regarding the preambular clauses, the M’Baye Draft identifies two significant 
elements relevant for interpreting socio-economic rights. Firstly, the preamble identifies 
the apparent object and purpose, as well as the underlying values, of the African 
Charter. According to the preamble, African leaders commit to protecting fundamental 
human rights, including socio-economic rights, and the value of human dignity.103 The 
respect for human dignity and fundamental rights is not restricted to civil and political 
rights, but extends to socio-economic rights.104 Therefore, every individual is entitled to 
the enjoyment of his or her socio-economic rights, as well as the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights.105 Secondly, it stated the commitment of African leaders to protecting 
fundamental rights in accordance with the UN Charter and the UDHR.106 
The second way in which the M’Baye Draft protects socio-economic rights is through 
general provisions. These general provisions protect socio-economic rights in two 
respects. On the one hand, the general provisions recognise individuals’ socio-economic 
rights. On the other, they impose obligations on States to protect socio-economic rights. 
For example, article 1(1) of the M’Baye Draft requires States to respect the rights 
formulated therein without discrimination. Regarding this obligation, States are required 																																																								
101 Organisation of American States (‘OAS’) American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", 
Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 (‘American Convention’). The American Convention was adopted on 22 
November 1969 and entered into force on 18 July 1978, see <http://www.oas.org/dil/ treaties_b-
32_american_convention_on_human_rights_sign.htm> (accessed 03-04-2017).  
102 See part 3 3 below. 
103 Introduction to the M’Baye Draft para 2. 
104 Para 2. 
105 Para 4. 
106 Para 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
to adopt “legislative or other measures… to give effect to these rights and freedoms”.107 
Article 2(1) recognises the right to self-determination of the individual’s socio-economic 
development. In accordance with this right, individuals are allowed to dispose of “their 
natural wealth and resources” for their socio-economic development.108 This right is 
qualified by prohibiting the deprivation of individuals’ own socio-economic means of 
subsistence.109 Article 3 requires States to take steps through available resources and 
progressive realisation to realise individuals’ rights. This article is similar to the 
provisions of article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which provides for States obligations.110  
The third way in which the M’Baye Draft protects socio-economic rights is through the 
formulation of specific substantive provisions related to these rights. The socio-economic 
rights in the M’Baye Draft include the right to equal enjoyment of the socio-economic 
rights to work;111 social security;112  an adequate standard of living;113 health;114 and 
education. 115  These rights in the M’Baye Draft enshrine the legal socio-economic 
entitlements of individuals, as well as the obligations they impose upon States for their 
full realisation.  
As noted above, the M’Baye Draft was used by experts as a guide to develop the 
draft African Charter, which is analysed below. 
3 2 3 6 Dakar Draft  
A group of experts116 under the chairmanship of Keba M’Baye, met in Dakar and 
prepared the draft African Charter (‘Dakar Draft’).117 The Dakar Draft formulated various 
socio-economic rights and other provisions relevant to socio-economic rights. According 																																																								
107 Art 1(2) of the M’Baye Draft. 
108 Art 2(2). 
109 Art 2(3). 
110 Art 2(1) of the ICESCR reads: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant.” 
111 Art 6 of the M’Baye Draft. 
112 Art 7. 
113 Art 10. 
114 Art 11. 
115 Art 12. 
116 A group of experts was formed by the Secretary-General of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, as directed by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in its Decision 115(XIV). The record shows that the group 
was composed of twenty African experts, presided over by Judge Keba M’Baye. However, the record 
does not disclose the names of the experts, see <www.achpr.org> (accessed 11-11-2015). 
117 Preliminary Draft of the African Charter, prepared during the Dakar Meeting of Experts at the end of 
1979, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 1. 
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to the Dakar Draft, the promotion and protection of human rights should be able to 
improve peoples’ needs, including their socio-economic needs.118  The Dakar Draft 
recognises the values of freedom, equality, justice, and dignity, as significant for the 
achievement of peoples’ needs.119  It therefore formulated substantive provisions in 
relation to these values, including provisions on the rights to non-discrimination, equality, 
life, and dignity.120 The Dakar Draft emphasised the improvement of individuals’ socio-
economic conditions through the protection of socio-economic rights.121 
Socio-economic rights in the Dakar Draft included the rights to property;122 work; 
health; education; family; wealth and natural resources; as well as the right to economic; 
social and cultural development.123 Unlike the M’Baye Draft, the Dakar Draft formulates 
socio-economic rights in a general form in that it does not elaborate their normative 
scope and content. The Dakar Draft also omitted some significant socio-economic rights 
provisions. These include the right to social security, as well as the right to an adequate 
standard of living.124 According to Viljoen, the general formulation and the omission of 
some socio-economic rights hinders the development of the normative content of these 
rights.125 However, the Dakar Draft provides the mechanism with which the omitted 
rights, and the normative content of socio-economic rights, should be developed, as it 
requires interpretive organs to develop the normative content of these rights through 
interpretation.126 
Another significant aspect of the Dakar Draft is the imposition of obligations on 
States, as well as individuals, to realise some socio-economic rights.127 States are 
generally obliged to “recognise” and “guarantee” human rights and to adopt “legislative 
and other measures” in order to “give effect” to these rights. 128  The Dakar Draft 
recognises an individual’s duties towards his or her family, community, other individuals, 
and the country.129 Unlike the M’Baye Draft, the Dakar Draft thus formulates these duties 
																																																								
118 Governing principle of the Dakar Draft. 
119 Preamble to the Dakar Draft para 3. 
120 Arts 2-5 and 19 of the Dakar Draft. 
121 Governing principle of the Dakar Draft para 6. See also, preamble to the Dakar Draft para 6. 
122 The social dimensions of the right to property are discussed in part 3 5 4 1 below. 
123 Arts 14-19 of the Dakar Draft. 
124 The ICESCR contains these socio-economic rights in articles 9 and 11 respectively. 
125 Viljoen (2004) Human Rights Law Journal 320. 
126 Dakar Draft paras 2-3. 
127 Arts 16(2) and 17(2) of the Dakar Draft. 
128 Art 1 of the Dakar Draft. 
129 Arts 27-29 of the Dakar Draft. 
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broadly in a manner that provides for their scope and content. For example, article 27(2) 
requires individuals to fulfil these duties without discrimination. 
The formulation of rights provisions in the Dakar Draft does not distinguish between 
socio-economic rights and civil and political rights. This formulation is significant in two 
ways. Firstly, it allows the interpretation of socio-economic rights through the concept of 
the interdependence of rights.130 Secondly, it can assist interpretive organs interpreting 
socio-economic rights in a manner that recognise various States’ obligations. As Viljoen 
notes, in addition to the obligations to respect and protect as stated in the provisions of 
the health and education rights, the formulation of the Dakar Draft incorporates the 
obligation to fulfil by requiring States to ensure and promote these rights.131 
3 2 3 7 Report of the Rapporteur on the Dakar Draft 
The Report of the Rapporteur (‘Rapporteur’s Report’) 132  represents another 
significant piece of preparatory material for interpreting the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. The significance of the Rapporteur’s Report in relation to socio-
economic rights provisions is found in the remarks by the Chairman of the Committee of 
Experts who drafted the Dakar Draft:133 
“The relatively simple form in which some articles were drafted so as to enable the 
future users of the legal instrument to apply and interpret them with some flexibility. It 
is left to the protection organs of human rights to complete the Charter. The 
deliberate refusal to indulge in the definition of such notions as ‘people’ so as not to 
end up in difficult discussions.”134 
Chairman M’Baye’s words are significant as they allow the interpretive organs to 
flexibly develop the scope and content of the socio-economic rights and their related 
obligations. As such, in situations where the interpretive organs find that the socio-
economic rights provisions are formulated in a general form, they can use various 
interpretive sources to develop the required meaning of these rights. 
The Dakar Draft was submitted to the OAU Ministers of Justice for deliberation. 
Significantly, the provisions of the Dakar Draft did not undergo any substantial change 
																																																								
130 The concept of interdependence of rights is discussed in part 3 3 2 2 below. 
131 Viljoen (2004) Human Rights Law Journal 320. 
132 Rapporteur’s Report OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt Rpt (II) Rev 4.  
133 Para 13. 
134 Para 13. 
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during deliberation.135 After deliberation, the Dakar Draft was submitted to the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Governments, which adopted the African Charter on 17 June 
1981. While the text of the African Charter is discussed below,136 the ensuing part 
discusses the implications of the preparatory work of the African Charter for interpreting 
socio-economic rights provisions. 
3 2 4 Implications of the preparatory work for interpreting socio-economic rights 
3 2 4 1 Promoting and protecting socio-economic rights  
An analysis of the preparatory work of the African Charter shows the underlying goals 
that influenced the adoption of the African Charter. The underlying object that guided 
initiatives to adopt the African Charter was to ensure the promotion and protection of the 
human rights of individuals, including socio-economic rights.  
The preparatory work’s promotion and protection of socio-economic rights was 
characterised by both explicit and implicit formulations of these rights. Explicit protection 
is evidenced in the Dakar Declaration, the M’Baye draft, and the Dakar Draft. Implicit 
protection is evident in the Law of Lagos, the Dar Es Salaam Seminar and Senghor’s 
speech. These two forms of socio-economic rights formulation promoted and protected 
the right to equality in the enjoyment of socio-economic rights to property; work; social 
security; family; children’s socio-economic rights; and an adequate standard of living, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing. Other rights include the rights to health; 
education; socio-economic development; and a healthy environment. The significant 
action required by interpretive organs is to interpret the socio-economic rights provisions 
in the African Charter in a manner that guarantees their promotion and protection. The 
advantage of promoting and protecting socio-economic rights is that it will further the 
object and purpose of the African Charter and ensure the improvement of the socio-
economic conditions of individuals.  
3 2 4 2 Promoting the African philosophy and the values of freedom, equality, 
justice, and dignity 
The preparatory work has consistently demonstrated the need to embrace the African 
philosophy and promote the values of equality, freedom, justice, and dignity. The 
requirement to promote the African philosophy and these values is evidenced in the 																																																								
135 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 285. 
136 See part 3 3 below. 
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Dakar Declaration, the OAU Resolution, Senghor’s speech, the M’Baye Draft, and the 
Dakar Draft.  
There is a scholarly debate concerning the existence of a distinctly African 
philosophy. Hountondji rejects the existence of an African philosophy on the ground that 
it is not found in written literature. According to her, the African philosophy is a “set of 
texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors”.137 She argues 
that the lack of literature on an African philosophy “prevents it from integrating itself into 
a collective theoretical tradition” and from “taking its place in history as a reference point 
capable of orienting future discussion”.138  Maurier also denies the existence of an 
African philosophy on the basis that it does not satisfactorily meet the three criteria 
required for an existence of a genuine philosophy, namely the reflective, rational, and 
systematic.139 Bodunrin too rejects the existence of an African philosophy on the basis 
that it is wrong to argue that an African philosophy is centred on the collective nature of 
the individuals. According to him, since philosophy is studied through examining the 
thoughts of an individual, the African conception of philosophy based on the collective 
nature of individuals is based on an incorrect conception.140 He argues that this view of 
an African philosophy merely portrays a specific system of thought of a particular African 
community.141 
It is, however, wrong to rely exclusively on the existence of philosophical literature 
and philosophers as the sole justification for the existence of an African philosophy. As 
Appiagyei-Atua argues, the denial of the existence of African philosophers implies the 
denial of the existence of African people who can reflect and conceptualise their 
experiences.142 Apart from published literature, philosophical information can also be 
found through other undocumented sources, such as stories. Wright observes that 
although the subject of philosophy is established through a systematically identifiable 
body of literature, as developed by philosophers, this proof can be difficult as there is not 
any work by individual African philosophers similar to “Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Hume’s 
																																																								
137 PJ Hountondji African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1983) 33. 
138 106. 
139 H Maurier “Do we have an African philosophy?” in RA Wright (ed) African Philosophy: An Introduction 3 
ed (1984) 25 26. 
140  PO Bodunrin “The question of African philosophy” in RA Wright (ed) African Philosophy: An 
Introduction 3 ed (1984) 1 11. 
141 1. 
142 K Appiagyei-Atua “A rights-centred critique of African philosophy in the context of development” (2005) 
2 South African Human Rights Law Journal 335 346. 
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Treatise of Human Nature, or Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason”.143 According to Wright, it 
is genuine to assume that the existence of a particular philosophy largely depends on 
published literature.144  However, it is wrong to assume that written literature is an 
exclusive means to substantiate the existence of philosophy.145  
Wright further argues that African philosophy can be found through stories, oral 
tradition, and social institutions, as well as the writings of scholars. 146  Writing on 
Ubuntu,147 as an African philosophical concept,148 Shutte notes that it was expressed 
through songs and stories.149 As such, Wright concludes that an African philosophy 
exists and that “its tenets may legitimately be found in the types of literature mentioned 
earlier”.150  
Appiagyei-Atua argues that African philosophy can be demonstrated through the 
cultures, experiences, and mentalities of African people, which shape their societies.151 
In a similar vein, Makinde notes that if the scepticism concerning the existence of an 
African philosophy is based on historical reasons (namely that there have been no 
renowned African philosophers) then such a doubt is wrong. Makinde also notes that the 
existence of an African philosophy can be established through common social values in 
African communities, which lay the foundation for an African philosophy.152  
The foundation of an African philosophy is the collective way of living in African 
societies. Mbiti argues that African philosophy is founded in the phrase “I am, because 
we are; and since we are, therefore I am”.153 The phrase by Mbiti demonstrates that the 
African philosophy is built on the collective nature of human beings, rather than on an 
individual basis. Maurier notes that African philosophy is characterised by the vital 
relationship that an individual maintains with other members of the community. 154 
Similarly, President Senghor acknowledges that the African philosophy considers an 																																																								
143 RA Wright “Investigating African philosophy” in RA Wright (ed) African Philosophy: An Introduction 3 ed 
(1984) 41 50. 
144 50. 
145 50. 
146 51.  
147 The concept of Ubuntu is discussed in this part below. 
148 J Broodryk Ubuntu in South Africa LLD thesis, University of South Africa (1997), as quoted in JY 
Mokgoro Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, Paper delivered at Potchefstroom University on 31 October 
1997, 2. 
149 A Shutte Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa (2001) 9. 
150 Wright “Investigating African philosophy” in African Philosophy 51. 
151 Appiagyei-Atua (2005) South African Human Rights Law Journal 335 347. 
152 MA Makinde African Philosophy, Culture, and Traditional Medicine (1988) 28-29. 
153 JS Mbiti African Religions and Philosophy 2 ed (1990) 106 and 141. 
154 Maurier “Do we have an African philosophy?” in African Philosophy 35. 
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individual as part and parcel of the community in the sense that he and the community 
are inseparable.155  
The African philosophy accordingly refers to an individual as a person who is 
responsible to the entire community for the realisation of his or her rights. In this vein, 
Okere argues that “the African conception of man is not that of an isolated and abstract 
individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity”.156 As 
such, the African philosophy is guided by the values of collectiveness, humanism, 
togetherness, corporation, responsibility, and interdependence. Anyanwu argues that 
the African philosophy refers to the “fundamental and general principles governing the 
community of people called Africans”.157  
The community-oriented nature demonstrated by the African philosophy is, however, 
challenged by scholars. Howard argues that the collective conception of an individual is 
not the exclusive system in Africa.158 According to her, African societies are largely 
divided in classes and status, such as age and sex, free-men and slaves, members and 
aliens.159 She further contends that individualism has increased in contemporary African 
society due to economic difficulties and unemployment.160 According to her, insistence 
on the communal-oriented nature of the African philosophy is not feasible.161  
The communal oriented nature of an individual in a society is characterised as an 
African philosophy based on the fact that it was practiced by many pre-colonial African 
societies. This community-oriented practice enshrined in the African philosophy is 
identified through different names. Mutua pinpoints that scholars in contemporary Africa 
society identify the African philosophy as “African personality”; “negritude”; and “Ujamaa” 
																																																								
155 Address by Senghor paras 27-29. 
156 BO Okere “The protection of human rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A comparative analysis with the European and American Systems” (1984) 6 Human Rights 
Quarterly 141 148. See also JAM Cobbah “African values and the human rights debate: An African 
perspective” (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 309 323; and RN Kiwanuka “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 80 82. 
157 KC Anyanwu “The African world-view and theory of knowledge” in EAR Omi & KC Anyanwu (eds) 
African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa (1984) 77 
81. 
158 RE Howard “Human rights in Commonwealth Africa” 25, as quoted in IG Shivji The Concept of Human 
Rights in Africa (1989) 12. 
159 RE Howard “Group versus individual identity in the African debate on human rights” in AA An-Na’im & 
FM Deng (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1990) 159 163-174. 
160 165. 
161 165. 
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(the Kiswahili term for African socialism).162 Winks terms the African philosophy “African 
humanism”.163 Winks also notes that African humanism was pre-dominant in pre-colonial 
societies and is similar to Kwame Nkrumah’s modern reformulation of “consciencism”; 
Kenneth Kaunda’s “humanism”; and Julius Nyerere’s “Ujamaa”.164  
These formulations of African philosophy are practiced and expressed in many 
African countries through various languages. For example, Winks notes that in South 
Africa it is known as “Ubuntu”.165 Ubuntu originates from the Zulu phrase “Umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu”, which literally means “a person is a person through other 
persons”.166 Langa J notes in S v Makwanyane (‘Makwanyane’)167 that: 
“Ubuntu emphasises on collective and “interdependence of the members of a 
community. It recognises a person’s status as a human being, entitled to 
unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the 
community such person happens to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. 
The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and 
acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the 
mutual enjoyment of rights by all.”168 
Broodryk points out the existence and practice of Ubuntu in other African 
languages.169 According to Mutua, although the names for African philosophies are 
different, they all represent the “respect for, and protection of, the individual and 
individuality within the family and the greater socio-political unit”.170  
The concept of an African philosophy has direct implications for the interpretation of 
both individual and collective socio-economic rights in the African Charter. Cobbah 																																																								
162 M Mutua “The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of 
duties” (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339 352. 
163 BE Winks “A covenant of compassion: African humanism and the rights of solidarity in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 447 456. 
164 456.  
165 456. 
166 T Metz “Toward an African moral theory” (2007) 15 The Journal of Political Philosophy 321 323. Based 
on available literature on Ubuntu, this dissertation uses the notion of ubuntu to elaborate on the notion of 
African philosophy.  
167 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 CC. 
168 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 CC paras 224 and 308. See also JY Mokgoro Ubuntu and the Law in 
South Africa (1997) 2, Paper delivered Potchefstroom University on 31 October 1997. 
169 J Broodryk Ubuntu: African Life Coping Skills (2006) 3-4, Paper delivered at the CCEAM Conference in 
Lefkosia (Nicosia), Cyprus, 12-17 October 2006. According to Broodryk, Ubuntu is also known as Botho in 
Sesotho; Biakoye in Akan; Ajobi in Yoruba; Numunhu in Shangaan; Vhuthu in Venda; Bunhu in Tsonga; 
Umntu in Xhosa; Hunhu in Shona; Utu or Ujamaa in Swahili; Abantu in Ugandan languages; and 
Menslikgeit in Cape Afrikaans.  
170 M Mutua “The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of 
duties” (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339 352. 
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argues that an African philosophy based on the values of cooperation, collectiveness, 
obligations, and interdependence is appropriate for developing socio-economic rights 
seriously.171 Commenting on the relationship between Ubuntu and the socio-economic 
rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘South African 
Constitution), 172  Metz notes that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution relates to the respect for communal nature enshrined in Ubuntu in two 
ways. Firstly, it requires a state to foster a communal relationship between itself and its 
people, by improving the quality of an individual’s socio-economic life through poverty 
reduction. According to Metz, poverty reduction strengthens togetherness between 
people and their state. Secondly, it requires a State to foster community among the 
people themselves by reducing the level of an individual’s impoverishment. Metz further 
notes that the State is required to protect an individual’s socio-economic rights in order 
to enable that individual to commune and engage in joint projects with others. Metz also 
argues that disregarding socio-economic rights undermines the ability of an individual to 
commune with others and weakens solidarity among the people.  
An individual feels ashamed to commune with others if his or her basic socio-
economic needs are not realised, while those of other members of the community are. 
As such, a State is required to provide individuals with the socio-economic resources 
that will help them to commune with others in society.173 In a similar vein, writing on the 
link between Ubuntu and the socio-economic right to social security, Tshoose posits that 
Ubuntu is relevant to the right to social security, as it advocates for the concepts of 
“humanness”, “justice” and “equality”. According to Tshoose, humanness is the basis for 
the provision of social security.174 
African philosophy is directly linked to the concept of human rights, as understood in 
the African context. Like an African philosophy that considers an individual as 
inseparable from his or her community, the African concept of human rights is communal 
in nature as it considers an individual’s rights as being integrally related to the rights of 
the community. Cobbah argues that an individual’s human dignity and rights in Africa are 
not derived from an individualistic framework but rather from a communal structure.175 																																																								
171 Cobbah (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 331. 
172 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
173 T Metz “Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa” (2005) 2 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 532 550-551. 
174 CI Tshoose “The emerging role of the constitutional value of Ubuntu for informal social security in 
South Africa” (2009) 3 African Journal of Legal Studies 12 14-15. 
175 Cobbah (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 331. 
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The conception of an individual who is endowed with rights and bound by obligations 
towards the community is the essence of the African notion of human rights.176 This 
communal nature of rights in Africa was deliberately adopted to ensure equality among 
groups and classes in matters of justice.177 The recognition of an individual’s rights is 
subject to his respect and recognition of the rights of others.178  
Ankumah contends that, in African societies, an individual depends on other 
members of the community (such as the extended family) to enforce his or her rights. 
This dependence guarantees a form of social security among individuals.179 As such, the 
conception of human rights in Africa recognises not only the rights of the individual, but 
also his obligations towards others. According to Cobbah, this African philosophical 
context expresses rights and duties through four underlying principles, namely respect, 
restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity.180 
Philosophers criticise the communal conception of human rights in Africa on three 
grounds. Firstly, they argue that proponents of the communal nature of rights confuse it 
with human dignity. According to Howard, the African concept of human rights is actually 
a mere concept of human dignity, which expresses the moral nature of an individual and 
his relationship with society.181 Secondly, the African communal nature of human rights 
is considered a mere mechanism used by African leaders to justify their undemocratic 
rule. Howard argues that the communal conception of human rights, which denies the 
existence of economic and political inequalities, is invoked to support African leaders 
staying in power for a long time.182 Thirdly, the African communal nature of human rights 
is subject to objection on the grounds that pre-colonial African societies did not know 
human rights due to their low level of development. Scholars such as Eze, Howard and 
Donelly believe that the existence of human rights in a society largely depends on the 
level of development of that particular society. 
																																																								
176 Mutua (1995) Virginia Journal of International Law 363. 
177 R Cohen “Endless teardrops: Prolegomena to the study of human rights in Africa” in R Cohen, G 
Hyden & WP Nagan (eds) Human Rights and Governance in Africa (1993) 3 14. 
178 Mbiti African Religions and Philosophy 106. 
179 EA Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures 
(1996) 160. 
180 Cobbah (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 321. 
181 Howard “Group versus individual identity” in Human Rights in Africa 165. 
182 RE Howard “Human rights in Commonwealth Africa” 25, as quoted in IG Shivji The Concept of Human 
Rights in Africa (1989) 12. 
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Three arguments can be raised in response to these objections.183 Firstly, while it is 
true that the African philosophy is mainly founded on the value of human dignity, it is a 
mistake to contend that the African philosophy is exclusively a human dignity notion, 
which is isolated from the recognition and respect for human rights. To the contrary, it 
can be argued that the African philosophy based on human dignity is the foundation for 
human rights as understood in the African context. As such, the value of human dignity 
enshrined in the African philosophy broadly encompasses a recognition and respect for 
human rights. Writing on the African philosophical concept of Ubuntu, Metz argues that: 
“One is required to develop one’s humanness by honouring friendly relationships (of 
identity and solidarity) with others who have dignity by virtue of their inherent 
capacity to engage in such relationships, and human rights violations are serious 
degradations of this capacity. This Ubuntu-inspired theory is sufficient to account to 
many arrays of human rights.”184 
The collective nature of the African philosophy clearly demarcates individuals’ rights 
and obligations. It is thus not correct to claim that the African philosophy does not reflect 
the notion of human rights. Mutua argues that the African philosophy developed through 
a system of rights and obligations structured through political and social organisations, 
such as gender and age.185 Moreover, African pre-colonial societies recognised various 
human rights norms similar to those that are currently recognised as human rights in 
various human rights instruments. These include the rights to life, personal freedom, and 
right to property.  
In this vein, Fernyhough argues that pre-colonial societies had a respect for the right 
to life, which was subject to the right to justice. Accordingly, cases regarding the right to 
life were determined through a judicial process. Moreover, accused persons convicted of 
murder or manslaughter were allowed a right of appeal from a subordinate court to a 
higher court.186 
Secondly, it is unjustifiable to contend that under-developed African societies were 
not aware of human rights norms. Marasinghe argues that African societies recognised 																																																								
183 The discussion regarding democracy falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Accordingly, this 
dissertation will respond to the second objection only to the extent that it addresses the relationship 
between African philosophy and socio-economic rights. 
184 Metz (2005) African Human Rights Law Journal 547. 
185 Mutua (1995) Virginia Journal of International Law J 361. See also RT Nhlapo “International protection 
of human rights and the family: African variations on a common theme” (1989) 3 International Journal of 
Law and the Family 1 5. 
186 T Fernyhough “Human rights and precolonial Africa” in R Cohen, G Hyden & WP Nagan (eds) Human 
Rights and Governance in Africa (1993) 39 56. 
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the rights to membership, freedom of thought, speech, belief, and association, as well as 
the right to property.187 According to Marasinghe, the right to freedom of association was 
closely linked to the right to family in that it incorporated the rights to marriage and 
children. 188  Regarding the right to property, Marasinghe advances that it is a 
fundamental right of any African society. Marasinghe notes that, in pre-colonial African 
societies, the right to property was communal in nature189 in the sense that it largely 
depended on membership to a family.190 As such, any disposition of the family property, 
for example, required the consent of all members of the extended family.191 This consent 
requirement was significant for all land transactions, such as leasing, mortgaging, as 
well as the determination of the boundaries. 192  The requirement for consent thus 
demonstrates that pre-colonial African societies recognised the limits attached to the 
enjoyment of the right to property.193 
Thirdly, it is flawed to generally argue that the African philosophy encourages 
undemocratic rule. The fact that there exist undemocratic leaders in Africa does not 
necessarily mean that the practice is attributed to the African philosophy. It can be 
argued that the African philosophy enshrines attributes that embrace democracy and 
respect for human rights. As demonstrated above,194 the African philosophy is founded 
on the principles of humanness; dignity; togetherness; community; and respect for 
human rights.  
The significance of an individual is also seen through his capacity to commune with 
others. The African philosophy places an individual as the leader of the family or 
community who should support his family or community. The African philosophy treats 
all human beings as equal in society. In doing so, it fosters the value of equality. Based 
on this ground, the African philosophy encourages leaders to practice humanness, 
respect for human rights, and human dignity. It also encourages individuals in leadership 
positions to be on good terms with the people they govern. In this regard, it embraces a 
mutual relationship between the leaders and the other members of the State.  
																																																								
187 L Marasinghe “Traditional conceptions of human rights in Africa” in CE Welch Jr & RI Meltzer (eds) 
Human Rights and Development in Africa (1984) 32 33. 
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194 See part 3 2 4 2 above. 
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Writing on Ubuntu as an African leadership philosophy, Ncube argues that as a 
leadership philosophy Ubuntu centres on relationships with others.195 It also embraces 
the significance of mutual relationships between leaders and their followers. According 
to her, this value of togetherness fosters the sanctity of human life to treat all human 
beings equally. Ncube argues further that Ubuntu provides a viable leadership 
philosophy that helps leaders to balance the past and present by examining immediate 
and pressing concerns in society, as well as the vision for the future.196  
It is argued that the African philosophy, through its consideration of the past, present, 
and future by way of the values identified above, allows for undemocratic practices that 
are not in line with present conditions or principles of democracy. Writing on the African 
philosophy from the Akan context, Appiagye-Atua argues that the African philosophy 
does not exclusively confine itself to thoughts of the past. According to Appiagye-Atua, 
while considering the past, African philosophy identifies and leaves norms that are 
irrelevant to present circumstances. Moreover, through its various values, African 
philosophy can consider norms that are relevant for present living conditions.”197 
As demonstrated above, there is a close link between African philosophy and the 
values of freedom, equality, justice, and dignity. African philosophy is founded on the 
value of dignity, which considers freedom, equality, and justice as part of human dignity. 
In elaborating on the concept of Ubuntu as an African philosophical approach in 
Makwanyane, Langa J198 and Mokgoro J199 stated that Ubuntu relates to the values of 
human dignity, freedom, and equality that need to be upheld in society. Similarly, writing 
on the African philosophical concept of Ubuntu as a component of South African legal 
culture, Keep and Midgley argue that Ubuntu is directly linked to the values of human 
dignity, equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, as well as 
accountability, responsiveness, and openness.200  
Therefore, the interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter 
should be able to depict the adherence to and promotion of the African philosophy and 
its identified values. The significance of promoting these elements is that they can 																																																								
195 LB Ncube “Ubuntu: A transformative leadership philosophy” (2010) 4 Journal of Leadership Studies 77 
78. See also Tshoose (2009) African Journal of Legal Studies 14. 
196 LB Ncube “Ubuntu: A transformative leadership philosophy” (2010) 4 Journal of Leadership Studies 77 
78.  
197 Appiagyei-Atua (2005) South African Human Rights Law Journal 347-348. 
198 Makwanyane para 224. 
199 Para 308. 
200 H Keep & R Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in F Bruinsma & D Nelken (eds) Explorations in Legal Cultures (2007) 29 35. 
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ensure that socio-economic rights are interpreted in a manner that achieves the 
collective nature of human rights and obligations, as well as the values of equality, 
dignity, justice, and freedom in the enjoyment of these rights. It is thus imperative for the 
African Charter’s supervisory organs to engage the values of freedom, equality, justice, 
and dignity in developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights. As Tshoose 
notes, interpreting fundamental human rights requires considering the values accepted 
in an open and democratic society.201 
3 2 4 3 Developing the normative scope and content of socio-economic rights and 
their related obligations 
Elaborating on the substantive provisions of socio-economic rights and their 
concomitant obligations in preparatory work can provide interpretive organs with 
valuable guidance to interpret these rights in the African Charter. The formulation of 
socio-economic rights provisions and other related provisions can assist interpretive 
organs in interpreting socio-economic rights in a manner that develops their normative 
content. Significantly, the preparatory work does not distinguish between civil and 
political rights and socio-economic rights in that these rights are not formulated in 
distinct categories. Accordingly, the interpretive organs should interpret socio-economic 
rights in a manner that gives effect to the principle of interdependence of rights.202 The 
advantage of utilising this principle is that it can ensure internal consistency by 
considering the treaty as a whole. 
The preparatory work can also guide the interpretive organs to develop the normative 
scope and content of the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. In particular, the 
preparatory work establishes the obligations of States and individuals to respect, 
promote, and protect human rights, including socio-economic rights. Furthermore, 
according to the preparatory work, States have the obligation to realise these rights 
progressively and within their maximum available resources.203  As is demonstrated 
below,204 the notions of progressive realisation and maximum available resources were 
not expressly included in the provisions of the African Charter. Scholars have 
considered the reasons for the omission of these limitation clauses. According to De 
																																																								
201 Tshoose (2009) African Journal of Legal Studies 18-19. 
202 The concept of the interdependence of rights is discussed in part 3 3 2 2 below. 
203 Art 3 of the M’Baye Draft. 
204 See part 3 3 3 3 below. 
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Vos205 and Yeshanew,206 the omission of the limitation clauses was deliberate in order to 
foster the notion of interdependence of rights in the African Charter.  
As argued in chapter two, the teleological approach to interpretation allows the 
application of the preparatory work in elaborating on the provisions of the African 
Charter. Accordingly, the supervisory organs can take into account the M’Baye Draft as 
part of the preparatory work of the African Charter to elaborate the limitation clauses in 
its provisions.207  
3 3 Socio-economic rights in the African Charter: Relevant textual provisions 
3 3 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that the teleological approach interprets a treaty as a 
whole.208 Through this premise, the teleological approach allows interpretive organs to 
use the provisions within the text of the treaty to generate the meaning of the rights 
being interpreted. The discussion on the methodology for the application of the 
teleological approach demonstrated that, in the interpretative process, the interpretive 
organs are required to begin with the elements emerging from the treaty as a whole.209 
Against this background, this section analyses the textual formulation of socio-economic 
rights and other provisions relevant for their interpretation. This analysis shows the 
textual interpretive possibilities embedded in various provisions formulated in the African 
Charter, which can assist interpretive organs in generating the meaning of socio-
economic rights.  
3 3 2 Preamble to the African Charter  
3 3 2 1 African philosophy and the values of freedom, equality, justice, and dignity  
In this study, the discussion of the teleological approach and the methodology for its 
application indicates the significance of the preamble in the interpretative process.210 
The preamble to the African Charter, in particular, stipulates Member States’ 
commitment to promote the African philosophy. In this regard, the preamble declares 																																																								
205 P de Vos “A new beginning? The enforcement of social, economic and cultural rights under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2004) 8 Law, Democracy & Development 1 10. 
206 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 282. 
207 Part 3 3 3 3 below elaborates another vital mechanism through which these qualifiers can be included 
in the African Charter. 
208 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 3, 2 4, 2 5, and 2 5 2 1. 
209 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 1. 
210 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 5, and 2 5 2 1. 
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States’ consideration of the virtues of African historical tradition and values as sources 
and reflection of the African human rights concept. 211  In relation to the African 
philosophy, the preamble acknowledges the fact that the enjoyment of the rights in the 
African Charter implicitly requires the performance of duties by everyone.212 
The preamble also enshrines Member States’ commitment to promoting the values of 
freedom, equality, justice, and dignity in the protection of individuals’ rights.213 This 
statement underlines the significant role vested in interpretive organs to promote these 
values through the interpretation of various rights provisions, including socio-economic 
rights. Promoting these values in the interpretation of socio-economic rights requires 
interpretive organs to uphold the object and purpose of the African Charter in relation to 
these rights. In order to promote these values, the interpretation of socio-economic 
rights should be carried out in a manner that attains the various goals of these rights, 
including the improvement of individuals’ socio-economic conditions.  
Writing on socio-economic rights in the context of the South African Constitution, 
Liebenberg argues that in order to promote these values interpretive organs should 
consider the relationship between the purposes of socio-economic rights and these 
values.214 The application of values in the interpretation of socio-economic rights can 
assist interpretive organs in developing the content of these rights. Albertyn convincingly 
argues, while writing on the value of equality in the context of the South African 
Constitution, that: 
“As a value, equality gives substance to the vision of the Constitution … The fact that 
there is a relationship between value and right – the value is used to interpret and 
apply the right – means that the right is infused with the substantive content of the 
value.”215 
Accordingly, reference to the African Charter’s preamble will assist supervisory 
organs in interpreting socio-economic rights provisions.  
																																																								
211 Preamble to the African Charter paras 5-6. 
212 Para 7. 
213 Para 3. 
214 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 48. 
215 C Albertyn “Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous 
jurisprudence of equality” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248 249. 
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3 3 2 2 The interdependence of human rights 
The preamble to the African Charter reiterates the interdependence of human 
rights.216 This concept is demonstrated through States’ declaration that “civil and political 
rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights”.217 This statement 
implies that, in interpreting socio-economic rights, interpretive organs should take into 
account the interrelationship between these two categories of rights.  
In his analysis of the interdependence of rights, Scott argues that the concept entails 
two senses, namely “organic” and “related interdependence”. 218  Organic 
interdependence entails that one derivative right forms part of another core right.219 For 
example, organic interdependence considers whether the core right to life can be 
interpreted to include a derivative right to an adequate standard of living.220 This nature 
of interpretation means that protecting the right to life directly means the protection of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. 
Regarding related interdependence, Scott argues that this form of interdependence 
considers rights as distinct, yet dependent on each other.221 Stated differently, related 
interdependence treats rights as “equally important and complementary, yet 
separate”.222 This interpretation means that the protection of one right indirectly protects 
another right.223 For example, the civil and political rights to equality224 and a fair trial225 
in the African Charter may be applied to protect socio-economic rights. In other words, 
the right to equality guarantees the enforcement of civil and political rights, as well as 
socio-economic rights.226 With reference to socio-economic rights in particular, the right 
to equality may help the equal distribution of public resources for the protection of rights 
to health, labour, and education, as well as other socio-economic services.227  
																																																								
216 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 1. 
217 Preamble to the African Charter para 7. 
218 C Scott “The Interdependence and permeability of human rights norms: Towards a partial fusion of the 
international covenants on human rights” (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769 779. 
219 779. 
220 780. 
221 782-783. 
222 783. 
223 783. 
224 Art 3 of the African Charter. 
225 Art 7. 
226 TS Bulto “The utility of cross-cutting rights in enhancing justiciability of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2010) 29 University of Tasmania Law Review 142 163. 
227 163. 
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An understanding of the interdependence of rights, as elaborated by Scott, is 
advantageous in two respects. Firstly, it allows interpretive organs to interpret socio-
economic rights holistically in a manner that engages the African Charter as a whole. 
Secondly, it enables interpretive organs to apply the relevant civil and political rights 
provisions in the African Charter to develop the meaning of socio-economic rights.  
Developing the content of socio-economic rights through civil and political rights 
provisions may assist in ascertaining the nature and scope of their protection.228 This 
means that there is no right in the African Charter that is meaningful in itself. As 
Liebenberg argues, it is difficult to effectively protect one category of human rights in 
isolation from another.229 Thus, applying the concept of the interdependence of rights 
will enable supervisory organs to interpret socio-economic rights in connection with 
relevant civil and political rights, as well as the African Charter as a whole.  
3 3 3 Operative provisions 
3 3 3 1 General obligations of States 
The general obligations of states are formulated in article 1 of the African Charter: 
“The member states of Organisation of African Unity parties to the present Charter 
shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall 
undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.” 
Article 1 determines the nature of the legal obligations imposed to give effect to all 
the rights in the African Charter. Its formulation creates two layers of obligations. Firstly, 
the general obligation to recognise the rights contained in the African Charter and their 
related obligations and freedoms. Secondly, it establishes States’ obligation to 
undertake legislative or other measures in order to give effect to these rights and their 
related obligations. These two obligations are interlinked in the sense that they reinforce 
each other. This interrelationship means that the full realisation of one obligation is 
dependent on the enforcement of the other. Therefore, States should enforce both 
obligations in order to ensure the full protection of all the rights in the African Charter.  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Commission’ or 
‘ACHPR’)230 interpreted the obligation “to recognise” in Commission Nationale des Droits 																																																								
228 158. 
229 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 51-52. 
230 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Commission’ or ‘ACHPR’) was 
established by art 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc 
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de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad (‘Chad’)231 to mean that States are in breach of this 
obligation if they fail to undertake measures to give effect to the rights in the African 
Charter.232 These obligations denote the fact that States are required to take positive 
measures to “take steps” and “adopt legislative or other measures”. As Liebenberg 
argues, in international human rights law, the effective realisation of human rights 
depends on both negative and positive duties.233 
The formulation of the obligation to recognise in article 1 is mandatory in nature in 
that States are required to acknowledge all the rights and their concomitant obligations 
as guaranteed in the African Charter. According to Yeshanew, the nature of the 
requirement to “recognise” in article 1 is twofold. Firstly, it requires States to 
acknowledge all the rights in the African Charter as legally binding standards. Secondly, 
it requires States to adopt measures to give effect to the binding nature of the rights 
enshrined in the African Charter. 234  Through these requirements, the obligation to 
recognise reinforces the obligation to adopt legislative or other measures. 
The obligation to adopt legislative or other measures imposes on States the duty to 
realise and protect all the rights in the African Charter, through adequate domestic 
legislation, in order to ensure the full enjoyment of all rights. The formulation of article 1 
allows supervisory organs to interpret this article in a manner that includes a State’s 
obligation to protect socio-economic rights through legislation and other measures.  
The UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) expresses a 
similar interpretation in its General Comment on the nature of States Parties obligations 
(‘General Comment 3’), 235  while elaborating on the obligation to adopt legislative 
measures. General Comment 3 affirms that legislation is crucial in the health and 
education sectors.236 
The obligation to legislate implies that States are obliged to pass legislation that is 
consistent with the rights protected in the African Charter. In addition, this obligation 																																																																																																																																																																																			
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 I.L.M 58 (1982) (‘African Charter’), adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into 
force on 21 October 1986. The discussion on the African Commission and its mandate regarding the 
protection and interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter is carried out in chapter 
four, parts 4 2 and 4 3.  
231 Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad Communication No 74/92 (2000) 
AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995). 
232 Para 20. 
233 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 83. 
234 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 222. 
235 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The nature of States parties 
obligations (art 2, para 1) (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 (‘General Comment 3’).  
236 Para 3. 
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requires States to amend all existing legislation that is inconsistent with the socio-
economic rights recognised in the African Charter. In Lawyers for Human Rights v 
Swaziland (‘Swaziland’),237 the African Commission held that a State’s failure to take 
steps to ensure the conformity of its domestic laws with the provisions of the African 
Charter amounted to a violation of article 1.238  
Additionally, the obligation to legislate indicates that the adopted domestic legislation 
should be able to guarantee three significant elements of rights. Firstly, domestic laws 
should guarantee substantive socio-economic rights and their related duties. Secondly, 
laws should provide for effective enforcement mechanisms and means that can ensure 
governmental accountability. Thirdly, legislation should provide for effective and 
adequate redress and remedy for violations of these rights.  
The African Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Principles and Guidelines’), 239  that the adoption of 
legislative or other measures in article 1 of the African Charter requires States to protect 
socio-economic rights by guaranteeing appropriate administrative, as well as judicial 
remedies, to redress the violations of such rights.240 A similar statement is found in the 
CESCR’s General Comment on the application of the ICESCR (‘General Comment 
9’).241 In General Comment 9, the CESCR states that in order to give effect to their 
international obligations States are required to amend their domestic laws, as well as 
provide for effective judicial and administrative remedies for human rights violations.242 
The obligation to legislate requires States to incorporate socio-economic rights in 
their domestic legal and administrative system that is, in the national legislation and 
regulations. In its Principles and Guidelines, the African Commission states that the 
obligation to recognise rights, duties, and freedoms, as well as the obligation to adopt 
legislative and other measures to give effect to the rights in the African Charter, impose 
on States an obligation to protect and realise socio-economic rights apart from other 
																																																								
237 Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland Communication No 251/02 (2005) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 2005). 
238 Swaziland para 51. See also I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 6 ed (2003) 35. 
239 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as adopted on 24 October 2011 (‘Principles and Guidelines’). 
240 Para 2. 
241  CESCR General Comment 9: The domestic application of the Covenant (1998) UN DOC 
E/C.12/1998/24 (‘General Comment 9’). 
242 Para 3. 
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ordinary legislation in their national constitutions.243 The approach used to incorporate 
socio-economic rights into domestic laws should ensure a State’s compliance with its 
obligations in the African Charter, as well as ensure that it is the efficient mechanism for 
protecting socio-economic rights. As the CESCR states in General Comment 9, any 
approach of incorporation of the ICESCR applied by a State should take into account 
two significant criteria. Firstly, it should guarantee the State’s fulfilment of its obligations 
in terms of the ICESCR. Secondly, it should be the most effective approach for 
protecting human rights in that State.244  
3 3 3 2 States’ obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil 
The formulation of States obligations in article 1 incorporates negative and positive 
duties. The negative duties require States to desist from interfering with individuals’ 
enjoyment of their rights. The positive duties oblige States to undertake a variety of 
measures to ensure that individuals enjoy their rights. These duties are incorporated in 
the obligation to “recognise” and “legislate”. States are required to implement the quartet 
typology of obligations, namely obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil. In 
Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & INTERIGHTS v Cameroon (‘Post 
Electoral Violence’) the African Commission held that: 
“Article 1 places the States Parties under the obligation of respecting, protecting, 
promoting and implementing the rights. The respect for the rights imposes on the 
State the negative obligation of doing nothing to violate the said rights. The 
protection targets the positive obligation of the State to guarantee that private 
individuals do not violate these rights… This Article places on the States Parties the 
positive obligation of preventing and punishing the violation by private individuals of 
the rights prescribed by the Charter.”245 
When elaborating the nature of obligations imposed by socio-economic rights, the 
African Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines that: 
																																																								
243 Principles and Guidelines para 2. 
244 General Comment 9 para 7. 
245 Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & INTERIGHTS v Cameroon Communication No 
272/03 paras 87-90. 
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“A useful framework for understanding the nature of the duties imposed by 
economic, social and cultural rights is the duty ‘to respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ 
these rights.”246 
Thus States’ obligations to “recognise” and “legislate” imply that domestic legislation 
and other measures by States should be able to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the 
socio-economic rights of individuals guaranteed in the African Charter.  
The concept of the typology of obligation was firstly developed by Shue, who argues 
that the meaningful realisation of all human rights requires the fulfilment of a spectrum of 
duties.247 According to Shue, each human right assigns a tripartite typology of duties. 
These duties include “duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation, and 
duties to aid the deprived”.248 The duty to avoid depriving entails the obligation not to 
remove an individual from his or her sources of subsistence.249 The nature of this duty 
requires States to refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals, including socio-
economic rights.250 The duty to protect from deprivation incorporates States’ obligation 
to protect the rights of individuals from interference by third parties.251 The duty to aid 
the deprived enshrines States’ obligation to provide means of subsistence to individuals 
who cannot provide for themselves.252  
The typology of States’ obligations is further developed by Eide. According to Eide, 
human rights impose a quartet typology of obligations, namely obligations to respect, 
protect, facilitate, and fulfil.253 The obligation to respect requires States to respect the 
resources of individuals and their autonomy to use them for their well-being. 254 
Furthermore the obligation to protect, imposes on States the duty to protect individuals’ 
enjoyment of their resources against interference by third parties.255  Regarding the 
obligation to facilitate, States are required to avail individuals with opportunities to enjoy 
																																																								
246 Principles and Guidelines para 4 and paras 5-12. See also C Heyns “Civil and political rights in the 
African Charter” in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
System in Practice 1986-2000 (2002) 137 138. 
247 H Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (1980) 52. 
248 52. 
249 53. 
250 55. 
251 53. 
252 53. 
253 Updated Study on the Right to Food submitted by A Eide in accordance with Sub-Commission Decision 
1998/106 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12 paras 52-53. 
254 A Eide “Economic, social, and cultural rights” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed 
(2001) 9 23. 
255 24. 
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their rights.256 The obligation to fulfil requires States to directly provide needy individuals 
with the necessities of life.257  
The formulation of the obligation to undertake measures does not limit States 
exclusively to legislative measures. States are also required to take other measures. 
The obligation to adopt other measures is broad and flexible in that it does not define 
and limit the scope of the term “other measures”. This broad formulation implies that 
legislative measures are not exclusive measures for the full realisation of human 
rights.258 This broad and flexible formulation allows States to take into account a variety 
of necessary measures that can facilitate the enjoyment of the socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter. These measures include administrative, financial, educational, and 
social measures. The African Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines that 
article 1 of the African Charter requires Member States to safeguard socio-economic 
rights by adopting policy, budgetary, educational, public awareness, and administrative 
measures.259  
As the CESCR notes in General Comment 3, the legislative measures required in 
article 2(1) of the ICESCR are not exhaustive.260 According to the CESCR, the phrase 
“all appropriate means” in article 2(1) requires other measures, such as judicial 
remedies, to be taken.261 Other measures may also include administrative, financial, 
educational, and social measures. 262  The CESCR further emphasises in General 
Comment 9 that judicial remedies are not exclusive. States’ obligations to give effect to 
the rights in the ICESCR require States to ensure that remedies are accessible, 
affordable, timely, and effective administrative remedies in addition to legislative and 
judicial measures.263  
3 3 3 3 Obligations of progressive realisation and within available resources 
Unlike the provisions of article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the formulation of article 1 of the 
African Charter does not expressly include a State’s obligation to realise rights 
“progressively” and within “available resources”. According to Odinkalu, the omission of 																																																								
256 MM Sepulveda The Nature of Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2003) 162. 
257 Eide “Economic, social and cultural rights” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 24. 
258 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 222. 
259 Principles and Guidelines para 2.  
260 General Comment 3 para 4. 
261 Para 5. 
262 Para 7. 
263 General Comment 9 para 9. 
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these two phrases implies that the socio-economic rights in the African Charter should 
be realised immediately.264 However, it can be argued that based on the scarcity of 
resources in many African countries, socio-economic rights need to be realised 
progressively. Ankumah argues that poor levels of economic development, as well as 
the uneven allocation of resources, can hinder States from realising these rights 
immediately.265  
The African Commission acknowledges that many African states are faced with 
economic hardships.266 In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia (‘Purohit’),267 the African 
Commission stated that poverty in many African countries hinders the enjoyment of the 
right to health.268 The African Commission confirmed that resource scarcity and poverty 
contribute to the failure of African states to effectively realise individuals’ rights to 
health.269  
Yeshanew270 pinpoints the concern that framers of the African Charter could adopt 
the approach of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’). 271  The CRC 
establishes a specific provision regarding socio-economic rights, which incorporates the 
notions of “progressive realisation” and “within available resources”.272 Although concern 
for the adoption of an explicit provision regarding the obligation of progressive realisation 
is valid, I argue that the suggestion to adopt a distinct provision can weaken the object 
and purpose of the African Charter to protect human rights, including socio-economic 
rights. As mentioned above,273 the framers of the African Charter did not intend to create 
a dichotomy between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. Their intention 
was to consider these rights on the same footing. As such, an adoption of a specific 
provision that exclusively qualifies socio-economic rights strengthens the dichotomy of 
rights and weakens their protection. 																																																								
264 Odinkalu “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights” in The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 196. 
265 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 144. 
266  Union interafricaine des droits de l’Homme, Federation internationale des ligues des droits de 
l’Homme, Rencontre africaine des droits de l’Homme, Organisation nationale des droits de l’Homme au 
Senegal and Association malienne des droits de l’Homme v Angola Communication No 159/96 para 16. 
267 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication No 241/2003 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003). 
268 Para 84. 
269 Purohit para 84. See also Kevin Mgwanga Gunme v Cameroon Communication No 266/03 (2009) 
AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009) para 206. 
270 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 282. 
271 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 28 ILM 1456 (1989) was adopted on 20 November 1989 and 
entered into force on 2 September 1990. 
272 Art 4 of the CRC. 
273 See parts 3 2 3 4 and 3 2 3 6 above. 
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The concept of progressive realisation is designed to take into consideration the fact 
that the full realisation of socio-economic rights largely depends on the availability of 
resources. In elaborating this concept, as used in article 2(1)274 of the ICESCR, the 
CESCR notes that “progressive realisation” entails the understanding that realising 
socio-economic rights within a short period of time is impossible.275 While writing on the 
ICESCR, Alston and Quinn rightly point out that the notion of “progressive realisation” 
reflects the fact that resources in variables are required to ensure the full realisation of 
socio-economic rights.276 This notion is significant in explicating the nature of state 
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights.277  
Although the African Charter does not explicitly provide for the concepts of 
“progressive realisation” and “within maximum available resources”, it does not 
necessarily mean that these notions are excluded from the African Charter. As Craven 
observes, all human rights instruments relating to socio-economic rights, including the 
African Charter, recognise that States must take immediate steps while the full 
realisation of these rights may be progressive.278  
I argue in this part that the notions of “progressive realisation” and “within maximum 
available resources” are implicitly incorporated in article 1 of the African Charter. 
“Progressive realisation” and “within maximum available resources” can be derived from 
the phrase “to adopt other measures”. This phrase allows States to take into account 
non-legislative measures,279 such as resource consideration, planning, and budgeting to 
realise the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. According to Yeshanew, “other 
measures” should be construed in a manner that includes the notions of “progressive 
realisation” and “within maximum available resources”.280 
As discussed above,281 article 1 imposes on Member States obligations of both a 
negative and positive nature. While negative obligations are immediate in nature, 
positive obligations require a lot of resources and planning. Accordingly, they cannot be 
realised immediately. As the African Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines: 																																																								
274 Art 2(1) of the ICESCR is reproduced in part 3 2 3 5 above. 
275 General Comment 3 para 9. 
276 P Alston & G Quinn “The nature and scope of States Parties’ obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156 172. 
277 172. 
278 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (1995) 130. 
279 The requirement to adopt legislative measures in art 1 is similar in nature to the negative obligation to 
respect. See Purohit para 42. 
280 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 282-283. 
281 See part 3 3 3 1 above. 
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“The concept of progressive realisation means that States must implement a 
reasonable and measurable plan, including set achievable benchmarks and 
timeframes, for the enjoyment over time of economic, social and cultural rights within 
the resources available to the state party.”282  
There is a direct link between “progressive realisation” and “available resources”. 
Underestimating the availability of resources, as a key element to the progressive 
realisation of rights, can render impossible a State’s realisation of socio-economic rights. 
Chenwi argues that a State’s progressive realisation of socio-economic rights largely 
depends on the socio-economic rights recognised by such State and its available 
resources to realise such rights.283 
Alston and Quinn pinpoint the existence of a perception that “progressive realisation” 
distinguishes socio-economic rights from civil and political rights in the sense that civil 
and political rights are realised immediately and do not involve any resources.284 This 
perception is based on article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which requires socio-economic rights 
to be realised progressively, while its counterpart the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)285 imposes on States an obligation to “respect and ensure” civil 
and political rights – which means immediate realisation.286  
It is wrong to argue that all civil and political rights are immediately realisable without 
any resource implications. Craven notes that, based on their socio-economic 
dimensions, it is impossible to realise all civil and political rights within the shortest 
period of time.287 The ECtHR in Airey v Ireland (‘Airey’), while deciding on article 6 of the 
European Convention, held that civil and political rights also have socio-economic 
implications.288 
The full realisation of civil and political rights also requires the deployment of 
resources. Alston and Quinn argue that realising civil and political rights largely depends 
																																																								
282 Principles and Guidelines para 14. 
283  L Chenwi “Unpacking ‘progressive realisation’, its relation to resources, minimum core and 
reasonableness, and some methodological considerations for assessing compliance” (2013) De Jure 742 
743. 
284 Alston & Quinn (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 172. 
285 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 was adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
286 Art 2(1) of the ICCPR provides: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without discrimination of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.” 
287 Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 130. 
288 Airey v Ireland Application No 6289/73 Judgment of 9 October 1979. 
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on the availability of resources, as well as the development of societal structures.289 
Moreover Liebenberg argues that the rights to vote, fair trial and equality, for example, 
have resource and policy implications.290 In a similar vein, Riedel notes that civil and 
political rights that guarantee the rule of law and protect peaceful demonstrations involve 
financial resources for their implementation. According to Riedel, the only distinction 
between these two categories of rights is the amount of resources required rather than 
the principle.291  
Scholars raise the concern that the requirement to progressively realise socio-
economic rights can cause States to evade their obligations. For example, Craven 
identifies the concern raised during the drafting of the ICESCR that reliance on 
“progressive realisation” would create an avenue for States to postpone the realisation 
of socio-economic rights or dodge the obligations imposed by such rights.292 In a similar 
vein, Odinkalu argues that the term “progressive realisation” is incomprehensible in that 
it lacks meaningful normative content and can cause States’ endless postponement to 
realise individuals’ socio-economic rights.293  
It should be noted that the phrase “progressive realisation” does not deter States 
from ensuring that socio-economic rights are realised as soon as possible. Craven 
pinpoints that, regardless of the contingent requirement to realise socio-economic rights 
progressively, these rights should be implemented in a manner that ensures their 
expeditious achievement.294  In a similar vein, the African Commission states in its 
Principles and Guidelines that “progressive realisation” includes both immediate 
obligations and reasonable and measurable strategies that specify the goals to be 
achieved and the timeframes for the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.295 
It is thus worth noting that “progressive realisation” cannot be used by States to 
neglect their obligation to fully realise the socio-economic rights in the African Charter in 
circumstances where resources are available. To the contrary, “progressive realisation” 
is meant to ensure that States utilise their available resources prudently in a manner that 																																																								
289 Alston & Quinn (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 172. 
290 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 55. 
291 E Riedel “Economic, social and cultural rights” in C Krause & M Scheinin (eds) International Protection 
of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2012) 131 138. See also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 191. 
292 Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 130-131. 
293 Odinkalu “Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 183. See also Alston & Quinn (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 172. 
294 Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 131. See also General 
Comment 3 para 9; and The Maastricht Guidelines on Violation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
adopted in Maastricht, January 1997 para 8. 
295 Principles and Guidelines para 14. 
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would enable the realisation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter at the 
earliest possible moment. In Kevin Mgwanga Gunme v Cameroon (‘Gunme’), the African 
Commission held that Member States to the African Charter are obliged to invest their 
resources carefully in a manner that guarantees the realisation of the right to 
development, as well as other socio-economic rights progressively.296  
In evaluating a State’s obligation to take steps to the maximum of its available 
resources under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (‘Optional Protocol’), 297  the 
CESCR states that the “availability of resources” should not be understood as a means 
to stop the immediacy of a State’s obligations to take concrete steps towards the full 
realisation of socio-economic rights.298 It should also be noted that even socio-economic 
rights incorporate immediately realisable obligations, such as a State’s obligation to 
respect socio-economic rights, as well as non-discrimination. For example, Yeshanew 
argues that the right against arbitrary forced eviction, a person’s right to his or her own 
choice of work, and the right to establish and direct educational institutions are 
immediate in nature.299 
3 3 3 4 Non-discrimination 
The right to non-discrimination is recognised in article 2 of the African Charter: 
“Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status.” 
The formulation of article 2 implies that non-discrimination standards are applicable 
to everyone and are immediately realisable. The right to non-discrimination applies to all 
rights in the African Charter, including socio-economic rights. The African Commission 
elaborates in its Principles and Guidelines that article 2 of the African Charter prohibits 
any form of discrimination regarding the enjoyment of all human rights protected in the 																																																								
296 Gunme para 206. 
297 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly through its resolution A/RES/63/117 on 10 December, 2008. 
298 An Evaluation of the Obligation to take steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant UN doc E/C12/2007/1, 10 May 2007, paras 4-5. See also Riedel 
“Economic, social and cultural rights” in International Protection of Human Rights 139; Yeshanew The 
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 278; and Craven The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 131. 
299 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 278. 
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African Charter.300 According to the African Commission, discrimination in relation to 
individuals’ socio-economic rights amounts to a violation of the African Charter.301 
The African Commission defines discrimination to include any “conduct or omission” 
that nullifies or impairs equality of enjoyment of socio-economic rights by individuals.302 
The formulation is broad and prohibits any kind of discrimination, both formal and 
substantive. These grounds include race, ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, and birth. 
The explicit formulation of the prohibited grounds of discrimination requires the equal 
enjoyment of all rights, including socio-economic rights, between men and women, as 
well as between nationals and non-nationals. The African Commission states in its State 
Party Reporting Guidelines for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter (‘State Reporting Guidelines’) that Member States are required to indicate in 
their reports legislative and other practical measures they have taken to ensure equality 
of enjoyment of socio-economic rights between men and women, as well as vulnerable 
and marginalised groups. 303  Moreover, article 2 recognises the right to non-
discrimination of every individual in his capacity as an individual and a group. The 
inclusion of “ethnic group” as a prohibited ground takes into account individuals as a 
group.304 
Unlike the ICESCR, the African Charter expressly includes “fortune” as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination, which implies the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
individuals’ socio-economic status, for example, poverty. Individuals who are too poor to 
afford socio-economic goods and services, such as health care services and education, 
should not be denied access to these services on grounds of their poverty. The 
Principles and Guidelines are silent on the implications of the term “fortune” in article 2 
of the African Charter. In its General Comment on non-discrimination (‘General 
Comment 20’),305 the CESCR elaborates on discrimination on the basis of economic and 
																																																								
300 Principles and Guidelines para 19. 
301 Para 19. 
302 Para 19. 
303 State Reporting Guidelines para 6. 
304 R Gittleman “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A legal analysis” (1982) 22 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 667 683. 
305 CESCR General Comment 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art 2, para 
2) (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (‘General Comment 2’). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
127 
 
social situation to include the denial of socio-economic goods, such as health care and 
education, to individuals on the ground of poverty or being homeless.306 
The list of prohibited grounds of discrimination is not exhaustive. The formulation 
does not limit the application of the principle of non-discrimination exclusively to the 
explicitly mentioned prohibited grounds. Article 2 includes a prohibition against 
discrimination based on other status. This formulation is broad and flexible as the phrase 
“other status” implicitly allows the inclusion of other prohibited grounds of discrimination 
that are not expressly mentioned in article 2, such as age, disability, marital status, 
family status, legal status, and nationality.  
In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (‘Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum’),307 the African Commission included sexual orientation as a ground of 
discrimination. According to the ACHPR, the right to non-discrimination in the African 
Charter ensures the equal treatment of individuals, regardless of their sexual 
orientation.308 In its Resolution on Protection against Violence and other Human Rights 
Violations against Persons on the Basis of their Real or Imputed Sexual Orientation 
(‘Resolution on Sexual Orientation’),309 the African Commission condemns violations of 
human rights on the basis of sexual orientation and urges States to stop such violations.  
In 2015, in relation to sexual orientation, the African Commission granted seven non-
governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) observer status, including the Coalition of African 
Lesbians (‘CAL’).310 The African Union (‘AU’) rejected the ACHPR’s decision to grant 
CAL observer status. The AU requested the African Commission to consider 
“fundamental African values, identity and good traditions” and to withdraw the observer 
status it granted to CAL.311 																																																								
306 Para 35. 
307 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe Communication No 245/02 (2006) AHRLR 128 
(ACHPR 2006). 
308 Para 169. 
309 Resolution on Sexual Orientation adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights held in Luanda, Angola, 28 April-12 May 2014, paras 1-4, see 
<www.achpr.org/sessions/55th/resolutions/275> (accessed 20-05-2017). 
310  Thirty-Eighth Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AU 
DOC.EX.CL/921 (XXVII) para 14. The names of these seven NGOs are listed in the Final Communiqué of 
the 56th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held in Banjul, The 
Gambia, 21 April-7 May 2015. These NGOs are the Legal Assistance Trust (Namibia); Asylum Access 
(Tanzania); International Lawyers.org (Switzerland); Coalition of African Lesbians (South Africa); Universal 
Rights Group (Switzerland); and the Pan African Lawyers Union (‘PALU’) (Tanzania). 
311 Decision of the African Union Executive Council on the Decision of the Thirty-Eighth Activity of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights AU DOC.EX.CL/Dec.887 (XXVII) para 7. The focus of 
this dissertation is to demonstrate that the broad formulation of art 2 of the African Charter creates a 
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Writing on the notion of sexual orientation, scholars argue for an interpretation of the 
rights to non-discrimination, equality, and dignity in the African Charter to include sexual 
orientation. Viljoen and Murray argue that the right to equality in the African Charter 
includes rights related to sexual orientation. 312  Viljoen notes that article 2, which 
prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex or any other status, can be interpreted to 
include a prohibition against discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.313 In a 
similar vein, Rudman argues that the rights to equality, dignity, liberty, freedom of 
expression, and the implicit right to privacy in the African Charter can be interpreted to 
include sexual orientation as a ground for discrimination.314 
The formulation of the principle of non-discrimination in article 2 implies that States 
are required to protect individuals’ access to their enjoyment of socio-economic rights 
against discriminatory practices by non-state actors. For example, non-state actors 
(such as employers) may conduct discriminatory practices in different labour 
circumstances, such as recruitment processes, working conditions, training 
opportunities, remuneration, promotion, termination, and retirement. 315  The African 
Commission held in Post Electoral Violence that the obligation to protect “targets the 
positive obligation of the State to guarantee that private individuals do not violate these 
rights”.316  
3 3 3 5 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates the interpretive potential embedded in the preamble to the 
African Charter and the operative provisions. The notion of African philosophy and the 
values of freedom, equality, justice, and dignity, as well as the notion of the 
interdependence of rights can broadly be applied to enrich the scope and content of the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. Engaging these interpretive tools implies 
that supervisory organs will develop the scope and content of socio-economic rights that 																																																																																																																																																																																			
possibility for the inclusion of different grounds that are not expressly listed in art 2, including sexual 
orientation as a ground of discrimination. An in-depth discussion of the legality of homosexual practices 
falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  
312 R Murray & F Viljoen “Towards non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: The normative 
basis and procedural possibilities before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
African Union” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 86 91. 
313 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 264-265. 
314 A Rudman “The protection against discrimination on sexual orientation under the African human rights 
system” (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 14-19. 
315 Kinley & Tadaki (2004) Virginia Journal of International Law 977.  
316 Post Electoral Violence paras 87-90. 
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guarantee human dignity and equality of opportunity for individuals and peoples. The 
consideration of an African philosophy in interpreting socio-economic rights will help 
supervisory organs to garner insights into the scope and content of these rights and 
particularly those of a collective nature.  
The principle of interdependence of rights offers supervisory organs an opportunity to 
take into account the provisions of socio-economic rights, as well as other provisions in 
the African Charter, during the interpretive process. In particular, “organic 
independence” enables supervisory organs to engage the rights to equality,317 life,318 
and dignity 319  in developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights. 
Furthermore, the provisions on non-discrimination enable supervisory organs to interpret 
socio-economic rights in a manner that ensures that their beneficiaries are not 
discriminated against, either on the explicit or implicit grounds of discrimination. The 
following part analyses the socio-economic rights provisions.   
3 3 4 Socio-economic rights provisions 
3 3 4 1 Right to property320	
 
The African Charter provides for the right to property in article 14: 
“The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the 
interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance 
with the provisions of appropriate laws.” 
The African Charter formulates the right to property in a general way in two respects. 
Firstly, it does not explicitly specify the content or the right-holder of the right. Secondly, 
it requires this right to be guaranteed. This formulation allows for a consideration of an 
individual’s right to property, as well as the peoples’ right to property. This includes 
aspects of ownership, possession, usage, and the enjoyment of property. This broad 
formulation signifies that individuals, both in their individual as well as collective 
capacities, enjoy the right to property. In its Guidelines and Principles, the African 
Commission states that the right to property in article 14 of the African Charter is broad 
in that it protects individual and collective property rights. These property rights include a 																																																								
317 Art 3 of the African Charter. 
318 Art 4. 
319 Art 5. 
320 The reasons why this dissertation considers the right to property as a socio-economic right are 
discussed in this part below. 
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legitimate expectation of the acquisition of property, peaceful enjoyment of property, and 
access to as well as use of land and natural resources held under communal ownership 
under traditional custom and law. According to the African Commission, the protection of 
property under communal ownership obliges States to guarantee security of tenure to 
communities and their people.321 
The broad formulation of the right to property creates space to incorporate equality of 
enjoyment of this right between men and women, as well as vulnerable and 
marginalised individuals. The African Commission elaborates in its Principles and 
Guidelines that article 2 of the African Charter prohibits any discrimination in the 
enjoyment of all rights protected in the African Charter.322  Furthermore the African 
Commission requires Member States to indicate measures they have taken to guarantee 
equitable and non-discriminatory access, acquisition, ownership, inheritance, and control 
of land and housing, especially by women and members of low income groups.323 
Moreover, the right to property creates space to incorporate States’ obligations to 
respect, protect, promote, and fulfil individuals’ rights to property. The African 
Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines that the specific duties relating to the 
right to property should be interpreted in light of the general obligations regarding socio-
economic rights, as elaborated by the African Commission.324 
The right to property, as formulated in article 14, is not absolute and can be 
restricted. Two reasons justify the encroachment of this right, namely “interest of public 
need” and “general interest of the community”. The formulation of these grounds is 
broad as it does not elaborate on their meaning, as well as the meaning of different 
types of encroachment.325 The implication of this broad formulation is that it allows a 
broad interpretation of the legitimate interests of the public and considers the 
expropriation of property, provided such expropriation is for public interest or the general 
interest of the community. The reference to the terms “public interest” and “general 
interest of the public” takes into account peoples’ socio-economic interests – that is, 
individuals’ collective socio-economic rights. The African Commission elaborates in its 
																																																								
321 Principles and Guidelines paras 53-54. 
322 Para 19. 
323 States Reporting Guidelines para 7(v). 
324 Principles and Guidelines para 52. 
325 C Krause “The right to property” in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 200. See also Ssenyonjo (2011) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
358 362. 
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Principles and Guidelines that “public interest concerns the common well-being or 
general welfare of the population”.326  
Furthermore, the reference to “public interest” and “general interest of the public” 
implies the inclusion of States’ commitment to ensuring land reform in a manner that 
protects equitable access to property. The African Commission states in its Principles 
and Guidelines that the right to property imposes upon States an obligation to ensure 
“legitimate public interest objective”, including economic reforms and other measures 
adopted for promoting and protecting “social justice”.327  
The formulation of the grounds for expropriation is qualified by the requirement to 
conform to appropriate laws. This formulation denotes that the laws governing the 
encroachment of the right to property guarantees all the requirements of the protection 
of this right. Such requirements include payment of compensation and a prohibition 
against arbitrary encroachment. As Yeshanew observes, in order to be appropriate, the 
laws “should not be arbitrary” and should take into account the “right to remedy”.328 In its 
Principles and Guidelines, the African Commission states that Member States have the 
obligation to guarantee an individual’s peaceful enjoyment of this right, as well as 
protection against forced evictions. This obligation implies that Member States shall 
protect the enjoyment in all its forms, from interference by third parties to its own 
agents.329 
Scholars have challenged the inclusion of the right to property as a socio-economic 
right. For example, Oloka-Onyango330 and Odinkalu331 argue that the right to property is 
not recognised as a socio-economic right in other international human rights treaties, 
such as the ICESCR. Oloka-Onyango further argues that the right to property, as a 
socio-economic right, does not help to improve the socio-economic conditions of African 
people for two reasons. Firstly, the right to property is individualistic in nature and 
guarantees individual ownership of land. Secondly, it is controversial regarding the rights 
of tenure, land reform, and equality in access to land. Accordingly, scholars such as 
																																																								
326 Principles and Guidelines para 1(h). 
327 Para 55(c). 
328 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 237. 
329 Principles and Guidelines para 55(a)-(e). 
330 J Oloka-Onyango “Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the struggle for economic and social rights in 
Africa” (1995) 26 California Western International Law Journal 1 49. 
331 Odinkalu “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights” in The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 190. 
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Umuzorike, 332  Ankumah, 333  Nmehielle, 334  and Ouguergouz 335  consider the right to 
property as a civil and political right, rather than a socio-economic right. 
However, the right to property can also be classified as a socio-economic right based 
on the number of social dimensions it possesses. For example, the intimate connection 
between the land rights of indigenous people and their socio-economic well-being 
illustrates the socio-economic dimensions of the right to property. According to the 
African Commission, the right to property protects property rights relating to “access and 
use of land and other natural resources” held under collective ownership, as recognised 
by customary law.336 Cobo points out that for indigenous communities, land is the basis 
for their existence, such as food production and family life.337 The connection is based 
on the fact that their land and natural resources guarantee their socio-economic 
development and existence.338 The ACHPR held in the Centre for the Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council (‘Endorois’)339 that the first step to protecting indigenous communities is 
to acknowledge that the rights, interests, and benefits attached to their traditional land 
constitute property.340  The African Commission stated that indigenous communities’ 
rights include assets, such as houses built on their traditional land, livestock, forests, 
pasture, and grazing land, as well as economic activities such as stock-breeding.341  
In a similar vein, Yeshanew argues that shelter and other socio-economic needs of 
indigenous people renders the right to property a socio-economic right.342 Krause argues 
that the uncertainty of whether the right to property is a civil and political right or a socio-
economic right can be resolved by considering the social dimensions of this right.343  
																																																								
332 UO Umozurike The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997) 40-41. 
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Based on the foregoing discussion, the formulation of the right to property in the 
African Charter, interpreted against the background of the prevalence of customary land 
tenure and the need to promote land reforms in Africa to redress colonial wrongs, 
justifies it to be considered as a socio-economic right. 
3 3 4 2 Right to work  
The right to work is contained in article 15 of the African Charter:  
“Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory 
conditions and shall receive pay for equal work.” 
Yeshanew argues that this provision protects only the right of employed 
individuals.344 However, this article recognises the right to work in two respects. Firstly, it 
recognises the right to work in a general manner in that it entitles every individual to the 
right to work. This implies that the right is guaranteed on the basis of equality and non-
discrimination between men and women and on any prohibited ground of discrimination. 
The formulation of this right requires equality and satisfactory conditions of work, such 
as equal opportunities, safe working conditions, and an individual’s choice of work. 
Secondly, article 15 recognises the right to work in that it formulates the right to receive 
equal pay for equal work. This formulation allows the inclusion of equality of 
remuneration for equal work among employed individuals. 
According to the African Commission, the right to work in article 15 incorporates the 
right to equitable and decent work that respects an individual’s basic rights. Moreover 
this right includes rights regarding conditions of work, safety, and remunerations. The 
African Commission emphasised further that the right to work does not mean a right to 
obtain employment, but rather a State’s duty to create a conducive environment for an 
individual’s employment that takes into account respect for human dignity. The right to 
work also includes an individual’s right to freely choose work.345 
3 3 4 3 Right to health  
The right to health is provided for in article 16 of the African Charter: 
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“1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical 
and mental health. 
2. State parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect 
the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when 
they are sick.” 
The right to health is formulated as a guarantee to every individual in that everyone is 
entitled to its enjoyment. The formulation recognises the right to enjoyment of both 
physical and mental health. This right is formulated broadly in that it does not provide for 
a definition of “health” and it also confers a right upon individuals to “enjoy the best 
attainable” state of health. This general formulation considers the various circumstances 
that can play a role in determining the meaning of “health”, as well as the “best 
attainable” state of health. It allows individuals freedom of choice of medical treatment, 
sexual and reproductive freedom, and freedom from interference with his or her right to 
health. It also considers the right to enjoy the underlying determinants of a right to health 
that furthers the enjoyment of the best attainable state of health.  
The African Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines that the right to health 
is inclusive and is not restricted to health care, but rather extends to the underlying 
determinants of health.346 These determinants enshrine access to safe and potable 
water and adequate sanitation, adequate food, nutrition and housing, as well as healthy 
occupational and environmental conditions.347 Others include health-related education 
and information on sexual and reproductive health.348 In addition to these elements, the 
CESCR’s General Comment on the right to the highest standard of health (‘General 
Comment 14’),349 adds the engagement of people in decision-making in all health-
related issues at community, national, and international levels as an underlying 
determinant of health.350 
Furthermore, the formulation of the phrase “best attainable state” takes into 
consideration both individuals’ and states’ socio-economic conditions, such as financial 
status, biological conditions, and available resources. As Chirwa351 and Yeshanew352 																																																								
346 Principles and Guidelines para 61. 
347 Para 63. 
348 Para 64. 
349  CESCR General Comment 14: The right to the Highest Standard of Health (2000) UN Doc 
E/C12/2000/4 (“General Comment 14’). 
350 Para 11. 
351 DM Chirwa “African regional human rights system: The promise of recent jurisprudence on social 
rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (2008) 323 330. 
352 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 283. 
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rightly observe, the provisions of article 16(1) (“the individuals’ right to enjoy the best 
attainable state”) depends on various factors including the individual and State’s socio-
economic conditions to realise the right. 
Article 16(1) is qualified by article 16(2), which requires States to “take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people” and to ensure that “people receive 
medical attention” when they are ill. This formulation establishes States’ obligations to 
protect the right to health through various measures. Moreover, the obligation to ensure 
individuals who are ill receive medical attention denotes the States’ duty to ensure 
health facilities and providers are available, and accessible, in a manner that guarantees 
the enjoyment of the best attainable right to health. It also accommodates the provision 
of health-related facilities, such as food and water. 
3 3 4 4 Right to education  
The African Charter formulates the right to education in article 17: 
“1. Every individual shall have the right to education. 
2. Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his community. 
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognised by the 
community shall be the duty of the State.” 
Article 17 protects the right of every individual to education. The formulation of the 
right to education is general in nature in that it does not explicitly state the form of 
education to be enjoyed. This formulation allows the inclusion of different types and 
forms of education that can be enjoyed. In its Principles and Guidelines the African 
Commission elaborates on the right to education to encompass pre-school, primary, 
secondary, tertiary, and adult education, and vocational training. 353  The broad 
formulation of the right to education also requires the consideration of the elements 
relating to availability, accessibility, adaptability, and non-discrimination. The African 
Commission has stated that the right to education requires States to guarantee 
children’s access to the right to free and compulsory primary education. States have an 
obligation to ensure that secondary education is generally available and accessible on 
the same basis to all. States have to ensure that higher education is generally available 
and accessible to all on the basis of capacity. Significantly, States should progressively 
introduce free secondary and higher education to all. Moreover, the African Commission 
																																																								
353 Principles and Guidelines para 70. 
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emphasised States’ obligations to ensure that education is accessible physically and 
economically at all levels by providing finance, building schools, and providing 
educational materials, as well as training for teachers and instructors.354  
In relation to the right to education, the African Charter recognises the freedom of 
every individual to take part in the cultural life of his or her community. This broad 
formulation of the term “cultural life” denotes the possibility of including cultural 
educational training and languages, as well as lawful cultural practices compatible with 
human rights standards. The African Commission elaborates in its Guidelines and 
Principles that States should ensure that education systems in their jurisdiction preserve 
and strengthen positive African morals, traditional values, and cultures.355 
The right to education in article 17(1) and (2) is qualified by the obligations on States 
to protect and promote traditional values recognised by the community. Ouguergouz 
confirms the formulation of these obligations in article 17. 356  Through these two 
obligations, states are obliged to take positive legislative and other measures to ensure 
this right is protected, respected, promoted, and fulfilled. These measures include the 
adoption of educational and cultural legislation and cultural policies that respect and 
uphold the cultural values of the community. Ouguergouz confirms the requirement to 
develop educational and cultural policies contained in the formulation of article 17(3).357 
Moreover, the formulation of article 17(3) protects both the individual in his personal 
capacity, as well as the individual as a group, by conferring on States the obligation to 
protect and promote the morals and traditional values of the community, which are 
consistent with human rights standards. Ouguergouz confirms the intention of article 
17(3) to safeguard the individual and the community.358 
3 3 4 5 Right to family 
The right to family is provided for in article 18 of the African Charter: 
“(1) The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by 
the state which shall take care of its physical and moral health. 
(2) The state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals 
and traditional values recognised by the community. 																																																								
354  Para 71 (a)-(e). See also CESCR General Comment 13: The right to education UN Doc 
E/C.12/1999/10 (‘General Comment 13’) para 6(a)-(d). 
355 Principles and Guidelines para 71(f)(3). 
356 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 189. 
357 189. 
358 189. 
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(3) The state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and 
also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions. 
(4) The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of 
protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.” 
In relation to the formulation of this article, Ouguergouz argues that the article is 
formulated in a manner that does not define the term “family” in terms of either a nuclear 
or extended family.359 According to Ouguergouz, article 18 does not clearly demonstrate 
how States should implement this right.360  
The formulation of this right demonstrates the protection of the family in five different 
aspects. Article 18(1) broadly defines the family as the natural unit and the basis of 
society. This broad formulation allows the inclusion of different forms of family, such as 
polygamous families and extended families. It also implicitly creates space for the 
inclusion of same sex families as a form of family.361 In its Principles and Guidelines, the 
African Commission stated that the notion of family differs between individuals or 
societies.362  
Article 18(1) imposes on States the obligation to protect the family, implying the 
adoption of both positive and negative measures to safeguard the family. These 
measures include the adoption of laws that guarantee the respect and protection of the 
family. According to the African Commission, the right to family imposes on Member 
States an obligation to adopt legislative measures and practices that enable individuals 
to freely form a family. The right also requires States to abolish customs, customary 
laws, and practices that violate an individual’s freedom to choose a spouse.363 
																																																								
359 197. 
360 197. 
361 According to State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Laws: Criminalisation, Protection, and 
Recognition of Same-Sex Love (2015), 34 African States criminalises same sex relationships. See 
<http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2015.pdf> (accessed 16-05-
2017). These countries are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The aim of this dissertation is to show that the 
formulation of the provisions regarding the right to family in the African Charter is broad in the sense that it 
creates space to consider same sex families as a form of family. However, an in-depth discussion of the 
legality of the right to same sex families in Member States falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
362 Principles and Guidelines para 94. See also UN HRC General Comment 19 (art 23): The Family (1990) 
Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1/28 
(‘General Comment 19’) para 2. 
363 Principles and Guidelines para 95(a)-(c). 
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The measures should also ensure the protection of both the physical and moral 
health of the family. This obligation thus requires the measures taken by States to 
include the provision of financial, as well as other support relevant for the protection of 
families. According to the African Commission, States have an obligation regarding the 
right to family to ensure that social welfare programmes are in place for the protection of 
family life. Social programme measures may include social security benefits, tax-
exemption, and housing and child-care assistance.364  
In a similar vein, the UN Human Rights Committee states that the right to family 
imposes on states an obligation to adopt legislative, administrative, and other measures. 
365 States are required to indicate the extent to which it protects the family by providing 
financial or other support to various social institutions tasked with the protection of the 
family.366 Writing on the formulation of article 18(1), Ouguergouz observes that the 
provision requires the protection of an adequate standard of living, including adequate 
food, clothing, and housing.367 
The formulation of article 18(2) strengthens the obligation established in sub-article 1 
by conferring on States the duty to assist the family, as the custodian of morals and 
traditional values.368 The duty to assist in article 18(2) implies States’ obligations to fulfil 
regarding the realisation of the right to family. The African Commission elaborates the 
duty to fulfil socio-economic rights as incorporating a State’’ duty to adopt measures with 
the aim of enabling and assisting individuals to gain access to the enjoyment of socio-
economic rights.369  
Article 18(3) takes into account two significant things, namely a prohibition of 
discrimination against women, and the obligation of States to protect women and 
children in accordance with relevant international human rights treaties. This formulation 
implies States’ obligations to adopt legislative and other measures that guarantee non-
discrimination to women. The formulation allows the consideration of laws and other 
measures that prohibit all discriminatory practices against women. These may include 
																																																								
364 Para 95(d). 
365  The HRC is a UN body comprised of independent experts with a mandate to monitor the 
implementation of the ICCPR by its Member States, see <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/ 
Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx> (accessed 04-04-2017). 
366 General Comment 19 para 3. 
367 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 192. 
368 Rehman International Human Rights Law 247. 
369 Principles and Guidelines para 11. 
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prohibitions of discrimination in various areas such as marriage, land ownership, 
employment opportunities, and other areas.  
The African Commission states in its Principles and Guidelines that regarding the 
right to family, States have an obligation to ensure equality between partners in 
marriage.370 According to the African Commission, equality of partners includes “equal 
rights of women regarding adoption, guardianship and custody of children”.371 Moreover, 
women shall have the same rights as men to hold and acquire nationality, to choose a 
family name, a profession and occupation”.372 
States are also required to take positive and negative measures to protect children. 
This formulation allows the inclusion of a prohibition against child labour and the 
enjoyment of various children’s rights, such as educational, health, and other socio-
economic rights. As Rehman rightly argues, article 18(3) is drafted in a manner that 
protects the rights of women and children.  
In its Principles and Guidelines the African Commission states that the protection of 
children includes the adoption of measures that provide children with opportunities and 
facilities for their physical and psychological health without discrimination. It also 
incorporates measures to protect children from all forms of exploitation, neglect or 
cruelty and from being subject to trafficking. Other measures that govern work by 
children are particularly there to ensure that such work is not dangerous or harmful to 
children’s moral or physical well-being, as well as to their physical, intellectual and 
psycho-social development.373 
The measures taken by the State should be in conformity with international human 
rights treaties. The formulation further allows interpretive organs to draw inspiration from 
relevant international instruments. Rehman,374 Ouguergouz,375 and Yeshanew376 confirm 
the requirement for interpretive organs to apply different relevant international human 
rights treaties, as enshrined in the provisions of article 18(3). 
Article 18(4) recognises the rights of the aged and persons with disabilities. The 
provision imposes on States an obligation to take “special measures” to protect the aged 
																																																								
370 Para 94. 
371 Principles and Guidelines para 95(f). 
372 Para 95(g). 
373 Para 95(aa)(1)-(4). 
374 Rehman International Human Rights Law 247. 
375 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 193. 
376 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 256. 
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and persons with disabilities. The broad formation of the term “special measures” allows 
the inclusion of different measures. 
3 3 4 6 Right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources  
The right of peoples377 to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources is 
provided for in article 21(1)-(5) of the African Charter. According to this article: 
“1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people 
be deprived of it. 
2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful 
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without 
prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic co-operation based 
on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law. 
4. State parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the 
right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to 
strengthening African unity and solidarity. 
5. State parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of 
foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies 
so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their 
national resources.” 
The formulation of this right is broad in that it implies that the holders of this right are 
the people in their collective capacity.378 Moreover, this right is formulated in a general 
manner in that it does not define the term “peoples”. The intention of this broad 
formulation is to accommodate various meanings, such as minority groups, indigenous 
people, citizens of a particular State, people in a particular State, and other possible 
meanings. The African Commission elaborates that:  
“Peoples are any groups or communities of people that have an identifiable interest 
in common, whether this is from the sharing of an ethnic, linguistic or other factors … 
peoples are therefore not to be equated solely with nations or states.”379  
Dealing with indigenous peoples, the African Commission held in Endorois that the 
term “peoples” as used in the African Charter is necessary for claiming the collective 
rights enshrined in articles 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the African Charter.380 The African 																																																								
377 The concept of “people” is used in arts 19-24 of the African Charter. However, since this dissertation 
analyses only arts 21-22 and 24 regarding peoples’ rights, it analyses this notion in this part. 
378 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 304, 308; and Viljoen International 
Human Rights Law 226. 
379 Principles and Guidelines para 1(c). See also Viljoen International Human Rights Law 226. 
380 Endorois paras 149-150. 
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Commission identified four criteria to identify indigenous peoples. These criteria are “the 
occupation and use of a specific territory; the voluntary perpetuation of cultural 
distinctiveness; self-identification as a distinct collectively, as well as recognition by other 
groups; an experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or 
discrimination”.381 Kiwanuka defines the concept of “peoples” to include four different 
meanings:  
“(a) all persons within the geographical limits of an entity yet to achieve political 
independence or majority rule; 
(b) all groups of people with certain common characteristics who live within the 
geographical limits of an entity referred to in (a), or in an entity that has attained 
independence or majority rule (i.e. minorities under any political system);  
(c) the state and the people as synonymous;  
(d) all persons within a state.”382 
Moreover the prohibition against depriving people of their right in article 21 implies 
that both States and non-state actors are obliged to respect this right. This obligation 
requires that the States and non-state actors refrain from interfering with people’s right 
to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.  
The formulation of article 21(2) qualifies the provisions of article 21(1) in two 
respects. Firstly, it entitles deprived people with the right to a lawful recovery of their 
property. Secondly, it entitles them to the right to adequate compensation.  
Furthermore, the provisions of article 21 impose on States an obligation to “eliminate 
all forms of foreign economic exploitation”. This obligation denotes that States have a 
duty to protect people’s rights against third parties. In this regard, States are required to 
undertake legislative and other measures to ensure that people’s rights to their wealth 
and natural resources are protected against States’ entities and private actors. 
3 3 4 7 Right to development 
The right to development is provided for in article 22 of the African Charter:  
“1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development 
with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
common heritage of mankind. 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the 
right to development.” 
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The right to development focuses on five concerns, namely “all peoples”; 
“development”; “freedom and identity”; “equal enjoyment”; and “common heritage”. The 
right to development is formulated in a general manner in that it does not define the 
terms “peoples”, “development”, and “identity”. This omission allow the consideration of 
the meaning of peoples as discussed above.383  
Moreover, the broad formulation of the term “development” allows the inclusion of 
different aspects of development. As the UN Secretary-General stated in his report on 
an agenda for development, the term “development” incorporates five dimensions, 
namely peace, economy, environment, justice, and democracy.384  Furthermore, the 
broad formulation of the term “identity” implies that different meanings can be allocated 
to this term such as race, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, and others.385 
The formulation of article 22(1) requires account to be taken of two elements in the 
guarantee of the right to development, namely peoples’ freedom and identity as well as 
equality in the enjoyment of the common heritage. Regarding equality in enjoyment of 
the common heritage, the formulation requires non-discrimination in the enjoyment of 
the right as well as equality of men and women. These provisions are broadly formulated 
thus can assist in the consideration of various meanings and elements of “common 
heritage”. This concept has been defined by different scholars to include five main 
principles. Goedhuis identifies four elements of the common heritage as follows: 
“The following basic implications of this concept are generally recognised: first, that 
the area to which it applies cannot be appropriated; second, that it requires a system 
of management in which all countries share; third, that it requires an active sharing of 
benefits from the exploration of the resources between all countries; and fourth, that 
it requires the dedication of the area to exclusively peaceful purposes.”386 
Joyner adds the fifth element, which is that scientific research by States’ institutions 
and non-state actors should benefit all individuals.387 Furthermore, Joyner elaborates the 
meaning of these elements. According to Joyner, non-appropriation means that common 																																																								
383 See part 3 3 4 6 above. 
384 An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General UN Doc A/48/935, 6 May 1994, paras 
16-138. 
385 I Brownlie “The right of peoples in modern international law” (1985) 9 Bulletin of the Australian Society 
of Legal Philosophy 104 107-108. 
386  D Goedhuis “Some recent trends in the interpretation and the implementation of the rules of 
international space law” (1981) 19 Columbia Journal of Transnational L 213 219. See also B Larschan & 
BC Brennan “The common heritage of mankind principle in international law” (1983) 21 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 305 305; and CC Joyner “Legal implications of the concept of the common heritage 
of mankind” (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190-192. 
387 CC Joyner (1985) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190 192. 
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heritage areas are not subject to either public or private ownership.388 Joyner argues 
that peoples’ collective management means that States are merely the representative 
agents of all people whereby the interests of the people prevail rather than the interests 
of the States.389 He further argues that the equality of allocation of the benefits of natural 
resources requires the distribution of the natural resources to “enhance the common 
benefit” of all the people rather than the “agencies engaged in commercial or private 
gain”. 390  Regarding peaceful use rather than military use, Joyner argues that the 
element requires States to ensure the common heritage is used for peaceful 
purposes.391 In relation to the conduct of scientific research, Joyner observes that the 
research should be conducted in a manner that does not physically threaten or impair 
the ecology of the common space.392 It should be conducted in order to benefit all 
peoples, rather than the States that sponsor this research.393 
However, according to Ouguergouz, the above-mentioned elements are not the 
exclusive characteristics of the concept of “common heritage of mankind”, as other 
elements can be developed.394 The formulation of article 22(2) places an obligation on 
States in their individual and collective capacity to guarantee and enforce the exercise of 
the right to development. This formulation implies that States are the primary duty-
bearers of the right to development.395 
3 3 4 8 Right to a satisfactory environment 
The right to a satisfactory environment is formulated in article 24 of the African 
Charter: 
“All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable for 
their development.” 
The right to a satisfactory environment is collective in nature in that it is recognised 
for all peoples. The formulation of this right reinforces the right to development in the 
sense that the enjoyment of a satisfactory environment is guaranteed for the purpose of 																																																								
388 191. 
389 191-192. 
390 192. 
391 192. 
392 192. 
393 192. 
394 Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 322-323. 
395 319. 
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peoples’ development. Its formulation is general in nature in that it does not explicitly 
define the term “general satisfactory environment” or specify its content. Ouguergouz,396 
and Nmehielle397 confirm the fact that the broad formulation of the right to a general 
satisfactory environment creates space to include, through interpretation, many aspects 
rather than confining the meaning of environment exclusively to habitat.  
The fact that the right to a satisfactory environment is a precondition for the 
realisation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter renders it a socio-economic 
right. There is a direct link between the right to a satisfactory environment and the socio-
economic rights to property, education, work, health, and an adequate standard of living 
(including, water, food and housing), as well as the right to development. In Social and 
Economic Rights Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (‘SERAC’),398 the African Commission held 
that the right to a satisfactory environment in article 24 relates to other socio-economic 
rights.399 According to the ACHPR, the polluted environment adversely affects standards 
of healthy living conditions and individual’s physical and mental health.400   
In its Statement on the context of the Rio+20 Conference on the Green Economy in 
the Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (‘Green Economy 
Conference’)401  the CESCR stated that the socio-economic rights provisions in the 
ICESCR are directly interlinked to the right to environment.402 The violation of the right to 
a satisfactory environment adversely affects the enjoyment of these socio-economic 
rights. Economic and social activities related to environment, such as the extraction of 
natural resources, mining activities, and deforestation, violate not only the right to a 
satisfactory environment, but also other socio-economic rights in the African Charter.  
The CESCR stated in its Concluding observations on Uzbekistan403 that the effects 
caused by the Aral Sea catastrophe in Uzbekistan curtailed individuals’ enjoyment of the 
socio-economic rights recognised in the ICESCR.404  The CESCR also notes in its 																																																								
396 361. 
397 Nmehielle The African Human Rights System 156. 
398 Social and Economic Rights Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication No 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 
(ACHPR 2001). 
399 Para 51. 
400 Para 51. 
401 CESCR Statement in the Context of the Rio+20 Conference on the Green Economy in the Context of 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, adopted at the forty-eighth session, 30 April-18 May 
2012, UN Doc E/C12/2012/1. 
402 Para 5. 
403 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Uzbekistan 24 
January 2006, UN Doc E/C12/UZB/CO/1. 
404 Para 9. 
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Concluding observations on Cambodia 405  that the extraction of natural resources, 
particularly in reserved zones, negatively affect “ecology and biodiversity” leading to the 
“loss of livelihood” and the dislocation of indigenous populations from their traditional 
lands.406 In its Report on the Solomon Islands,407 the CESCR notes that deforestation 
activities in the Solomon Islands and overfishing adversely affect the enjoyment of the 
right to an adequate standard of living in the ICESCR.408 In its General Comment 15,409 
the CESCR states that the enjoyment of the right to water requires the prevention of 
contamination of water sources.410 
3 3 5 Duties provisions 
3 3 5 1 States’ obligations to promote the rights in the African Charter  
The African Charter formulates a State’s obligation to promote all the rights in the 
African Charter. This obligation is provided for in article 25: 
“State parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure 
through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms 
contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as 
well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.” 
The formulation of this article requires States to ensure individuals enjoy the rights 
protected in the African Charter. Article 25 is significant as it implies that interpretive 
organs can apply its provisions to consider a State’s obligation to promote socio-
economic rights. Through article 25, States are required to implement the obligation to 
promote the rights of individuals by considering three mechanisms, namely teaching, 
education, and publication. Through these obligations, States are required to perform a 
variety of activities, such as training on human rights and publishing and disseminating 
information about human rights. The African Commission states in its Principles and 
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June 2009, UN Doc E/C12/KHM/CO/1. 
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Guidelines that the obligation to promote requires States to avail people with accessible 
information regarding their socio-economic rights.411 
3 3 5 2 States’ obligations to guarantee the independence of the courts 
Article 26 of the African Charter provides for the State’s obligation to guarantee the 
independence of the courts: 
“State parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the 
independence of the courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of 
appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.” 
The formulation of article 26 establishes two types of duties. These duties are firstly, 
to guarantee the independence of domestic courts and secondly, the duty to establish 
and improve relevant domestic institutions. Moreover, the formulation requires 
established institutions to promote and protect all the rights enshrined in the African 
Charter. According to Anyangwe, the independence of the courts in article 26 means 
non-interference in the judicial system by the legislative or executive organs of the 
State.412 It also includes security of tenure for judges, as well as adequate conditions of 
work.  
The formulation to establish and improve national institutions that promote and 
protect human rights in the Charter allows the consideration of a State’s obligation to 
protect socio-economic rights, through the establishment of various institutions, such as 
human rights commissions.  
3 3 5 3 Individual’s duty to family, society, and State 
Article 27 of the African Charter provides for the duty of every individual towards 
various institutions: 
“1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the state and 
other legally recognised communities and the international community. 
2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to 
the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.” 
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The formulation of article 27(1) means that an individual is obligated to his family, 
society, State, and other legally recognised communities, as well as the international 
community. This formulation denotes that an individual is required to respect and protect 
the family. This obligation includes the duty of the individual to provide for the needs of 
family members, such as health and educational needs. Moreover, the reference to 
“society” imposes an obligation on an individual to respect and protect other people in 
their individual and collective capacities. The reference to “other legally recognised 
communities” implies the duty of the individual to respect and protect legally recognised 
communities, such minority and indigenous communities. These include linguistic, 
ethnic, religious, and other communities. However, Ankumah argues that article 27(1) is 
vague in the sense that it does not elaborate the nature of the duties that an individual 
owes the family, society, State, and international community.413  
While article 27(1) does not explicitly state the nature of obligations that the individual 
owes the family, society, and State, it can be argued that the implication of the 
obligations in article 27(1) is two-fold in nature. Firstly, it embodies the African 
philosophy in the African Charter in the sense that it demonstrates the relationship 
between the individual and the family, as well as society and the State. These provisions 
elaborate the obligations of the individual enshrined in the African philosophy, to 
promote the values of responsibility, communitarianism, and participation. As such, the 
provisions impose on an individual the obligations to respect and protect the family, the 
society, the State, and the international community.  
Secondly, article 27(1) demonstrates the avenue for the horizontal application of 
human rights in that it allows the application of human rights and their obligations to non-
state actors. Writing on the obligations of multinational corporations under international 
law, Kinley and Tadaki argue that some provisions in human rights instruments can be 
construed in a manner that apply to non-state actors.414  
The implied horizontal application in article 27(1) is two-fold. Firstly, the provisions 
imply an individual’s obligation to respect. As discussed above,415 the obligation to 
respect requires States and individuals to abstain from interfering with an individual’s 
enjoyment of rights. As such, regarding the socio-economic rights in the African Charter, 
this obligation in article 21(1) requires non-state actors to abstain from practices that 
interfere with an individual’s enjoyment of such rights. Secondly, the provisions of article 																																																								
413 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 170. 
414 Kinley and Tadaki (2004) Virginia Journal of International Law 948. 
415 See part 3 3 3 2 above. 
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27(1) allow the possibility of holding non-state actors accountable for violations of socio-
economic rights through States’ obligations to protect. As discussed above,416 a State’s 
responsibility to protect requires such States to protect individuals against violations of 
their fundamental rights by third parties. This argument is appropriate based on the fact 
that the African Charter, like other international human rights treaties, imposes 
obligations on Member States. As discussed in chapter two,417 unlike bilateral treaties 
whose object and purpose is to safeguard the interests of Contracting States, the African 
Charter (like other human rights treaties) is a law-making body with a common object 
and purpose to protect human rights. As such, it is the responsibility of States to protect 
individuals against violations by State’s agencies as well as non-state actors. 
Scholars and institutions support the application of the doctrine of State 
responsibility. For example, Chirwa argues that State responsibility is the most 
appropriate means to hold non-state actors accountable for international and national 
human rights violations.418 The ACHPR applied the doctrine of State responsibility in 
SERAC, whereby it held the respondent State responsible for its failure to protect, as 
well as facilitating, the private oil companies to violate the socio-economic rights of the 
Ogoni people.419 Regarding the right to housing, the African Commission held that the 
obligation to protect requires the respondent State to prevent violations of the 
individual’s right to housing by other individuals as well as non-state actors.420 
While scholars’ arguments regarding the need to hold non-state actors directly 
responsible for violations of human rights is significant, a State’s obligation to protect 
continues to be an appropriate mechanism to hold non-state actors responsible. The 
need to hold non-state actors directly responsible for violations of socio-economic rights 
should be considered as an addition to State responsibility. As such, direct horizontal 
application does not replace the significance of State responsibility. The African Charter 
imposes obligations upon Member States. As such meaningful protection of socio-
economic rights in the African Charter requires an emphasis on the duty of Member 
States to protect such rights. Article 27(2) is formulated in a manner that limits the 
enjoyment of the rights of individuals in that it requires the enjoyment of an individual’s 
rights to take into account the rights of other individuals, both in their individual and 																																																								
416 See part 3 3 3 2 above. 
417 See chapter two, part 2 3 2 2. 
418 Chirwa (2004) Melbourne Journal of International Law 14 36. 
419 SERAC para 58. 
420 Para 61. 
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collective capacities. Ankumah argues that the inclusion of the phrases “collective 
security, morality, and common interests” deprive the meaning of this article since the 
meaning of these terms is not clear.421 Like article 27(1), the provisions of article 27(2) 
embody the African philosophy in the African Charter in the sense that it shows that the 
rights of the individual are not absolute. Mutua argues that this article acknowledges the 
fact that in Africa, as in the wider world, individual’s rights are conditional.422  The 
formulation of article 27(2) qualifies all the rights’ provisions in the African Charter, 
including socio-economic rights.  
3 3 6 ‘Drawing inspiration’ clauses 
As discussed in chapter two,423 the provisions of articles 60 and 61 of the African 
Charter and article 7 of the African Court Protocol are relevant for the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights.424 These provisions avail the African Commission and the African 
Court with the mandate to consider other international and national human rights 
instruments and jurisprudence in interpreting the rights in the African Charter.  
The provisions of articles 60 and 61 are mandatory in nature in the sense that the 
word “shall” obliges interpretive organs to draw inspiration from other relevant 
international, regional, and national instruments and jurisprudence. Moreover, the 
formulation of these articles is general in nature. Although the formulation lists some 
international, regional, and national sources to be applied by interpretive organs, the list 
is not exhaustive. For example the use of the terms “other instruments” in article 60, 
“relevant human rights instruments” in article 7, and other general or specialised 
international conventions and “legal precedents and doctrines” in article 61 denote that 
the formulation is general. In this regard, the general formulation creates substantial 
scope for interpretive organs to consider other various sources in developing the 
normative scope and content of socio-economic rights and their concomitant obligations. 
The discussion in chapter two developed the hierarchy of sources that the interpretive 
organs should consult in interpreting socio-economic rights.425  
																																																								
421 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 170. 
422 Mutua (1995) Virginia Journal of International Law 369. 
423 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
424 These provisions are quoted in chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
425 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
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3 4 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the preparatory work of the African Charter is 
vital in interpreting socio-economic rights provisions. It consistently reveals the 
protection of human and peoples’ rights as the sole object and purpose of the African 
Charter. The interpretation of socio-economic rights by supervisory organs should thus 
guarantee the protection of these rights. The emphasis on the promotion of the African 
philosophy and the values of equality, dignity, freedom, and justice, substantive 
provisions of socio-economic rights, and other related rights, as well as their 
concomitant obligations and the principle of interdependence of rights in the preparatory 
work provide the supervisory organs with insight into the appropriate meaning of socio-
economic rights. These elements demonstrate a direct link between the preparatory 
work and the text of the African Charter in that they help to understand the provisions of 
the African Charter. 
The text of the African Charter is an imperative interpretive aid that can enrich the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights provisions. The object and purpose of the African 
Charter, the African philosophy and the values of freedom, equality, justice and dignity, 
the principle of interdependence of rights, and “drawing inspiration” clauses enshrined in 
the preamble and substantive provisions provide the interpretive organs with possibilities 
available within the African Charter that can guide the interpretation of socio-economic 
rights. The values are implicit in each socio-economic right in the African Charter. The 
application of these elements in a methodology developed in chapter two guarantees the 
appropriate meaning of socio-economic rights.  
The broad formulation of socio-economic rights provisions allows the interpretive 
organs to engage all the relevant provisions in the African Charter in order to generate 
the meaning of these rights. The general obligation provisions allow the immediate as 
well as progressive realisation of socio-economic rights taking into account the 
availability of resources. The duties’ provisions include the non-state actors as duty-
bearers of the individuals’ socio-economic rights. This horizontal application broadens 
the scope of protection of individuals’ socio-economic rights. The “drawing inspiration” 
clause demonstrates the possibility of applying other international and African 
instruments and jurisprudence to develop the meaning of socio-economic rights 
provisions. The following chapter analyses the interpretive mandate of the supervisory 
organs. 
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Chapter 4 
The supervisory organs of the African Charter: Interpretive mandate 
and remedial jurisdiction 
4 1 Introduction 
Interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘African Charter’)1 depends on the existence of autonomous supervisory organs. 
The autonomy of such organs is determined by various factors,2 including a broad 
interpretive mandate that can ensure the practical and effective protection of socio-
economic rights. Autonomous supervisory organs should also be able to redress 
violations. Additionally, supervisory organs’ remedial jurisdiction is vital for the effective 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. For supervisory organs to maximise the 
effectiveness of socio-economic rights remedies, their mandate to monitor states’ 
implementation of remedies is imperative.3  
This chapter aims to examine the interpretive mandate and remedial jurisdiction of 
the supervisory organs of the African Charter.4 It analyses provisions relating to the 
establishment of these organs; the nature of their contentious jurisdiction; relevant 
provisions relating to legal standing; admissibility criteria; provisional measures; the legal 
status of decisions; remedies; and monitoring mechanisms. Significantly, the analysis 
indicates the nature of the legal power vested in the Charter’s supervisory organs to 
develop the meaning, scope and content of socio-economic rights, as well as their 
concomitant obligations. It is also important for ensuring effective remedies and 
monitoring socio-economic rights decisions and judgments. Finally, this chapter links the 
																																																								
1 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 I.L.M 58 
(1982) (‘African Charter’) adopted on 27th June 1981 and entered into force on 21st October 1986. 
2 NJ Udombana “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never” (2000) 
3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 70-72. Udombana identifies factors that limit the 
autonomy of the African Commission including dependence on Heads of States and Government, and a 
lack of resources.  
3 CA Odinkalu “The individual complaints procedures of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A preliminary assessment” (1998) 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 359 359-360. 
4  Supervisory organs of the African Charter in the context of this dissertation refer to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Since the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights has not entered into force, the African Court of Justice is not yet in operation. 
This dissertation will demonstrate the implications for the African Commission and the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
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analysis of these jurisdictional elements and their implications for interpreting socio-
economic rights provisions. 
4 2 Establishing the supervisory organs of the African Charter 
The African Charter’s supervisory organs are established by three distinct 
instruments: the African Charter; the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘African Court Protocol’);5 and the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (‘African Court of Justice Protocol’). Article 30 of the African 
Charter establishes the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African 
Commission’).6 Article 1 of the African Court Protocol establishes the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Court’),7 while article 2 of the African Court of 
Justice Protocol establishes the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (‘African 
Court of Justice’).8  
These supervisory organs are significant for interpreting socio-economic rights in four 
respects. Firstly, they guarantee the existence of institutional mechanisms that grant the 
legal mandate for interpreting and protecting these rights. Secondly, they guarantee the 
existence of enforcement mechanisms that are vital for rights protection. As Pasqualucci 
argues, individuals’ rights are meaningless if there is a lack of procedural enforcement 
mechanisms.9 International human rights courts and commissions are fundamental for 
protecting human rights and elaborating on State and non-state actors’ obligations 
related to such rights. 10 																																																								
5 A total of 24 States have ratified the African Court Protocol, 25 States have signed but not yet ratified it, 
and 5 States have neither signed nor ratified the African Court Protocol, see <www.achpr.org/ 
instruments/Court-establishment/ratifications> (accessed 07-11-2016). 
6 Art 30 of the African Charter provides: 
“An African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, hereafter called ‘the Commission’, shall be 
established within the Organisation of African Unity to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their 
protection in Africa.” 
7 Art 1 of the African Court Protocol reads: 
“There shall be established within the Organisation of African Unity an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights hereafter referred to as ‘the Court’, the organisation, jurisdiction and functioning of which shall be 
governed by the present Protocol.”  
8 Art 2 of the African Court of Justice Protocol reads: 
“The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights established by the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the African Union, are hereby merged into a single Court and established as “The African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights.” 
9 JM Pascualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2 ed (2013) 1. 
10 1. 
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Thirdly, they guarantee both quasi-judicial and judicial safeguards that are relevant 
for interpreting and protecting socio-economic rights through their interpretive mandate. 
Writing on the African Commission, Ankumah argues that through its interpretive 
mandate the African Commission demonstrates its quasi-judicial function.11 In a similar 
vein, Mugwanya argues that the quasi-judicial functions of the African Commission are 
contained in its mandate to interpret and protect human rights.12 Moreover, the judicial 
safeguards of the African Court are contained in its mandate to complement the African 
Commission’s protective mandate, as stated in article 2 of the African Court Protocol.13 
Lastly the supervisory organs, through their interpretive mandate, can interpret socio-
economic rights in a manner that embraces the African philosophy.14 This understanding 
of African philosophy is significant, as it ensures that the meaning of the rights in the 
African Charter (including socio-economic rights) are interpreted in ways that are 
responsive to African States’ particular historical trajectory and current socio-economic 
conditions. Regional human rights supervisory organs are conversant with the historical 
and philosophical background of the particular region and can elaborate individuals’ 
rights and consider appropriate remedies.15 Writing on the comparison between the 
American and the European Conventions on Human Rights, Buergenthal argues that: 
“[F]or better or for worse, the problems of our Hemisphere are more unique… than 
they are universal or European. They can only be solved within the framework of our 
own legal, cultural, political, and social traditions.”16 
The following part analyses the African Commission’s interpretive mandate and 
remedial jurisdiction. 
																																																								
11 EA Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures (1996) 
20-21. 
12 GW Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human 
Rights System (2003) 243. 
13 Art 2 of the African Court Protocol reads: 
“The Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective mandate of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’, 
conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
Charter’.” 
14 See chapter three, part 3 2 4 2. 
15 GL Neuman “Import, export, and regional consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” (2008) 
19 European Journal of International Law 101 106. 
16  T Buergenthal “The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities and 
differences” (1981) 30 American University Law Review 155 166. 
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4 3 African Commission: Mandate and jurisdiction 
The legal mandate of the African Commission is derived from articles 30 and 45 of 
the African Charter respectively. Article 30 grants the Commission the mandate to 
promote and protect individuals’ human rights in Africa.17 Article 45 elaborates on the 
promotional and protective mandate stated in article 30 and confers on the African 
Commission an interpretative mandate in the form of advisory opinions. 
Based on these provisions, the African Commission’s mandate encompasses 
promoting and protecting the rights in the African Charter and providing advisory 
opinions. Regarding its promotional mandate, article 45(1)(a)-(c) enjoins the 
Commission to collect documents, undertake research relating to human rights problems 
in Africa, and disseminate human rights information through seminars, symposia and 
conferences. Moreover, it requires the Commission to formulate rules and principles that 
can be used to solve human rights problems in Africa.  
Additionally, the African Commission is required to co-operate with African and 
international human rights institutions in order to promote and protect human rights. This 
promotional mandate is significant for protecting socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter, as it raises peoples’ and States’ awareness of such rights and their related 
obligations. Its fundamental objective is to educate and sensitise the general public to 
the human rights protected in the African Charter.18 The aim of the promotional mandate 
is to sensitise States Parties’ awareness of human rights conditions in their respective 
states. It also enables the Commission to monitor the status of respect for human rights. 
Hansungule notes that through promotional activities, the African Commission 
promotes human and peoples’ rights in African states and institutions.19  Writing on state 
reporting mechanisms, Viljoen notes that these mechanisms enable States to 
understand their successes and shortfalls in safeguarding human rights.20 Moreover, it 
enables the African Charter’s supervisory organs to assess States’ human rights 
protection. 21  Human rights awareness helps people to ensure their rights are 
protected.22 In this regard, promotional activities can be used to achieve the protective 																																																								
17 The provisions of art 30 of the African Charter are re-produced in part 4 2 above. 
18 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 21. 
19 M Hansungule “African courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Bosl A & 
Diescho J (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection and Promotion (2009) 233 
250. 
20 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 2 ed (2012) 350. 
21 350. 
22 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 21. 
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mandate. Viljoen argues that promotional functions contribute to achieving the 
Commission’s protective functions.23 In particular, promotional activities such as special 
rapporteurs and the adoption of resolutions aim to protect human rights.24 Odinkalu and 
Christensen argue that promotional and protective functions are closely interrelated in 
that the purpose of the promotional mandate is to protect individuals’ rights from 
violations.25 Nmehielle also argues that both promotional and protective mandates are 
specific manifestations of the Commission’s interpretive mandate.26 
As the focus of this dissertation is interpreting socio-economic rights in quasi-
adjudicatory and adjudicatory procedures, a detailed analysis of the African 
Commission’s promotional mandate falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Reference will be made to this promotional mandate only to the extent that it facilitates 
socio-economic rights interpretation. The following part analyses the Commission’s 
protective mandate. 
4 3 1 Protective mandate of the African Commission 
The African Commission’s protective mandate is established through the provisions 
of articles 30, 45(2)-(3) and 46 of the African Charter respectively. While article 30 
requires the Commission to protect human rights in Africa, article 45(2) requires the 
Commission to ensure such protection “under conditions laid down by the present 
Charter”. This formulation of article 45(2) is broad and incorporates the protection of all 
rights in the African Charter through its communication procedures.27 Viljoen argues that 
the Commission’s protective mandate entails interpreting the African Charter’s 
provisions through the consideration of communications. 28  Mutua argues that the 
consideration of communications is the main protective function of the African 
Commission,29 which is required to consider communications that allege human rights 
																																																								
23 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 295. 
24 295. 
25  CA Odinkalu & C Christensen “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
development of its non-state communications procedures” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 235 241. 
26 VO Nmehielle The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions (2001) 181. 
27 See also Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 245. 
28 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 295. 
29 M Mutua “The African human rights court: A two-legged stool?” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 342 
346. 
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violations.30 The protection of human rights through a communications procedure allows 
the Commission to clarify the meaning of rights’ provisions.31  
The conditions relating to the African Charter’s communications procedure are two-
fold: the inter-state communications provided for in articles 47-54 and the non-state 
communications elaborated in articles 55-59. These communications procedures enable 
the African Commission to interpret the scope and content of socio-economic rights 
invoked in such communications. It should, however, be noted that the Commission has 
so far decided only one inter-state communication.32 As Hansungule notes, States rarely 
approach the Commission to interpret the Charter’s articles.33 According to Hansungule, 
the African Commission protects human and peoples’ rights mostly through an individual 
communications procedure.34 This chapter focuses on non-state communications, as the 
decided inter-state communication did not deal with socio-economic rights.  
The African Commission has decided a substantial number of socio-economic rights’ 
non-state communications. This jurisprudence is vital in analysing the interpretive 
mandate of the African Commission in relation to the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. The analysis of the jurisprudence in this chapter confines itself to the 
procedural aspects of the interpretive mandate. The substantive jurisprudence is the 
subject of chapter 5 of this dissertation. The analysis in this chapter is based on locus 
standi, the admissibility of communications, the jurisdiction to issue provisional 
measures, the status of the African Commission’s recommendations, and the jurisdiction 
to publish its reports, remedies, and follow-up jurisdiction. 
4 3 2 African Commission’s jurisdiction over non-state communications 
The legal basis of the African Commission’s mandate to receive communications 
from individuals and groups is found in articles 55-59 of the African Charter.35 Article 55 
is significant for elaborating the Commission’s legal mandate regarding non-state 
communications. This article is broadly formulated in two respects. Firstly, the African 
Charter requires the Commission to “make a list of the communications other than those 
																																																								
30 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 66. 
31 Nmehielle The African Human Rights System 181. 
32 Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda Communication No 227/99 (2004) 
AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2004). 
33 Hansungule “African courts” in Human Rights in Africa 251 
34 251. 
35 See part 4 3 1 above. 
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of State parties”,36 which enables it to consider both individual and actio popularis 
communications (those brought by individuals or groups in the public interest). 37 
Nmehielle38and Yeshanew39 confirm that individual communications are covered in the 
term “other communications”. Odinkalu and Christensen also affirm that the African 
Commission has considered individual communications based on article 55 of the 
African Charter.40  
The African Commission held in Dawda Jawara v The Gambia (‘Jawara’)41 that 
article 55 provides it with a mandate to determine communications submitted by 
complainants other than States. 42  In Social and Economic Rights Action Centre 
(SERAC) v Nigeria (‘SERAC’),43 the Commission acknowledged the initiative of two non-
governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) that brought the communication to its attention, as 
it demonstrates the effectiveness of the actio popularis before the African Commission.44  
Despite textual indicators, scholarly opinions, and jurisprudence confirming the 
African Commission’s mandate regarding non-state communications, various scholars 
have challenged aspects of this jurisdiction. Their scepticism revolves particularly 
around whether article 55 extends to actio popularis communications. For example, 
Murray argues that the African Commission’s mandate in relation to communications 
from individuals or communications submitted by individuals or organisations acting in 
the public interest is not clear from the Charter’s text.45  																																																								
36 Art 55(1) of the African Charter. 
37 The origin of public interest litigation can be traced to the Indian human rights proceedings. See PN 
Bhagwati “Judicial activism and public interest litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
561 568. According to Bhagwati, public interest litigation is a result of the efforts by the highest court of 
India by relying on the basic objectives and values underlying the Constitution of India to ensure people 
and communities in India whose rights are deprived have access to justice. Forster and Jivan define public 
interest litigation as “proceedings in which the public or the community at large has some pecuniary or 
legal interest”. According to them public interest litigation enable the interest of the broader community or 
public to be recognised and enforced through adjudicatory mechanisms. See MC Forster & V Jivan 
“Public interest litigation and human rights implementation: The Indian and Australian experience” (2008) 
3 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1 1.  
38 Nmehielle The African Human Rights System 203. 
39 SA Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human 
Rights System: Theories, Laws, Practices and Prospects (2011) 153. 
40 Odinkalu & Christensen (1998) Human Rights Quarterly 239. 
41 Dawda Jawara v The Gambia Communication Nos 147/95 & 149/96 (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 
2000). 
42 Para 42. 
43 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication No 155/96 (2001) 
AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
44 Para 49. 
45 R Murray “Decisions by the African Commission on individual communications under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 412 413 
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In its jurisprudence, the African Commission confirmed its mandate to determine 
communications in actio popularis. The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Rules of Procedure’)46 do not explicitly elaborate on the 
Commission’s mandate regarding actio popularis.47 However, it can be argued that Rule 
93(1) of the Rules of Procedure elaborates on article 55 by requiring “natural or legal” 
complainants of human rights violations to address their communications submitted 
under article 55 to the chairperson of the African Commission. The phrase “natural or 
legal person” can be broadly interpreted to permit individuals and/or organisations to 
submit communications to the African Commission in three distinct capacities. Firstly, to 
allow communications submitted by an individual in his own capacity as a victim of the 
violations. Secondly, to allow representative actions brought by groups of individuals or 
NGOs on behalf of victims of socio-economic rights violations. Lastly, to allow 
communications submitted by individuals or NGOs in the interest of the public or a 
broader community of people. As Viljoen correctly notes, a communication can be 
submitted to the African Commission by an individual, a group of individuals or by an 
NGO,48 which can file a communication on behalf of the general public or in the public 
interest.49 
When interpreting socio-economic rights in the African Charter, the significance of 
standing on the basis of an actio popularis is two-fold. Firstly, it helps protect the socio-
economic rights of people who, due to poverty, cannot reach the African Commission by 
their own means. It thus allows those with the means to access the African Commission 
and to submit cases on behalf of such poor people. As Hassan and Azfar note, the 
rationale for permitting litigation in the public interest is to facilitate access to justice for 
people living in poor socio-economic conditions. 50  Secondly, the actio popularis is 
relevant in communications involving the collective rights recognised in the African 
Charter under articles 21, 22 and 24. Thus, public interest standing enables the 
protection of peoples’ socio-economic rights in their collective capacity and helps to stop 																																																								
46 The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights were adopted by the 
African Commission during its 2nd Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal, from 2-13 February 1988, 
and they were revised by the African Commission during its 18th Ordinary Session held in Praia Cabo-
Verde, from 2-11 October, 1995. They were later approved by the African Commission during its 47th 
Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia, in 2010. 
47 See also Viljoen International Human Rights Law 304. 
48 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 304. 
49 304. 
50 P Hassan & A Azfar “Securing environmental rights through public interest litigation in South Asia” 
(2004) 22 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 215 226. 
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violations for the benefit of the whole community. As Forster and Jivan argue, litigation in 
the public interest facilitates the enforcement of a community’s human rights as a whole, 
rather than focusing only on the rights of a particular individual.51 The benefits of actio 
popularis are collective in nature and shared by the entire community. 
4 3 3 Locus standi and its implications for interpreting socio-economic rights 
The African Charter does not explicitly state who can file a communication before the 
African Commission. Despite textual indicators and scholarly opinions on the African 
Commission’s mandate to consider communications from individuals, various scholars 
have challenged the Charter’s omission regarding locus standi.52 Murray, for instance, 
argues that this omission renders the Commission’s mandate regarding individual 
communications uncertain.53  
These criticisms are based on a limited textual interpretative approach,54 which does 
not allow for the application of other treaty provisions to generate effective meaning of 
the relevant provisions. Chapter two demonstrated that human rights treaties such as 
the African Charter should be interpreted broadly based on their object and purpose.55 
This allows for a holistic interpretation that engages all the relevant treaty provisions to 
generate their effective and practical meaning.  
Although the African Charter does not explicitly state who can file a communication, 
this omission should not be construed narrowly as a restriction on individuals’ or NGOs’ 
access to the Commission. A narrow interpretation of locus standi weakens the 
Charter’s object and purpose to protect human rights, as it restricts victims of human 
rights violations or their representatives from accessing the African Commission. 
As discussed earlier, the African Charter’s preparatory work and preamble clarify that 
its object and purpose are to protect the rights of the people of Africa.56 Accordingly, 
interpretations that limit access to the Commission undermine the object and purpose of 
the Charter. Moreover, a narrow interpretation limits the Charter’s effectiveness. The 
teleological approach to interpretation, and the methodology for its application, identifies 
																																																								
51 Forster & Jivan (2008) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 23. 
52 Viljoen defines locus standi as the right to appear as a party the adjudicatory body. See Viljoen 
International Human Rights Law 304. This dissertation adopts Viljoen’s definition. 
53 Murray (1997) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 413. 
54 See chapter two, part 2 2 2. 
55 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 3 2 3. 
56 See chapter three, parts 3 2 and 3 3 2. 
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the principle of effectiveness as a significant element of this approach.57 The essence of 
this principle is to render treaty provisions practical and effective, rather than theoretical 
and illusory. Interpreting the African Charter in a manner that restricts people’s access to 
the African Commission renders the Charter ineffective and therefore illusory.  
The omission should be construed broadly in a manner that allows individuals or their 
representatives to petition the African Commission. This will enable the Commission to 
engage various provisions of the African Charter to allow individuals’ locus standi. A 
broad interpretation is vital for interpreting socio-economic rights in two respects. Firstly, 
it allows individuals to access the African Commission in their personal capacity. 
Secondly, it allows petitions on actio popularis. Mutua argues that generously 
interpreting the African Charter enables any individual, group or NGO to access the 
African Commission in relation to violations of individuals’ rights.58  
It is noteworthy that article 45(1)(b) of the African Charter allows the Commission to 
formulate principles and rules aimed at solving problems related to its human rights 
provisions. Based on this provision, the African Commission formulated its Rules of 
Procedure, which elucidate its locus standi rules. Rule 93(2)(a), for instance, requires 
that a communication should include the “name, nationality and signature of the person 
or persons filing it; or in cases where the Complainant is a non-governmental entity, the 
name and signature of its legal representative(s)”. Rule 93(2)(e) identifies that, in 
circumstances where the victim of the human rights violations alleged is not the 
claimant, the communication should disclose the name of such a victim. Rule 94(2) 
allows for the right to legal representation for individuals or legal entities appearing 
before the African Commission. 
Rule 93(2)(a) and (e) and Rule 94(2) are significant in three ways. Firstly, they solve 
the problem regarding the omission of locus standi in the African Charter. The 
requirement to include the name of a person or the name of the NGO’s legal 
representative confirms this argument. Secondly, these provisions construe locus standi 
broadly in a manner that allows individuals’ access to the African Commission in their 
individual capacity or as represented by NGOs. Thirdly, they ascertain that the 
Commission does not adopt a strict victim requirement by allowing NGOs to represent 
victims. This approach is imperative in interpreting socio-economic rights, as it enables 
victims of socio-economic rights violations, who for various reasons cannot personally 																																																								
57 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
58 Mutua (1999) Human Rights Quarterly 346. 
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submit their communications to the African Commission, to be represented by NGOs. 
Such reasons include poverty, lack of access to legal services and poor geographical 
infrastructure in most African countries.  
In contrast to international and regional human rights bodies, the African 
Commission’s jurisprudence clearly indicates that it does not adopt a strict ‘victim’ 
standing requirement. In Article 19 v Eritrea (‘Article 19’),59 the African Commission 
confirmed that it will accept actio popularis standing in instances where the petitioner is 
not strictly required to know the victim of the violations. This broad approach enables 
NGOs to assist victims of human rights violations who cannot financially, or due to 
geographical location, access the Commission.60  This broad interpretation of locus 
standi allows the African Commission to address collective socio-economic rights 
communications. Viljoen argues that the narrow approach is confined to individual 
victims, which limits the communications by other interested parties.  The broad 
approach allows communications in the public interest, which reinforces the concept of 
peoples’ rights.61 The term “peoples” in the African Charter is broad and enshrines 
various meanings, including a community of people and the general public. 62 
Accordingly, public interest standing embrace peoples’ rights.  
4 3 4 Other admissibility requirements for non-state communications  
For the African Commission to consider a communication it must be admissible. 
Article 56 of the African Charter contains admissibility requirements for non-state 
communications. A communication must reveal its author and be compatible with the 
Charter.63 It must not include “disparaging or insulting language” and must be based 
“exclusively on news disseminated by mass media”.64 The communication should be 
submitted after exhausting local remedies and within reasonable time.65 It should also 
not concern a matter that has already been settled at an international forum. 66 
																																																								
59 Article 19 v Eritrea Communication No 275/03 (2007) AHRLR 73 (ACHPR 2007). 
60 Para 65. 
61 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 305. 
62 See chapter three, part 3 3 4 6. 
63 Art 56(1) and (2) of the African Charter. 
64 Art 56(3) and (4). 
65 Art 56(5) and (6). 
66 Art 56(7). 
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The Commission held in Malawi African Association v Mauritania (‘Malawi African 
Association’)67  that article 56 of the Charter governs the admissibility of individual 
communications. 68  According to the Commission, the article states the underlying 
“conditions that communications must meet in order to be considered”.69 Some scholars 
note that the formulation of article 56 strictly requires each of the admissibility criteria to 
be fulfilled in order for the Commission to consider communications submitted before it. 
70 
Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure reinforces article 56 by expressly indicating that 
communications must comply with all admissibility requirements. Failure to comply 
allows supervisory organs to reject a complaint’s admissibility. 71  Similarly, this 
dissertation argues in favour of parties fulfilling all admissibility requirements as 
prescribed in article 56. Compliance is important, as it allows supervisory organs to be 
presented with a properly formulated complaint that is based on well-founded facts, 
while avoiding being overburdened with frivolous and vexatious complaints. The strict 
interpretation of article 56, in a manner that requires the complainant to comply with 
each admissibility requirement can help to uphold the object and purpose of the African 
Charter to protect human rights.  
However, in circumstances where parties cannot fulfil the admissibility requirements 
for genuine reasons, supervisory organs should interpret these requirements flexibly. 
There are various reasons that can prevent victims and complainants of socio-economic 
rights violations from fulfilling all the admissibility requirements enshrined in article 56. In 
Malawi African Association, the African Commission stated that the conditions of article 
56 should be applied by considering the specificity of each communication.72  This 
generous interpretation should also be applied to the interpretation of Rule 106 in order 
to uphold the object and purpose of protecting human rights vested in the African 
Commission. As Udombana argues, Rules adopted by supervisory organs should be 
“broad, flexible and creative” in a manner that furthers the object and purpose of the 
																																																								
67 Malawi African Association v Mauritania Communication Nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 and 
210/98 (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000). 
68 Para 77. 
69 Para 77. 
70  See also Viljoen International Human Rights Law 311. See also Yeshanew The Justiciability of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 158. 
71 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 311. 
72 Malawi African Association para 77. 
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African Charter.73 The next part analyses the relevant admissibility requirements that 
require generous interpretation.  
4 3 4 1 Exhaustion of local remedies 
Exhausting local remedies before a complainant files a petition with an international 
supervisory body is a key admissibility criterion.74 Pascualucci considers exhaustion of 
local remedies a fundamental principle of international law. 75  The African Charter 
provides for this requirement in article 56(5), which necessitates the communication’s 
author to indicate that local remedies have been exhausted “unless it is obvious that this 
procedure is unduly prolonged”. This requirement is significant as it furthers the 
Charter’s object and purpose in relation to the protection of socio-economic rights in two 
respects. 
Firstly, it allows for the protection of socio-economic rights and guarantees redress 
for the victims of rights violations at a domestic level. The exhaustion of local remedies 
provides States with an opportunity to redress alleged human rights violations within its 
domestic legal and administrative systems.76 As a general human rights principle, the 
local remedies rule enables States to correct breaches of human rights obligations 
through their domestic legal and administrative system before the cases are challenged 
through an international mechanism. 77  In a similar vein, Viljoen argues that the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies implies that a State’s legal system should be able 
to remedy the alleged human rights violations.78 Stated differently, local courts should be 
the first to determine complaints of rights violations before they are submitted to the 
Commission.79  
The African Commission held in Jawara that the objective of the local remedies rule 
is to enable a State’s domestic legal system to remedy a violation before the complaint 
is submitted to an international adjudicatory system.80 Furthermore, the Commission 																																																								
73 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 106. 
74 L Chenwi “An appraisal of international law mechanisms for litigating socio-economic rights, with a 
particular focus on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the African Commission and Court” (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 683 691. 
75 Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 92. 
76 NJ Udombana “So far so fair: The local remedies rule in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 1 2. 
77 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 67. 
78 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 316. 
79 316. 
80 Jawara para 31. 
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held in SERAC that the exhaustion of local remedies rule aims to provide domestic 
interpretive mechanisms with an opportunity to consider a dispute first, instead of 
directly challenging the alleged rights violation before an international supervisory 
body.81 In this regard, States are made aware of the human rights violations and availed 
with an opportunity to remedy them before they are brought before an international 
body. 82 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘Inter-American Court’) held in the 
Velasquez Rodriguez case (‘Rodriguez’) that the requirement to exhaust local remedies 
in international human rights law enables the State to remedy violations through its 
domestic law.83 Moreover, in Acevedo Jaramillo et al v Peru (‘Jaramillo’) the Inter-
American Court stated that the State is the protector of human rights. As such, States 
must resolve rights violations through their domestic mechanisms before the violations 
are challenged through an international supervisory body.84  
Secondly, exhausting local remedies enables States to fulfil their international 
obligations relating to socio-economic rights. As Udombana argues, exhausting local 
remedies helps ensure that States implement their international human rights obligations 
in their domestic legal systems. 85  The African Commission found in Amnesty 
International v Sudan (‘Amnesty International’)86 that exhausting local remedies helps 
States to be aware of and remedy alleged violations of individuals’ rights. 87 
However, Ankumah is critical of the formulation of article 56(5). According to her, its 
provisions do not conform to international human rights standards. International human 
rights standards related to exhaustion of local remedies broadly include circumstances 
where local remedies do not guarantee due process. Accordingly, article 56(5) considers 
only the circumstance where local remedies are unduly prolonged. Ankumah thus 
argues that the article does not account for circumstances where local remedies 
provided by the State are inadequate.88  																																																								
81 SERAC para 37. 
82 Para 38. 
83 Velasquez Rodriguez case (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 4 (29 July 
1988) para 61. 
84  Acevedo Jaramillo et al v Peru (Interpretation of Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 157 (24 November 2006) 
para 66. 
85 Udombana (2003) American Journal of International Law 9. 
86 Amnesty International v Sudan Communication Nos 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, and 89/93 (2000) AHRLR 297 
(ACHPR 1999). 
87 Para 32. 
88 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 67. 
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As discussed in chapter two, the interpretation of the African Charter as a human 
rights treaty requires the meaning of its provisions to be practical and effective.89 Giving 
meaningful effect to article 56 requires a broad interpretation of provisions in a manner 
that includes adequate remedies. This broad interpretation furthers the object and 
purpose of the African Charter by securing effective remedies for violations of articles 
protecting socio-economic rights. As a supervisory organ, the African Commission is 
required to interpret the provisions of the African Charter in a manner that protects 
individuals’ rights.90 Interpreting the local remedies rule in a manner that contravenes the 
Charter’s object and purpose weakens the protection of human rights.91  A narrow 
interpretation of the local remedies rule that excludes consideration of the adequacy of 
domestic remedies curtails the ability of the African Commission to provide effective 
remedies for socio-economic rights violations. The principles of interdependence and 
effectiveness discussed in chapter two can be invoked to require that the domestic 
remedies that must be exhausted in article 56(5) are adequate.92 These provisions 
include articles 1, 7 and 26 of the African Charter. The broad formulation of these 
articles creates scope to consider the adequacy of local remedies.  
As discussed in chapter three, article 1 of the African Charter enjoins States to adopt 
legislative and other measures in order to ensure human rights protection. 93  The 
provisions of article 1 can be applied to require States to enact legislation that provides 
for substantive and procedural remedies. In SERAC, the Commission held that local 
remedies are inadequate in circumstances where a State’s domestic legal system does 
not provide for substantive rights.94 Article 7 recognises the individual’s right to be heard 
in the domestic legal system. In Amnesty International, the African Commission held that 
the requirement to exhaust local remedies in article 56 should be applied in conjunction 
with article 7, which requires the right to a fair trial. 95 
Article 26 obliges States to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and other 
institutions tasked with human rights protection. A lack of independence weakens the 
adequacy of local remedies. In this respect, Udombana argues that in states where 
domestic courts are not independent, it is impossible for complainants to obtain copies 																																																								
89 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 4. 
90 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 68. 
91 68. 
92 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 5 2 1 and 2 5 2 4. 
93 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 1. 
94 SERAC para 37. 
95 Amnesty International para 31. 
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of judgments timeously so that they can challenge violations through international 
bodies.96 The African Commission held in SERAC that the State’s military government 
action to oust the jurisdiction of the courts demonstrated that there were no adequate 
domestic remedies.97 These provisions help to ensure the local remedies rule in article 
56 is adequate in the sense that local remedies are sufficient to protect socio-economic 
rights from violations. As it was held by the Inter-American Court in Godinez-Cruz v 
Honduras (Merits) (‘Cruz’) local remedies are adequate when they suitably redress the 
violation of a legal right.98 
It is vital that the domestic remedies rule only applies if domestic remedies exist, and 
if those remedies are adequate for protecting relevant rights. Regarding the adequacy of 
local remedies, the African Commission has established three criteria to determine the 
conditions under which applicants are required to exhaust domestic remedies: they must 
be “available, effective and sufficient”.99 A local remedy is considered “available” if the 
complainant can pursue it without obstacles. 100  The requirement to exhaust local 
remedies is not absolute. These remedies must not be exhausted in circumstances 
where there are hurdles in the process of exhausting them. In order for local remedies to 
be exhausted, States should ensure that complainants are not obstructed from 
exhausting such remedies. Pasqualucci argues that the purpose of this requirement is 
not to establish procedural hurdles for victims of human rights violations, but rather to 
ensure that States remedy such violations.101 A local remedy is effective if it provides 
possibilities for success.102 The Inter-American Court held in Rodriguez that for a local 
remedy to be effective it should be capable of achieving its expected outcomes.103 In 
Las Palmeras v Colombia (‘Las Palmeras’) the Inter-American Court held that: 
“It is not enough that recourses exist formally: they must be effective in that, they 
must give results or responses to the violations of rights established in the 																																																								
96 Udombana (2003) American Journal of International Law 18. 
97 SERAC para 41. See also Constitutional Rights Project (on behalf of Wahab Akamu, Globan Adeaga 
and Others) v Nigeria Communication No 60/91 (1995) para 10. 
98 Godinez-Cruz v Honduras (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 5 (20 January 
1989) para 67. 
99 Jawara para 31. 
100  Para 32. See also Jawara para 35; Krishna Achutan (on behalf of Aleke Banda) v Malawi 
Communication No 64/92, 68/92, and 78/92 (1995) (2000) AHRLR 144 (ACHPR 1995); Rencontre 
africaine pour la defence des droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) v Zambia Communication 71/92 (2000) 
AHRLR 321 (ACHPR 1996) para 11. 
101 Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 96. 
102 Jawara para 32. 
103 Rodriguez para 66. 
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Convention… remedies that… prove illusory cannot be considered effective. This 
may happen when for example, they prove to be useless in practice because the 
jurisdictional body does not have independence necessary to arrive at an impartial 
decision or because they lack means to execute their decisions; or which justice is 
denied, or such as cases in which there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering 
a judgment.”104 
A remedy is also sufficient if it is able to redress rights violations found to have been 
committed.105 In this respect, the availability of local remedies requires States to provide 
substantive and procedural legal mechanisms that allow complainants to access 
institutions with a mandate to consider socio-economic rights cases. In situations where 
domestic legal mechanisms are restricted, there are no local remedies. Udombana 
confirms that deliberately obstructing the domestic legal system renders local remedies 
unavailable.106  
In John K Modise v Botswana (‘Modise’),107  the African Commission found the 
communication admissible after establishing that domestic legal procedures were 
deliberately being obstructed, thereby preventing the victim from accessing the justice 
system for sixteen years.108 The African Commission held in Media Rights Agenda v 
Nigeria (‘Media Rights Agenda’)109 that provisions that restrict domestic courts from 
determining rights violations render local remedies unavailable, ineffective and 
unlawful. 110  In Jawara, the African Commission stressed that local remedies are 
unavailable and non-existent in circumstances where a State’s laws limits a court’s 
jurisdiction to determine cases. 111  The Commission held that local remedies are 
unavailable in circumstances where the victim of the violations cannot return to his or 
her own country to pursue such remedies.112  
The availability of local remedies to exhaust within a reasonable time is significant for 
protecting socio-economic rights. In circumstances where local remedies are not 
available, a complainant should not be subjected to the requirement to exhaust what are 
in effect non-existent local remedies. Since the formulation of article 56(5) uses the 																																																								
104 Las Palmeras v Colombia (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 90 (6 December 
2001) para 58. 
105 Jawara para 32. 
106 Udombana (2003) American Society of International Law 23. 
107 John K Modise v Botswana Communication No 97/93 (2000) AHRLR 30 (ACHPR 2000). 
108 Paras 18-22. 
109 Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria Communication Nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96 (2000) AHRLR 
200 (ACHPR 1998). 
110 Para 50. 
111 Jawara para 34. 
112 Para 35. 
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phrase “if any” this implies that if the remedies are not provided the complainant should 
not be forced to exhaust local remedies. Although the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies is significant, it should not be applied in a manner that limits an individuals’ 
access to the international mechanisms. 113 
The African Commission held in Malawi African Association that the requirement to 
exhaust local remedies cannot be applied in communications where complainants or 
victims cannot practically exhaust such remedies.114 Exhaustion of local remedies can 
be impracticable in circumstances where the communications involve too many 
victims.115 The Commission did not, however, elaborate on the manner in which many 
victims in a communication renders the exhaustion of local remedies impracticable.116 It 
can further be argued that, in circumstances where a communication involves too many 
victims, in a manner that renders exhaustion of local remedies impossible, complainants 
can use actio popularis to submit their communications to the African Commission. As 
discussed above, the actio popularis is relevant for communications involving violations 
of collective rights, as well as for victims who for reasons of poverty cannot access the 
African Commission.117  
Complainants who have not exhausted local remedies should be required to show 
that such remedies are in effect unavailable. In Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project v Nigeria (‘SERAP’)118 the complainant alleged violations of the 
right to education under article 17 of the Charter.119 The complainant did not exhaust 
local remedies and raised five grounds for its failure to exhaust local remedies. Firstly, 
local remedies were unavailable due to strict interpretations of the locus standi rule in 
the respondent State.120 Secondly, local remedies were unavailable due to the large 
number of victims involved.121 Thirdly, the courts in the respondent State lacked the 
legal mandate to determine cases of a socio-economic rights nature.122 Fourthly, the 																																																								
113 Udombana (2003) American Journal of International Law 15. 
114 Malawi African Association para 85. 
115 Para 85. See also Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Human Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) v Sudan Communications No 279/03-296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009) paras 100-102. 
116 This dissertation demonstrates in this part and in part 4 3 4 2 below that violation of collective rights 
which mainly involve many victims, as well as poverty of some of these victims of collective human 
rights violations, can render the exhaustion of local remedies impracticable. 
117 See part 4 3 2 above. 
118 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v Nigeria Communication No 300/2005 (2008) 
AHRLR 108 (ACHPR 2008). 
119 Paras 2-4. 
120 Para 25. 
121 Para 25. 
122 Para 26. 
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respondent State’s laws do not recognise the socio-economic rights allegedly 
violated. 123  Lastly, the respondent State’s judicial system was “weak and unduly 
prolonged” rendering local remedies ineffective.124 
The African Commission held that the complainant raised mere doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of local remedies in the respondent State. It is mandatory for the 
complainant to take all necessary steps or attempt to exhaust local remedies. 125 
Complainants are required to show steps taken to exhaust local remedies. By not 
attempting to exhaust local remedies or substantiating their weaknesses or 
ineffectiveness, the complainant failed to justify the non-exhaustion of local remedies.126 
The African Commission held further that the respondent State’s Constitution 127 
incorporates socio-economic rights in its Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy.128 It also domesticates the African Charter in its Constitution, 
which allows for socio-economic rights litigation and enforcement in domestic courts.129 
In Ilesanmi v Nigeria (‘Ilesanmi’), 130  the African Commission established the 
procedure for establishing that complainants did not exhaust local remedies because 
they were unavailable, ineffective and insufficient.131 According to the Commission, this 
procedure is threefold. Firstly, the complainant must allege that it was impossible to 
exhaust local remedies, as they are unavailable, ineffective or insufficient. The 
complainant is, however, not required to prove this allegation. 132  Secondly, the 
respondent State is obliged to prove that local remedies are available, effective and 
sufficient. 133  Thirdly, the complainant must show that he or she exhausted local 
remedies, but that such remedies were ineffective in this particular case. 134  The 
complainant can also demonstrate that although the local remedies were available, 
effective or sufficient, their exhaustion was not possible in the particular circumstances 																																																								
123 Para 26. 
124 Para 27. 
125 Paras 59-60. 
126 Para 61. 
127 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
128 Arts 16 to 18 and 20 to 21 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
129 SERAP paras 61-65. 
130 Ilesanmi v Nigeria Communication No 268/03 (2005) AHRLR 48 (ACHPR 2005) (‘Ilesanmi’). 
131 Para 46. 
132 Para 46.  
133 Ilesanmi para 46. See also Hansungule “African courts” in Human Rights in Africa 263. According to 
Hansungule, the requirement that the respondent State should prove the availability, effectiveness, and 
sufficiency of local remedies is based on the fact that the complainants are mostly not aware of the 
remedies at their exposure. It is the respondent State that determines the local remedies. 
134 Ilesanmi para 46. 
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of the case.135 In SERAC, the African Commission acknowledged the fact that the 
communication did not indicate any information regarding the exhaustion of local 
remedies by the complainants. However, the Commission decided to proceed with 
hearing the communication based on the fact that the State never responded to the 
Commission’s requests concerning the communication.136  
In Purohit, the complainants alleged that they could not exhaust local remedies as 
the respondent State’s laws did not provide for such remedies.137 The respondent State 
submitted that local remedies were available through the tortious liability actions of false 
imprisonment or negligence, and through the provisions of the Constitution.138  The 
African Commission stated that although local remedies were available139 they were not 
realistic to mental patients (the complainants represented in the communication). 
According to the Commission, the complainants in the communication were people 
picked from the streets or poor people who could not be expected to exhaust remedies 
provided through the Constitution. In this regard, the African Commission held that in the 
absence of legal aid services the remedies available in the Constitution or common law 
were not realistically available to them, and were thus ineffective.140 
A flexible interpretation of the exhaustion of local remedies is significant as it allows 
complainants who cannot exhaust such remedies, based on various impediments, to 
challenge violations at the African Commission. These impediments include the gravity 
of the violations and large number of individual victims. The African Commission held in 
Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
v Sudan (COHRE’)141 that: 
“The scale and nature of alleged abuses, the number of persons involved… make 
local remedies unavailable, ineffective and insufficient… due to the seriousness of 
the human rights situation and the large number of people involved, such remedies 
as might theoretically exist in the domestic courts are as a practical matter 
unavailable… such is the case… where tens of thousands of people have allegedly 
been forcibly evicted and their properties destroyed. It is impracticable and 																																																								
135 Para 46. 
136 SERAC para 40. 
137 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication no. 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003) 
(‘Purohit’) para 26. 
138 Para 28. 
139 Para 36. 
140  Purohit paras 37-38. See also Ilesanmi para 45 where the African Commission held that the 
complainant cannot exhaust local remedies if such remedies lack either one of the identified criteria of 
availability, effectiveness, and sufficiency. 
141 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan 
Communication Nos 279/03-296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009) (‘COHRE’). 
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undesirable to expect these victims to exhaust the remedies claimed by the State to 
be available.”142 
This part has demonstrated the importance of local remedies in protecting the socio-
economic rights of individuals and people. It is important that States render these 
remedies available, effective and sufficient. Complainants of socio-economic rights 
violations should be required to demonstrate that they have exhausted domestic 
remedies before they bring complaints to the supervisory organs of the African Charter. 
The supervisory organs should ensure that these remedies have been exhausted as 
required by the African Charter. However, it should also be established that the domestic 
remedies are practically available, effective, and sufficient. Complainants should not be 
forced to exhaust local remedies in circumstances where either one of these 
requirements does not exist.  
4 3 4 2 Communications must be submitted within a reasonable time after the 
exhaustion of local remedies 
Article 56(6) requires a communication to be submitted within a reasonable period 
from the time local remedies were exhausted. The African Charter does not define the 
term “reasonable time”. This omission should be interpreted broadly in a manner that 
allows the African Commission to take into account various circumstances in 
determining the “reasonable time” rather than adopting a strict time limit. In Darfur Relief 
and Documentation Centre v Sudan (‘Darfur’),143 the Commission held that since the 
Charter is silent on the meaning of reasonable time the omission enables it to treat each 
communication based on its own circumstances.144 The African Commission further held 
that article 56(6) aims to ensure that complainants are vigilant. However, in 
circumstances where there are compelling justifications for complainants’ failure to 
submit their communication within a reasonable time the Commission can proceed to 
determine the communication for the sake of “fairness and justice”.145 
It is imperative for protecting socio-economic rights that article 56 is construed 
broadly to allow the African Commission to consider the circumstances of each 
communication alleging a violation of socio-economic rights. The significance is based 																																																								
142 Paras 100-102. 
143 Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v Sudan Communication No 310/05 (2009) AHRLR 193 
(ACHPR 2009). 
144 Para 75. 
145 Para 79. 
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on the fact that it allows victims, who could not submit their communications in the 
shortest period of time after the exhaustion of local remedies for various reasons, to 
submit their communications. For example, impoverished victims of socio-economic 
rights violations can face profound financial obstacles in gaining access to legal 
representation or other forms of NGO-assistance to submit their communications to the 
African Commission. Furthermore, victims who fail to get copies of judgments due to 
delays caused by domestic courts can fail to submit their communications immediately 
after the exhaustion of local remedies. Victims facing challenges of poor infrastructure 
and chronic delays inherent to the domestic legal system can also fail to access the 
Commission within a reasonable period.146 According to Udombana, in most cases 
complainants obtain copies of judgments after a very long time when these copies no 
longer have a purpose.147 The flexible interpretation of this requirement thus allows 
victims of socio-economic rights violations to access the African Commission after their 
failure to access domestic systems.  
Viljoen argues that these provisions consider various conditions peculiar to Africa, 
which include a “low level of awareness” of the African Charter among people in Africa; 
the “material conditions in which the complainants may find themselves”; and the fact 
that judicial proceedings in many African countries take a long time before their final 
determination.148 According to Viljoen, the African Charter’s omission to stipulate a fixed 
time responds to the “African landscape’s fluidity”.149 Accordingly, the requirement to 
submit a communication within reasonable time should be interpreted flexibly, 
particularly to advance the object and purpose of the African Charter in the specific 
context of socio-economic rights cases.  
Once a communication fulfils the admissibility criteria discussed in this dissertation, 
the African Commission proceeds to determine the merits of the communication and 
issue the findings and recommendations. Depending on the nature of the socio-
economic rights violations involved,150 the African Commission can be required to issue 
provisional measures, before the communication is decided. The following part analyses 
the African Commission’s mandate regarding provisional measures.  
																																																								
146 Udombana (2003) American Journal of International Law 18. 
147 18. 
148 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 319-320. 
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150 See chapter three, part 3 3 4 and chapter five, 5 5 2. 
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4 3 5 African Commission’s jurisdiction to issue provisional measures 
Elkind defines a provisional measure as a temporary remedy enabling a supervisory 
organ to issue an order that requires parties to a dispute “to perform or refrain from 
performing certain acts” pending the decision of the case.151 According to Elkind, no 
party to a pending case is allowed to act in a manner that jeopardises the case.152 The 
implications for interpreting human rights in the African Charter (including socio-
economic rights) are two-fold. Firstly, provisional measures help to protect human rights, 
which are the subject of the main communication, from being violated. As Pasqualucci 
notes, the objective of interim measures in international human rights law is to protect 
individuals’ rights from irreparable harm arising from violations.153 Viljoen posits that 
provisional measures aim to safeguard the rights of individuals pending the final 
determination of a communication.154 It is vital to safeguard victims’ rights during the 
interim period since the hearing of the communication may take a long time. 155 
Provisional measures thus protect individuals immediately by stopping rights violations 
pending the final determination of their cases.156 This protective function of provisional 
measures is crucial in that it can protect the socio-economic rights of the people more 
appropriately than remedies issued at the final judgment.  
Pasqualucci notes that the protective role of provisional measures is more significant 
than compensation issued at the final determination of the case. 157  Provisional 
measures further the object and purpose of the African Charter relating to socio-
economic rights by preventing serious harm to life or health, which often results in cases 
of serious socio-economic rights violations. The protection of human rights is 
meaningless in circumstances where such rights are irreparably harmed before the 
determination of a case on merits. 158  Juma posits that provisional measures by 
																																																								
151 JB Elkind Interim Protection: A Functional Approach (1981) 3. 
152 30. 
153 JM Pasqualucci “Interim measures in international human rights: Evolution and harmonisation” (2005) 
38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1 1 & 7. 
154 Viljoen International Human Rights Law306. See also GJ Naldi “Interim measures of protection in the 
African system for protection of human and peoples’ rights” (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 
5; Four Ngobe Indigenous Communities and their Members (Panama), Provisional Measures, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (28 May 2010) “considering” para 3. 
155 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 306. See also Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 3. 
156 Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3. 
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supervisory organs are a significant protective tool against human rights violations.159 
According to Rieter, provisional measures are directly linked to the object and purpose 
of the treaty as well as the essence of the treaty’s rights.160 
Several authors161 have argued that provisional measures perform a preventive role 
by preventing irreparable human rights abuses from State and non-state actors. They 
prevent irreparable damage such as harm to a complainant’s health and well-being as 
well as preventing irreparable damage that cannot be restored by financial 
compensation. They can also be issued to prevent and redress massive peoples’ rights 
violations. 
The African Commission reiterated the preventive aspect of provisional measures in 
International PEN, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and 
Interrights (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jnr) v Nigeria (‘Saro-Wiwa’).162 It held that the 
object of provisional measures is to prevent “irreparable damage” to victims of the 
violation during the determination of the communication.163  
However, the African Charter is silent on the mandate of the African Commission to 
issue provisional remedies. Scholars argue that this lack of jurisdiction renders the 
Commission ineffective. Benedek, for instance, argues that the Charter’s failure to 
expressly provide the African Commission with a remedial mandate (including 
provisional remedies) renders it ineffective in redressing human rights violations.164 
Pasqualucci notes that states tend to reject the enforcement of provisional measures in 
circumstances where such measures are not explicitly stated in a treaty.165 
These criticisms are based on a restrictive textual approach to interpretation. As 
discussed in chapter two, a textual approach to interpretation that uses the literal 																																																								
159 D Juma “Provisional measures under the African human rights system: The African Court’s order 
against Libya” (2012) 30 Wisconsin International Law Journal 344 344. 
160  E Rieter Preventing Irreparable Harm: Provisional Measures in International Human Rights 
Adjudication (2010) 207. See also Urso Branco Prison (Brazil) Provisional Measures, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (7 July 2004) Concurring Opinion, A A Cancado Trindade, para 11 whereby in his 
concurring opinion Trindade J stated that the underlying objective of the provisional measures is to protect 
human rights. 
161 See Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 4 and 7; Rieter Preventing Irreparable 
Harm 83, 205 and 209; and Juma (2012) Wisconsin International Law Journal 346. 
162 International PEN, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Interrights (on behalf 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jnr) v Nigeria Communication Nos 137/94 139/94 154/96 161/97 (2000) AHRLR 212 
(ACHPR 1998). 
163 Para 114. 
164 W Benedek “The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: How to make it 
effective” (1993) 11 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25 31. 
165 Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 7. 
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meaning and only the words of the text to extract its meaning is an interpretative flaw 
that fails to engage the treaty provisions.166  A limited textual approach does not include 
other interpretive elements, such as the principle of effectiveness, which can assist 
supervisory organs in generating a mandate that is not explicitly stated in a treaty. A 
human rights treaty, such as the African Charter, should be interpreted broadly in a 
manner that furthers its object and purpose to protect human rights.167  
This dissertation demonstrates that the teleological approach to interpretation 
enables supervisory organs to engage various treaty provisions to elaborate their 
mandate.168 When a treaty does not explicitly provide for provisional measures, its object 
and purpose allows the application of relevant provisions to identify measures for 
effective rights protection.169 Accordingly, it can be argued that the African Charter’s 
failure to explicitly provide the African Commission with a mandate to issue provisional 
measures does not necessarily mean that the Commission is incapable of issuing such 
remedies. The jurisdiction to issue provisional measures is implicit in various treaty 
provisions that recognise individuals’ rights to challenge rights violations.170  
The legal basis for the African Commission’s jurisdiction to issue provisional 
measures pending the substantive consideration of the communication can be found in 
articles 30, 45(1)(b), 45(2) and 46 of the African Charter. Article 45(1)(b) allows the 
Commission to formulate procedural rules for of procedure in order to solve any legal 
problems relating to the protection of human rights. Based on article 45(1)(b), the 
Commission formulated Rule 98(1) on its jurisdiction to issue provisional remedies: 
“At any time after the receipt of a Communication and before a determination on the 
merits, the Commission may, on its initiative or at the request of a party to the 
Communication, request that the State concerned adopt Provisional Measures to 
prevent irreparable harm to the victim or victims of the alleged violation as urgently 
as the situation demands.” 
The formulation of Rule 98(1) is significant in three ways. Firstly, it elaborates on the 
African Charter by incorporating the Commission’s mandate to issue provisional 
measures. Juma argues that the Commission’s rules relating to its provisional measures’ 
mandate addresses the omission in the Charter.171 Similarly, Pasqualucci observes that 																																																								
166 See chapter two, part 2 2 2. 
167 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
168 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 1. 
169 Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 14. 
170 5. 
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most supervisory organs whose mandate to issue provisional measures is not explicit 
delineate it through their procedural rules. 172  Secondly, Rule 98(1) enables the 
Commission to issue provisional remedies on its own initiative, rather than waiting for 
requests from victims of socio-economic rights violations. This formulation is helpful as it 
enables the African Commission to require States to stop socio-economic rights 
violations by way of provisional measures. Thirdly, a party to a communication can 
request the Commission to issue provisional measures. 
The African Commission can also apply article 46 in a manner that recognises its 
mandate to issue provisional measures, as it permits the Commission to “resort to any 
appropriate method of investigation”. This phrase is sufficiently broad to allow the 
Commission the opportunity to consider provisional measures as a means of 
investigating socio-economic rights violations. Mugwanya argues that article 46 justifies 
the Commission’s protective mandate and allows it to interpret the Charter holistically.173 
Moreover, the broad scope of the protective mandate enshrined in articles 30 and 45(2) 
can vest in the African Commission the power to issue provisional remedies to protect 
socio-economic rights from irreparable harm. The Commission’s protective mandate 
enables it to order a respondent State to adopt provisional measures in order to prevent 
irreparable harm to the victims of human rights violations at any time after the receipt of 
a communication.174  
The African Commission has ordered provisional measures in various 
communications, 175  but Centre for the Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya 
(‘Endorois’) 176  is the only socio-economic rights communication where provisional 
measures were ordered. In Endorois, the Commission issued provisional measures 
requiring the respondent State to stop any actions that violated the complainants’ rights 
to property pending the final determination of the communication.177  
																																																								
172 Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 12. 
173 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 245-246. 
174 Juma (2012) Wisconsin International Law Journal 357-358. 
175 The African Commission has mostly ordered provisional measures inn communications of a civil and 
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Scholars have commented on States’ general non-compliance with the African 
Commission’s provisional measures.178 Viljoen, for example, notes that in Saro-Wiwa 
the respondent State disregarded the provisional measures and executed Mr Saro-
Wiwa.179 Juma also notes that States generally fail to comply with the Commission’s 
provisional measures for various reasons.180 Firstly, States’ fail to comply with their 
international obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Secondly, the 
confidentiality requirement in article 59 causes the African Commission’s weakness to 
protect human rights, as its lack of transparency limits the effectiveness of the 
Commission’s protective mandate. Juma also criticises the Commission’s narrow 
approach to confidentiality in its jurisprudence.181 Thirdly, reliance on States’ good faith 
to enforce the Commission’s decisions due to a lack of enforcement procedures. Lastly, 
States emphasise that the African Commission’s decisions are mere recommendations 
thus they lack legal binding effect.182 Writing on provisional measures in international 
human rights law, Pasqualucci notes that certain States have rejected the binding nature 
of provisional measures issued by human rights commissions.183  
The object and purpose of the African Charter to protect individuals’ rights, including 
socio-economic rights, entails State compliance with the provisional measures issued by 
its supervisory organs. In La Grand, the ICJ stated that the legally binding nature of 
provisional measures stems from a treaty’s object and purpose. Thus, the State’s 
argument that provisional measures are not legally binding contravenes the treaty’s 
object and purpose.184 According to the ICJ, a treaty’s object and purpose in relation to 
provisional measures is to protect individuals’ rights pending the determination of the 
final judgment.185 Deciding on the question whether article 94 of the UN Charter curtails 
the binding effect of the provisional measures contained in article 41 of the ICJ 
Statute,186 the ICJ stated that interpreting article 41 in light of the object and purpose of 
the ICJ Statute renders its provisional measures binding.187  																																																								
178 In Safia Husaini the respondent state complied with the African Commission’s provisional measures 
whereby the Federal Court of Appeal of the respondent State overturned the death sentence against 
Safia. Safia Husaini para 22. 
179 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 306-307. 
180 Juma (2012) Wisconsin International Law Journal 358. 
181 Juma’s concern regarding the confidentiality requirement will be responded to in part 4 3 8 below. 
182 Juma (2012) Wisconsin International Law Journal 358. 
183 Pasqualucci (2005) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2 & 5. 
184 La Grand case (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ, (27 June 2001) para 102. 
185 Para 102. 
186 Para 108. 
187 Para 109. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
178 
 
Furthermore, the principle of effectiveness requires the African Charter to be 
interpreted in a manner that renders its substantive and procedural provisions effective 
and practical. As such, provisions relating to the Commission’s mandate to issue 
provisional measures should be construed to incorporate States’ obligations to enforce 
such measures. The ECHR stated in Mamatkulov that the requirement that a treaty 
should be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose and in accordance with the 
principle of effectiveness extends to procedural and regulatory provisions.188 The African 
Commission stated in Saro-Wiwa that States are legally bound to respect provisional 
measures.189 
The requirement that States comply with provisional measures and the implications 
of violating their quartet typology of obligations have already been discussed.190 The 
analysis demonstrated that States are bound to enforce their human rights obligations. 
The following part discusses the African Commission’s mandate to issue remedies.  
4 3 6 African Commission’s jurisdiction to issue remedies 
Shelton defines “remedies” in both the procedural and substantive sense. 191 
Procedurally, remedies entail the processes through which allegations of human rights 
violations are heard and decided by judicial and administrative organs.192 Substantively, 
remedies concern the outcome of proceedings and redress granted to successful 
claimants.193 Remedies thus incorporate the substance of redress and the procedures 
through which such redress can be attained.194 This part considers remedies in their 
substantive form, as procedural remedies were addressed earlier.195 
The meaningful protection of human rights through communications includes the 
power of supervisory organs to remedy established violations. Naldi argues that the 
hearing process should incorporate the mandate to remedy violations.196 The African 
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Commission held in Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire (‘Free Legal Assistance’)197 
that the main aim of communications is to remedy rights violations complained about.198 
Shelton notes that international human rights instruments establish various mechanisms 
for the effective protection of human rights and that individuals’ access to effective 
remedies represents the most effective mechanism for protecting human rights.199 
However, the African Charter does not explicitly define the Commission’s remedial 
mandate. Scholars are critical of this silence. Benedek, for instance, argues that it 
restricts the African Commission from issuing remedies on the findings of violations.200 
Enonchong argues that this renders the Commission’s mandate to determine 
communications unsatisfactory.201 Chirwa argues that the African Charter’s omission to 
grant the Commission power to issue remedies renders it ineffective. 202  Benedek 
suggests that the African Charter should be amended to include an explicit remedial 
mandate for the African Commission.203  
Similar to the scholarly criticisms of the lack of explicit provision for provisional 
measures,204 the above arguments are based on a narrow and literal textual approach 
that does not conform to a teleological approach to human rights interpretation.205 The 
fact that the African Charter does not explicitly provide for the Commission’s jurisdiction 
to issue remedies does not necessarily mean that it cannot order remedies to redress 
human rights violations. A teleological approach to interpretation, which allows the broad 
application of various interpretative tenets to generate a treaty’s meaning,206 supports 
this argument. Thus, through the teleological approach, the African Commission can 
apply various relevant Charter provisions to redress socio-economic rights violations.  
Writing on the implementation of the Commission’s decisions, Viljoen notes that the 
purpose of the communications procedure, through the teleological approach, is to 
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ensure victims of human rights violations get appropriate remedies.207 He argues that a 
holistic interpretation of relevant provisions of the African Charter empowers the 
Commission with the mandate to remedy violations. 208  Musila notes that a broad 
formulation of the Charter’s provisions creates scope for interpretations that incorporate 
omitted provisions, as the drafters of the Charter intended to treat remedies as an 
implied right to be established through interpretation.209 He further argues that, in the 
context of human rights instruments, the right to remedy is self-evident and that there is 
no need for explicit articulation.210  
Various provisions of the African Charter can be construed broadly to incorporate the 
Commission’s mandate to issue remedies. In particular, Shelton notes that provisions 
supporting effective remedies include 1, 7, 21(2), 26, 30, 45(1)(b), 45(2), and 55.211  
Article 1 of the African Charter requires States to recognise the rights and duties in 
the Charter through legislative or other measures.212 Its formulation incorporates the 
African Commission’s jurisdiction to issue remedies for socio-economic rights violations 
in two respects. Firstly, the obligation to adopt legislative measures allows the African 
Commission to require States to ensure that adopted legislation entrenches various 
substantive and procedural remedies that are appropriate for redressing socio-economic 
rights violations. The nature of this mandate allows the Commission to require States to 
amend legislation and other regulatory policies that violate socio-economic rights. In 
Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland (‘Swaziland’), 213  the African Commission 
required the respondent State to amend a proclamation, which vested all legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in the King, to conform with the African Charter.214  
Secondly, the phrase “other measures” is broadly formulated and allows the African 
Commission to order States to remedy violations through other non-legislative 
measures. As Yeshanew correctly argues, the right to remedy is implicit in the phrase 
“other measures” in article 1 of the African Charter”.215 The right to remedy requires 
States to provide remedial mechanisms that can redress the victims of violations.216 																																																								
207 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 341.  
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210 447. See also Yeshanew The justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 169. 
211 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 142. 
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Viljoen observes that the term “other measures” also includes remedies that are 
designed to redress the State’s rights violation.217 Accordingly, the broad formulation of 
the general obligation clause in article 1 implicitly incorporates the mandate of the 
African Commission.  
Musila posits that in human rights treaties the right to remedy is constituent of the 
provisions of States’ general obligations.218 In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v 
Zimbabwe (‘Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum’),219 the Commission held that the 
general obligations in article 1 of the African Charter requires States to ensure that 
victims of human rights violations have access to effective and enforceable remedies.220 
According to Viljoen, the legislative and other remedies in article 1 are adequate for 
redressing the human rights violation.221 Similarly, Shelton argues for considering the 
provision of effective remedies for human rights violations as part of States’ general 
obligations to realise human rights:222 
“The legal basis for State responsibility for violations of human rights derives from 
breach of a human rights treaty or a human rights norm of customary international 
law. Most human rights treaties impose a duty on States parties to respect and 
ensure the rights recognized [sic], a formulation that imposes a due diligence 
obligation to respond to violations committed by private persons as well as to abstain 
from State-authored violations.”223 
Article 7 of the African Charter represents another provision that allows the African 
Commission to issue remedies, as it recognises the right of every individual to be 
heard.224 Specifically, it recognises the right to “appeal to competent national organs” 
regarding human rights violations.225 This formulation of article 7(1)(a) is broad in the 
sense that it incorporates individuals’ rights to be heard by domestic judicial and 
administrative organs against rights violations in the African Charter. Through these 
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provisions, the African Commission can require States to avail victims of socio-economic 
rights violations access to quasi-adjudicatory and adjudicatory mechanisms.226  
Shelton argues that the duty to issue remedies for human rights violations entails the 
“existence of remedial institutions and procedures” that are accessible to the victims of 
such violations. States’ legal systems should guarantee the independence of such 
institutions in a manner that they can afford a fair hearing to the victims of human rights 
violations.227 In Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria (‘Civil Liberties Organisation’),228 
the African Commission held that the respondent State’s decree, which ousted the 
jurisdiction of the courts, violated article 7 of the African Charter as it limited individuals’ 
rights to seek redress for the violation of their rights.  
Article 21(2) can also be used by the Commission to exercise its remedial mandate, 
as it recognises the right of people, whose property has been dispossessed or polluted, 
to lawfully recover their property and claim adequate compensation. This article thus 
enables the Commission to order compensatory remedies for victims of dispossession of 
individual or collective property rights.  
Additionally, the African Commission can apply article 26 of the African Charter, 
which requires States to guarantee judicial independence and establish other domestic 
institutions responsible for individual rights protection. Through these provisions, the 
Commission can require States to ensure that established institutions are able to 
independently remedy socio-economic rights violations.229 In human rights discourse, 
remedies entail the existence of independent remedial enforcement mechanisms and 
individuals’ rights to access such bodies.230 In Civil Liberties Organisation, the African 
Commission held that the respondent State’s decrees, which ousted the jurisdiction of 
courts, weakened the independence of the judiciary, thus violating article 26 through a 
limitation of the rights of individuals to access courts for their remedies.231  
Articles 30 and 45(2) grant the African Commission its protective mandate and can 
be interpreted broadly to incorporate the Commission’s mandate to issue remedies. The 
meaningful protection of socio-economic rights incorporates redress for victims whose 
rights have been violated. Conferring a protective mandate on the African Commission 																																																								
226 Musila confirms the application of article 7 as a remedial provision. See Musila (2006) African Human 
Rights Law Journal 448. 
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through communications implies it has the authority to issue remedies upon finding 
violations of individuals’ rights.232 The provisions do not establish a dichotomy between 
the right and the remedy. The African Commission held in Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum that once it finds a respondent State responsible for a human rights 
violation it has the mandate to “recommend the appropriate remedy” for the victim.233 To 
treat the Commission as a supervisory organ that lacks the authority to issue remedies 
rests on a flawed, sharp dichotomy between rights and remedies. As Fiss argues, rights 
and remedies are inseparable: while a right constitutes specified standards to be 
recognised to a human being, a remedy realises the right.234 
Similarly, the argument that the African Commission lacks the mandate to issue 
remedies, based on the fact that the African Charter is silent on remedies, is based on 
the flawed argument that supervisory organs only have the mandate to interpret the 
rights, but not to remedy the violation. This argument simply means that supervisory 
organs can only construe the meaning of a right while leaving it to other institutions to 
remedy violations. Sager argues, while writing in a constitutional rights context: 
“It is part of the intellectual fabric of constitutional law and its jurisprudence that there 
is an important distinction between a statement which describes an ideal which is 
embodied in the Constitution and a statement which attempts to translate such an 
ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues.”235 
Rights and remedies are, however, interdependent and the African Commission’s 
protective mandate in articles 30 and 45(2) of the African Charter supports this 
argument. Similarly, Levinson argues that in constitutional adjudication the dichotomy 
between rights and remedies does not even exist.236 
The effectiveness of socio-economic rights thus depends on the link between such 
rights and their corresponding remedies. The preparatory work of the African Charter 
demonstrates, for instance, that some provisions were omitted and left to supervisory 
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organs to construe them through interpretation.237 Writing on the lack of an express 
remedial provision in the African Charter, Musila argues that:  
“The African Charter does not provide specifically for the right to an effective 
remedy… This ‘omission’ can be explained by at least two factors. One could take 
the view that it is one of the substantive rights that should have been included in the 
Charter but were not, especially when the regional initiative is seen within the context 
of the general character of the Charter… It is also possible that the drafters of the 
African Charter could have considered it superfluous to include such a right, which 
would be considered as an implied right. This is reflected in the Latin maxim ubi jus 
ibi remedium: For the violation of every right, there must be a remedy. In this regard, 
the view is that in a justiciable regime of rights such as that established by the 
Charter, the right to remedy is so self-evident that it need not be specifically 
enshrined.”238 
A generous interpretation of article 55 can also incorporate the African Commission’s 
mandate to issue effective remedies. The phrase “consider communications other than 
States Parties communications” should be broadly construed to include the power to 
issue remedies. It should not be interpreted narrowly or limited to only the power to 
determine communications without the power to redress violations. A narrow 
interpretation defeats the object and purpose of effectively protecting socio-economic 
rights and unnecessarily sustains the dichotomy between rights and remedies.  
Furthermore, through articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, the African 
Commission can draw inspiration from international human rights bodies’ jurisprudence 
on remedies. The remedial jurisprudence of international bodies such as the Human 
Rights Committee (‘HRC’) under the ICCPR and the CESCR, as well as regional bodies 
such as the Inter-American Commission, can help the African Commission to garner 
insight regarding appropriate remedies relating to socio-economic rights violations. 
Although their decisions are not binding they are authoritative in the sense that States 
Parties committed to protecting and upholding the human rights in the African Charter 
should fulfil their commitments in good faith.  
Supervisory organs should issue different effective remedies for redressing human 
rights violations.239 The formulation of the above-discussed provisions legally allows the 
African Commission to issue various types of appropriate remedies, including 
declaratory, restitutionary, and compensatory remedies. Their application is important to 
redress socio-economic rights violations in a manner that advances the object and 																																																								
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purpose of the African Charter. Human rights treaties are unique from other international 
law treaties in the sense that States are obliged to protect the rights of individuals and 
groups, as opposed to their interests.240 Shelton notes that the non-reciprocal nature of 
human rights instruments has a direct impact on remedial orders issued by supervisory 
organs. It also requires them to issue remedies that can effectively protect victims of 
human rights violations, while preventing future violations. Remedial orders should thus 
protect individuals’ rights and deter re-occurrence of the violations.241  
Similar remedies exist in international human rights law and in other international 
instruments. This is due to the fact that, in both fields, remedies aim to prevent society 
from engaging in unlawful behaviour or illegal conduct.242 They are also used, through 
punishment and fines, to condemn perpetrators of unlawful conduct.243 However, while 
remedial orders in international human rights law are similar to remedies in other 
international legal instruments, some differences exist. In human rights law, remedies 
must advance the object and purpose of human rights regarding the rights at stake. 
Shelton notes that, in human rights law, remedial orders must advance human rights 
goals.244 Moreover, in addition to compensation, the purpose of remedial orders is to 
rectify conditions caused by violations and provide restitution.  
The Inter-American Court stated in La Cantuta v Peru (‘La Cantuta’) that remedies 
aim to redress human rights violations. The nature and form of remedies vary based on 
the violation and harm caused by such violation.245  
Remedial powers are significant as they enable the African Commission to broadly 
and appropriately redress socio-economic rights violations. Supervisory organs are 
vested with the power to determine violations and remedy them.246 Shelton notes that 
human rights violations can be redressed through various remedies, including restitution, 
compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.247 Writing on the African 
Commission’s remedial mandate, Naldi argues that remedies broadly include orders for 
reparations which entail restitution, rehabilitation, and the payment of compensation.248 																																																								
240 See chapter two, parts 2 3 2 2 and 2 3 2 3. 
241 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 49. 
242 51. 
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162 (29 November 2006) para 202. 
246 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 10. 
247 8. 
248 Naldi (2001) Leiden Journal of International Law 681. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
186 
 
These various forms of remedies are significant for effectively protecting socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter, as some remedies may be appropriate to remedy certain 
kinds of violations, whilst inappropriate for other. Restitution, for instance can be 
impossible where socio-economic rights violations cause the death of a person. In 
Aloeboetoe v Suriname (‘Suriname’) 249 , the Inter-American Court held that some 
remedies, such as restitution, are not “possible, sufficient or appropriate” in cases 
involving the violation of the right to life. These cases demand alternative remedies, 
such as compensation to the victim’s relatives.250 Pasqualucci argues, however, that in 
some cases compensation can represent an insufficient remedy.251  Other forms of 
remedies such as restitution, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition may be 
required.252 These forms of remedies are discussed below. 
4 3 6 1 Declaratory remedies 
Declaratory remedies are common in international human rights law.253 They are 
issued by the United Nations, as well as regional supervisory organs, mainly as a means 
to require States to redress violations.254 Supervisory organs use declaratory remedies 
to establish whether a respondent State has violated the rights at stake.255 Declaratory 
remedies merely declare an act or omission unlawful and grant a State’s authorities a 
margin of discretion to adopt appropriate redress mechanisms.256 A supervisory organ 
can merely issue a declaratory order and leave States to take appropriate domestic 
measures to redress the violations. 257  These remedies mainly enable supervisory 
organs to require States’ authorities to redress the unlawful situation.258  
For Shelton, declaratory remedies are issued by supervisory organs when States 
violate their international obligations and must take certain measures, such as changing 
a law or practice that violate human rights.259 As such, a declaratory remedy indicates to 
a State that there is a violation of a Charter right and that appropriate legislative and 																																																								
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other measures must be taken to redress this violation. Naldi argues that a declaratory 
remedy is significant as it constitutes a binding finding by an authoritative, treaty-
monitoring body that the State concerned must take legislative measures to remedy the 
violation found at the merits phase, including the amendment of laws that violate human 
rights.260  
As will be shown in the next chapter, the African Commission has issued declaratory 
remedies in all communications that found a violation of socio-economic rights. In 
SERAC, for instance, the African Commission issued a declaratory remedy holding that 
the respondent State has violated articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the 
Charter.261 Similarly, in Purohit, the African Commission issued a declaratory remedy 
finding the respondent State in violation of articles 2, 3, 5, 7(1)(a) and (c), 13(1), 16, and 
18(4) of the African Charter. It urged the respondent State to repeal the Lunatics 
Detention Act (‘LDA’) and replace it with a new legislative regime for mental health which 
was compatible with the African Charter and international standards governing mentally 
ill or disabled persons; create an expert body to review the cases of all persons detained 
under the LDA and make appropriate recommendations for their treatment or release; 
provide adequate medical and material care for persons suffering from mental health 
problems in The Gambia. Finally, the Commission required the State to report to it on 
measures taken for implementation of the decision through periodic reports pursuant to 
article 62 of the Charter. 
Declaratory remedies are important for protecting socio-economic rights as they help 
to ensure that States’ laws and conduct do not violate human rights. Moreover, they 
assist States to fulfil their obligation to protect these rights. As Shelton observes, the 
effect of declaratory orders in human rights must not be underrated.262 A declaration that 
a State has violated human rights confirms allegations of human rights abuses by a 
State and requires it to change.263 They are therefore relevant for preventing human 
rights violations.264  
It can be argued that, on their own, declaratory remedies cannot effectively advance 
the object and purpose of the African Charter to protect socio-economic rights. Although 
these remedies are useful in preventing human rights violations, States may decide not 																																																								
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to rectify a situation since they are left with the discretion to adopt domestic measures to 
redress violations. Shelton notes that respondent States may consider these remedies 
as less serious265 and that declaratory remedies are insufficient for redressing human 
rights violations.266 In addition to declaratory remedies, supervisory organs should issue 
remedial orders such as restitution.267 
4 3 6 2 Restitution 
Restitution is a remedial order that seeks to restore a victim of a human rights 
violation to the position he or she was before the violation. Its aim is to ensure that the 
perpetrator of human rights violations restores the position of the victim.268 Naldi argues 
that, through this category of remedies, the African Commission requires the respondent 
States to take “specific action” to redress the violations complained about.269 According 
to Viljoen, this remedy aims at correcting the violations through restoring the situation of 
the victim as far as possible to what it was prior to the violation.270 In La Cantuta, the 
Inter-American Court stated that the objective of restitution is to restore the victim of 
human rights violations to a position he was before the violations.271  
The African Commission has issued restitution remedies in different communications. 
In Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon (‘Mazou’),272 the 
African Commission required the respondent State to “draw all necessary legal 
conclusions to reinstate the victim in his rights”.273 The Commission did not directly state 
that this was a restitutionary measure. However, it can be argued that, since the aim of 
restitution is to restore the victim to the situation he was before the violation of his right, 
the Commission’s recommendation to re-instate Mr Mazou was a restitutionary 
measure. Commenting on Loayza Tamayo v Peru (‘Tamayo’), where the Inter-American 
Court required the respondent State to re-instate the complainant to her teaching 
position and pay her salary as a restitutionary measure, Melish argues that the decision 
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by the Inter-American Court to re-instate the complainant was a “necessary” 
restitutionary measure.274 
4 3 6 3 Compensation 
Finally, the African Commission has the mandate to issue compensatory remedies 
upon finding rights violations. Through this remedy, the Commission can order States to 
pay compensation to individuals whose rights have been violated.275 Shelton describes 
compensatory remedies in human rights law as follows: 
“Compensation serves to restore to the individuals to the extent possible their 
capacity to achieve the ends that they personally value. As such, compensation may 
have a rehabilitative effect, alleviate suffering, and provide for material needs.”276  
In Malawi African Association, the African Commission required the respondent State 
to take appropriate measures to compensate the widows and other beneficiaries of the 
victims.277 In SERAC it required the respondent State to ensure adequate compensation 
to the victims of socio-economic rights violations. 
4 3 7 Legal status of the African Commission’s remedial recommendations 
The African Commission’s substantive remedies are issued in the form of 
recommendations. 278  Through its jurisprudence on non-state communications, the 
Commission has made recommendations to respondent States concerning necessary 
redress measures. In Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘Noca’),279 for 
instance, the African Commission found the respondent State in violation of article 14 
and required it to either restore the complainant’s right to property (by reinstating his title 
deed) or compensating him expeditiously, justly and fairly. 280  In Endorois, the 
Commission recommended that the respondent State should recognise victims’ rights to 
property ownership, as well as the restitution of their traditional land. Moreover, it 
required the respondent State to ensure that the Endorois enjoy their right of access to 
Lake Bogoria for religious and cultural practices, as well as for grazing their livestock. 																																																								
274 TJ Melish “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond progressivity” in M Langford (ed) Social 
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The respondent State was also required to adequately compensate the victims.281 In 
INTERIGHTS, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association 
Mauritanienne des Drots de l’Homme v Mauritania (‘Mauritania’), 282  the African 
Commission also recommended that the respondent State pay adequate compensation 
to the victims for the loss they suffered.283 
Scholars and States have contested the legal status of the African Commission’s 
recommendations. Eno argues, for example, that the Commission’s recommendations 
are not legally binding.284 Similarly, Udombana argues that mere recommendations 
render the African Commission ineffective.285 Additionally, Viljoen and Louw argue that 
the non-binding nature of the African Commission’s recommendations is the reason for 
States’ reluctance to comply with them.286  
Moreover, scholars argue that the African Commission is merely a quasi-adjudicatory 
body. Stated differently, it only issues recommendations that are legally non-binding 
compared to court orders, which are legally binding and enforceable. Enonchong287 and 
Nmehielle288 argue that being a quasi-judicial body, the Commission has no jurisdiction 
to make legally binding decisions and can only make recommendations to the 
respondent State. In rejecting the African Commission’s recommendations in Kenneth 
Good v Republic of Botswana (‘Kenneth Good’),289 the respondent State argued that: 
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“We are not going to follow on the recommendation made by the Commission; it 
does not give orders, and it is not a court. We are not going to listen to them. We will 
not compensate Mr Good.”290  
Wachira and Ayinla also note that States have been ignoring the implementation of 
the African Commission’s remedial recommendations since its inception, leaving victims 
of violations without any remedy. Consequently, non-implementation renders the African 
Commission an ineffective protector of human rights.291  
Regarding the non-binding nature of recommendations, it can be argued that the 
aforementioned criticisms are limited and do not allow scope to consider the object and 
purpose the recommendations are meant to fulfil. The argument should not narrowly be 
that recommendations by their nature do not bind Member States. Mechlem advances 
that, since decisions of quasi-judicial treaty bodies are non-binding, their legal force 
largely depends on how persuasively and convincingly they are argued and consistently 
used and applied.292  
Departing from this perspective, it is argued that the Commission’s recommendations 
are highly authoritative interpretations of the African Charter in the context of a 
communication procedure. Recommendations help to further the object and purpose of 
the African Charter. Accordingly, it constitutes a lack of good faith for States Parties to 
ignore them without very compelling reasons. As Shelton notes, recommendations 
issued by regional human rights commissions are authoritative and require States to 
enforce them in good faith. 293  An enquiry into the object and purpose allows an 
established body a broad consideration of recommendations in the context of a treaty’s 
object and purpose.  
The African Charter’s object and purpose is to protect human rights, including socio-
economic rights. As such, in order to fulfil their obligations to further the object and 
purpose of the African Charter, States are required to comply with the Commission’s 
recommendations. Moreover, Member States are bound by the African Charter to 
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enforce supervisory organs’ recommendations. Anyangwe advances that the object and 
purpose of the African Charter is to impose binding obligations upon Member States.294 
As Viljoen argues, the debate should not be about the binding nature of 
recommendations, but rather about States’ compliance with their obligations to protect 
human rights according to the interpretation assigned by supervisory organs.295 It is the 
Member States’ obligations that are binding.296 
Furthermore, the fact that the African Commission issues recommendations, rather 
than orders, does not necessarily mean that its recommendations are unenforceable. 
The object and purpose of a treaty, as well as the principle of effectiveness (as aspects 
of the teleological approach to interpretation), can be used to render recommendations 
enforceable. Interpretation based on a treaty’s object and purpose, permits a generous 
understanding of the nature of the African Commission’s recommendations and their 
enforceability. It enables the use of various Charter provisions in support of an 
interpretation of the Commission’s recommendations that supports their enforceability. 
Viljoen and Louw argue that a generous interpretation of the African Charter’s provisions 
demonstrates the enforceability of the remedial recommendations,297 including article 1. 
Regarding article 1, Member States declare their commitment to “recognise” the 
rights entrenched in the African Charter through “legislative and other measures” in a 
manner that “gives effect” to such rights. The term “recognise”, in relation to a State’s 
compliance, requires it to recognise human rights in an effective manner through the 
implementation of remedial recommendations related to the protection of such rights. 
The formulation of article 1 requires States to legally recognise remedial 
recommendations issued by the African Commission. This obligation is supplemented by 
the obligation to adopt “legislative and other measures”. The phrase broadly requires 
States to adopt and enforce legislative and other measures in a manner that responds to 
remedial recommendations by the African Commission. Apart from adopting legislation 
that promotes and protects socio-economic rights, the obligation to adopt other 
measures broadly requires States to create measures that show the implementation of 
the African Commission’s recommendations.  
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Viljoen and Louw persuasively argue that “other measures” incorporates States’ 
obligations to enforce remedial orders.298 As such, the object and purpose of the African 
Charter, read with States’ obligations in article 1, requires States to consider 
recommendations as enforceable for effective protection of human rights. Murray and 
Mottershaw argue that States’ obligations in article 1 regarding the implementation of 
recommendations are two-fold. Firstly, States should “reassert” the obligation to 
implement. Secondly, States should establish coherent mechanisms for implementing 
the African Commission’s recommendations.299 In a 2012 report, as one mechanism for 
implementation, the High Commissioner on Human Rights recommended that States 
should establish a National Reporting and Coordinating Committee to implement 
supervisory organs’ decisions.300  
The phrase “to give effect” is broad and capable of incorporating States’ compliance 
with the African Commission’s recommendations regarding the protection of socio-
economic rights. Member States’ refusal to enforce recommendations amounts to a 
violation of their commitment to give effect to rights, as required in article 1 of the African 
Charter.301 Article 1 legally binds States to adhere to the Charter’s provisions and to 
recognise and comply with the competence and the recommendations of the African 
Commission. In Saro-Wiwa, the Commission held that the State’s failure to comply with 
its recommendations regarding human rights violations amounted to a violation of article 
1 of the African Charter.302  
Furthermore, it should be noted that by ratifying the African Charter, States are 
bound to implement the Commission’s recommendations in response to their obligations 
in article 1.303 The African Commission held in Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, 
Rwanda, and Uganda (‘DRC’)304 that by ratifying the African Charter, Burundi committed 
to co-operate with the Commission and enforce its decisions.305 																																																								
298 7. 
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300 OHCHR Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System: A Report by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay (2012), as quoted in Murray & 
Mottershaw (2014) Human Rights Quarterly 352. 
301 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 339. 
302 Saro-Wiwa paras 113-116. 
303 Art 14 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8I.L.M 679 (1969), adopted on 23 May 1969 
and entered into force on 27 January 1980 (‘Vienna Convention’). See also Murray & Mottershaw (2014) 
Human Rights Quarterly 354. 
304 Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda Communication No 227/99 (2004) 
AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2003).  
305 Para 53.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
194 
 
Interpretation based on the object and purpose of the African Charter also requires its 
provisions to be construed in a manner that renders their meaning practical and 
effective.306 This principle of effectiveness generally requires the effective enforcement 
of supervisory organs’ findings. Non-compliance with the African Commission’s 
recommendations would render the object and purpose of the Charter meaningless and 
the Commission’s protective mandate ineffective. As Wachira and Ayinla argue, non-
enforcement renders the African Commission an ineffective protector of human rights.307 
The fact that the African Commission issues recommendations does, therefore, not 
mean that States are at liberty to ignore such recommendations. Instead, States are 
bound to enforce the Commission’s decisions relating to socio-economic rights violations 
for effective protection of such rights. As Tardu argues, the concern should not be 
whether the decision is “an order” or “a recommendation”, but rather the legal purpose 
that the Member States are required to achieve.308 
The argument that, as a quasi-adjudicatory organ the African Commission is 
incompetent to issue binding decisions, is also not convincing. Since the African 
Commission was established with the aim of furthering the Charter’s object and purpose, 
the focus should be on the object and purpose of establishing the treaty body. It can be 
argued that the Commission’s mandate should be the determining factor in States’ 
compliance, rather than whether the body is a quasi-adjudicatory or an adjudicatory 
organ. Viljoen and Louw argue that the “nature of the body does not conclusively 
determine the issue of the status of its findings”.309 As such, Member States’ objecting to 
the Commission’s competency defeats the object and purpose of protecting human 
rights. It should be noted that other quasi-adjudicatory bodies, with a similar mandate to 
the African Commission, have issued recommendations that are respected and 
implemented by States. As noted above, the African Commission has been interpreting 
the Charter and considers its recommendations as binding on Member States for the 
effective protection of human rights. The Commission’s remedial recommendations 
further States’ obligations in article 1, in socio-economic rights provisions and in other 
relevant provisions regarding rights protection.  
																																																								
306 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 4. 
307 Wachira & Ayinla (2006) African Human Rights Law Journal 466-467. 
308 ME Tardu “The Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-
American System: A study of co-existing petition procedures” (1976) 70 American Journal of International 
Law 778 784. 
309 Viljoen & Louw (2004) Journal of African Law 14. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
195 
 
The African Commission’s jurisdiction to issue recommendations stems from its 
mandate to safeguard the rights in the African Charter.310 Through its recommendations, 
the Commission furthers the underlying object and purpose of the Charter to protect 
human rights norms. The Commission’s recommendations also enable Member States 
to fulfil their general obligations to protect individuals’ and groups’ socio-economic rights 
under the African Charter. By accepting the African Commission as a supervisory body 
with the mandate to elaborate the effective protection of individuals’ socio-economic 
rights, States are required to enforce its recommendations in order to further the 
Charter’s object and purpose. Pasqualucci posits that, by accepting the supervisory 
power to protect individuals’ rights through complaints mechanisms, States allow such 
organs to fulfil the treaty’s object and purpose.311  
Apart from State obligations, and the measures discussed above, the African 
Commission has the legal mandate to ensure States comply with its remedial 
recommendations. The Commission’s mandate to protect human rights, in articles 30, 
45 and 55, broadly enables it to protect socio-economic rights by requiring States to 
implement its recommendations. Moreover, the Commission can apply articles 60, 61, 
and 62 to ensure States comply. The following discussion demonstrates how these 
provisions can be applied to support the binding status of the African Commission’s 
findings and remedial recommendations. 
The African Commission’s mandate to promote human and peoples’ rights, and to 
“ensure their protection in Africa” in article 30 as read with article 45(2), implies that the 
Commission can require States – through various mechanisms – to implement their 
recommendations for the effective protection of human rights. As such, the meaningful 
mandate to protect human rights incorporates the mandate to ensure States implement 
remedial recommendations. Odinkalu notes that the effective protection of human rights 
by supervisory organs includes their mandate to issue enforceable remedies.312 Through 
the provisions of article 45(1)(b), the Commission has the mandate to formulate rules for 
solving legal problems relating to human rights in the African Charter. This article allows 
the African Commission to formulate rules for enforcing its recommendations. Through 
these provisions, the Commission has formulated Rules 112 and 118, which are 
significant for enforcing of its recommendations.313  																																																								
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Rule 112 requires a State to inform the African Commission within 180 days of the 
measures it has taken to implement the Commission’s decision.314 The Commission also 
has the mandate, within 90 days of receiving a State’s information concerning the 
implementation of its recommendation, to require such State to provide further 
information on the measures it has taken to enforce the recommendations. 315 
Furthermore, the Commission can apply Rule 112(8) to report a State that fails to 
comply with its recommendations to the Sub-Committee of the Permanent 
Representatives Committee, as well as the Executive Council. The application of article 
45(1)(b), read with Rules 112 and 118,316  creates a firm legal basis for States to 
implement their binding obligations in the African Charter – thus ensuring the 
enforcement of the African Commission’s recommendations.  
Viljoen argues that the formulation of Rule 112 guarantees a State’s commitment to 
give effect to its obligations in the African Charter, rather than focusing on whether the 
recommendations are binding.317 Murray and Mottershaw argue, however, that it can be 
difficult for the Commission to enforce Rule 112 due to a lack of resources and efficient 
follow-up mechanisms.318 A lack of resources is a “structural deficient” that requires 
States’ political will to financially support the African Commission.319  Udombana argues 
that the lack of resources can be solved by Member States and the OAU (AU) through a 
change of attitude towards the Commission. 320  Mbazira notes that the African 
Commission has been and continues to be underfunded by the AU which negatively 
affects their operations.321 
Article 55 of the African Charter can be interpreted broadly to render the African 
Commission’s remedial recommendations enforceable. The phrase “consider 
communications other than those of State Parties” can be broadly construed as the 
Commission’s power to order an effective remedy. The discussion above showed that 																																																								
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article 55, through this phrase, enables the Commission to broadly consider 
communications submitted by individuals and groups.322 The teleological approach to 
interpretation, through the principle of effectiveness, requires the African Charter to be 
interpreted generously in a manner that renders its meaning practical and effective, 
rather than illusory 323 The phrase “consider” will, therefore, be illusory if it only means 
the Commission’s mandate to determine communications without issuing appropriate 
remedies where it finds human rights violations. In this regard, the effective meaning of 
the word “consider” incorporates the Commission’s jurisdiction to issue effective 
remedies.  
Additionally, articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter allow the African Commission 
to draw inspiration from other international and African instruments and jurisprudence. 
The Commission can apply these provisions by emphasising States’ obligations to 
perform their African Charter obligations in good faith, as provided for in article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’).324 The phrase to 
perform “treaty obligations in good faith” is broad in that it includes a State’s obligation to 
enforce recommendations issued by the supervisory organs created by such treaties. As 
Anyangwe argues, performing a treaty in good faith implies that the obligations 
established by a treaty are meant to be respected rather than ignored by States.325 
Accordingly, Member States to the African Charter are obliged to implement the 
recommendations of the African Commission in good faith, regardless of its binding 
status. Viljoen argues that in addition to accepting the Charter’s binding nature, Member 
States also have to accept the competence of the African Commission’s 
recommendations issued pursuant to its communications procedure.326 A State’s non-
compliance with the Commission’s recommendations amounts to a disregard of its 
obligation to perform in good faith.327 
Although the findings and remedial recommendations of the African Commission are 
not formally binding on States Parties, they constitute influential and authoritative 
interpretations of the Charter by its supervisory organ. Moreover, through a teleological 
approach to interpretation various provisions of the Charter can be applied to 
demonstrate the authoritative nature of findings and remedial recommendations. This 																																																								
322 See part 4 3 2 above. 
323 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 4. 
324 Vienna Convention. 
325 Anyangwe (1998) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 628. 
326 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 339. 
327 339. 
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analysis is important, as it shows the strengths of the Commission’s interpretive and 
remedial mandate.  
4 3 8 African Commission’s jurisdiction to publish reports 
Article 59 of the African Charter requires the African Commission’s decisions to 
remain confidential until the (‘AHSG’) decides otherwise.328 It has been the subject of 
criticism. Benedek, for example, argues that the requirement restricts the Commission 
from publishing the proceedings of the communications.329 Udombana argues that the 
confidentiality rule makes the Commission invisible and ineffective and undermines its 
relevance in human rights protection. 330  Viljoen argues that the confidentiality 
requirement jeopardises the Commission’s protective mandate.331 Politicians have also 
challenged the confidentiality rule, by arguing that it curtails opportunities to make the 
protective mandate known to the public. The Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 
for instance, observed that: 
“The Commission is generally unknown and invisible, it is regarded with suspicion by 
those who do not know it, and as seen from the eyes of a casual observer, it is not 
performing. I don’t know of any cases that you have resolved related to any of the 
major human rights problems recently affecting our continent.”332 
The foregoing criticisms are based on the textual approach to interpretation, which 
mainly applies express provisions of the text being interpreted to generate its meaning. 
Interpretation through the teleological approach, however, allows the use of other 
interpretative aids, such as the principle of effectiveness, to construe the meaning of 
provisions.333 This principle applies to both substantive and procedural treaty provisions. 
The ECHR held in Loizidou v Turkey (‘Loizidou’) that the principle of effectiveness in its 
temporal dimension that requires a treaty to be interpreted in the present-day conditions 
is applicable to both substantive and procedural provisions that govern the operation of 
the supervisory organs.334 																																																								
328 Art 59(1)-(3) of the African Charter. 
329 Benedek (1993) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 29. 
330 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 70.  
331 F Viljoen “A human rights court for Africa, and Africans” (2005) 30 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 1 16. 
332 Remarks by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, as quoted in Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and 
Development Law Journal 70. 
333 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 3. 
334 Loizidou v Turkey (1995) Series A No 310 para 71. 
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The African Commission can apply the principle of effectiveness to justify its 
approach to publishing reports and ensuring that the confidentiality requirement in article 
59 is not interpreted in a manner that weakens socio-economic rights protection. 
Effective interpretation of article 59 requires the African Commission’s findings to be 
published, rather than rendering them confidential until the AHSG approves their 
publication. In Stoll v Switzerland (‘Stoll’), the ECHR held that when the confidentiality 
requirement renders rights theoretical and illusory, the principle of effectiveness that 
renders the right practical and effective should be observed. 335  Moreover, the 
substantive dimension of the principle of effectiveness requires the autonomy of Member 
States to be restricted at the expense of the protection and enjoyment of individuals’ 
rights.336 As Bernhadt argues: 
“Every protection of individual freedoms restricts State sovereignty, and it is by no 
means State Sovereignty which in case of doubt has priority. Quite the contrary, the 
object and purpose of human rights treaties may often lead to a broader 
interpretation of individual’s rights on one hand and restriction of State activities on 
the other.”337 
The principle of effectiveness, in its temporal dimension, allows treaty interpretation 
in a manner that reflects present-day conditions.338 Present-day conditions, in relation to 
the protection of human rights, require that the interpretation of the individuals’ rights be 
published publicly. Transparency is a significant aspect of human rights protection. In 
Scoppola v Italy (No 2) (‘Scoppola’) the ECHR held that: 
“Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human 
rights, the Court must however have regard to the conditions in the respondent State 
and in the Contracting States in general and respond, for example, to any emerging 
consensus as to the standards to be achieved. It is of crucial importance that the 
Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical 
and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a 
dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or 
improvement.”339  
																																																								
335 Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (ECHR, 10 December 2007) para 128. 
336 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
337 R Bernhadt “Evolutive treaty interpretation, especially of the European Convention of Human Rights” 
(1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 11 14, as quoted in D Rietiker “The principle of 
‘effectiveness’ in the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Its different dimensions 
and its consistency with public international law – No need for the concept of sui generis” (2010) 79 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 245 260.  
338 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
339 Scoppola v Italy (No 2) App no 10249/03 (ECHR, 17 September 2009) para 104. 
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It can be argued that the publication and transparency of the African Commission’s 
findings is significant for protecting socio-economic rights. It helps States Parties, and all 
interested in socio-economic protection, to know the Commission decisions regarding 
the scope and content of these rights and their related obligations. In this way, States 
Parties can be aware of how effectively they should realise socio-economic rights in their 
countries and can assist them to avoid similar violations. As Ankumah notes, the 
publication of the Commission’s decisions serves as a deterrent mechanism for further 
violations. 340  Furthermore, publication and transparency can assist victims of 
subsequent socio-economic rights violations to use African Commission’s findings as a 
basis for claiming the realisation of their rights. Ankumah rightly notes that a lack of 
published findings limits “potential litigants” from referencing such decisions as 
precedent. 341  Publication also helps to show the legal reasoning of the African 
Commission regarding its socio-economic rights jurisprudence. According to Ankumah, 
the African Commission can “develop an African human rights jurisprudence” through 
the publication of its findings.342 As such, the African Commission can apply the principle 
of effectiveness to justify its mandate to publish its findings.  
Moreover, the African Commission – through articles 60 and 61 – has the mandate to 
draw inspiration from relevant international instruments and jurisprudence. The African 
Commission can draw inspiration from the European Convention (article 32(3)) and 
Inter-American Convention (article 51(3)) respectively, which grant the European 
Commission and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights the mandate to publish 
their decisions. The African Commission has also altered the confidentiality requirement 
through practice. As Odinkalu observes, the African Commission has rectified the 
Charter’s shortcomings relating to its powers through its practice, Rules of Procedures, 
and jurisprudence.343 According to Ankumah, the Commission’s practice of publishing its 
decisions significantly impacts on the protection of individuals’ rights.344 
																																																								
340 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 75. 
341 77. 
342 77. 
343 Odinkalu (1998) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 398. 
344 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 77. 
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4 3 9 African Commission’s jurisdiction to follow-up States’ compliance with its 
decisions 
As is the case with the African Commission’s remedial jurisdiction, the African 
Charter does not explicitly confer upon the Commission the jurisdiction to follow-up on 
States’ compliance with its decisions. Scholars have challenged the Charter’s silence by 
arguing that it limits the Commission’s competence to undertake follow-up actions. 
Udombana, for instance, argues that the lack of a mandate to enforce decisions renders 
the African Commission ineffective and results in it being disregarded by States.345 
As was discussed in the remedial mandate above, the scholars’ criticisms are based 
on a textual approach to treaty interpretation. The textual approach to interpretation 
limits the interpretation of human rights treaties such as the African Charter. Protecting 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter will be meaningless if the supervisory 
organs’ mandate to monitor State compliance with remedial orders is restricted. Writing 
in the Inter-American context, Pasqualucci argues that the effectiveness of remedial 
orders issued by the Inter-American Court depends heavily on their implementation.346 
According to her, non-implementation of remedies renders the protection of human 
rights illusory.347 The teleological approach, which engages the treaty as a whole in the 
interpretive process, enables the African Commission to apply relevant Charter 
provisions to undertake follow-up measures. Viljoen argues that: 
“If implementation is not regarded as intrinsically part of the consideration of a 
decision, the following question arises: Why does the Commission consider 
communications in the first place, if it remains unconcerned about their 
implementation and effect? Adopting views is not a purposeless, formulaic exercise. 
Using a teleological approach, the aim of the communications procedure must be to 
grant relief (in the form of a remedy) to a complainant or to change laws and 
practices. Follow-up is therefore integral to the process of individual communications 
and making sense of the overarching duty of states to give effect to the rights in the 
Charter.”348 
The provisions that avail the African Commission with avenues to issue follow-up 
orders in respect of its recommendations include articles 30, 45(1)-(b), 45(2), 46, 55, 60, 
61 and 62. The protective mandate in articles 30 and 45(2) of the African Charter should 
be broadly construed to incorporate the African Commission’s mandate to follow-up its 																																																								
345 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 67-68. 
346 Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 303. 
347 303. 
348 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 341. 
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recommendations. Article 45(1)(b) allows the Commission to solve human rights 
problems through various rules and principles. Through these provisions, the African 
Commission formulated Rule 112, which governs follow-up mechanisms.349 Article 55 
also empowers the Commission to consider non-state communications. A strict textual 
reading of article 55 limits the power of the African Commission to follow-up on its 
decisions. Viljoen argues that a narrow interpretation of the word “consider” in article 55 
demonstrates that the Commission does not have a follow-up mandate.350  On the 
contrary, the teleological approach to interpretation, in accordance with the principle of 
effectiveness, allows the term “consider” to be construed broadly in a manner that 
incorporates the African Commission’s jurisdiction to follow-up on its decisions. 
Furthermore, articles 60 and 61 allow the Commission to draw inspiration from other 
relevant instruments and jurisprudence. These provisions can be applied to draw 
inspiration from other relevant instruments and jurisprudence relating to follow-up 
mandate.  
Article 62 requires Member States to submit reports that demonstrate the measures 
they have taken to protect individuals’ rights. State obligations in these provisions are 
significant as they enable the African Commission to consider States’ compliance with 
recommendations relating to socio-economic rights. A State reporting mechanism 
assists the Commission to monitor the progress of States’ compliance with its 
decisions.351 In a similar vein, writing on the Inter-American context, Pasqualucci posits 
that a State reporting procedure allows the supervisory organ to assess States’ 
compliance with its decisions.352 As such, the underlying objective of a State reporting 
mechanism is to examine the extent to which States comply with the African 
Commission’s recommendations.353 
The African Commission elaborated on article 62 in the specific context of socio-
economic rights through the State Party Reporting Guidelines for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Reporting 
																																																								
349 Rule 112(2) provides: 
“In the event of a decision against a State Party, the parties shall inform the Commission in writing, within one 
hundred and eighty (180) days of being informed of the decision in accordance with paragraph one, of all 
measures, if any, taken or being taken by the State Party to implement the decisions of the Commission.” 
350 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 341. 
351 341. 
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Guidelines’). 354  These Reporting Guidelines are significant in that they outline the 
content of States’ reports relating to socio-economic rights.355 The African Commission 
can use the Reporting Guidelines mechanism to inquire into States’ enforcement of 
socio-economic remedies. The African Commission can also use the Reporting 
Guidelines to require States found to have violated socio-economic rights to explain in 
their reports the measures they have taken to implement the recommendations issued. 
In Purohit, the Commission required the respondent State to incorporate in its report the 
measures it took to implement the African Commission’s recommendations.356   
There has been States’ failure to effectively comply with the African Commission’s 
recommendations. Viljoen and Louw observe that States fail to fully comply with the 
recommendations.357 Despite the Commission’s efforts to follow-up on implementation, 
very little information is available about State compliance.358 In August 2014, two NGOs 
(namely the Minority Rights Group International and International Network for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights) wrote to Commissioner Dr Mary Maboreke drawing her 
attention to the failure of the Government of Kenya to comply with the African 
Commission’s recommendations issued in Endorois. 359  The NGOs requested the 
Commission to invoke Rule 112(8) of the Rules of Procedure.360 Rule 112(8) requires 
the African Commission to draw attention to the Sub-Committee of the Permanent 
Representative and the Executive Council on the Implementation of the Decision of the 
African Union in circumstances where a State fails to comply with its recommendations. 
It should be noted that the African Commission had already issued a resolution to 
Kenya, but it failed to comply with this resolution concerning Endorois.361 
																																																								
354 State Party Reporting Guidelines for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 24 October, 2011. Guideline 1 provides: 
“These reporting guidelines are adopted to give further guidance to states parties to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter) in reporting, pursuant to article 62 of the Charter, on implementation 
of their obligations to realise the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under the Charter.” 
355 Reporting Guidelines 2(a)-(e), 3 and 4. 
356 Purohit para 85. See also Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia Communication No 211/98 (2001) 
AHRLR 84 (ACHPR 2001) para 76. 
357 F Viljoen & L Louw “State compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004 (2007) 101 The American Journal of International Law 1 5-6. 
358 3. 
359 The letter is on file with the author. 
360 The letter is on file with the author. 
361 Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to Implement the Endorois Case ACHPR/Res.257, 
concluded in Banjul, The Gambia, on 5 November 2013. 
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4 3 10 Complementarity between the African Commission and the African Court 
The complementarity between the African Commission and the African Court is 
governed by the African Court Protocol, the African Court Rules and the Rules of 
Procedure. The relevant African Court Protocol provisions are articles 2, 5(1)(a), 6(1) 
and (3), 8, and 33. Elsheikh confirms the inclusion of the principle of complementarity 
between these two supervisory organs in articles 5 and 6 of the African Court 
Protocol. 362  Article 2 demonstrates that the mandate of the African Court is to 
complement the protective mandate of the African Commission. Article 5(1)(a) allows the 
African Commission to submit cases to the African Court.  
Rule 118 elaborates four circumstances under which the African Commission can 
submit cases to the African Court. Firstly, it can submit a case in situations where States 
fail to comply with the African Commission’s recommendations.363  Secondly, it can 
submit a case if States fail to comply with the provisional measures issued by the African 
Commission. 364  Thirdly, it can submit a case in situations of serious or massive 
violations of human rights.365 Lastly, the Commission can submit a case to the African 
Court at any time it deems necessary. 366  Rule 118(4) is significant in that it 
demonstrates the broad nature of article 5(1)(a).  
Writing on the African Commission as a party before the African Court, Rudman 
notes that Rule 118 of the Rules of Procedure elaborate on “when and how” the 
Commission can refer a case to the Court.367  Rudman argues that through these 
provisions, the African Commission can refer a complaint to the African Court at any 
stage of the hearing, including referring a case before the consideration of the case’s 
admissibility.368 Rudman warns, however, that although the African Commission can 
refer a case to the African Court at any stage, referral of a case before considering its 
admissibility undermines the purpose of complementarity. It also undermines the 
functions of the African Commission and fails to effectively utilise the meagre resources 
allocated to supervisory organs.369 With particular emphasis on Rule 118(3) and (4), 																																																								
362 IAB Elsheikh “The future relationship between the African Court and the African Commission” (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 252 256. 
363 Rule 118(1) of the Rules of Procedure. 
364 Rule 118(2). 
365 Rule 118(3). 
366 Rule 118(4). 
367 A Rudman “The Commission as a party before the Court – Reflections on the complementarity 
arrangement” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 4.  
368 5. 
369 6. 
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Rudman contends that these provisions undermine the purpose of complementing and 
reinforcing the functions of the African Commission.370 She argues that in order to 
uphold the principle of complementarity, as envisaged by the provisions of the African 
Court Protocol and the Rules of Procedure in a manner that is also resource-conscious, 
the African Commission should refer the cases to the African Court after determining the 
admissibility of the case.371  
Rudman’s observation regarding the danger of undermining the function of the 
African Commission, as well as the whole purpose of complementarity, is valid. Writing 
on the future relationship between these two supervisory organs, particularly the African 
Commission as a party before the African Court, Elsheikh notes that a significant 
concern relates to how the African Commission can exercise this mandate effectively.372 
This chapter argues that the African Commission should interpret Rule 118 in a manner 
that renders the socio-economic rights involved in cases (which should be referred to the 
African Court) effective and practical. In this regard, the African Commission should take 
into account the principle of effectiveness, being a tenet of the teleological approach, 
whenever it considers the referral of a case to the African Court, before considering its 
admissibility. This principle can be applied to restrict the Commission from referring a 
case that it has the mandate to consider. Failure to apply this generous interpretation 
can cause unnecessary delays for the victims of socio-economic rights violations to 
obtain justice. It will eventually render the protection of these rights ineffective and 
illusory, rather than practical and effective. As a result, the practice fails to uphold the 
object and purpose of the African Charter to protect peoples’ socio-economic rights. 
Supervisory organs should interpret their rules of procedure generously in a manner that 
upholds the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-economic 
rights.373 As Udombana argues, the Rules of supervisory organs should be flexible in a 
manner that advances the object and purpose of the African Charter.374 In a similar vein, 
writing on the complementarity of these two institutions, Elsheikh notes that the Rules of 
Procedure developed by these supervisory organs regarding their complementarity 
should uphold the Charters object and purpose relating to the human rights it protects.375  
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The African Court should apply a similar approach when interpreting article 5 of the 
African Court Protocol, which grants it a mandate to determine cases filed before it by 
the African Commission, as well as Rule 29(3)(a) of the African Court Rules that 
elaborates article 5(1)(a). As discussed in chapter two, the principle of effectiveness 
requires restrictions on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights to be narrowly 
construed. As such interpretation of the provisions, regarding referral of cases to the 
African Court if they practically restrict the enjoyment of these rights, should be narrowly 
construed to enable their effective and practical protection.  
Article 2 of the African Court Protocol is also useful to elaborate this generous 
interpretation. In article 2, the term “complement” should be broadly construed to mean 
the African Court’s mandate to exclusively consider cases that are submitted by the 
African Commission, after determining their admissibility. As Rudman notes, for there to 
be effective complementarity between these two supervisory organs it is important for 
the African Court to restrict itself to the cases referred to it for determination on merits. 
Generous interpretation enables the African Court to restrict itself mainly to the cases 
referred to it for determination on the merits of a case. In other words, after the African 
Commission has already determined its admissibility.376 Furthermore, Rule 29(3) (a) of 
the African Court requires the African Commission to submit all the relevant documents 
relating to the case: 
“In a case brought before the Court by the Commission under Article 5(1)(a) of the 
Protocol, its application shall be accompanied by its Report as well as all documents 
pertaining to the proceedings.” 
A generous interpretation of Rule 29(3)(a), through the principle of effectiveness, 
would require the African Court to ensure that the African Commission determines a 
case’s admissibility and then submits its report on the admissibility, together with other 
relevant documents, for determination on its merits. As such, the term “report” in Rule 
29(3)(a) should be interpreted generously in a manner that takes into account the report 
regarding the determination of the case’s admissibility. This approach to interpretation 
will enable the African Court to exclusively determine only cases referred to it by the 
African Commission after the latter has considered the admissibility of the case. Similar 
provisions are provided for under Rule 121(1) of the African Commission Rules: 
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“When, in pursuance of Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol and Rule 120 of the Present 
Rules, the Commission decides to bring a communication before the Court, it shall 
submit an application seizing the Court in accordance with the Court Rules, 
accompanied by a summary of the communication and the communication file.” 
Commenting on the formulation of Rule 121(1)(a) in relation to the wording of Rule 
29(3)(a), Rudman notes a contradiction.377 While Rule 29(3)(a) requires the African 
Commission to submit a case with a report, Rule 121(1)(a) requires the Commission to 
refer a case to the African Court with a “summary of the communication”. Rudman notes 
that it is unclear whether the phrase “summary of the communication” in Rule 121(1)(a) 
should be understood as the word “Report” in Rule 29(3)(a).378 As argued above, the 
principle of effectiveness should be applied to interpret these Rules.  
This chapter contends that a generous interpretation based on the principle of 
effectiveness is also required to interpret the phrase “in accordance with the Court 
Rules” in Rule 121(1)(a) of the African Commission Rules in a manner that considers the 
word “summary” in this Rule to be understood as the “Report” in line with Rule 29(3)(a) 
of the African Court Rules. The considerable implication of this generous interpretation is 
that it will enable the African Commission to submit to the African Court a case after it 
has determined its admissibility. The above discussion regarding the generous 
interpretation of the word “report” in Rule 29(3)(a) argues for a report to be submitted 
after considering a case’s admissibility. As will be discussed in part 4 4 2, in all four 
ways the African Commission can facilitate an individual’s access to the African Court. 
This broad standing of the African Commission is significant, as it furthers the object and 
purpose of the African Charter to protect socio-economic rights.  
Writing on the justiciability of socio-economic rights, Yeshanew argues that these 
provisions guarantee the protection of socio-economic rights. 379  Thus, the 
complementarity between the African Commission and the African Court strengthens the 
effective protection of individuals’ socio-economic rights, as guaranteed in the African 
Charter. Writing on scholarly debates on the relationship between the African 
Commission and the African Court, Ankumah argues that the establishment of the 
African Court does not diminish the relevance of the African Commission for protecting 
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human rights.380 Complementarity also strengthens an individual’s access to the Court, 
as will be discussed in part 4 4 2 below. 
Finally, article 6(1) enables the African Court to request an opinion from the African 
Commission when deciding on the admissibility of cases. In relation to article 6(1), Rule 
29(2) requires the African Court to specify the sections of a case in respect of which it 
seeks the African Commission’s opinion, as well as the time limit within which it requires 
such opinion. Article 6(3) allows the African Court to transfer the case before it to the 
African Commission for determination. In relation to article 6(3), Rule 29(3) of the African 
Court Rules requires the African Court to submit to the African Commission a copy of 
the entire pleadings. Article 8 requires the African Court to consider its relationship with 
the African Commission when it determines cases. Article 33 requires the African Court, 
when it formulates its Rules of Procedure, to consult the African Commission.  
4 4 The African Court: Mandate and jurisdiction 
4 4 1 Contentious jurisdiction 
The contentious jurisdiction of the African Court is provided for in article 3 of the 
African Court Protocol: 
“1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any 
other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. 
2. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall 
decide.” 
Article 3(1) is formulated broadly and confers on the Court the mandate to interpret 
all rights in the African Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified 
by the States concerned. Scholars are sceptical of this broad mandate. Naldi and 
Magliveras, for example, argue that the article controversially extends the Court’s 
jurisdiction to international and other regional, as well as African, human rights 
instruments. 381  They the mandate to interpret other international human rights 
instruments is problematic, as it encroaches on the interpretive mandate of other 
supervisory organs specifically established by such instruments.382 Similarly, Udombana 																																																								
380 Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 196. 
381 GJ Naldi & K Magliveras “Reinforcing the African system of human rights: The Protocol on the 
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Human Rights 431 435. 
382 435. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
209 
 
argues that article 3 of the African Court Protocol extends the Court’s mandate to “all 
regional, sub-regional, bilateral, multilateral, and international treaties” that have been 
ratified by States in dispute before the African Court.383  
Scholars have developed means of restricting such a mandate. Heyns, for instance, 
argues that the term “relevant human rights instrument” contained in article 3(1) should 
be construed to cover only instruments that acknowledge the Court’s competence.384 
According to him, it is not common for a supervisory body of one regional or international 
system to enforce the instruments of another regional system.385 Viljoen suggests the 
use of the phrase “States concerned” to limit the African Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction.386 Yeshanew387 is of the view that the African Court’s mandate in article 3(1) 
should be exclusively restricted to the African Charter, the African Court Protocol, the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa (‘Women’s Protocol’),388 and the African Charter on the Rights and the Welfare 
of the Child (‘Children’s Charter’).389 He argues that, since the African Court Protocol’s 
object and purpose is to supplement the African Charter, it makes sense for the African 
Court to consider these three instruments.390 Restricting the Court to these three African 
regional human rights instruments may limit it from using other relevant ratified 
instruments to develop the scope and content of socio-economic rights.391  
I agree with criticisms of the broad nature of the African Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction and its danger of encroaching on other supervisory bodies’ interpretive 
mandates. I further agree with the need to restrict this broad mandate from extending to 
other international and regional human rights treaties that have already established their 
enforcement machinery. However, some scholarly solutions are problematic. Heyns’ 
interpretation, for instance, limits the African Court’s interpretive mandate exclusively to 
the African Charter and the Women’s Protocol, while Viljoen’s restriction allows the 																																																								
383 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 90. See also J Harrington “The 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (2002) 305 318. 
384 C Heyns “The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?” (2001) 2 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 155 168. 
385 167. See also Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 193. 
386 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 438. 
387 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 194. 
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389 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1999) was adopted on 
11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
390 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 194. 
391 194. 
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African Court to encroach on the mandate of other treaty bodies. Yeshanew’s 
suggestion that, based on the African Court Protocol’s object and purpose, the Court 
should exercise jurisdiction on the African Charter and only instruments that supplement 
the Charter is feasible. Its feasibility centres on the fact that the African Court will not 
interpret and apply other international, regional, African regional, or sub-regional treaties 
with their own enforcement machinery. However, Yeshanew does not develop the 
argument as to how the object and purpose of the African Charter can be invoked to 
appropriately restrict the Court’s mandate.  
An appropriate way to restrict the broad mandate of the African Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction is through the principle of effectiveness, which applies to both the Charter’s 
substantive and procedural provisions. The Inter-American Court stated in Serrano-Cruz 
Sisters v El Salvador (‘El Salvador’)392 that the principle of effectiveness is applicable to 
substantive as well as procedural provisions of human rights treaties.393 The principle of 
effectiveness in its general dimension allows the interpretation of treaty provisions in a 
manner that renders such provisions practical and effective, rather than theoretical and 
ineffective.394 This dimension of the principle is broad, as it allows the restriction of 
provisions to render them effective. The phrase “relevant human rights instruments” 
should be restricted and construed to mean relevant African human instruments that 
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the African Court, as well as protocols to the African 
Charter. This approach enables the African Court to interpret and apply African human 
rights instruments that acknowledge its competence. It will also save the African Court 
from encroaching on the interpretive mandate of other international, regional and sub-
regional supervisory organs. Yeshanew argues that it makes sense to restrict the 
Court’s mandate to interpret “other relevant treaties” to the relevant African regional 
human rights instruments.  
Furthermore, this approach helps the African Court to consider “other relevant human 
rights instruments ratified by the States concerned” to guide its interpretation of socio-
economic rights in African human rights instruments under its jurisdiction. The principle 
of effectiveness, in its systemic dimension, allows treaty provisions to be interpreted 
through other comparative legal sources.395 The systemic dimension of the principle of 																																																								
392 Serrano-Cruz Sisters v El Salvador (Preliminary Objection) Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Judgment of 23 November 2004. 
393 Para 69. 
394 See chapter two, part 2 2 3.  
395 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 4. 
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effectiveness allows the interpretation of article 3(1) of the African Court Protocol in a 
manner that renders it effective and practical. It also allows the Court to consider other 
international and regional, as well as African, human rights instruments as a guide for 
interpreting the Charter’s socio-economic rights. In this regard, the African Court’s 
interpretation can assist in ensuring the consistency and harmony of the African Charter 
with other relevant international and African human rights instruments.  
Related to the contentious jurisdiction, is the African Court’s mandate to decide cases 
brought by individuals relating to human rights violations, including socio-economic 
rights. Rudman notes that this mandate collides considerably with the African 
Commission’s mandate to consider communications, as well as matters relating to locus 
standi. 396  However, the complementarity between the African Commission and the 
African Court can be applied to solve Rudman’s jurisdiction and locus standi 
concerns.397 Writing on the African Commission as a party with a mandate to file cases 
before the African Court, Rudman admits that complementarity between these two 
supervisory organs has the potential to address such contradictions.398 
The African Court of Justice Protocol provides the African Court of Justice with a 
mandate to interpret and apply the African Charter, the Children’s Charter, the Women’s 
Protocol, or any other legal instrument relating to human rights ratified by the States 
Parties concerned.399 These provisions are significant in that they consider broadly the 
African Charter and instruments that supplement it. Like the provisions of the African 
Court Protocol, the phrase “any other legal instrument” should be construed to mean 
instruments that acknowledge the competence of the African Court of Justice or 
supplement the African Charter. This will help the African Court of Justice to avoid 
interpreting and applying other international, regional, and sub-regional instruments 
vesting such mandate in other bodies. 
4 4 2 Locus standi before the African Court and its implications for socio-economic 
rights interpretation 
Locus standi before the African Court is governed by article 5 of the African Court 
Protocol: 
																																																								
396 See parts 4 3 1, 4 3 2, and 4 3 3 above. 
397 See part 4 3 10 above. 
398 Rudman (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 4. 
399 Art 28(c) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
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“1. The following are entitled to submit cases to the Court: 
(a) The Commission; 
(b) The State Party which had lodged a complaint to the Commission; 
(c) The State Party against which the complaint has been lodged at the Commission; 
(d) The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation; and 
(e) African Intergovernmental Organisations. 
2. When a State Party has an interest in a case, it may submit a request to the Court 
to be permitted to join. 
3. The Court may entitle relevant Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) with 
observer status before the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly 
before it, in accordance with article 34(6) of this Protocol.”  
These provisions establish five categories of claimants who can access the Court. 
This wide range of claimants is significant for interpreting socio-economic rights. The 
significance is based on the fact that, in addition to the victims, article 5 allows a wide 
range of claimants to petition violations of individuals’ socio-economic rights to the 
African Court on their behalf. Through the African Commission and States’ locus standi, 
individuals can indirectly access the African Court.400 According to Udombana, these two 
sets of claimants have automatic access to the Court.401 
Scholars criticise article 5 for granting the African Commission and States direct 
access to the African Court, but not individuals or NGOs. Juma argues, for example, that 
to grant direct access to States is problematic since they are the main violators of 
individuals’ rights.402 States and inter-governmental organisations may be reluctant to 
file cases involving human rights violations.403  Regarding the African Commission’s 
direct access, Juma argues that there is no legal duty on the African Commission to file 
cases to the African Court.404 
States and institutions such as inter-governmental institutions, as well as the African 
Commission, are legally bound to protect human rights. As discussed in chapter 
three,405 article 1 of the African Charter requires States to protect human rights through 
legislative and other measures. Moreover, the African Commission is obliged – through 
articles 30, 45 and 46 – to protect the human rights in the African Charter. The effective 
and practical interpretation of these provisions imposes a legal obligation on Member 
States and the African Commission to file cases involving individuals’ socio-economic 																																																								
400 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 426. 
401 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 87. 
402 D Juma Access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Case of the Poacher turned 
Gamekeeper? 1 3, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?absract_id=1391482> 
(accessed 11-05-2015). 
403 4. 
404 8. 
405 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 1. 
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rights violations before the African Court. Articles 30 and 45(2) require the African 
Commission to protect human rights in the African Charter (including socio-economic 
rights). The word “protect” in these two articles should be construed broadly to include 
the obligation of the African Commission to submit cases involving socio-economic 
rights violations to the African Court. As Rudman notes, failure of the African 
Commission to submit cases to the African Court amounts to a failure to protect 
individuals’ and groups’ human rights.406  
Moreover, article 45(1)(c) requires the African Commission to co-operate with other 
international institutions with a human rights mandate. It should be interpreted broadly to 
include the African Commission’s mandate to co-operate with the African Court by 
submitting cases involving the socio-economic rights violations in the African Charter. As 
discussed above, 407  the African Commission through its complementarity with the 
African Court can submit cases to the African Court. In Compulsory Membership in an 
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (‘Compulsory 
Membership’) the Inter-American Court stated that: 
“Considering that individuals do not have standing to take their case to the Court and 
that a Government that has won a proceeding in the Commission would have no 
incentive to do so, in these circumstances the Commission alone is in position, by 
referring the case to the Court, to ensure the effective functioning of the protective 
system established by the Convention. In such a context, the Commission has a 
special duty … of coming to the Court.”408  
In circumstances where States and the African Commission are reluctant to file cases 
at the African Court, the African Court Protocol allows the Court to issue provisional 
measures aimed at protecting individuals’ rights on its own initiative.409 The jurisdiction 
to issue advisory opinions410 and provisional measures enables the Court to intervene in 
circumstances where States and the African Commission are reluctant to file cases. 
																																																								
406 A Rudman “The protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation under the African human 
rights system” (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 24-25. 
407 See part 4 3 10 above. 
408 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 
and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-5, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series A No 5 (13 November 1985) para 26. 
409 The provisional mandate of the African Court is provided for in art 27(2) of the African Court Protocol, 
and the advisory mandate is provided for in art 4 of the African Court Protocol. 
410 Article 4(1) of the African Court Protocol enables the Member States of the OAU (now AU), the AU or 
any of its organs, or any African organisation recognised by the AU to request the African Court to provide 
an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments only 
on a condition that such matter should be related to a matter being examined by the African Commission.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
 
While the African Court’s jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions falls outside the scope of 
this dissertation, the jurisdiction to issue provisional measures is discussed in part 4 4 4 
below. 
Moreover, individuals can directly access the Court through article 5(3). Individuals’ 
direct access to the African Court is subject to a respondent State’s deposition of a 
declaration acknowledging the competence of the Court to determine cases submitted 
by individuals, as provided for in article 34(6) of the African Court Protocol.411 Article 5(3) 
should therefore be read in conjunction with article 34(6) of the African Court Protocol: 
“At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall 
make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under 
article 5(3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 5(3) 
involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration.” 
Articles 5(3) and 34(6) have been criticised by various scholars. Udombana argues 
that these provisions weaken the Court’s mandate to hear individuals’ cases, as they 
limit their direct access.412 Articles 5(3) and 34(6) demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
African Court’s jurisdiction to determine cases brought by individuals.413  Moreover, 
Chenwi argues that the limitation of direct access arises from the fact that these 
provisions require the respondent State’s declaration to allow an individual to submit a 
case.414 Eno415 and Mutua416 argue that these provisions diminish the significance of the 
African Court as the protector of individuals’ human rights and render it the protector of 
States. Harrington417 and Juma418 argue that the limitation renders the African Court less 
accessible by potential complainants. If these provisions of the African Court Protocol 
are not interpreted broadly they will render the African Court meaningless.419 																																																								
411 At the time of writing, only eight States had made a declaration in accordance with art 34(6). These 
States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Ghana, Rwanda and Cote d’Ivoire, see 
<http://en.african-court.org/index.php/news/press-releases/item/69-benin-makes-the-declaration-to-allow-
ngos-and-individuals-to-directly-access-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights> (accessed 18-05-
2017). 
412 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 88. 
413 88. 
414 Chenwi (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 700. 
415 RW Eno “The jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2002) 2 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 223 231. 
416 M Mutua “The African Human Rights Court: A two-legged stool?” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
342 355. 
417 J Harrington “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (2002) 305 319. 
418 Juma Access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 15. 
419 Harrington “The African Court” in The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 355. 
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The African Court has also rejected cases submitted by individuals whose States 
have not deposited the declaration required by article 34(6). For example, in Michelot 
Yogogombaye v The Republic of Senegal (‘Yogogombaye’),420 an individual applicant 
directly instituted a case against the respondent State. However, the African Court held 
that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the case since the respondent State had not yet 
deposited the declaration pursuant to article 34(6).421 The African Court has reiterated 
this strict textual interpretation in other cases, including the recent case of Femi Falana v 
The African Union (‘Falana’).422 
The foregoing criticisms and the practice of the African Court are based on the 
textual approach to interpretation. As mentioned above, the provisions of human rights 
treaties, such as the African Charter, require a holistic interpretation that renders such 
provisions practical and effective rather than theoretical and illusory. Although the textual 
formulation of these provisions does not provide for an individual’s direct standing to the 
African Court it does not mean that an individual’s standing is absolutely restricted.423 
According to Viljoen, the African Court should not be construed as limiting individuals’ 
access.424  
Apart from an individual’s access through states and NGOs, article 5(1)(a) enables 
individuals’ standing through the African Commission. Indirect access to the African 
Court is significant, since the African Commission is obliged under the Charter to submit 
cases to the Court under the circumstances discussed above. A generous interpretation 
of this mandate requires the Commission to submit to the Court cases filed by 
individuals. Rudman rightly notes that the Commission fails to implement its obligation to 
protect human rights in the Charter if it fails to submit cases to the Court on behalf of 
individuals and groups whose States have not deposited the declaration required by 
article 34(6) of the African Court Protocol. 425  As discussed above, the African 
Commission has developed four distinct mechanisms through which it can submit cases 
by individuals to the African Court.426  
																																																								
420 Michelot Yogogombaye v The Republic of Senegal Application No 001/2008. 
421 Para 37. 
422 Femi Falana v The African Union Application No 001/2011 para 73. 
423 Some regional human rights treaties incorporate similar provisions requiring States to deposit a 
declaration accepting the competence of the court. For example, article 62(1) of the Inter-American 
Convention. 
424 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 430. 
425 Rudman (2015) African Human Rights Law Journal 25. 
426 See part 4 3 10 above. 
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The above discussion demonstrates that individuals can access the African Court 
indirectly. Significantly, it also shows that States and the African Commission, based on 
their obligations to promote and protect human rights, are obliged to submit cases by 
individuals to the Court for effective rights protection.  
Scholars question the nature of individuals’ indirect access to the African Court. Their 
concern is whether restricting an individual’s direct standing amounts to restricting such 
an individual from participating in the prosecution of the case filed by an entity with direct 
legal standing. Thus, whether an individual is eligible to appear before the African Court 
to argue his case or whether he is strictly required to rely on the representation of the 
African Commission. Viljoen notes that an individual who directly submits the case to the 
African Court is recognised as a party to a case. Accordingly, he questions the status of 
an individual whose case is submitted either by the African Commission or by the 
State.427  
The African Protocol does not explicitly provide for an individual’s participation in a 
case. It can be argued that the principle of effectiveness in its substantive dimension 
requires restrictions to be narrowly interpreted in order to enable the effective enjoyment 
of human rights. As such, the standing restriction in articles 5 and 34(6) of the African 
Court Protocol should be narrowly interpreted to enable individuals, whose complaints 
have been submitted by entities with direct legal standing, to participate in the 
prosecution of the case. This broad interpretation will ensure that victims of socio-
economic rights violations are given independent procedural standing to the African 
Court once the African Commission submits their case. In the matter of Viviana Gallardo 
(‘Gallardo’),428 Escalante J held that standing restrictions should be interpreted narrowly 
in order to further the object and purpose of the Inter-American Convention to protect 
human rights: 
“This limitation, as such, is in the light of principles, an ‘odious matter’ (materia 
odiosa) and should thus be interpreted restrictively. Therefore, one cannot draw from 
that limitation the conclusion that the individual is also barred from his autonomous 
condition of ‘party’ in the procedures once they begun. On the other hand, it is 
possible, even imperative, to grant to the individual that role.”429  
																																																								
427 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 341. 
428 In the matter of Viviana Gallardo et al Advisory Opinion No 101/81 Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Ser A) (1984). 
429 Gallardo explanation of vote of Judge Rodolfo Escalante para 8. 
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This broad interpretation will enable complainants and victims of socio-economic 
rights violations to have procedural standing before the African Court. As Escalante J 
stated in Gallardo, although an individual’s direct standing is restricted by the Inter-
American Convention it allows the Inter-American Court to grant victims of human rights 
violations “independent procedural standing once the proceedings have begun”.430  
Article 5(1)(a) is broad in that it regulates individuals’ indirect access to the African 
Court on broad terms. It does not restrict victims or their representatives’ procedural 
status and involvement in the litigation. Accordingly, the article should be interpreted 
broadly to ensure victims are afforded the right to appear before the African Court once 
the African Commission submits their case.  
Rule 29(3)(c) of the African Court Rules enables the Court, when necessary, to hear 
the individual or NGO that submitted the communication to the African Commission.431 
This Rule is subject to Rule 45 of the African Court Rules governing the African Court’s 
measures to “obtain” evidence. Rule 45 enables the Court to obtain evidence regarding 
the case before it by hearing any person as a witness or expert whose evidence, 
assertions or statements can assist the African Court to determine the case.432 Rule 
29(3)(c) read in conjunction with Rule 45 allows an individual to appear before the 
African Court as a witness to a case. As Vargas writes in the Inter-American context: 
“Even if lack of standing is read to preclude individuals from having access to the 
Court as a party the individual may still be called upon to appear as a witness.”433  
However, treating an individual as a mere witness to a case limits his or her right to 
appear as a party to a case before the Court. Viljoen notes that a narrow reading of Rule 
29(3)(c), read in conjunction with Rule 45, restricts an individual from being considered 
as a party to a case.434 Being a party is significant as it enables an individual to 
participate actively, directly or through his legal representatives in the case’s 
proceedings. Commenting on the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court, 
																																																								
430 Para 8. 
431 Rule 29(3)(a)-(c) of the African Court Rules.  
432 Rule 45(1). 
433 MD Vargas “Individual access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” (1984) 1 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 601 611. 
434 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 441. 
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Melish argues that the Rules allow the “participation of the victims and their 
representatives in all procedural stages of litigation”.435  
Based on similar reasoning, Rule 29(3)(c) read in conjunction with Rule 45(1), should 
be interpreted generously in a manner that allows the African Court to consider an 
individual complainant before the African Commission, as a party and a witness before 
the Court. This supports Viljoen’s argument that a broad interpretation of the Rules of 
the African Court entitles an individual to be party to a case submitted by the 
Commission or a State.436 
The teleological approach to interpretation thus allows the construction of articles 
5(3) and 34(6) and the Rules of the African Court in a manner that embraces the African 
Charter’s object and purpose regarding individuals’ access to the Court. The Court 
should therefore adopt this approach in interpreting the provisions of the African Charter, 
including provisions regarding the access of victims. Udombana argued earlier that: 
“The real effectiveness of the Court… will depend on how creative its judges are in 
interpreting their mandate and jurisdiction. If the Court takes a conservative 
approach to these issues, there is little hope that it will be… effective… in protecting 
human rights in the continent. By contrast, if the Court takes a liberal and creative 
approach to interpreting its mandate under the Protocol, the Court has the potential 
to take the lead on many innovative trends in regional and international human rights 
protection. This is particularly true to the Court’s jurisdiction over persons and 
subject matter. Should the Court, for example, interpret Articles 34(6) and 5(3) of the 
Protocol narrowly, it could effectively foreclose NGO and individual access to the 
Court.”437   
Regarding the African Court of Justice, locus standi is governed by articles 29 and 30 
of the African Court of Justice Protocol. This Protocol, when it comes into operation, will 
provide for explicitly broad provisions regarding locus standi. It allows access to State 
Parties to the Protocol, the Assembly, Parliament and other organs of the Union, African 
Union staff members, the African Commission, African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, African Intergovernmental organisations, African 
National Human Rights Institutions, individuals, and NGOs.438 
																																																								
435 T Melish “Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond progressivity” in M Langford (ed) Socio-
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 372 373. 
436 441. 
437 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 102. 
438 Arts 29(1) and 30 of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
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The above provisions are significant as they allow both direct439 and indirect440 
individual standing. As Wachira and Ayinla note, the African Court of Justice Protocol 
broadens individuals standing through individual direct access and other relevant human 
rights organisations.441 Direct standing enables individual complainants of human rights 
violations, whose States have deposited a declaration acknowledging the competence of 
the Court, to enjoy the full exercise of their interest. Indirect individual standing is 
significant, as it enables individuals to access the African Court of Justice as witnesses 
in cases where the case is instituted by other institutions, such as the African 
Commission.  
4 4 3 Admissibility requirements and their implications  
The admissibility of cases submitted to the African Court is governed by article 6 of 
the African Court Protocol: 
“1. The Court, when deciding on the admissibility of a case instituted under article 
5(3) of this Protocol, may request the opinion of the Commission which shall give it 
as soon as possible. 
2. The Court shall rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account the 
provisions of article 56 of the Charter. 
3. The Court may consider cases or transfer them to the Commission.” 
Article 6(2) requires the Court to consider article 56 of the African Charter, which 
establishes admissibility requirements. The formulation of article 6(2), particularly the 
phrase “take into account”, is flexible in that it allows the Court to depart from the strict 
application of all requirements enshrined in article 56 of the African Charter. According 
to Naldi and Magliveras, these provisions do not oblige the African Court, but rather 
require it, to consider admissibility requirements.442 Mugwanya also notes that article 
6(2) indicates that the Court is not bound to strictly apply article 56’s admissibility 
requirements.443 The flexibility of article 6(2) of the African Court Protocol is significant 
for interpreting socio-economic rights, as it allows the Court to interpret admissibility 
requirements for the effective protection of socio-economic rights. As Mugwanya argues, 
																																																								
439 Art 30(f). 
440 Arts 29(1)(a)-(c) and 30(a)-(f). 
441 Wachira & Ayinla (2006) African Human Rights Law Journal 490. 
442 Naldi & Magliveras (1998) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 441. 
443 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 330. See also Viljoen International Human Rights Law 441. 
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the African Court is given wide latitude to deliberately, for the sake of justice, overlook 
some admissibility requirements.444  
Moreover, it should be noted that article 8 of the African Court Protocol allows the 
Court, through its Rules of Procedure, to elaborate the conditions on which it should 
consider cases submitted before it.445 This provision is significant as it allows the African 
Court to consider various admissibility requirements flexibly.446 Article 33 of the African 
Court Protocol also allows the Court to draw up its own Rules that determine the 
procedures to apply the African Charter. Based on these provisions, the African Court 
developed the African Court Rules that elaborate admissibility requirements. 447 
According to Rule 40 of the African Court Rules, the Court is required to apply all the 
admissibility requirements in article 56.  
Scholars criticise the formulation of Rule 40 of the African Court Rules. For example, 
Viljoen argues that by strictly following the wording of article 56, Rule 40 restricts the 
flexibility allowed for by article 6 of the African Court Protocol.448 The Rules of the 
African Court should uphold the object and purpose to protect human rights, which the 
African Court is charged with. The effective interpretation is that broader protection 
should be opted for rather than the restriction offered by Rule 40. In this regard, 
Udombana argues that: 
“The rules of the system should be broad, flexible and creative so that the purposes 
of the Banjul Charter will not be defeated… Accordingly, the Court should adopt an 
evolutionary approach to the interpretation of the Banjul Charter and other related 
instruments.”449 
The foregoing discussion demonstrated that pursuant to article 6(2) of the African 
Court Protocol, the African Court can flexibly determine the admissibility of cases before 
it.  
																																																								
444 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 330. See also Naldi & Magliveras (1998) Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 440-441. 
445 Art 8 of the African Court Protocol provides: 
“The Rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions under which the Court shall 
consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind the complementarity between the Commission and the 
Court.” 
446 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 330. 
447 Rule 40 of the African Court Rules. 
448 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 441. 
449 Udombana (2000) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 106. 
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4 4 4 African Court’s mandate to issue provisional measures 
The African Court Protocol empowers the African Court to order provisional 
measures through article 27(2): 
“In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable 
harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary.” 
Like the African Commission’s mandate to issue provisional measures, the Court’s 
mandate furthers the object and purpose of the African Charter. Provisional measures 
protect individuals’ socio-economic rights from being irreparably harmed as Trindade J 
held in Urso Branco.450 As discussed above,451 provisional measures in international 
human rights law fulfil protective and preventative roles.452 The Inter-American Court 
stated in Panama that the protective role aims to avoid irreversible harm.453  The 
preventive function preserves individuals’ rights until the determination of the case.454  
Through their preventive role, provisional remedies render socio-economic rights 
meaningful, as they help to preclude threats of violations of such rights until the case is 
finally determined. Furthermore, provisional measures can help to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction by allowing it to issue temporary 
orders in order to avoid violations of the rights under consideration. The provisional 
measures, in a preventive capacity, can also assist the African Court to govern a State’s 
compliance with its orders. The Inter-American Court held in El Rodeo that the objective 
of provisional measures in their preventive sense is to ensure the integrity and 
effectiveness of decisions issued by supervisory organs.455 In this regard, provisional 
measures prevent individuals’ rights from being violated and thus render the final 
decision meaningful.456 Moreover, the court stated that provisional measures in the 
preventive form enable States to comply with the final decision issued by supervisory 
organs.457 
The formulation of article 27(2) of the African Court Protocol is broad as it enables 
the Court to issue provisional measures on its own motion. Rule 51(1) of the African 																																																								
450 Urso Branco para 11. 
451 See part 4 3 5 above. 
452 Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 252. 
453 Panama “considering” para 3. 
454 Para 3. 
455 El Rodeo “considering” para 7.  
456 Para 7.  
457 Para 7.  
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Court Rules also provides for this. In the Libya case, the African Court reiterated its 
mandate to issue provisional measures on its own motion.458 This power is significant for 
protecting socio-economic rights, as it enables the Court to protect such rights in 
circumstances where it finds a rights violation that needs urgent intervention. In this way, 
it furthers the African Charter’s object and purpose to protect human rights.  
Writing on the power of the Inter-American Commission to issue provisional 
measures without a case being submitted before it, Pascualucci argues that such 
mandate embraces the object and purpose of the American Convention, which is to 
protect individuals’ rights.459 Restricting a supervisory organ from issuing provisional 
measures on its own motion is dangerous for the protection of human rights, as it limits 
the applications of such measures in the most urgent cases involving violations.460 This 
protective aspect of provisional measures was stated by the Inter-American Court in 
Natera Balboa: 
“In view of the protective nature of provisional measures, it is possible to… order 
them even when there is not a contentious case as such within the Inter-American 
System, in situations that, prima facie, may result in a grave and urgent infringement 
of human rights. For this, an assessment of the problem presented, the effectiveness 
of the state’s actions regarding the situation described, and the degree of lack of 
protection that fall upon the people over which the measures are requested if they 
are not adopted shall be assessed.”461 
The African Court has issued provisional measures in its jurisprudence. In The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya (‘The 
Republic of Kenya’), 462  the African Court was satisfied that there was a risk of 
irreparable harm to the Ogiek Community regarding their socio-economic rights to 
property and development.463 The African Court issued provisional measures pursuant 
to article 27(2) of the African Court Protocol.464 In African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Libya (‘Libya’) the African Court required the respondent State to 
refrain from actions that would cause loss of life or the physical integrity of persons, 
																																																								
458 Libya para 10. 
459 Pascualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 257. 
460 257. 
461 Natera Balboa (Venezuela) Provisional Measures, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1 February 
2010) “considering” para 8. 
462 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012. 
463 Para 20. 
464 Paras 21-25. 
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which can violate the provisions of the African Charter. 465  Moreover, in African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya (‘Libyan Provisional Measures’) the 
African Court, having been satisfied that the conditions of extremity and urgency were 
met, ordered the respondent State to refrain from judicial proceedings, investigations, or 
detention that could cause irreparable damage to the detainee.466 
Harrington criticises the African Court Protocol in relation to the legal status of 
provisional measures issued by the African Court. According to her, the African Court 
Protocol does not expressly indicate whether States are bound by provisional measures 
or not.467  Writing on the binding nature of the provisional measures of the Court, 
Mugwanya argues that it should explicitly state in its jurisprudence that provisional 
measures are binding. According to Mugwanya, in this respect, the African Court can 
draw inspiration from the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence.468  
Since the aim of provisional measures is to protect individuals’ rights, States are 
required to respect and implement provisional measures issued by the African Court. 
Provisional measures of the Court have a legal binding effect as the phrase “shall adopt” 
in article 27(2) demonstrates.469 Moreover, article 28(2) of the African Court Protocol, 
relating to judgements of the African Court, states that “the judgment of the Court 
decided by majority shall be final and not subject to appeal.” This clause is broad in that 
it does not define the term “judgment”. This broad formulation allows the inclusion of 
orders, relating to provisional measures issued by the African Court, as authoritative 
judgments. Writing on the provisional measures of the Inter-American Court, 
Pascualucci argues that the requirement in article 67 of the American Convention, 
namely that a judgment of the Inter-American Court is final and not subject to appeal, 
extends to orders of provisional measures.470 
Like the African Court, the African Court of Justice, when in operation will also have a 
mandate to issue provisional measures “on its own motion” or on the application of 
																																																								
465 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application No. 004/2011 para 25. 
466 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application No. 002/2013. 
467 Harrington “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 325. 
468 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 334. 
469 334. 
470 Pascualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 253. 
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parties for purposes of preserving their rights pending the final determination of the 
case.471  
4 4 5 Judgment  
The African Court has the mandate to render judgment after its deliberations. This 
mandate is provided for in article 28(1) of the African Court Protocol:  
“The Court shall render its judgment within ninety (90) days of having completed its 
deliberations.” 
The provisions on judgment are significant in that they establish the time when the 
African Court should deliver its judgment. The African Court Protocol helps to avoid 
unnecessary delays after hearing the case. Nmehielle notes that the time limit in article 
28(1) is meant to preclude delays by the Court.472 Furthermore, according to article 
28(2), the decision of the African Court is final. These provisions imply that the decisions 
of the African Court are binding in that States are obliged to enforce them.473  In 
elaborating these provisions, the African Court states in its Rules of Procedure that the 
judgement of the Court shall be final and binding on the parties.474 This interpretation is 
significant for interpreting socio-economic rights, as Member States will be required to 
comply and implement the African Court’s decisions relating to socio-economic rights 
violations. It should be noted that, under article 30 of the African Court Protocol, Member 
States commit themselves to comply with the decisions of the African Court and 
guarantee to execute them.475 
Moreover, article 28(6) of the African Court Protocol requires the African Court to 
state the reasons for its judgment. This is important in order to show the parties the legal 
grounds on which the African Court based its decision. The legal reasoning of the Court 
also helps to elaborate the scope and content of the socio-economic rights being 
interpreted. In turn, this helps to develop a consistent and well-reasoned jurisprudence 
of the African Court, which is critical for its legitimacy and credibility. The substantive 
legal reasoning of the African Court helps to identify the relevant national, regional, and 																																																								
471 Art 35(1)-(2) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
472 Nmehielle The African Human Rights System 301. 
473 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 414. 
474 Rule 61(4)-(5) of the African Court Rules. 
475 Art 30 of the African Court Protocol provides: 
“The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they 
are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution.” 
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international law it has taken into account in developing the content of socio-economic 
rights and remedial orders. In his critique on the African Commission’s weak legal 
reasoning, Mbazira argues that the African Commission’s inadequacy is based on its 
failure to justify its findings by relevant international human rights instruments.476 
 Like the African Court, the African Court of Justice also has jurisdiction to issue “its 
judgment within ninety (90) days” after its deliberations.477 Similarly, the judgment of the 
African Court of Justice should state legal reasoning for its findings.478 According to 
article 46(1)-(2) of the African Court of Justice Protocol, the judgment of the African 
Court of Justice shall be final and binding. 
4 4 6 Remedies and their enforcement 
Article 27(1) of the African Court Protocol governs the Court’s mandate to remedy 
individual rights violations in the African Charter: 
“If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ rights, it shall 
make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair 
compensation or reparation.” 
Scholars have criticised article 27(1) as being restrictive. Naldi and Magliveras, for 
instance, compare it with article 63(1) of the Inter-American Convention. According to 
them, the provisions are restrictive as they do not expressly enable the Court to order a 
respondent State to stop practices that violate human rights.479  
The fact that the African Court Protocol is silent on the power of the Court to order 
States to stop human rights abuses does not necessarily mean that the Court lacks such 
a mandate. The term “appropriate” in article 27(1) is broad and enables the African 
Court to issue a wide range of remedies to victims of socio-economic rights violations. 
This provision gives the Court a broad and flexible power to order appropriate 
remedies.480 Writing on article 26(1) of the draft African Court Protocol, which is similar 
to article 27(1) of the African Court Protocol, Shelton notes that this provision is broader 
compared to the remedial provisions of other supervisory organs.481 These remedies 																																																								
476 Mbazira (2006) African Human Rights Law Journal 344. 
477 Art 43(1) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
478 Art 43(2). 
479 Naldi & Magliveras (1998) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 450. 
480 See also TM Antkowiak “Remedial approaches to human rights violations: The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and beyond” (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 351 414. 
481 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 226. 
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may include the requirement that States should stop practices of socio-economic rights 
violations. Viljoen notes that the remedial mandate of the African Court is broad in that it 
avails the Court with the “discretion to choose from an open-ended list of ‘appropriate 
remedies’”.482 Furthermore, the phrase “including the payment of fair compensation or 
reparation” also demonstrates that the list is not exhaustive in the sense that other 
remedial measures or forms of remedies can be applied. Commenting on article 27(1) of 
the African Court Protocol, Mugwanya argues that the remedial power of the African 
Court in article 27(1) is broad in two senses. Firstly, it allows the African Court to order 
appropriate remedies to redress specific violations. Secondly, it enables the Court to 
order a change of legislation or practices that violate human rights.483 
Yeshanew rightly argues that the general formulation allows the African Court to 
order compensatory orders, as well as remedies that can ensure social reform.484 
Writing on the African Commission’s remedial mandate, Naldi argues that remedies 
broadly include orders for reparations, which entail restitution, rehabilitation, and the 
payment of compensation.485 The Inter-American Court defines the term “reparations” as 
“measures that are intended to eliminate the effects” of a violation. The nature and 
amount of reparations depends on the “damage done both at the material and moral 
values” are not meant to “enrich or impoverish the victim or his heirs”.486 These forms of 
reparations can be applied by the African Court in its remedies jurisprudence. It should 
be noted that, in elaborating its jurisdiction to issue remedies in article 27(1), the African 
Court uses the term “reparations” in its Rules of Procedure in the sense that remedies 
take the form of reparations. Rule 34(5) of the African Court provides that:  
“Any applicant who on his/her own behalf or on behalf of the victim wishes to be 
granted reparation pursuant to article 27(1) of the Protocol shall include the request 
for the reparation in the application in accordance with sub-rule 4 above. The amount 
of the reparation and the evidence relating thereto may be submitted subsequently 
within the time limit set by the Court.” 
Remedies aim to repair the damage caused by violations and, if possible, to restore 
the victim to the position he or she was before the violation. The Inter-American Court 
held in Ituango Massacres v Colombia (‘Ituango’) that:  																																																								
482 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 445. 
483 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 333. 
484 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 201. 
485 Naldi (2001) Leiden Journal of International Law 681. 
486 Guatemala para 34. See also La Cantuta v Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No 162 (29 November 2006) para 202.  
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“The State must provide necessary and sufficient resources to ensure that the 
victims of forced displacement may resettle in similar conditions to those they had 
before... in a place they freely and voluntarily choose.”487  
Moreover, in La Cantuta, the Inter-American Court held that the requirement to 
redress human rights violations requires States to fully restore the victims to the position 
they were in before the violations. In circumstances where full restitution is impossible 
the supervisory organ should order alternative remedies, such as compensation to 
effectively remedy the violations.488 
The broad formulation of article 27(1) allows the African Court to order a wide-range 
of remedies, such as restitution, rehabilitation, orders to stop practices of human rights 
violations, and compensation. Mugwanya argues that, in developing its remedies 
jurisprudence, the African Court should draw inspiration from other international human 
rights bodies such as the Inter-American Court, which applies these forms of remedies. 
According to him, the broad nature of article 27(1) enables the African Court to apply 
forms of remedies applied in other jurisdictions.489 According to Viljoen, the formulation 
of article 27(1) of the African Court Protocol is similar to that of article 63(1) of the Inter-
American Convention.490 
The jurisdiction of the African Court to issue remedies is significant for the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights, as it furthers the African Charter’s object and 
purpose to protect such rights. Moreover, the mandate of the African Court to issue 
remedies is significant, as it helps States to redress socio-economic rights violations 
through their domestic legal and administrative systems. As Shelton notes, the existence 
of remedies for violations implies that States responsible for violations have an 
obligation to redress them. The supervisory organ’s role is to ensure that a State fulfils 
this obligation.491 
The African Court of Justice has a similar remedial mandate. According to article 45 
of the African Court of Justice Protocol, this Court can order “any appropriate measures” 
to remedy  human rights violations, including fair compensation. These provisions are 
similarly broad to the manner elaborated on in this part above regarding the remedial 
mandate of the African Court. 																																																								
487 Ituango Massacres v Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No 148 (1 July 2006) para 404. 
488 La Cantuta para 201. 
489 Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa 333. 
490 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 445. 
491 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law 114. 
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The enforcement of the African Court’s remedial decisions is governed by the article 
30 of the African Court Protocol. According to article 30, States are required to comply 
with the African Court’s judgments within the time limits stipulated by the Court and to 
“guarantee its execution”. This provision places an obligation on States Parties to 
enforce remedial orders issued by the African Court.492 The States’ compliance with the 
African Court’s decisions renders the protected socio-economic rights practical and 
effective. Writing on the Inter-American context, Pasqualucci notes that the effectiveness 
of the Inter-American Court’s decisions and remedies depends on States’ enforcement. 
Non-enforcement by States can render decisions and human rights in the Inter-
American Convention ineffective. 493  The ECHR held in Verein gegen Tierfabriken 
Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland (No 2) (‘VgT’) that States found responsible for human 
rights violations have an obligation to enforce the decisions of the ECHR regarding 
those violations.494 
The African Court of Justice Protocol requires States to comply with its remedial 
decisions within the time prescribed by the African Court of Justice.495 In the case of a 
State’s failure to comply, the Court is mandated to refer the matter to the AHSG, which 
has the mandate to impose sanctions in terms of article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act.496 
4 5 Conclusion  
The African Charter, the African Court Protocol, and the African Court of Justice 
Protocol grant supervisory organs a broad interpretive mandate that enables them to 
interpret socio-economic rights and effectively remedy violations. The interpretive 
mandate of supervisory organs involves various jurisdictional aspects. These aspects 
include the locus standi of victims of socio-economic rights violations or their 
representatives; admissibility requirements; the mandate to issue provisional measures; 
the legal status of the decisions; and the mandate to issue remedies and monitor their 
enforcement.  
Apart from the mandate to determine communications from individuals, the African 
Commission has the mandate to determine communications submitted by individuals or 
NGOs in the public interest. The mandate over actio popularis is significant for 																																																								
492 Wachira & Ayinla (2006) African Human Rights Law Journal 488. 
493 Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court 303. 
494 Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland (No 2) (App No 32772/02 (ECHR, 30 June 
2009) para 85. 
495 Art 46(3) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
496 Art 46(4)-(5). 
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interpreting socio-economic rights as it enables the African Commission to determine 
communications relating to socio-economic rights violations committed against the 
public. The African Charter broadly provides the Commission with the mandate to issue 
provisional measures and remedies, as well as the mandate to follow-up on States’ 
compliance with issued remedies. A generous reading of the Charter as a whole, 
through a teleological approach to interpretation, demonstrates that it grants the African 
Commission such powers. This generous reading is significant, as it furthers the African 
Charter’s object and purpose of protecting socio-economic rights.  
The requirement that complainants of socio-economic rights violations should first 
exhaust local remedies is important, as it enables domestic legal and administrative 
systems to remedy violations. However, provisions governing such a requirement should 
be interpreted flexibly to help complainants who, for various reasons, such remedies are 
not available, adequate, or efficient. This flexibility assists complainants in accessing the 
African Commission for redress of their socio-economic rights violations and to ensure 
effective protection. The Commission’s decisions in the form of recommendations are 
legally binding and enforceable. The object and purpose of these recommendations 
require that States implement them to ensure the effective protection of socio-economic 
rights. Similarly, the mandate to safeguard socio-economic rights granted in the African 
Charter renders the African Commission capable of issuing enforceable 
recommendations. 
Provisions regarding the contentious mandate of the African Court should be 
interpreted in a manner that renders them effective. The teleological approach, through 
the principle of effectiveness, is an appropriate means to render contentious mandate 
provisions effective and practical. This effective interpretation enables the Court to 
interpret and apply the African Charter and other treaties, which acknowledge the 
competence of the African Court, as well as the protocols that supplement the African 
Charter. It also enables the Court to consider other relevant human rights treaties for 
guidance when interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. The use of 
other relevant human rights instruments guarantees external consistency with these 
instruments and bodies, which are imperative in interpreting the socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter. 
The African Court Protocol grants the African Court a mandate to hear individual 
complainants broadly, both directly and indirectly. Direct access by individuals and 
NGOs is predicated on the condition that a declaration is made by a State that 
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acknowledges the competence of the African Court to determine cases submitted by 
individuals and NGOs. Regarding indirect access, the African Court has a mandate to 
consider, as a party and a witness, an individual whose case is submitted by the African 
Commission or a State. The argument that an individual cannot appear before the 
African Court as a party should be avoided. The teleological approach to interpretation 
enables the African Court to interpret provisions relating to individual access broadly in a 
manner that enables them to appear as parties even in cases that are submitted by the 
African Commission or a State. 
Like the African Court Protocol, the interpretive provisions of the African Court of 
Justice Protocol grant the African Court of Justice a broad mandate to interpret socio-
economic rights and remedy their violations. When it enters into force, the African Court 
of Justice will have a mandate to determine cases submitted by individuals directly. It will 
also have a mandate to issue provisional measures, binding judgments and remedial 
orders. This understanding of the mandate of the African Court of Justice is significant 
for the effective protection of socio-economic rights. The following chapter analyses and 
evaluates the jurisprudence of the African Commission. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysing and evaluating the jurisprudence of supervisory organs  
5 1 Introduction 
The analysis in chapter two and four demonstrated two significant aspects relevant 
for the analysis of socio-economic rights’ jurisprudence of the supervisory organs of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.1 Chapter two2 identified the teleological 
approach as the most appropriate interpretive methodology for interpreting the 
normative scope and content of socio-economic rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Charter’).3 It also identified that the approach is relevant 
for elaborating the nature of States’ obligations imposed by these rights.4 Chapter four 
demonstrated that the African Charter grants the supervisory organs with a broad 
interpretive mandate that enables such organs to interpret all the rights in the African 
Charter in a way that develops their effective normative scope and content.5 
The supervisory organs’ interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter is vital in developing their normative scope and content. Writing on the lack of a 
definition of the right to property in various human rights instruments Krause argues that 
the meaning and content of this right depends on its interpretation by the supervisory 
bodies.6 Ssenyonjo notes that the formulation of the socio-economic rights provisions 
and a clear understanding of the obligations they impose require interpretation by the 
supervisory bodies.7 Odinkalu argued earlier that the meaningful development of the 																																																								
1 The supervisory organs of the African Charter in the context of this dissertation include the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Since the African Court of Justice has not entered into force, 
this dissertation will analyse the implications of the provisions relating to its interpretive and remedial 
mandate in the discussion of the African Court. 
2 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 4, and 2 5. 
3 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982) 
was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21October 1986. 
4 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 4 and 2 5. 
5 See chapter four. 
6 C Krause “The right to property” in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 191 198. 
7 M Ssenyonjo “Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter” in M Ssenyonjo (ed) The 
African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (2012) 55 59-60. It should also be noted that the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights 
in African States varies. Some States such as South Africa, Kenya, Angola and Mozambique protect these 
rights explicitly in their constitutions. Other States such as Senegal, Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Cameroon protect some of these rights explicitly, and include other socio-economic rights implicitly as 
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content of socio-economic rights in the African Charter depends on the interpretative 
mechanisms of the African Charter.8 
The interpretation of socio-economic rights by the supervisory organs, in a manner 
that develops their scope and content, can be effected through various mechanisms. 
The mechanisms include resolutions, declarations on socio-economic rights,9 principles 
and guidelines on the implementation of socio-economic rights,10 and communications 
procedures. Writing on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African 
Commission’) Mugwanya posits that all these mechanisms have helped the African 
Commission to develop the normative content of human rights in the African Charter.11 
As mentioned in chapter four, this dissertation focuses on non-state communications.12 
This chapter therefore, focuses only on the analysis and evaluation of the jurisprudence 
developed through non-state communications. The objective of this chapter is to analyse 																																																																																																																																																																																			
directive principles of State policy. See S Liebenberg “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in South Africa” in DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 305  305; GO 
Odongo & GM Musila “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under 
Kenya’s 2010 Constitution” in DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 338 346; AC Mandlate, 
J Nhampossa, & DM Chirwa “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Lusophone Legal Systems: Angola and Mozambique” in DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 
372 372; F Diallo “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Francophone 
Legal Systems: Senegal” in DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 396 396-397; SA Yeshanew 
“Ethiopia’s Hybrid Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in DM Chirwa & L 
Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and 
National Perspectives (2016) 423 426; C Mbazira “Uganda’s Hybrid Constitutional Protection of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 447 448; PA Atupare “Ghana’s 
Hybrid Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) 
The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National 
Perspectives (2016) 476 477; ES Nwauche “Indirect Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Nigeria” DM Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 501 501; and AN Akonumbo 
“Indirect Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Cameroon” DM Chirwa & L 
Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and 
National Perspectives (2016) 527 527. 
8 Odinkalu “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights” in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
System in Practice 1986-2000 (2002) 178 215. 
9 See Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, 2004. 
10 The Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted on 24 October 2011. 
11 GW Mugwanya Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human 
Rights System (2003) 265. 
12 See chapter four, part 4 3 1. 
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and evaluate the African Charter supervisory organs’ socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence. The strengths and weaknesses of the supervisory organs’ decisions and 
their implications for the development of the normative content of socio-economic rights 
will be considered. The chapter applies the teleological approach and methodology for 
its application as an evaluative paradigm.13  
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Court’), decided on merits 
its first socio-economic rights case a few days after the submission of this dissertation 
for examination but before the final submission. Thus, the discussion in this chapter 
mainly focuses on the jurisprudence of the African Commission and briefly analyses the 
recently decided case of the African Court in a postscript to the dissertation. Finally, the 
chapter will consider the implications of the African Commission’s jurisprudence for the 
African Court and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (‘African Court of 
Justice’). 
5 2 Evolution of the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
The African Commission is established under the provisions of article 30 of the 
African Charter.14 It was officially inaugurated on 2 November 1987 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.15 The Headquarters of the African Commission is in The Gambia however, it 
sits in different countries twice a year, mainly between March and April as well as 
October and November.16 The African Commission consists of eleven Commissioners 
who are chosen from amongst highly reputable Africans with a high degree of morality 
and integrity.17 The Commissioners should also be competent in human rights matters.18 
Furthermore, chapter four also showed that the African Commission has the legal 
mandate to determine State and non-state communications.19 Through these two forms 
																																																								
13 The teleological approach as an evaluative paradigm is analysed in part 5 3 below. 
14 See chapter four, part 4 2. 
15 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “History” (2016) African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights <http://www.achpr.org/about/history> (accessed 12-09-2016). 
16 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “History” (2016) African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. See also CA Odinkalu & C Christensen “The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The development of its non-state communication procedures” (1998) 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly 235 236. 
17 Art 31(1) of the African Charter. 
18 Art 31(1). 
19 See chapter four, part 4 3 1. 
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of communication procedure, the African Commission has developed valuable human 
rights jurisprudence since 1989.20  
The African Commission’s development of the socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
started in 1995 when it decided on merits its first socio-economic rights 
communication.21 From 1995 to date there has been a growing body of socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence by the African Commission. At the time of writing, the latest socio-
economic rights communication was decided in 2013,22 and the African Commission has 
already decided seventeen socio-economic rights communications on merits.23 
As shown below24 the African Commission’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence has 
been gradually developing in terms of the normative scope and content of socio-
economic rights and their related obligations. The jurisprudence between 1995 and 2000 
did not sufficiently develop the scope and content of the relevant socio-economic rights 
and their concomitant obligations. However, a more detailed elaboration of the scope 
and content of socio-economic rights and the obligations they impose on States is noted 
in the jurisprudence since 2001. This chapter takes stock of the development of the 																																																								
20 M Ssenyonjo “The development of economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2015) 4 
International Human Rights Law Review 147 158. 
21 Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire Communications Nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (2000) AHRL 
74 (ACHPR). 
22 Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo Communication No 286/2004. 
23 Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire Communications Nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (2000) AHRLR 
74 (ACHPR); Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v Cameroon Communication no. 39/90 (2000) AHRLR 57 
(ACHPR 1997); Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola Communication no. 159/96 (2000) 
AHRLR 18 (ACHPR 1997); International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria Communication nos. 
137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1999); Malawi African Association v 
Mauritania Communications Nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 & 210/98 (2000) AHRLR 149 
(ACHPR 2000); Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria Communication Nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96 
(2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998); John K. Modise v Botswana Communication No 97/93 (2000) AHRLR 
30 (ACHPR 2000); Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication No 
156/96, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001); Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication No 
241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003); Prince v South Africa Communication No 255/2002 (2004) 
AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004); Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Human Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) v Sudan Communications No 279/03-296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009); Institute for 
Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola Communication No 292/2004 (2008) AHRLR 43 
(ACHPR 2008); INTERIGHTS, Institute for Development and Human Rights in Africa, and Association 
Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Mauritania Communication No 373/09 (2010) AHRLR 90 (ACHPR 
2010); Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Republic of 
Zimbabwe Communication No 284/03 (2009) AHRLR 235 (ACHPR 2009); Mouvement Ivorien Droits de 
l’Homme (MIDH) v Cote d’Ivoire Communication No 262/02 (2008); Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v 
Cameroon Communication no. 266/03 (2009) AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009); Centre for the Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v 
Kenya Communication No 276/2003 (2009) AHLRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009); and Dino Noca v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Communication no. 286/2004 (2012). 
24 See parts 5 4 and 5 5 below. 
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jurisprudence of both categories. It does so by analysing and evaluating some key 
communications of the African Commission decided since 1995. The following part 
identifies and discusses the paradigm that is used in this chapter to evaluate the 
jurisprudence.  
5 3 Evaluative criteria derived from the teleological methodology 
Chapter two developed the teleological approach as an appropriate approach for 
interpreting socio-economic rights in the African Charter.25 The chapter identified that 
this approach to interpretation potentially applies object and purpose of the treaty to 
generate the meaning, scope and content of the provisions of a treaty. The chapter 
identified that the potential of the teleological approach is based on the fact that, through 
identifying the object and purpose of a treaty, a supervisory organ may be able to apply 
a variety of interpretative tools to its provisions. Significantly, the chapter identified key 
tenets of the teleological approach that the supervisory organs may engage to interpret 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. The identified tenets include: the object 
and purpose of the African Charter; the text of the African Charter as a whole; 
preparatory work of the African Charter; other relevant international, regional, and 
national laws and jurisprudence; and the principle of effectiveness. 
As a teleological tenet “the text of the African Charter as a whole” encompasses the 
preamble to the African Charter that includes interpretative tools such as the values of 
equality, dignity, freedom, and justice; the principle of interdependence of the rights, and 
the notion of African philosophy. Furthermore, the text of the African Charter as a whole 
includes operational provisions including general obligations in article 1 and the right to 
non-discrimination in article 2. It also includes socio-economic rights’ provisions, 
provisions relating to States’ obligations and other relevant provisions. All these 
elements were identified in chapter two as relevant for interpreting socio-economic 
rights.26 These tenets of the teleological approach to interpretation are useful in the 
interpretative process for developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter, expanding the scope of socio-economic rights to include derived 
rights, explaining the nature of States’ obligations imposed by these rights, and 
identifying relevant remedial orders to be issued by the supervisory organs. The 
effective interpretation of socio-economic rights in a manner that improves the socio-																																																								
25 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
26 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5. 
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economic conditions of individuals and groups in Africa depends on the development of 
these aspects.  
Significantly, chapter two developed the methodology for the application of the 
teleological approach to interpretation. 27  The methodology aims at guiding the 
supervisory organs to apply the tenets of this approach for the effective interpretation of 
the socio-economic rights coherently. The coherent application of the teleological 
approach is vital for the furtherance of the object and purpose of the African Charter 
relating to socio-economic rights.  
This chapter uses the teleological methodology developed in chapter two as a 
paradigm to evaluate the jurisprudence of the African Commission. This part outlines the 
manner in which this evaluative paradigm is applied. It asks whether the African 
Commission applies the teleological approach in its jurisprudence. If the answer is to the 
affirmative, it evaluates the nature of the findings of the African Commission regarding 
the scope and content of the socio-economic rights and their related obligations. 
Particularly, it evaluates whether the African Commission sequentially applies the 
identified tenets in developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights, in 
developing the derived rights, in elaborating the nature of States’ obligations, and in 
issuing the remedial recommendations. Thus, guiding questions in the evaluative 
process will be: has the African Commission applied the teleological approach? Does 
the application correspond with the methodology? What are the implications? The aim of 
the evaluation is to identify aspects of the socio-economic rights jurisprudence that 
correspond with the teleological approach and those that do not. At the end of the 
evaluation the implications for the socio-economic rights jurisprudence will be 
considered. However, it is important to analyse the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission before evaluating it. The following part analyses the jurisprudence of the 
African Commission.28 
																																																								
27 See chapter two, part 2 5. 
28 Considering the fact that some of the communications determined by the African Commission involve 
similar allegations of socio-economic rights and the reasoning of the African Commission in these 
communications has been similar, this chapter analyses four communications in the limited phase and five 
communications in the expansive phase. However, the communications that are not analysed in this 
chapter will be referred to, for the purposes of showing similarities or differences regarding the findings 
and reasoning of the African Commission. The communications analysed in the limited phase include Free 
Legal Assistance Group v Zaire Communications Nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (2000) AHRLR 74 
(ACHPR 1995); Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v Cameroon Communication No 39/90 (2000) AHRLR 57 
(ACHPR 1997); Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola Communication No 159/96 (2000) 
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5 4 Jurisprudence of the African Commission: Analysis  
5 4 1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter three the African Charter recognises a wide range of socio-
economic rights. 29  Chapter four demonstrated the broad interpretive and remedial 
mandate vested on the African Commission by the African Charter to interpret socio-
economic rights in its jurisprudence. As demonstrated above, since its inauguration in 
1987 the African Commission has developed a valuable jurisprudence regarding socio-
economic rights.30 This jurisprudence is analysed in this chapter. The analysis focuses 
on the socio-economic rights’ violations alleged by the complainants, the findings of the 
African Commission and its reasoning to the findings.  
The jurisprudence of the African Commission can be divided in two phases. The first 
phase consists of communications in which there was a limited development of the 
normative scope and content of socio-economic rights by the African Commission. This 
phase (‘the limited phase’) includes all communications handed down prior to the African 
Commission’s decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria 
(‘SERAC’)31 in 2001. The second phase includes communications in which the African 
Commission developed the scope and content of socio-economic rights more 
expansively and through better reasoning. The latter phase (‘the expansive phase’) 
includes all communications after the SERAC decision. The following part analyses the 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence in the limited phase. 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
AHRLR 18 (ACHPR 1997); International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria Communication Nos 
137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1999). The communications that are 
analysed in the expansive phase include: Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria 
Communication No  156/96, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001); Purohit and Moore v The Gambia 
Communication No 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003); Sudan Human Rights Organisation & 
Centre on Human Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan Communications No 279/03-296/05 (2009) 
AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009); Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon Communication No 266/03 (2009) 
AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009); Centre for the Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication No 276/2003 (2009) 
AHLRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009). 
29 See chapter, part 3 3 4. 
30 Earlier scholarship notes that only a few socio-economic rights communications were brought before the 
African Commission. According to them, the African Commission’s early jurisprudence dealt mainly with 
civil and political rights rather than socio-economic rights. See M Ssenyonjo “Analysing the economic, 
social and cultural rights jurisprudence of the African Commission: 30 years since the adoption of the 
African Charter” (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 358 360. 
31 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication no. 155/96 (2001) 
AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
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5 4 2 The limited phase: An analysis 
5 4 2 1 Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire 
In Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire (‘Free Legal Assistance’) 32  the African 
Commission had to decide whether the confiscation of church property, denying the 
victims access to education, mismanagement of public finances, failure to provide basic 
services, shortages of medicine, as well as the closure of universities and secondary 
schools by the respondent State violated the rights to health and education as set out in 
articles 16 and 17 of the African Charter.33  
Regarding the right to health the African Commission stated that article 16 of the 
African Charter recognises the right of every individual to enjoy “the best attainable state 
of physical and mental health”.34 It stated further that the failure of the respondent State 
to provide basic services including safe drinking water and electricity, as well as a lack of 
medicine, amounts to a violation of article 16 of the African Charter.35 On the right to 
education, the African Commission pointed out that article 17 of the African Charter 
recognises the right to education. The African Commission went on to decide that the 
closure of institutions of learning such as universities and secondary schools constitutes 
a violation of article 17.36 The African Commission, without any legal reasoning, went on 
to state that the facts of the communication amount to serious and massive violations of 
article 16 and 17 of the African Charter.37 Having found the respondent State to be in 
violation of articles 16 and 17 of the African Charter, the African Commission issued 
undetailed declaratory remedies.38 It merely held that the facts in Free Legal Assistance 
amount to serious and massive violation of articles 16 and 17 of the African Charter.39 
The African Commission did not elaborate on the nature and scope of States’ 
obligations that the rights to health and education impose on them. It remained unclear 
as to what the African Charter obliges the Member States to do to give effect to these 
rights. The African Commission issued declaratory remedies, which lack specificity and 
																																																								
32 Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire Communications Nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (2000) AHRLR 
74 (ACHPR 1995). 
33 Paras 3-4. 
34 Para 47. 
35 Para 47. 
36 Para 48 
37 Para 49. 
38 Para 49. 
39 Para 49. 
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detail. As mentioned in chapter four these remedies are inadequate to redress the 
violations of the socio-economic rights effectively.40 
5 4 2 2 Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v Cameroon 
In Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v Cameroon (‘Mazou’),41 the African Commission 
was called upon to decide on a communication regarding the right to work in article 15 of 
the African Charter. The complainant alleged that the respondent State’s military tribunal 
sentenced the victim to five years imprisonment for the offence of hiding his brother who 
was alleged to have committed the offence of an attempted coup de tat. It was further 
alleged that the respondent State failed to reinstate the victim in his magisterial position 
after his release from prison. Thus, the complainant alleged a violation of the right to 
work contained in article 15 of the African Charter.42 
The African Commission merely noted that the provisions of article 15 of the African 
Charter protect the right to work “under equitable and satisfactory conditions”.43 It went 
on to state that the respondent State’s failure to reinstate the victim in his position as a 
magistrate, while other people who were condemned of a similar offence had been re-
instated, was a violation of article 15 of the African Charter.44  
In this communication, the African Commission did not elaborate on the scope and 
content of the right to work. It relied exclusively on the narrow and literal textual 
approach to interpret the provisions of article 15 of the African Charter. The broad 
formulation of article 15 does not provide sufficient details regarding the scope and 
content of the right to work. Moreover, the African Commission did not attempt to 
describe the nature and scope of States’ obligations imposed by this right. It merely 
found the respondent State in violation of article 15 of the African Charter and 
proceeded to issue broad declaratory remedies. 45  It then recommended that the 
respondent State should draw all the “necessary legal conclusions” to reinstate the 
victim. It did not elaborate upon these “necessary legal conclusions” that the respondent 
State was required to take. It did not apply any legal reasoning for its remedial findings. 
																																																								
40 See chapter four, part 4 3 3 1. 
41 Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v Cameroon Communication No 39/90 (2000) AHRLR 57 (ACHPR 
1997). 
42 Mazou paras 1-2. 
43 Para 22. 
44 Para 29. 
45 Para 30. 
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5 4 2 3 Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola 
In Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola (‘Union Interafricaine’)46 the 
complainants brought the communication on behalf of West African citizens who alleged 
that the respondent State has expelled them from its territory in 1996. The complainants 
alleged that during the expulsion the victims lost their belongings. The complainants 
alleged further that the respondent State violated the rights to non-discrimination, the 
right to be heard, and the right to freedom of movement in articles 2, 7(1)(a), 12(4) - (5) 
of the African Charter.47  
Importantly, the African Commission linked these allegations relating to the violation 
of the civil and political rights with socio-economic rights in the African Charter.48 The 
African Commission started by stating that difficulties in economic conditions necessitate 
States to adopt various measures to protect their citizens and economy from 
foreigners.49 However, the African Commission stated further that such measures should 
not violate the enjoyment of human rights.50 The African Commission pointed out that 
mass expulsions of people on any ground amounts to “special” violations of human 
rights.51 It went further to state that deportations violate a variety of rights guaranteed in 
the African Charter such as the socio-economic rights to property, work, education, and 
protection of the family in articles 14, 15, 17(1) and 18(1) of the African Charter.52 
However, the African Commission failed to elaborate how deportation is connected to 
the violation of the socio-economic rights to property, work and education, though it 
noted their inter-relation.53 
Furthermore, although it linked deportation with rights to property, work, education 
and the protection of the family, it only elaborated on the violation of the right to 
protection of the family.54 Thus the African Commission held that the deportation of the 
victims resulted in separating them from their families.55 The African Commission found 
the respondent State to have infringed, amongst other rights, the right to property and 																																																								
46 Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola Communication No 159/96 (2000) AHRLR 18 
(ACHPR 1997). 
47 Paras 1-2. 
48 Para 17. 
49 Para 16. 
50 Para 16. 
51 Para 16. 
52 Para 17. 
53 Para 17. 
54 Para 17. 
55 Para 17. 
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family in articles 14 and 18(1) of the African Charter.56 However, the African Commission 
failed to develop the scope and content of these rights. It went on to refer to the 
provisions of article 2 of the African Charter on non-discrimination and stated in a 
general way that this article requires Member States to guarantee the enjoyment of all 
the rights in the African Charter without distinction.57 
Without providing any supporting reasons, the African Commission issued 
declaratory remedies, requiring the respondent State to “draw all legal consequences 
arising from the present decision”.58 It is uncertain as to what specifically the respondent 
State is required to do to redress the violations. Application of the teleological approach 
to interpretation would have assisted the African Commission, as was shown in chapter 
four,59 to apply various provisions of the African Charter to issue detailed remedial 
orders including declaratory, restitutionary, and compensatory remedies. 
5 4 2 4 International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria 
In International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (‘Saro-Wiwa’)60 the African 
Commission was called upon to determine whether the respondent State violated the 
right to health in article 16 of the African Charter. The complainants in Saro-Wiwa 
brought the communication on behalf of Mr Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa and his co-
defendants who were detained in the respondent State’s detention facilities. The 
complainants alleged that the respondent State denied the victim access to medical 
attention including medicine to regulate his blood pressure, access to his family, as well 
as detaining him in poor detention facilities. 61  The complainants alleged that the 
respondent State violated, amongst other rights, the right to dignity in article 5 and the 
right to health in article 16 of the African Charter as well as the States obligations in 
article 1.62 
The African Commission started its judgment by determining the right to dignity. It 
stated that prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in article 5 
includes not only conducts that cause physical or psychological pain but also conducts 																																																								
56 Paras 16-17 and 21. 
57 Para 18. 
58 Para 22. 
59 See chapter four, part 4 3 6. 
60 International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria Communication Nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 
161/97 (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1999). 
61 Paras 1-2. 
62 Para 13. 
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that humiliates or compels a person to unwillingly act in a certain way.63 The African 
Commission went on to determine the violation of article 4 on the right to life. 64 
Significantly, it connected the right to life with the State’s obligation by broadly stating 
that this right imposes upon a State an obligation not to let an individual, who is in the 
State’s custody, die.65 It went on to hold that the State’s conduct to deny Mr. Saro-Wiwa 
medical attention whilst in custody endangered his life and caused multiple violations of 
article 4.66  
In Saro-Wiwa the African Commission broadly demonstrated the inter-relation 
between the rights to dignity, life and health. However, it did not clearly elaborate upon 
this interdependence. Although the African Commission did make an attempt to develop 
the content of the right to dignity, it did not sufficiently explain the linkages between the 
right to dignity and the violations of the right to health.67  
Regarding the right to health the African Commission referred to provisions of article 
16 of the African Charter and stated that the State’s obligation is heightened where the 
victim is held in the State’s custody.68 It went on to state that the respondent State bore 
a “direct responsibility” by denying Mr. Saro-Wiwa access to a qualified medical doctor. 
According to the African Commission, this conduct by the respondent State endangered 
the life of Mr. Saro-Wiwa.69  
The African Commission went on to determine the violation of article 1 of the African 
Charter.70 It stated that upon ratification Member States are obliged to respect the 
provisions of the African Charter.71 Without any legal reasoning that elaborates the 
State’s obligations in terms of article 1 of the African Charter the African Commission 
held that the failure of the respondent State to implement its obligations violates article 
1.72 The African Commission held that the respondent State’s denial of medical attention 
to the victim constitutes a violation of article 16,73 but it did not elaborate on the nature of 
State’s obligations imposed by the right to health. Moreover, the African Commission did 
not elaborate on the scope and content of the right to health. Furthermore, the African 																																																								
63 Para 79. 
64 Para 102. 
65 Para 104. 
66 Para 104. 
67 Paras 78-84. 
68 Para 112. 
69 Para 112. 
70 Para 113. 
71 Para 116. 
72 Para 122. 
73 Paras 111-112. 
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Commission failed to elaborate on the normative scope and content of prisoners’ right to 
health although Saro-Wiwa dealt with persons in prisons. This could have been an 
opportunity for the African Court to expand the scope of this right relating to its holders. 
It merely relied on the broad textual provisions of article 16 which, as discussed in 
chapter three, requires further interpretation to ascertain its application in various 
contexts. 
Furthermore, although Saro-Wiwa alleged denial of the right to the protection of the 
family, the African Commission failed to direct its mind to this significant socio-economic 
right. Moreover, the African Commission broadly elaborated the nature of States’ 
obligations. This broad definition of States’ obligations is unhelpful, as it does not help 
States to understand what they should do to give effect to the relevant socio-economic 
rights. The African Commission proceeded to issue its usual broad declaratory remedies 
typified in this phase of its socio-economic rights jurisprudence.74 
5 4 2 5 Conclusion 
The analysis above has demonstrated that the African Commission in the limited 
phase had an opportunity to interpret the explicit socio-economic rights to property, 
work, health, education and family. It also had an opportunity to determine the violations 
of the implicit socio-economic rights to food and water. However, in all the 
communications the analysis has shown that the African Commission failed to develop 
the scope and content of these rights and their related obligations in any detail. In some 
communications, it defined the obligations broadly in a manner that does not help States 
to understand their precise obligations in giving effect to the relevant socio-economic 
rights.  
With regard to remedial recommendations the African Commission issued mainly 
very broadly formulated declaratory, restitutionary and compensatory remedies. The 
following part proceeds to analyse the jurisprudence of the African Commission in what I 
describe as “the expansive phase” of the African Commission’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence. 
																																																								
74 Para 117. 
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5 4 3 The expansive phase: An analysis 
5 4 3 1 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria   
The complainants in SERAC brought the communication on behalf of the citizens of 
the respondent State who belong to the Ogoni Community. The complainants alleged 
that the military government of the respondent State had been directly engaged in oil 
production through the State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), which was the majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation (SPDC). According to the complainants, the oil production 
activities had been contaminating the environment, therefore causing environmental 
degradation and health problems to the Ogoni peoples. The complainants alleged that 
the respondent State had been disposing toxic wastes into the surroundings and local 
water sources, contrary to international environmental standards. It was further alleged 
that the respondent State’s failure to maintain its oil facilities caused numerous 
avoidable spills of oil in the proximity of villages resulting in the contamination of water, 
soil and air, as well as in serious short and long-term health impacts such as skin 
infections, gastro-intestinal and respiratory ailments, increased risks of cancers, and 
neurological and reproductive problems. According to the complainants, the respondent 
State also failed to control the operations of the private oil companies as it has failed to 
require such companies to take safety measures. Furthermore, the respondent State 
failed to require the oil companies or its agents to conduct basic health and 
environmental studies relating to the dangers of oil operations. Moreover, the 
respondent State had been withholding relevant information on the possible risks 
created by oil production activities. It was further alleged that the victims were not 
engaged in the decision-making process concerning the development projects affecting 
their land. The complainants alleged that the respondent State, through its security 
forces attacked, burned and destroyed several villages and homes in Ogoniland, 
claiming that this action was taken to dislodge officials and supporters of the Movement 
of the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). Allegedly, the respondent State destroyed 
and threatened food sources in Ogoniland through pollution of soil and water on which 
the Ogoni people relied for their farming and fishing activities. During the raids on 
villages the armed forces destroyed crops and killed animals. All these activities resulted 
in malnutrition and starvation among the Ogoni people. The complainants alleged that 
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these actions and omissions of the respondent State amounted to the violations of 
articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the African Charter.75 
The African Commission commenced its decision by describing the States’ 
obligations as set out in the African Charter. According to the African Commission, both 
civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights impose upon States a quartet of 
obligations, namely: the duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights.76 The 
obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering in the enjoyment of all 
fundamental rights of the right-holders. 77  With regard to socio-economic rights in 
particular, this obligation requires States to respect the free use of resources owned or 
at the disposal of individuals, both individually and collectively.78  The obligation to 
protect entails a State’s duty to protect, through legislation and provision of effective 
remedies, the right-holders against violation by third parties.79 This obligation relates to 
the obligation to promote the enjoyment of all rights.80 The obligation to fulfil requires a 
State to “move its machinery towards actual realisation” of the individuals’ rights and 
freedoms as recognised by various international human rights instruments ratified by the 
State.81  By drawing inspiration from the provisions of article 2 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’), 82  the African 
Commission stated that States are required to implement all these categories of 
obligations.83 It went on to state that the provisions of articles 60 and 61 of the African 
Charter oblige the African Commission to draw inspiration from the relevant international 
and regional human rights instruments and jurisprudence. This reasoning and aspect of 
the application of relevant international, regional and national human rights laws and 
jurisprudence resonates strongly with the teleological approach to interpretation of socio-
economic rights.  
The African Commission went on to determine the allegations regarding the 
violations of articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter.84 The African Commission stated 																																																								
75 SERAC paras 1-9. 
76 Para 44. 
77 Para 45. 
78 Para 45. 
79 Para 46. 
80 Para 46. 
81 Para 47. 
82 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (‘ICESCR’) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 
1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976. 
83 SERAC para 48. 
84 Para 50. 
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that the joint reading of the provisions of articles 16 and 24 guarantees the right to 
healthy environment.85 It further explained that the right to a healthy environment relates 
to socio-economic rights.86 The African Commission noted that polluted environment 
does not meet the standards of healthy living conditions and is dangerous to the 
individual’s physical and mental health.87 According to the African Commission, article 
24 imposes upon States “an obligation to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures” to avoid air and environmental pollution as well as promoting progressive 
environmental conservation and “ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources”.88 The African Commission drew inspiration from the provisions of 
article 12 of the ICESCR. According to the African Commission, these provisions require 
the respondent State to take all necessary steps to improve the environmental and 
industrial hygiene in all its aspects.89 It stated further that both articles 16 and 24 require 
States to refrain from directly threatening the health and environment of their citizens. In 
line with the obligations in these articles, States must also order or allow independent 
scientific monitoring of threatened environments; require and publish environmental and 
social impact studies before introducing any major industrial development; undertake 
appropriate monitoring and provide information to those communities exposed to 
hazardous materials and activities; provide them with meaningful opportunities to be 
heard and to participate in the developmental decisions affecting their communities.90 
According to the African Commission, the respondent State failed to take these outlined 
measures, which would have protected the victims.91 It therefore found the respondent 
State to be in violation of articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter. 
Moreover, the African Commission determined the alleged violation of article 21 
concerning the right of peoples to dispose freely of their natural wealth and resources. It 
referred to the provisions of article 21 and started by explaining their origin.92 The article 
originates from the colonial time whereby the colonisers exploited Africa’s human and 
natural resources.93 The African Commission pointed out that this exploitation deprived 
																																																								
85 Para 51. 
86 Para 51 
87 Para 51 
88 Para 52. 
89 Para 52. 
90 Paras 52-53. 
91 Para 54. 
92 Paras 55-56. 
93 Para 56. 
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people of their land and caused poverty.94 The African Commission pointed out that the 
intention of the drafters of the African Charter to include article 21 was to remind 
Member States about this significant and painful history so that they protect the socio-
economic rights of the people in Africa.95 Although the African Commission referred to 
the provisions of article 21, it failed to state clearly the aspects of article 21 that were 
involved. The African Commission then elaborated upon the nature and scope of States’ 
obligations imposed by this right.96 According to the African Commission, the State has 
an obligation to protect its citizens through legislation and effective enforcement, as well 
as protecting them from damaging acts perpetrated by third parties. 97  Drawing 
inspiration from Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (‘Velasquez’) 98  the African 
Commission held that a State violates its obligation to protect when it permits third 
parties to act in a manner that violates peoples’ rights.99 The African Commission then 
held that the respondent State failed to protect the victims from interferences in the 
enjoyment of their rights. 100  Instead, it facilitated the destruction of Ogoniland. It 
therefore found the respondent State had violated article 21.101 The reference to the 
preparatory work of the African Charter and drawing inspiration from relevant 
international human rights instruments correspond with the teleological approach to 
interpretation. 
The African Commission went on to determine the right to housing implicitly 
recognised in articles 14, 16 and 18(1) of the African Charter. 102  The African 
Commission held that, while the African Charter does not expressly recognise the right 
to housing, this right is implicitly protected through the provisions protecting the rights to 
health, property and family.103 According to the African Commission, when housing is 
destroyed, property, health and family are negatively affected.104 It stated that, at the 
minimum the right to shelter imposes upon the respondent State an obligation to refrain 
from destroying the housing of its citizens and to desist from preventing their efforts to 																																																								
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reconstruct the destroyed homes.105 It stated further that this obligation requires States 
to refrain from conducting, supporting or tolerating conduct that violates the right to 
housing.106 The obligation to protect housing requires the respondent State to prevent 
third parties from violating the right to housing.107 According to the African Commission, 
the right to housing includes not only “a roof over one’s head” but also individuals’ “right 
to be left alone and to live in peace”.108  The African Commission stated that the 
respondent State’s actions to destroy houses and villages in Ogoni, as well as its armed 
forces’ obstruction, harassment, beating and killing of innocent people demonstrate its 
failure to observe these two minimum obligations and constitute a massive violation of 
the rights to shelter. Thus, the respondent State violated articles 14, 16, and 18(1) of the 
African Charter.109 Moreover, the African Commission held that the implicit right to 
adequate housing also incorporates the right to protection against forced evictions.110 
Drawing on the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (‘CESCR’)111 
definition, the African Commission defined forced evictions as the permanent removal, 
against their will, of individuals, families and communities from their homes which they 
occupy without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other 
protection.112 According to the African Commission, forced evictions cause physical, 
psychological and emotional distress, loss of means of economic sustenance and 
increased impoverishment.113 They cause sporadic deaths, break up of families and 
homelessness.114 The African Commission drew inspiration from the CESCR General 
Comment 4 on the right to adequate housing (‘General Comment 4’)115 that recognises 
the right of every individual to possess a security of tenure that ensures legal protection 
against forced eviction, harassment, and other threats against his or her property.116 The 
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respondent State’s actions demonstrated a violation of this right enjoyed by the Ogoni as 
a collective right.117 
The African Commission then dealt with the right to food alleged by the applicants to 
be impliedly incorporated in articles 4, 16 and 22 of the African Charter. The African 
Commission noted that the right to food is directly linked to the dignity of human beings 
and relevant for the enjoyment and fulfilment of other rights including, health, education, 
work and political participation.118 The respondent State is bound by the African Charter 
and international law to protect and improve existing food sources, and ensure access to 
adequate food for its citizens.119 The minimum core of the right to food requires the 
respondent State to desist from destroying or contaminating food sources and prevent 
peoples’ efforts to feed themselves.120 The respondent State violated the minimum core 
of the right to food, namely the destruction of food sources through armed forces and 
State oil companies, permitting private companies to destroy food sources.121 Through 
terror, it also prevented the Ogoni people from feeding themselves.122 Through these 
established actions, the respondent State violated the Ogoni peoples’ right to food.123 
Regarding the violation of the right to life, the African Commission held that the 
violations of the rights to housing, food, property, health, and protection of the family 
amounted to the violation of the right to life.124 This was done through the killings of 
Ogonis, environmental pollution and degradation, and the destruction of farms.125 
Having found violations of articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the African 
Charter, the African Commission required the respondent State to guarantee the 
protection of the victims’ rights to environment, health and livelihood. Moreover, the 
African Commission required the respondent State to adequately compensate the 
victims, as well as ensure that environmental and social impact assessment is 
conducted. 
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5 4 3 2 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia  
In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia (‘Purohit’)126 the complainants called upon the 
African Commission to decide on the alleged violations of the rights to non-
discrimination, equality, dignity, and health. The complainants brought the 
communication on behalf of the patients who were detained in a psychiatric unit of the 
Royal Victoria Hospital at Campama, and on behalf of both the current and future mental 
health patients who will be detained in accordance with the Mental Health Acts of the 
respondent State.127 The complainants alleged that the law governing the mental health 
in the respondent State was out-dated.128 They referred to the failure of the Lunatic 
Detention Act (‘LDA’) to define the term “lunatic”, and to the lack of provisions and 
significant requirements to protect the mental health of patients during the diagnosis, 
certification and detention processes.129 They further claimed that the psychiatric unit 
was overcrowded and that there was a lack of requirement of consent to treatment or 
continuation of treatment. 130  They also alleged the non-independence of the 
administration, management and living condition processes within the psychiatric unit.131 
They further alleged that the LDA does not provide for legal aid scheme and 
compensatory mechanisms for the violations of the patients’ rights.132 As such, the 
complainants alleged the violation of articles 16 and 18(4) of the African Charter that 
provide for the right to health.133 Moreover, the complainants alleged that the treatment 
of mental patients to indefinite institutionalisation and the conditions in which they are 
held under the LDA violate the rights to non-discrimination, equality and dignity provided 
in articles 2, 3 and 5 of the African Charter.134 
In response, the respondent State submitted that it plans to amend the LDA. It further 
submitted that the Constitution of The Gambia contains provisions, which can be used 
by persons detained under the LDA, to challenge their detention.135 The respondent 
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State admitted that it did not provide legal aid to this vulnerable group to access the 
legal procedures in the country to challenge their detention.136 
The African Commission commenced by describing the nature of States’ 
obligation. 137  The African Commission stated that by ratifying the African Charter 
Member States are required to take immediate measures to comply with their obligations 
in the African Charter.138  It explained further that ratification also requires Member 
States to ensure their domestic laws are in conformity with the African Charter.139 It 
stated that the developments in international human rights law concerning persons with 
disabilities require the respondent State to amend the LDA in line with such international 
instruments.140  
The African Commission went on to determine the violation of the rights to non-
discrimination and equality. The African Commission found the respondent State to be in 
violation of articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter. 141  According to the African 
Commission, the provisions of articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter are significant in 
that they prohibit discrimination in all aspects and guarantee individuals’ fair and just 
treatment in a country’s legal system.142  The African Commission held that 143  the 
respondent State’s argument that the persons described as lunatics can challenge their 
detention through provisions of the constitution, without legal aid or assistance,144 do not 
satisfy the requirements of anti-discrimination and equal protection in articles 2 and 3 of 
the African Charter. Neither are they in conformity with Principle 1(4) of the United 
Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement 
of Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (‘UN Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness’).145 According to the African Commission, 
since most of the mental patients are collected from the streets or come from poor 
backgrounds, they cannot afford the services of private lawyers.146 The general legal 
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provisions that allow persons who are injured by the actions of others can only benefit 
persons who are financially capable to afford the services of private lawyers.147  
The African Commission then determined whether the respondent State violated the 
right to dignity in article 5.148 On this issue, it responded in the affirmative. It referred to 
the provisions of article 5 and stated that this right also imposes on every human being 
the obligation to respect this right.149 It further stated that all Member States to the 
African Charter should respect this right.150 With reference to Media Rights Agenda and 
Others v Nigeria (‘Media Rights Agenda’) 151  and John K Modise v Botswana 
(‘Modise’)152 the African Commission stated that the LDA’s description of persons with a 
mental illness as “lunatics”, and “idiots” violates the right to dignity in article 5 as these 
terms dehumanise and deny such persons any form of dignity. 153  It further drew 
inspiration from UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and 
stated that the dignity of persons with a mental disability should be respected.154 
Moreover, the right to dignity requires persons with a disability to be treated with 
humanity. 155 It then stated that persons with a mental disability have the right to enjoy 
the right to dignity and that the right should be protected by all Member States to the 
African Charter.156 Purohit broadly referred to the rights to non-discrimination, equality, 
and dignity. Although the African Commission decided Purohit after SERAC, it failed to 
show clearly the interdependence between rights to non-discrimination, equality, dignity 
and the right to health. 
Regarding the right to health, the African Commission found the respondent State in 
violation of article 16 of the African Charter, read in conjunction with article 18(4) of the 
African Charter.157 The African Commission held that the right to health incorporates the 
right to health facilities, and access to goods and services without discrimination.158 It 
further held that in particular, persons with a mental illness require special treatment that 																																																								
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will enable them to attain and sustain their independence and performance in 
accordance with article 18(4) and the standards applicable to the treatment of persons 
with a mental illness provided by the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness.159 These principles require recognition of the highest attainable standards 
of health care for persons with a mental illness during analysis and diagnosis, treatment, 
and rehabilitation. 160  According to the African Commission, the LDA falls short of 
objectives and provisions that provide for the resources and programmes for treating 
persons with a mental illness.161 Thus, the LDA fails to meet the standards set in articles 
16 and 18(4) of the African Charter.162 Moreover, the African Commission held that the 
provisions of article 16 of the African Charter “impose upon States an obligation to take 
concrete and targeted steps within their available resources for the realisation of all 
aspects of the right to health without discrimination”. 163  However, the African 
Commission failed to elaborate on the meaning and content of the obligation “to take 
concrete and targeted steps”.  
The African Commission then recommended the respondent State to repeal the LDA 
and replace it with legislation governing persons with a mental illness in a manner that is 
compatible with the African Charter and other international instruments. Moreover, the 
African Commission recommended that the respondent State realise the victims’ right to 
health by providing them with adequate medical treatment and medical care. 
5 4 3 3 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan  
In Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) v Sudan (‘COHRE’),164 the second complainant (‘complainant’) alleged the 
violation of human rights by the respondent State against the indigenous black African 
tribes in the Darfur region found in the western part of the respondent State.165 These 
tribes are Fur, Marsalit and Zaghawa.166 The complainant alleged that in February 2003 
the armed conflict in the Darfur region intensified as a result of the emergence of two 																																																								
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armed groups, namely the Sudan Liberation Army (‘SLA’) and the Justice Equality 
Movement (‘MEM’).167 Both of these armed groups originated from the Fur, Marsalit and 
Zaghawa tribes.168 The armed groups were demanding that the respondent State stop 
the marginalisation and underdevelopment of the Darfur region.169 According to the 
complainant, the respondent State established, armed and sponsored the Janjaweed, 
which was an Arab militia to fight the SLA and MEM.170 The complainant alleged that 
through the Janjaweed the respondent State attacked the civilian population, raided and 
bombed their villages, markets and water wells by helicopter gunships and airplanes.171 
They further claimed that the respondent State forcibly evicted a large number of people 
from their homes that were also totally or partially burned and destroyed. The 
complainant alleged that the respondent State deliberately and indiscriminately killed 
people and many other people were displaced. 172  Based on this background the 
complainant alleged the respondent State’s violation of, amongst others, articles 4, 5, 
14, 16, 18(1) and 22 of the African Charter.173 
In response, the respondent State submitted that it has addressed the human rights 
violations in Darfur through the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(‘DPA’).174 The respondent State submitted that it has also improved the humanitarian 
situation and facilitated the flow of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced 
persons.175 It further stated that it has rehabilitated various villages and provided basic 
services including water, health care, education and housing with the aim of 
encouraging voluntary return of the internally displaced persons to Darfur. It also 
submitted that it has provided people with agricultural facilities.176 
The African Commission started with the allegations regarding the violations of 
articles 4 and 5 on the right to life and dignity.177 The African Commission found the 
respondent State in violation of articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter.178 With regard to 
article 4, the African Commission noted that the right to life should be interpreted broadly 																																																								
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to include the right to dignity and livelihood.179 It is a supreme right without which other 
rights become meaningless.180 This right to life imposes upon States the duty to protect 
people from arbitrary actions committed by both public authorities and private 
persons.181 This duty is broad in that it includes strict control and limits circumstances 
under which a person may be deprived of his or her life by State authorities.182 The right 
also imposes a duty upon the State to respect the right to life by desisting from violating 
it and by protecting it from violation by non-state actors within its jurisdiction.183 Referring 
to Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (‘Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum’),184 the African Commission held that lack of due diligence on the part of the 
State to prevent the violation or for not taking steps to provide the victims with 
reparation, amounts to violation of the right.185 Thus, the African Commission found the 
failure of the respondent State to investigate the arbitrary killing allegations and extra-
judicial executions effectively amounted to a violation of article 4 on the right to life.186 
Regarding the right to dignity the African Commission started by, through reference 
to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, defining the phrase “torture or 
degrading treatment or punishment” in article 5. According to the African Commission, 
“torture or degrading treatment or punishment” is a deliberate conduct of inflicting on a 
person severe physical or mental pain. The African Commission explained further that 
such pain is inflicted with the aim of obtaining information from that person or a third 
person. According to the African Commission, as a means to obtain such information 
such a person is discriminatorily punished, intimidated or coerced at the approval or 
consent of a public official or a person acting in that capacity. 187  The African 
Commission elaborated further that “torture” is used to deliberately and systematically 
inflict physical or psychological pain on a person with the aim of getting information from 
that person.188 The African Commission stated that States use torture as a mechanism 
to discriminate individuals or peoples with the intention of controlling such persons.189 																																																								
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Torture is inflicted for controlling individuals and peoples by destroying and frightening 
them, their leadership and communities.190  
Having defined “torture or degrading treatment or punishment” contained in article 5 
of the African Charter, through reference to Media Rights Agenda, Modise and the 
decision of the United Nations Committee Against Torture in Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v 
Yugoslavia (‘Hajrizi’), 191  the African Commission held that “cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment or treatment” in article 5 should be broadly interpreted to protect 
people from physical or mental abuse.192 It noted that forced evictions and destruction of 
housing amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. According to 
the African Commission, the forced eviction of Darfurians from their villages and homes, 
executed by the respondent State through the Janjaweed militia and its agents, 
amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment and threatened their right to human dignity. 
As such, the respondent State violated both articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter.193 
The African Commission went on to determine whether rights in the African Charter 
can be limited during armed conflicts.194 Referring to Constitutional Rights Project et al v 
Nigeria, the African Commission emphasised that it is an obligation of States to respect 
the rights of individuals and peoples at all times. 195  According to the African 
Commission, restriction of human rights enshrined in the African Charter cannot be 
justified by emergencies or special circumstances.196 The African Commission stated 
further that limitation of rights should only be justified through the conditions established 
in article 27(2) of the African Charter. 197  The conditions are that rights “shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and 
common interest.”198 The African Commission found that forced eviction executed by the 
respondent State does not pass the standards established in article 27(2). In elaborating 
the civil and political right to movement, the African Commission stated that Member 
States of the African Charter have an obligation not to arbitrarily restrict the rights. It 
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emphasised that limitation of the rights must be proportional and necessary for a 
legitimate public need.199 
The African Commission then proceeded to determine the allegations regarding 
violation of article 14 on the right to property.200 The African Commission found the 
respondent State in violation of article 14 of the African Charter on the right to 
property.201 The African Commission started by stating the significance of the right to 
property and the nature and scope of States’ obligations imposed by this right.202 
According to the African Commission, right to property is a fundamental right in 
democratic States.203 The right imposes upon States obligations to respect and protect it 
from encroachment by the States and non-state actors.204 The African Commission went 
on to explain that States are required to ensure that this right is accessible to everyone 
while taking the public interest into account.205  
 The African Commission explained further that the right to property incorporates two 
principles, namely: ownership and peaceful enjoyment of property, as well as conditions 
for deprivation of the right such as public or general interest and “in accordance with the 
law”.206 According to the African Commission, the respondent State’s action through the 
Janjaweed militia to destroy the victims’ villages and homes amounted to the deprivation 
of the right to property.207 The respondent State failed to demonstrate that it refrained 
from forcible evictions of the victims or demolition of their houses and other 
properties.208  
The African Commission further found that the respondent State failed to take 
measures to protect the victims from attacks and bombings.209 Therefore, the African 
Commission held that the fact that the victims could no longer use their possessions to 
earn their living indicated that they were deprived the right to use their property in 
circumstances allowed by article 14 of the African Charter.210 
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The African Commission then went on to consider the allegations regarding the right 
to health.211 It found the respondent State in violation of the right to health contained in 
article 16 of the African Charter.212 Significantly, the African Commission, defined the 
content of the broadly formulated right to health to include both health care and health 
conditions.213 It then stated that the respondent State’s destruction of homes, livestock, 
and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources such as wells, exposed the victims 
to serious health risks. Referring to CESCR General Comment 14 on the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health (‘General Comment 14’)214 the African Commission 
held that, in addition to timely and appropriate health care, the right to health 
encompasses other underlying determinants such as access to safe and portable water, 
an adequate supply of food, nutrition and housing.215 The African Commission, drawing 
inspiration from the General Comment 14, held that the right should be available, 
accessible, and acceptable, and it should be of good quality.216 According to the African 
Commission, referring to the General Comment 14, the right to health imposes 
obligations to respect, fulfil and protect. 217  States should thus not infringe on the 
enjoyment of this right.218 Through this obligation, States should refrain from polluting 
air, water and soil.219 The right to health also imposes upon States an obligation to 
ensure that non-state actors do not restrict individuals or groups’ accessibility to any 
information and services related to this right. 220 The African Commission went on to 
state that the State’s failure to adopt and enforce legislation that prevent water pollution 
equally amounts to the violation of the right to health. 221  Referring to Free Legal 
Assistance the African Commission held that failure to provide safe drinking water and 
electricity amounts to violation of the right to health.222 The African Commission found 
that the respondent State’s conduct of destroying housing, livestock and farmlands as 
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well as the poisoning of water sources seriously endangered victims’ health and 
therefore violated their right to health enshrined in article 16 of the African Charter.223 
The African Commission also found the respondent State in violation of the right to 
the protection of the family contained in article 18(1) of the African Charter. The African 
Commission referred to article 18 and stated that it imposes upon States a positive 
obligation to protect the physical and moral well-being of family.224 It further explained 
that provisions of article 18 prohibit States’ and non-state actors’ arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with the family.225 Drawing inspiration from the CESCR General Comment 
19 on the right to social security (‘General Comment 19’)226 the African Commission 
stated that the right to the protection of the family imposes on States obligations to adopt 
legislative, administrative, or other measures to give effect to this right.227 It also obliges 
States to desist from conduct that may endanger the family unit such as arbitrary 
separation of family members and displacement of families involuntarily.228 Drawing 
inspiration from the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) in 
Dogan v Turkey (‘Dogan’)229 the African Commission stated that the respondent State’s 
refusal to allow the victims to access their homes and livelihood amounts to an 
interference with the family.230  Significantly, the African Commission connected the 
mass expulsions of the applicants with their right to the protection of the family.231 
Referring to Union Interafricaine it held that massive forced expulsions of people 
adversely affects the right to the protection of the family.232 According to the African 
Commission, the respondent State’s forcible eviction of the victims from their homes, 
killing of some family members and displacement of others threatened the foundation of 
family and made the enjoyment of the right to family difficult. As such, the respondent 
State was found to have violated the right to family.233  
Then the African Commission moved on to determine allegations regarding the 
violation of the right to development in article 22 of the African Charter. 234  The 																																																								
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respondent State was found to be in violation of the right to development provided in 
article 22 of the African Charter.235 According to the African Commission, article 22 is 
collective in nature in that it recognises individuals as a people. 236  The African 
Commission reasoned that in order to establish the violation of article 22 the question 
whether victims constitute “people” in the context of the African Charter is vital.237 
Therefore, the African Commission had to determine whether Darfurians constitute a 
“people” thus entitling them to the right to development.238 According to the African 
Commission, various characteristics can be used to identify persons referring to 
themselves as “a people”.239 These characteristics include language, religion, culture, 
the territory they occupy in a State and a common history.240 The African Commission 
stated further that race also characterises “people” in communities with a population of 
different racial composition.241 It stated that in Africa racial and ethnic diversity contribute 
to cultural diversity that should be embraced.242 Significantly, the African Commission 
elaborated on the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding peoples’ rights. It 
stated that the object and purpose of the African Charter is to protect peoples against 
external and internal rights’ violations. 243  Based on this reasoning the African 
Commission pointed out that the African Charter protects individuals and groups of 
different racial, ethnic, religious and other social backgrounds. 244  The African 
Commission applied article 19 of the African Charter to emphasise that Darfurians in 
their collective are “a people”.245 According to the African Commission, article 19 of the 
African Charter prohibits one group of people from dominating peoples of another group 
within the same State.246 The article recognises peoples’ right to equality and enjoyment 
of the same human rights without distinction.247 Thus, the respondent State’s action to 
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target Darfur’s civilians instead of combatants amounted to collective punishment.248 
According to the African Commission: 
“The attacks and forced displacement of Darfurian people denied them the 
opportunity to engage in economic, social and cultural activities. The displacement 
interfered with the right to education for their children and pursuit of other 
activities.”249 
In this respect, the African Commission found the respondent State to have violated 
article 22 of the African Charter.250 
The African Commission recommended that the respondent State take legislative 
and judicial measures to protect the individuals against serious and massive human 
violations, including destruction of property. 251  Moreover, the African Commission 
recommended the respondent State to compensate the victims adequately, and to 
rehabilitate their socio-economic infrastructure, including education, health, water and 
agricultural services.252 
5 4 3 4 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme at al v Cameroon 
In Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon (‘Gunme’),253 the complainants brought 
a communication on their own behalf and on behalf of the people of Southern Cameroon 
against the Republic of Cameroon.254 The complainants alleged that the violations of 
their socio-economic rights started when the respondent State became independent on 
January 1, 1960.255 The complainants alleged further that Southern Cameroon was 
under the British Trusteeship separate from the Francophone part of the Republic of 
Cameroon, which was under French Trusteeship.256 They alleged further that during the 
plebiscite in 1961 the Southern Cameroonians had to decide to join either Nigeria or 
Cameroon. They decided to join Cameroon. As a result the Southern Cameroon and the 
La Republique du Cameroun negotiated and adopted the Federal Constitution at 
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Foumban in September 1961.257 The complainants alleged that the right of Southern 
Cameroonians to form their own State of South Cameroon was ignored in the 1961 
plebiscite.258 They alleged further that the disregard of the alternative to form their 
statehood was a source of all the socio-economic violations alleged in this 
communication. 259  According to the complainants, most of the local administrative 
positions in the Southern Cameroon are predominantly occupied by the Francophone 
Cameroonians. 260  They contended further that by this predominance Francophone 
Cameroonians deprive the Southern Cameroonians of their land and other economic 
resources and use these resources for their own benefit.261 The complainants also 
alleged that the respondent State treats Southern Cameroonians unequally by denying 
them basic socio-economic infrastructures and the right to development.262 According to 
the complainants, most of the socio-economic infrastructure and development projects 
are situated in the Francophone Cameroon.263 The complainants mentioned some of the 
development projects located in the Francophone Cameroon including Chad-Cameroon 
Oil Pipeline, the deep seaport, and the oil refinery.264  Moreover, the complainants 
alleged further that Francophone Cameroonians mostly dominate the Ministry of 
Education and that the respondent State has been underfunding primary education in 
Southern Cameroon.265 According to the complainants, the respondent State has not 
been building new schools and the existing ones are understaffed.266 They also alleged 
the closure of all teachers training colleges in Southern Cameroon by the respondent 
State. 267 Based on this background the complainants alleged the violation of articles 2, 
4, 5, 17(1), 21, 22, and 24 of the African Charter.268 
The African Commission started by dealing with the alleged violation of article 2 of 
the African Charter on non-discrimination.269 It took note of the complainants’ allegations 
regarding the respondent State’s discriminatory practices relating to the rights to 																																																								
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education and development. 270  However, it did not deal with the right to non-
discrimination in relation to the rights to education and development. It exclusively dealt 
with the violation of the right of non-discrimination relating to the alleged denial of the 
registration of companies originating from Southern Cameroon. 271  The African 
Commission missed an important opportunity to elaborate the interdependence between 
non-discrimination and the socio-economic rights to education and development. The 
discussion in chapter three demonstrated that holistic reading of the African Charter as a 
tenet of the teleological approach considers right to non-discrimination as a relevant 
provision in developing the normative scope and content of socio-economic rights.272  
The African Commission went on to determine the violation of article 4 where the 
complainants alleged the ill-treatment of arrested Southern Cameroonians in detention 
facilities and poor conditions in such facilities.273  The respondent State denied the 
allegation and contended that the complainants failed to show evidence in support of 
their allegations.274 The African Commission found the respondent State in violation of 
article 4.275 It held that the respondent State failed to investigate the violations of the 
right to life in its detention facilities and as such it violated the right to life.276 However, 
the African Commission did not elaborate the link between the right to life and health 
although the complainants alleged the poor conditions of the detention facilities and 
denial of medical treatment.277 
The African Commission proceeded to determine the violation of article 5 on the right 
to dignity.278 The complainants alleged the violation of this right by the respondent State 
because of torture, amputations and denial of medical treatment to the victims who were 
arrested by the respondent State’s police officials.279 The African Commission rejected 
the defence by the respondent State that the victims belonged to terrorist groups who 
vandalised State properties, stole weapons and ammunitions and killed police 
officers.280 It held that the defence does not justify exposing the victims to acts of torture, 
cruelty, inhuman and degrading punishment and treatment prohibited in article 5 of the 																																																								
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African Charter.281 The African Commission therefore found the respondent State in 
violation of article 5.282  As with the right to life, the African Commission failed to 
elaborate the content of the right to dignity and clarify its inter-relationship with the right 
to health. The discussion in chapter three demonstrated that the teleological approach to 
interpretation by reading the African Charter holistically allows the application of the right 
to dignity as a relevant provision in developing the scope and content of socio-economic 
rights including the right to health.283  
The African Commission then determined the violation of article 17 on the right to 
education. 284  The African Commission held that the complainants have failed to 
convince the African Commission that the data and statistics issued by the respondent 
State on the measures it has adopted to realise the right to education in Southern 
Cameroon were unreliable.285  With regard to allegations of discriminatory practices 
concerning the admission of Southern Cameroonians to the Polytechnique in Yaounde 
the African Commission agreed with the respondent State that admission of students is 
carried out on the basis of qualification, and that the Polytechnique has admitted and 
trained a number of civil engineers from Southern Cameroon. 286  Regarding the 
complainants’ allegations on the refusal of the respondent State to register the Bameda 
University of Science and Technology, the African Commission held that the 
complainants have failed to prove that Bameda University of Science and Technology 
fulfilled the required criteria for registration.287 According to the African Commission, 
complainants should, in accordance with Rule 119 of its 1995 Rules of Procedure, 
provide it with all the necessary information for it to be able to make findings on any 
allegations.288 It however, allowed the parties to make oral submissions and found that 
the complainants failed to substantiate the allegations and thus there was no violation of 
article 17(1) of the African Charter by the respondent State.289  
The African Commission proceeded to determine the violation of article 21 on the 
right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.290 The African 																																																								
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Commission held the complainants did not provide any evidence to support their 
allegation.291 As such, there was no violation of article 21 on the part of the respondent 
State.292 
Finally, the African Commission dealt with the right to development enshrined in 
article 22 of the African Charter. The African Commission stated that it is aware of the 
challenges facing the respondent State and other Member States of the African Charter 
to realise the right to development due to scarcity of resources.293 It further held that the 
respondent State has an obligation to use its resources in a manner that guarantees the 
progressive realisation of the right to development and other socio-economic rights.294 
Then the African Commission held that the lack of economic projects in Southern 
Cameroon does not necessarily amount to the violation of the right to development.295 
As such, there was no violation of the right to development by the respondent State.296 
Finally, the African Commission stated that the complainants failed to bring sufficient 
evidence to substantiate the violations of the right to a satisfactory environment in article 
24 of the African Charter.297 
5 4 3 5 Centre for the Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya  
In Centre for the Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (‘Endorois’), 298  the 
complainants brought the communication on behalf of the Endorois Community living in 
the respondent State. The complainants alleged the violation of a series of human rights 
that occurred as a result of the removal of the Endorois from their ancestral land located 
around Lake Bogoria in the Baringo and Koibatek Districts, as well as the Nakuru and 
Laikipia Districts in the Rift Valley Province. According to the complainants, 
approximately 60,000 Endorois have been living in areas around Lake Bogoria for a very 
long time and practising their sustainable way of life, which is directly connected to their 
ancestral land. They alleged that since 1973 the Endorois have been denied access to 																																																								
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their land as a result of the creation of the Lake Hannington Game Reserve followed by 
the re-gazetting of the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve in 1978. They alleged that the 
respondent State forcibly evicted the Endorois from their traditional land and failed to 
adequately compensate them for the loss of their property. The respondent State has 
interfered with the Endorois pastoral life and violated their right to practice their religion 
and culture, as well as their right to development as the Endorois community. The 
complainants alleged further that the respondent State granted a private company ruby 
mining concessions on their ancestral land. According to the complainants, ruby mining 
operations on their ancestral lands is dangerous to water sources used for their personal 
as well as their livestock consumption. Based on this background the complainants 
alleged that the respondent State violated in particular, the rights to property, cultural 
life, natural resources, and the right to development contained in articles 14, 17, 21 and 
22 of the African Charter.299  
In response, the respondent State submitted that most of the tribes around Lake 
Bogoria do not reside solely in their ancestral land. According to the respondent State, 
such people move from one area to the other in search of pastures for their cattle and 
fertile land for agricultural activities. They were relocated by government for the creation 
of development projects, creation of irrigation schemes, national parks, game reserves, 
forests, as well as for extraction of natural resources, including minerals. The 
respondent State stated further that it has established a programme for universal free 
primary education and an agricultural recovery programme aiming at increasing the 
household income of poor and marginalised people, including the Endorois. The 
respondent State submitted that it has established programmes for the “equitable 
distribution of budgetary resources, economic recovery strategy for wealth and 
employment creation”300 as well as eradication of poverty and protection of the socio-
economic rights of poor people, including the Endorois. Moreover, the respondent State 
submitted that the Endorois community is not the distinct community living around the 
Lake Bogoria area but rather that the area is occupied by the Tugen tribe comprising of 
four clans namely: the Endorois, the Lebus, the Somor and the Alor. The respondent 
State further stated that the Endorois community was compensated adequately.301 
In order for the African Commission to decide whether the respondent State violated 
the alleged rights of the Endorois, it first had to decide whether the Endorois constitute 																																																								
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an indigenous people.302 The African Commission noted that the difficulties in defining 
the term “peoples” led the drafters of the African Charter to avoid defining it. 303 
According to the African Commission, referring to its Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations and Communities,304 the term “peoples” as used in the African 
Charter is necessary for claiming the collective rights in the African Charter, recognised 
in articles 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the African Charter.305 The African Commission 
identified four criteria to identify indigenous peoples. These criteria are: “the occupation 
and use of a specific territory; the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; self-
identification as a distinct collectivity, as well as recognition by other groups; an 
experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or 
discrimination”. 306  The African Commission further identified two-significant 
characteristics of the indigenous peoples. Firstly, the indigenous peoples are mainly 
hunters and gatherers as well as pastoralists. Secondly, their survival depends largely 
on the access and rights to their ancestral land and natural resources found in such 
land.307 Thus, the African Commission stated the definition of the indigenous peoples 
incorporates their land, culture and desire to be recognised as a people.308 The African 
Commission pointed out that the provisions of article 61 of the African Charter requires it 
draw inspiration from other relevant human rights instruments in defining the term 
“peoples”.309 Based on this reasoning, it referred to the United Nations Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations read in conjunction with the African Commission’s Report on 
Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations to elaborate on the meaning of 
“indigenous peoples”.310 Extracting from these sources the African Commission noted 
that indigenous peoples are the people who due to their common history consider 
themselves distinct from other groups of people in the State and maintain their socio-
economic, cultural, and political identity.311 The African Commission thus found the 																																																								
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Endorois to be an indigenous community and a distinct people who share a common 
history, culture and religion.312 According to the African Commission, as a community, 
the Endorois are entitled to the protection of the collective rights as set out in the African 
Charter, including the right to property separately from the Tugen tribe.313  
Having defined the term “peoples” and found that the Endorois constitutes an 
indigenous people the African Commission elaborated the limitation of the rights in the 
African Charter.314 According to the African Commission, rights in the African Charter 
can be limited.315 However, the limitation should not render the right illusory. It must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim and in accordance with the law.316  The African 
Commission further added that the limitation of the rights must be reasonable.317 
However, it did not elaborate the content of these States’ obligations. 
The African Commission went on to determine the violation of article 14.318 The 
African Commission found the respondent State to be in violation of article 14 of the 
African Charter.319 The African Commission started by determining the meaning of right 
to property in the context of indigenous people. 320  Referring to Malawi African 
Association, SERAC, and Dogan the African Commission noted that property rights in 
the context of article 14 of the African Charter includes land.321 It further noted that, in 
addition to the right to access to property and the right not to be interfered with the 
enjoyment of property, property rights encompasses “the right to undisturbed 
possession, use and control of such property however the owner(s) deem fit.” 322 
Moreover, “property rights” incorporates the economic resources and rights to the 
common land of the victims.”323  
The African Commission held that, particularly in relation to indigenous communities, 
special measures must be adopted that guarantee their survival in a manner that 
protects their traditions and customs.324 The African Commission stated that a significant 																																																								
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way to protect the African indigenous communities is to ensure their “rights, interests 
and benefits” in their ancestral lands constitute property within the context of the African 
Charter.325 It emphasised that the measures adopted must be able to protect indigenous 
peoples’ property rights.326 The African Commission further observed that property rights 
are not restricted to ownership of physical goods but rather includes other rights and 
interests such as assets, including houses. With reference to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ (‘IACtHR’) decision in Dogan, and Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v 
Nicaragua (‘Mayagna’),327 it held further that “property rights” includes the rights of the 
indigenous peoples over communal property that is not officially registered and issued a 
real title deed.328  
Based on the foregoing observations the African Commission identified that the 
provisions of article 14 of the African Charter impose upon States the obligation to 
respect and protect the right to property.329 As such, the “confiscation and pillaging of 
the property” constitute a violation of the right to property in article 14 of the African 
Charter.330 It further held that the right to property, as guaranteed in article 14, is violated 
when people are forcibly removed from their homes.331 
The African Commission found the respondent State in violation of the Endorois 
community’s right to property as provided by article 14 of the African Charter.332 In 
particular, the property rights of the Endorois community have been violated through the 
respondent State’s “expropriation and the effective denial of ownership of their land.”333 
The African Commission held that, although the Constitution of Kenya provides that 
“Trust Land can be alienated and that the Trust Land Act provides comprehensive 
procedure for the assessment of compensation”, the trust land system created by the 
respondent State however, “has proved inadequate to protect” the rights of the 
Endorois.334 
The African Commission referred to the General Comment 4, CESCR General 
Comment 7 on forced evictions and the right to adequate housing (‘General Comment 																																																								
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7’),335 article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘Protocol 1 
to the European Convention’), and the case of Akdivar v Turkey (‘Akdivar’) 336  to 
determine the forced removal of people from their traditional land they regard as their 
property.337 The African Commission noted that forced evictions violate the right to 
housing and that every person is entitled to peaceful enjoyment of his or her 
possessions. 338  The African Commission observed that the right to ownership of 
property is not the mere access to the property.339 Access to the property would only 
have rendered the indigenous communities vulnerable to further dispossessions by the 
State or third parties.340 According to the African Commission, ownership of property 
enables indigenous peoples to engage actively with the State and non-state actors 
regarding development projects in their territories.341 With reference to articles 26 and 27 
of the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, the African Commission noted that 
“indigenous peoples have a recognised claim to ownership to ancestral land under 
international law, even in absence of official deeds.” 342  According to the African 
Commission, traditional ownership of land by the indigenous people is the same as with 
land with official title deeds.343 Based on this reasoning the African Commission found 
the respondent State to have encroached upon the traditional land of the Endorois.344 
According to the African Commission, the encroachment of the Endorois’ land was 
evidenced by their inability to freely access their ancestral land for keeping their 
livestock and conduct their religious activities.345 The African Commission clarified that 
encroachment done in accordance with the law does not violate article 14 of the African 
Charter.346 According to the African Commission, article 14 creates a two-fold test upon 
which the encroachment will be lawful. Firstly, the encroachment should be conducted 
“in the interest of public need or in the general interest of public”.347 Secondly, the 
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encroachment should comply with appropriate laws.348 The African Commission held 
that this two-pronged test is conjunctive in the sense that the lawful encroachment 
should be proven to have been done “in the interest of public need or general interest of 
the community and was carried out in accordance with the appropriate laws.” 349 
According to the African Commission, the standard that is required to justify the “public 
interest” test is strict in cases dealing with encroachment of ancestral land of indigenous 
people. The African Commission relied on the report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
United Nations Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights that 
states: 
“Limitations, if any, on the right to indigenous peoples to their natural resources must 
flow only from the most urgent and compelling interest of the state. Few, if any, 
limitations on indigenous resources rights are appropriate, because the indigenous 
ownership of the resources is associated with the most important and fundamental 
human rights, including the right to life, food, the right to self-determination, to 
shelter, and the right to exist as a people.”350 
According to the African Commission, the limitations on the right to property in article 
14 must be reviewed by using the proportionality test.351 The African Commission noted 
that “the justification of limitations must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely 
necessary for the advantages which follow.”352 The African Commission drew inspiration 
from the ECHR’s case of Handyside v United Kingdom (‘Handyside’).353 In this case the 
ECHR held that any limitation of rights must be proportionate to the legitimate goal 
aimed to be achieved. 354  Referring to Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties 
Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (‘Constitutional Rights Project’)355 the 
African Commission stated that limitation should not render the protected right 
illusory.356 Limitations cannot be proportionate in a moment they render rights illusory.357  
The African Commission thus found the respondent State in violation of article 14 by 
unlawfully removing the Endorois from their traditional land and destroying their 																																																								
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belongings.358 According to the African Commission, such disruption and displacement 
of the Endorois from their homes and the denial of their rights over their traditional land 
was disproportionate to any public need served by the respondent State.359 The African 
Commission noted that although the creation of the game reserve was legitimate and 
served the public need, it could have been undertaken through other proportionate 
means. As such, the African Commission noted further, the limitation of right should not 
render such right an illusory. Where the right is rendered illusory by the limitation, such 
limitation cannot be regarded as proportionate but rather it becomes the violation of the 
right. Thus, the African Commission held that the respondent State’s denial of the 
Endorois’ rights to their traditional land rendered the Endorois’ property rights illusory. As 
such, the creation of the game reserve that caused the removal of the Endorois from 
their land, violates their right to property and cannot substantiate the encroachment with 
reference to “the general interest of the community or public need” test in article 14 of 
the African Charter. 360  According to the African Commission, the disproportionate 
encroachment of the land that belongs to the indigenous communities is greater when 
the encroachment is done by force. The proportionality test is not satisfied where the 
evictions are executed by force.361 
With regard to the “in accordance with the law” test in article 14, the African 
Commission held that the respondent State should be able to demonstrate that the 
evictions were in accordance with both domestic and international law. According to the 
African Commission, this test includes consultation with the indigenous people about the 
evictions and adequate compensation for evictions carried out by the State.362 The 
consultation in the context of indigenous people requires obtaining their consent.363 The 
failure to enforce the obligations to consult, seek consent and compensate amount to 
the violation of the right to property in article 14.364 The African Commission found that 
the respondent State did not consult and adequately compensate the Endorois for the 
evictions in their ancestral land.365  
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Moreover, the respondent State did not conduct an environmental and social impact 
assessment before the evictions. Consequently, the respondent State did not satisfy the 
“in accordance with the law” test, which amounts to the violation of the right to property 
in article 14 as well as the right to development in the African Charter.366 The African 
Commission found that the right to property of the Endorois had been severely 
encroached upon, and that the encroachment was not proportionate to the public need 
and was not in accordance with the domestic and international law. Based on these 
reasons, the African Commission found the respondent State in violation of the 
Endorois’ right to property in article 14 of the African Charter.367 
Then the African Commission dealt with the violation of article 17(2) – (3) of the 
African Charter.368 The African Commission found the respondent State in violation of 
article 17(2) – (3) of the African Charter. The African Commission noted that article 17 is 
dualistic in nature in the sense that it protects individuals’ right to cultural life as well as 
imposing upon States the obligation to promote and protect traditional values recognised 
by the community. 369  According to the African Commission, culture incorporates 
“spiritual and physical association with one’s traditional land, knowledge, belief, art, law, 
morals, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by humankind as a 
member of society.”370 The African Commission also held culture to include religion and 
language of such groups. Regarding the indigenous peoples, culture includes the 
manner in which such people use their traditional land and its resources, including 
fishing, hunting and the right to live in such lands. According to the African Commission, 
the respondent State’s laws that restrict the Endorois’ access to Lake Bogoria deny the 
Endorois access to an “integrated system of beliefs, values, norms, morals, traditions 
and artefacts closely linked to access to the lake.”371  
With reference to the preamble of the African Charter, and the Cultural Charter for 
Africa (‘African Cultural Charter’),372 the African Commission stated that civil and political 
rights and socio-economic rights are interdependent.373 As such, the recognition of 
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socio-economic rights guarantees the enjoyment of civil and political rights.374 It thus 
held that people have the right to enjoy their right to culture without interference.375 It 
then referred to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘Human Rights 
Committee’) comments376 regarding article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).377 Based on this legal source the African Commission held 
that in the context of indigenous peoples culture includes their use of land resources.378 
It went on to state that the right to culture largely incorporates indigenous peoples’ socio-
economic activities including fishing or hunting as well as the right to live in reserved 
land.379 It emphasised that the indigenous peoples’ right to culture imposes upon States 
an obligation to adopt positive legislative and other measures to ensure their active 
participation in decision-making.380 According to the African Commission, article 17(2) 
imposes on States an obligation to adopt measures that takes into account 
conservation, development and diffusion of indigenous peoples’ culture in a manner that 
promotes their cultural identity among other members of the community.381 The African 
Commission further explained that article 17(2) requires States to adopt measures that 
promote awareness and enjoyment of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. 382  It 
proceeded to hold that the respondent State therefore has an obligation to take positive 
steps to protect the Endorois as well as promote their cultural life.383 According to the 
African Commission, this obligation requires the respondent State to create 
opportunities, policies, institutions or other mechanisms that guarantee the existence of 
cultural diversity in the communities.384 The measures should also take into account the 
challenges experienced by indigenous peoples including “exclusion, exploitation, 
discrimination and extreme poverty”. 385  Measures should also address indigenous 
																																																								
374 Para 242. 
375 Para 242. 
376  Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 23, The right of minorities (art 27), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add 5. 
377 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and 
entered into force on 16 March 1976. 
378 Endorois para 243. 
379 Para 243. 
380 Para 243 
381 Para 246. 
382 Para 246. 
383 Para 248. 
384 Para 248. 
385 Para 248. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
275 
 
peoples’ expulsions from their traditional land, deprivation of their socio-economic 
means of livelihood, and their participation in decision-making.386  
The African Commission further noted the omission of an internal limitation clause in 
the African Charter. 387  It emphasised that the omission of the limitation clause 
demonstrates the deliberate intention of the drafters of the African Charter to have very 
few limitations regarding the right to culture.388 The African Commission went on to state 
that the respondent State’s restriction of the right to culture must be proportionate to a 
legitimate aim to be achieved in a manner that does not infringe the enjoyment of this 
Endorois’ right.389 The African Commission held that the respondent State failed to take 
into account the fact that restriction of the Endorois to access Lake Bogoria denies them 
access to their “integrated systems of beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions and 
artefacts linked to access to the Lake”.390 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the African Commission found the respondent State 
in violation of the Endorois’ right to culture provided in article 17(2) – (3) of the African 
Charter. The respondent State’s action to force the Endorois to live on infertile lands 
without access to their medicinal salt licks and vital resources for the health of their 
livestock threatened the Endorois’ pastoralist way of life. Moreover, their right to culture 
had also been denied by such denial and rendered the right an illusory.391 
The African Commission then proceeded to determine the alleged violation of article 
21 of the African Charter concerning the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources.392 The African Commission referred to SERAC and stated that 
this right is also recognised to indigenous peoples.393 Drawing inspiration from the 
IACtHR jurisprudence, particularly Saramaka People v Suriname (‘Saramaka’)394 the 
African Commission noted that the survival of indigenous peoples’ cultural and socio-
economic well-being largely depends on their access and use of natural resources 
protected in article 21.395 Drawing inspiration from Yakye Axa Yakye Axa Indigenous 
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Community v Paraguay (‘Yakye Axa’)396  the African Commission further noted that 
indigenous peoples enjoy the right of ownership of the natural resources they have been 
traditionally using in their territories.397 They also have the right of ownership of land that 
they have been traditionally using and occupying.398  
The African Commission pointed out that the right to natural resources imposes on 
States obligations to respect and protect this right.399 It obliges States to guarantee 
indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of their traditional way of life, as well as the respect and 
protection of their cultural diversity and socio-economic systems. 400  The African 
Commission insisted that article 21 safeguards traditionally used natural resources for 
the socio-economic existence of the indigenous peoples.401 It therefore strictly includes 
natural resources traditionally used for indigenous peoples’ subsistence, cultural and 
religious activities.402 Drawing inspiration from Saramaka the African Commission noted 
that the right in article 21 is not exclusive. According to the African Commission, States 
can restrict this right.403 The African Commission noted that limitation of this right by 
States must be in accordance with the law and proportionate with the aim to be achieved 
by such limitation.404 The African Commission stated that the respondent State has an 
obligation to evaluate whether the limitation of the Endorois’ right to natural resources is 
necessary for preserving the survival of the Endorois.405 It then referred to the provisions 
of article 14 of the African Charter to establish the conditions to justify States’ limitation 
of the right to natural resources in article 21.406 It pointed out that article 14 of the African 
Charter establishes a two-pronged test ‘in the interest of public need or in the general 
interest of the community’ and ‘in accordance with appropriate laws’ to be satisfied.  
The African Commission found that the respondent State failed to demonstrate that 
the Endorois have benefited from the tourism and mineral activities in their area. The 
respondent State did not evaluate whether its action to restrict the Endorois from freely 
disposing their wealth and natural resources was necessary for the survival of the 																																																								
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Endorois.407 The respondent State failed to meet the conditions established in article 14. 
The Endorois have the right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources in 
consultation with the respondent State. Article 21(2) imposes an obligation on States in 
cases of violations of this right to provide for restitution and compensation. The Endorois 
were not adequately compensated by the respondent State, and consequently violated 
article 21 of the African Charter.408 
The African Commission then determined the violation of article 22.409 The African 
Commission found the respondent State in violation of the Endorois’ right to 
development as provided for in article 22 of the African Charter. According to the African 
Commission, this right is dualistic in nature in that it is a means and an end to peoples’ 
socio-economic development.410 The African Commission emphasised that both the 
procedural and substantive elements of the right to development should be respected. It 
pointed out that the failure to observe either one amounts to the violation of the right.411 
The African Commission agreed with the complainants that the right to development 
requires the observation of five criteria namely: “it must be equitable, non-discriminatory, 
participatory, accountable, and transparent.”412 The right to development includes the 
right of people to choose freely the place to live and States must consult the indigenous 
community when it deals with their land.413  
The African Commission held that the consultation conducted by the respondent 
State was inadequate, thus failed to prove the effective participation of the Endorois.414 
As such, the Endorois were not given an opportunity to determine their role in the game 
reserve.415 The African Commission went on to elaborate the content of the right to 
development. It drew inspiration from article 2(3) of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Right to Development (‘Declaration on Development’)416 and noted that the right to 
development includes “active, free and meaningful participation” in development 
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processes.417 It noted further that it was not adequate for the respondent State to just 
provide food aid to realise the right to development, but the State rather should have 
improved the capabilities of the Endorois to feed themselves.418 Drawing inspiration from 
Yakye Axa the African Commission noted that the Endorois were not provided with a 
collective land of equal value to their ancestral land but rather they were moved to semi-
arid land that was unconducive for pastoralism.419 The right to development incorporates 
participation of people that requires States to disseminate information and constant 
communication between the parties.420 The consultations must be held in good faith.421 
The African Commission found that the consultation with the Endorois was not sufficient 
and that the respondent State did not obtain the consent of the Endorois before 
changing their land to a game reserve and executing the evictions.422 The respondent 
State also did not adequately inform the Endorois that they would be denied their right to 
access their land for grazing and the medicinal salt licks for their livestock, as well as 
religious ceremonies, as they legitimately expected.423  
The African Commission emphasised that in addition to the respondent State’s duty 
to consult the Endorois, it also has an obligation to obtain their consent freely.424 The 
African Commission, referring to the case by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (‘Inter-America Commission’) Mary and Carrie Dann v United States (‘Dann’),425 
agreed with the complainants that the respondent State failed to accurately inform the 
Endorois of the nature and consequences of the development process.426  Drawing 
inspiration from the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, the African Commission 
noted that major development projects carried out in territories occupied by indigenous 
peoples tend to affect their socio-economic rights.427 As such, the African Commission 
insisted that their free and prior consent is significant for the protection of such rights.428  																																																								
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Furthermore, the African Commission, referring to Saramaka, stated that benefit 
sharing is an important element of the rights to development and property.429 According 
to the African Commission, benefit sharing is also an important indicator of compliance 
with property rights including adequate compensation. 430  Failure to compensate 
adequately for the violation committed amounts to the violation of the right to property.431 
Drawing inspiration from the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development 
and Transformation (‘African Participation Charter’),432 the African Commission stated 
that benefit sharing is important in the development process.433 The African Commission 
stated further that based on the object and purpose of the African Charter right to “just 
compensation” means that the Endorois are entitled to a reasonable share to 
compensate them from restriction or deprivation of their right to use and enjoy their land 
and natural resources.434 With reference to the recommendation of the Committee on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, although prior and informed 
consent of the indigenous peoples is important when major development projects are 
carried out in their territories, equitable sharing of benefits deriving from such 
development projects must also be guaranteed.435  
The African Commission held that the object and purpose of the African Charter 
requires reasonable and equitable compensation when traditionally owned lands and 
natural resources relating to the survival of the Endorois are exploited.436 According to 
the African Commission, the lack of adequate consultation caused the Endorois to feel 
marginalised in a significant process of development in their life as a people. 437 
Furthermore, the African Commission stated that the respondent State’s failure to 
provide the Endorois with adequate compensation and other benefits as well as the 
failure to provide them with suitable land to graze their livestock, proves that the 
respondent State failed to involve the Endorois adequately in the development 
process.438 																																																								
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Based on the violations found, the African Commission recommended that the 
respondent State should recognise the victims’ rights of property ownership as well as 
restitution of their traditional land. Moreover, it recommended that the respondent State 
ensure that the Endorois enjoy their right of access to Lake Bogoria for religious and 
cultural practices as well as for grazing their livestock. The African Commission 
recommended that the respondent State compensate the victims adequately.439 
5 5 Jurisprudence of the African Commission: Evaluation in light of the 
teleological approach 
5 5 1 Development of the scope and content of explicit socio-economic rights 
The analysis has established that the African Commission did not apply the 
teleological approach in developing the scope and content of these rights during the 
limited phase. It did not elaborate the object and purpose of the African Charter relating 
to the socio-economic rights involved. The African Commission did not consider the 
African Charter holistically in developing the content of the rights. During the limited 
phase, the African Commission relied exclusively on the narrow and literal textual 
approach to interpretation. As was demonstrated in chapter two440 the narrow and literal 
textual approach limits the ability of the supervisory organs to engage different 
interpretative tools to generate the meaning, scope and content of the provisions 
effectively. The approach strictly confines the supervisory organ to the letters of the 
provisions being interpreted.  
During this phase, the African Commission found the violations of socio-economic 
rights by merely reiterating the provisions of such rights without elaborating what those 
rights entail. For example, in the Union Interafricaine, Malawi African Association and 
Modise, communications that involved the violation of the right to property, the African 
Commission did not elaborate the precise normative content of this broadly formulated 
right in the African Charter.441 As such, jurisprudence in the limited phase failed to clarify 
clearly, what States should protect regarding the right to property. Ssenyonjo observes 
that the failure to develop the content of the right to property caused the lack of clarity of 
the elements of this right, including its meaning.442 Similar to its approach with regard to 
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the right to property, the African Commission also failed to analyse the normative 
content of the right to work in Mazou and Union Interafricaine. Ssenyonjo argues that the 
African Commission was not clear on whether the right to work incorporates an 
exclusive and unconditional right to obtain employment as well as the individual’s right to 
choose work.443 Although it established the unequal treatment between the victim and 
other people condemned of the same offence, it failed to use the value of equality and 
the right to equality to develop the content of the right to work in Mazou. The African 
Commission thus failed to elaborate on the interdependence between the right to work 
and the right to non-discrimination and equality. 
In Free Legal Assistance, Union Interafricaine, Saro-Wiwa, Malawi African 
Association and Media Rights Agenda the African Commission failed to elaborate the 
elements that constitute the rights to health and education. Yeshanew confirms the 
failure of the African Commission to give an expansive analysis of the contents of the 
right to health in the Free Legal Assistance.444 In Union Interafricaine in particular, 
although the African Commission referred to the right to non-discrimination, it did not 
expound the interdependence between this right and the rights to property, work, 
education, and protection of the family. It also failed to use the right to non-discrimination 
to elaborate the scope and content of the rights involved in this communication. 
Mbazira445 and Ssenyonjo446 confirm the African Commission’s failure to interpret and 
develop the contents of these rights. Ssenyonjo argues that the actual words in the 
provisions of the rights to health and education do not generate the normative contents 
of these rights.447 They require proper interpretation and elaboration in the context of the 
specific communications. 
It should be noted that scholars have also identified various reasons that contributed 
to the limited development of the normative content of socio-economic rights in the 
jurisprudence of the African Commission during this phase. One of the reasons noted by 
Mbazira, Ssenyonjo and Umozurike is that various actors give less priority to socio-																																																								
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economic rights than to civil and political rights. Many communications filed with the 
African Commission engaged mainly civil and political rights rather than socio-economic 
rights.448 Civil society actors such as the non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) did 
not give priority to violations relating to socio-economic rights in the same manner they 
did with the civil and political rights.449 Thus, the African Commission received few 
communications alleging the violations of socio-economic rights such as the rights to 
food, adequate housing and social security.450 Moreover, the African Commission was 
more reluctant to determine communications involving socio-economic rights than those 
involving civil and political rights. 451  Ssenyonjo also mentions lack of international 
jurisprudence as a reason that hindered the African Commission from elaborating the 
normative scope and content of the socio-economic rights.452 Umozurike argued earlier 
that the development of the normative content of the socio-economic rights by the 
African Commission would burden the States with many problems that they could not 
solve.453  
Another reason mentioned by scholars is the confidentiality requirement regarding 
the findings of the African Commission in article 59 of the African Charter. Umozurike 
argues that the confidentiality requirement pursuant to the provisions of article 59 of the 
African Charter jeopardised the power of the African Commission to develop the content 
of human rights in an elaborate manner.454 The requirement minimises the responsibility 
of the African Commission to elaborate the content of socio-economic rights.455 It should 
be noted that, as discussed in chapter four of this study,456 the principle of effectiveness 
incorporated in the teleological approach to interpretation allows the African Commission 
to publish its reports. Moreover, as discussed in chapter four457 since June 1994 the 
African Commission has been publishing its decisions.458 Scholars have also identified 																																																								
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the African Commission’s lack of interdependence, expertise and financial resources as 
reasons for the under-development of the scope and content of socio-economic rights. 
459 
The reasons identified by these scholars concerning the contribution of the identified 
factors to the limited development of the normative scope and content of socio-economic 
rights are valid. However, it can be argued that the main reason for such under-
development is the failure of the African Commission to use the teleological approach for 
interpreting these rights. During this phase of its jurisprudence, the African Commission 
relied mainly on a narrow and literal textual approach to interpretation that does not take 
into account relevant interpretive tools of the teleological approach to human rights 
treaty interpretation as analysed in chapter two.  
Ssenyonjo also argues that in its decisions the African Commission failed to draw 
inspiration from relevant international human rights instruments to develop the scope 
and content of socio-economic rights despite article 60 of the African Charter requiring it 
to do so.460 It should be noted that the formulation of article 60 is mandatory, not 
discretionary. 461  Commenting on Malawi African Association, Mbazira argues that 
reference to international instruments and jurisprudence would have assisted the African 
Commission to elaborate the scope of socio-economic rights’ obligations. 462 
Commenting on the failure of the African Commission to elaborate the normative content 
of the right to education, Nmehielle argues that the African Commission could draw 
inspiration from the CESCR that considers the right to education as among the 
significant socio-economic rights.463  
In the expansive phase, the African Commission applied various aspects of the 
teleological approach to interpret socio-economic rights involved. For example in Dino 
Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘Noca’),464 Endorois, Mauritania, COHRE, 
and IHRDA the African Commission, engaging a number of provisions of the African 
Charter, applied relevant international, regional and national laws and jurisprudence to 
interpret the right to property. For example in Noca, in conjunction with the provisions of 																																																								
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article 2 of the African Charter, the African Commission identified that the right to 
property in article 14 is recognised for every individual.465 This interpretation by the 
African Commission is significant as it establishes the holder of the right to property. 
Krause correctly observes that in developing the holder of the right to property in article 
14 of the African Charter, the African Commission has to use the provisions of article 2. 
As such, recognition of individuals and groups as the right holder of this right is 
necessary.466  
In COHRE, IHRDA and Noca, the African Commission identified two main principles 
relating to the right to property. These principles include the general right to ownership 
and peaceful enjoyment of the right to property, as well as the possibility and condition 
of deprivation of the right to property.467 In Noca the African Commission stated that the 
right to property encompasses the right to an adequate compensation.468 The element of 
compensation is imperative in the right to property in that it recognises and protects an 
individual’s right to ownership of property against unlawful deprivation. As Krause notes, 
the requirement to compensate for deprivation of ownership distinguishes the two forms 
of interferences namely: deprivation of property and control over the use of property.469 
The African Commission also identified “land” as another component of the right to 
property.470  The inclusion of “land” as a component of property is significant as it 
broadens the scope of the right to property and cures the African Charter’s silence on 
what constitutes property. Krause correctly observes none of the international human 
rights instruments “limit the protection of property to any particular kind of property.”471 
Moreover, in Endorois the African Commission added other components of the right to 
property to include access to property, possession, use and control over the property as 
well as economic resources and rights on the collective land.472 These elements are 
significant in that they assist to identify forms of interference by the States and their 
implications for the right to property ownership. Krause, when commenting on “control 
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over the use of property”, argues that this is a lesser form of interference that does not 
infringe on the right to ownership.473 
Moreover, the decision of the African Commission in Endorois is unique and 
important regarding the property rights of the indigenous peoples. The decision 
recognises the right of the indigenous peoples to their ancestral land even without formal 
title.474 This recognition of the indigenous peoples’ property rights without registered 
titles embraces the approach of the African Charter that draws on African realities and 
philosophical perspectives regarding peoples’ rights. It was demonstrated in chapter 
three that the African Charter not only recognises individuals’ but also peoples’ socio-
economic rights.475 It was argued that the recognition of the collective socio-economic 
rights is justified by the notion of African philosophy entrenched in the preamble to the 
African Charter and elaborated in the provisions within the African Charter. It was 
elaborated that the notion of African philosophy is centred on the understanding that 
African societies are collective in nature.476 Particularly, chapter three demonstrated that 
based on African philosophy property rights in most of the African societies are collective 
in nature.477 
In Endorois however, the African Commission did not invoke the notion of African 
philosophy to elaborate and develop this unique and important scope and content of the 
right to property relating to indigenous peoples. It exclusively relied on the relevant 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR. Although relevant jurisprudence of other regional bodies is 
an important tenet of the teleological approach the interpretive potential within the text of 
the African Charter as a whole need to be explored first. The methodology for 
application of the teleological approach, developed in chapter two, argued for the 
supervisory organs to start the interpretative process by the text of the African Charter 
as a whole.478 Exclusive reliance on the relevant jurisprudence, although it resonates 
strongly with the teleological approach, does not enable the African Commission to 
elaborate the manner in which the African Charter is sufficiently formulated to develop 
the scope and content of the socio-economic rights. The African Commission could 
apply the notion of African philosophy first to develop the scope and content of the 
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property rights of the indigenous peoples and then apply the relevant jurisprudence to 
establish the external coherence. 
In SERAC the African Commission applied the ICESCR as a relevant international 
human rights instrument and the relevant provisions of the African Charter to interpret 
the right to health. Through these tenets of the teleological approach, the African 
Commission elaborated upon the normative content of the rights to health and the right 
to a healthy environment to include environmental and industrial hygiene, scientific 
monitoring of threatened environments, publishing of environmental and social impact 
studies, access to information and meaningful participation of the individuals.479  In 
Purohit the African Commission, by engaging the provisions of articles 16 and 18(4) of 
the African Charter, extended the content of the right to health to encompass right to 
health facilities and access to health goods and services without discrimination.480 In 
COHRE the African Commission drew inspiration from relevant international human 
rights instruments and expanded the content of the right to health.481 According to the 
African Commission, the right to health also incorporates timely and appropriate health 
care, access to safe and portable water, an adequate supply of food, nutrition and 
housing, as well as safe drinking water and electricity.482 Moreover, other determinants 
of the right to health include availability, accessibility and acceptability.483 These three 
elements are significant as they identify the guiding principles for the realisation of the 
right to health. Toebes argues that the criterion of “availability” guides the States to 
ensure health services are sufficient for the whole population and at an adequate 
standard. Accessibility requires States to ensure health services are financially 
affordable and they are geographically within reach as well as on an equal basis. 
Acceptability ensures that they are culturally acceptable by the population.484 Through 
this jurisprudence relating to the right to health, the African Commission has managed to 
cover two significant aspects relating to this right, namely health care as well as the 
underlying determinants of the right to health. As Toebes rightly argues:  
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“The elements that make up the right to health can be divided into two categories: 
one containing elements related to ‘health care’ (including curative as well as 
preventive health care), another one encompassing elements related to a number of 
‘underlying preconditions for health’. The latter may be considered to include safe 
drinking water, adequate sanitation, adequate nutrition, health-related information, 
environmental health, and occupational health.”485 
Furthermore, the African Commission in SERAC applied the preparatory work and 
the relevant international human rights jurisprudence to explain the right of peoples to 
freely dispose their wealth in article 21 of the African Charter. However, it failed to apply 
this important interpretative tool in the subsequent jurisprudence. 
5 5 2 Broadening the scope of socio-economic rights: Derived rights 
In the limited phase the communications did not expressly allege the violations of 
socio-economic rights that are not explicitly stated in the African Charter. These rights 
include the socio-economic rights to social security, and the highest standard of living 
including water, food and housing. For example, in Free Legal Assistance the 
complainants alleged that the respondent State’s failure to provide safe drinking water 
constituted a violation of the right to health in article 16 of the African Charter.486 In this 
communication the African Commission found denial of the basic services such as water 
to constitute a violation of the right to health. However, it failed to show the 
interdependence between the right to health and the right to water. The African 
Commission failed to use the opportunity in Free Legal Assistance to include in the 
African Charter the derivative right to water. In Malawi African Association the African 
Commission in determining the right to health held that denial of food to the victims 
violated right to health. However, it did not elaborate the existence of the right to food in 
the African Charter clearly. It also did not refer to any aspect of the teleological approach 
to elaborate the right to food. 
In the expansive phase, the African Commission broadened the scope of socio-
economic rights in the African Charter to include implicit socio-economic rights. It was 
demonstrated in the analysis that in SERAC the African Commission engaged some 
provisions of the African Charter to incorporate the right to food and housing in the 
African Charter.487 The African Commission held that by violating these existing rights 
the respondent State not only violated these explicit rights but also violated the right to 																																																								
485 174. 
486 Free Legal Assistance para 4. 
487 SERAC paras 60-67. See also part 5 4 3 1 above. 
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food that is implicit in the African Charter.488 As shown in the analysis above, in COHRE 
the African Commission interpreted the rights to adequate food, water and housing as 
the underlying components of the right to health.489 It relied on the relevant international 
instruments particularly, the UDHR, ICESCR, and General Comment 4 to include the 
derived rights. 
The position taken by the African Commission draws on the principle of 
interdependence of the rights to incorporate omitted socio-economic rights as discussed 
in chapter three.490 Thus, the broadening of the scope to include omitted socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter is significant in two respects. Firstly, it implies that socio-
economic rights that are not expressly formulated in the African Charter can be included 
in the African Charter through interpretation. Viljoen rightly argues that the concept of 
implied rights confirms that the express textually formulated rights do not necessarily 
prevent the recognition of other rights that are not textually formulated.491 Ssenyonjo 
notes that the jurisprudence of the African Commission brings into the African Charter all 
missing socio-economic rights, including the rights to social security, water and 
sanitation.492 Secondly, the extension of the scope of the African Charter affirms the 
interdependence of rights. As demonstrated in chapter three, the concept of 
interdependence of rights can be applied as a mechanism of recognising and 
incorporating into the African Charter significant socio-economic rights that are not 
explicitly formulated therein.493 Viljoen confirms the notion of the interdependence of 
rights through the notion of implied rights.494 In relation to interdependence of socio-
economic rights Krause, when commenting on the link between the right to property and 
housing, correctly observes that:  
“The link between housing rights and the protection of property is obvious. The home 
which one owns is protected by one’s right to property. In this way, the right to 
property also contributes to the realisation of the right to housing.”495 
The use of interdependence of the rights to incorporate omitted socio-economic 
rights resonates strongly with a teleological approach and advances the object and 																																																								
488 SERAC para 64. 
489 COHRE para 209. 
490 See chapter three, part 3 3 2 2. 
491 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 327. 
492 Ssenyonjo “Economic, social and cultural rights” in The African regional human rights system 74. 
493 See chapter three, part 3 3 2 2. 
494 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 327. 
495 Krause “The right to property” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 207. 
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purpose of the African Charter. As Viljoen argues, implicit socio-economic rights should 
be incorporated in the African Charter by using the explicit rights.496 According to Viljoen, 
the right to food can be established through the provisions of articles 4, 16 and 22.497  
5 5 3 Elaborating the scope and content of States’ obligations 
5 5 3 1 Obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil 
In the limited phase, the African Commission elaborated the nature and scope of 
States’ obligations broadly. The broad elaboration of States’ obligations is problematic, 
as it does not define the precise nature of these obligations. The African Commission did 
not apply any tenet of the teleological approach to interpret States’ obligations imposed 
by the relevant rights. 
To the contrary, in the expansive phase the African Commission elaborated the 
nature and scope of States’ obligations in a detailed manner. In SERAC the African 
Commission applied the ICESCR to clarify the nature of States’ obligations. It clarified 
the quartet typology of State obligations imposed by each socio-economic right. 
According to the African Commission, each right imposes upon States obligations to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the relevant rights. The African Commission applied 
its own jurisprudence and the relevant international laws to elaborate the nature of 
States’ obligations imposed by the rights to property and health in Endorois, 498 
Mauritania, COHRE,499 and Noca. The African Commission stated that the provisions of 
articles 14 and 16 respectively, impose upon States the duties to respect, protect and 
fulfil the rights to property and health.500  
The elaboration of States’ typology of obligations in the development of the nature 
and scope of the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights is significant in two 
respects. Firstly, it demonstrates that the content and scope of each socio-economic 
right encompasses both negative and positive duties. As Odinkalu501 and Chenwi502 
correctly observe, the human rights in the African Charter impose upon State Parties 																																																								
496 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 328. 
497 328. 
498 Endorois para 191. 
499 COHRE paras 192 & 209. 
500 Paras 192 & 209. See also Endorois para 191. 
501 Odinkalu “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights” in The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 196. 
502 L Chenwi “An appraisal of international law mechanisms for litigating socio-economic rights, with a 
particular focus on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the African Commission and Court” (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 683 689. 
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both negative and positive obligations. Through SERAC the African Commission 
outlines the negative and positive duties imposed upon States by the socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter.503 The negative obligations require States to desist from 
interfering in the enjoyment of the rights while positive obligations require States to take 
positive interventions. According to Heyns, the obligation to respect is negative in nature 
in that States are obliged to refrain from interfering with individuals’ enjoyment of their 
socio-economic rights.504 The obligations to protect, promote and fulfil are positive in 
nature in that States are required to ensure third parties do not violate individuals’ socio-
economic rights, as well as to advance and sustain individuals’ enjoyment of such 
rights. 505  Thus, all human rights impose upon States obligations relating to non-
interference, as well as taking positive measures to ensure enjoyment of these rights.506 
Secondly, drawing on international law scholarship, it suggests that States must 
immediately ensure that socio-economic rights are respected, whilst taking progressive 
positive steps to protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic rights. Chirwa observes that 
the obligation to respect requires States to realise the rights immediately while the 
obligations to protect, promote, and fulfil require a progressive realisation.507 The aspect 
of progressive realisation will be analysed below.508  
The African Commission failed to engage the duties’ provisions in the African Charter 
to incorporate and elaborate the typology of obligations. In the SERAC, the African 
Commission failed to engage the provisions of article 1, 25, and 26 of the African 
Charter to elaborate the quartet typology of obligations. As demonstrated in chapter 
three, article 1 incorporates the obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil.509 
Moreover, articles 25, 26, and 28 provide for the obligations to promote and respect.510 
Thus, the failure to expound the typology of obligations from these provisions is 
problematic. The problem lies with the fact that the African Commission failed to use the 
																																																								
503 689. 
504 C Heyns “Civil and political rights in the African Charter” in MD Evans & R Murray (eds) The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (2002) 137 138-139. 
505 138-139. 
506 IT Winkler The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water Allocation 
(2012) 107. 
507 DM Chirwa “African regional human rights system: The promise of recent jurisprudence on social 
rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (2008) 323 325. 
508 See part 5 5 3 3 below. 
509 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 2. 
510 See chapter three, parts 3 3 5 1 and 3 3 5 2. 
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relevant provisions of the African Charter to develop the nature and scope of the 
obligations imposed by the socio-economic rights.  
5 5 3 2 Obligation of non-discrimination 
Apart from the quartet typology of obligations, the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission identifies States’ obligation to non-discrimination as a socio-economic 
rights’ obligation. The African Commission in Purohit stated that the right to health 
imposes upon States an obligation to ensure realisation of this right without 
discrimination of any kind. 511  Moreover, in Endorois the African Commission 
acknowledged States’ obligation to non-discrimination in the right to property.512 
As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation,513 the inclusion of the obligation to 
eliminate discrimination in the realisation of the socio-economic rights is significant in 
two respects. Firstly, it shows that these socio-economic rights incorporate obligations of 
immediate nature. Secondly, the jurisprudence’s use of the term “any other kind”514 
shows that States should refrain from both direct and indirect discrimination of the rights 
to health and property.515 This implies that socio-economic rights prohibit discrimination 
on the prohibited grounds, as well as discrimination on any other status. While 
commenting on the provisions of article 2(2) of the ICESCR, Winkler notes that 
prohibition of discrimination extends to both direct and indirect discrimination, which 
includes discrimination based on prohibited grounds as well as discrimination done 
without the intention to discriminate.516  
Significantly, the jurisprudence of the African Commission includes positive 
discrimination as a component of socio-economic rights’ obligations. In Endorois the 
																																																								
511 Purohit para 80. 
512 Endorois  para 196. 
513 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 4. 
514 Endorois para 80. 
515 The CESCR defines direct and indirect discrimination in its General Comment 20, Non-discrimination in 
economic, social and cultural rights (art 2, para 2) (2009) UN Doc. E/C. 12/GC/20 (‘General Comment 20’) 
para 10 (a)-(b). According to CESCR:  
“Direct discrimination occurs when an individual is treated less favourably than another person in a similar 
situation for a reason related to a prohibited ground; e.g., where membership of a trade union, or employment 
in educational or cultural institution is based on the political opinions of applicants or employees. Direct 
discrimination also includes detrimental acts or omissions on the basis of prohibited grounds where there is not 
comparable similar situation (e.g. the case of a woman who is pregnant).” While “Indirect discrimination refers 
to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at first value, but have a disproportionate impact on the 
exercise of Covenant rights as distinguished by prohibited grounds of discrimination. For instance, requiring a 
birth certificate for school enrolment may discriminate against ethnic minorities or non-nationals who do not 
possess or have been denied, such certificates.”  
516 Winkler The Human Right to Water 112-113. 
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African Commission recognised that States bear an obligation to consider preferential 
treatment for marginalised and disadvantaged groups in order to eliminate the 
discrimination they face and promote substantive equality. Thus the African Commission 
held: 
“Positive discrimination or affirmative action helps to redress imbalance… it is a well-
established principle of international law that unequal treatment towards persons in 
unequal situations does not necessarily amount to impermissible discrimination. 
Legislation that recognises said differences is therefore not necessarily 
discriminatory.”517  
The African Commission’s recognition of positive discrimination in socio-economic 
rights is vital in the sense that it enables States to consider preferential treatment to 
vulnerable individuals to ensure their effective enjoyment of socio-economic rights. 
Ssenyonjo argues that the jurisprudence of the African Commission demonstrates that 
States have a general obligation not to discriminate on prohibited grounds as well as 
taking special measures to help marginalised groups from the violations caused by 
discrimination.518 Writing on the obligations imposed by the right to water, Winkler notes 
that States are obliged to adopt non-discriminatory measures. However, they are also 
obliged by the international human rights instruments to give preferential treatment to 
the most marginalised and vulnerable groups in order to redress the inequalities that 
perpetuate discrimination.519  As such, the obligation to non-discrimination does not 
prohibit or prevent States from taking special measures to correct the inequalities. As 
the CESCR states in its General Comment 20 on non-discrimination in economic social 
and cultural rights (‘General Comment 20’),520 such special measures are valid provided 
they are “reasonable, objective and proportional” to remedy de facto discrimination.521 
5 5 3 3 Obligation of progressive realisation  
In Purohit and in Gunme the African Commission stated that the right to health and 
the right to development impose upon States an obligation of progressive realisation.522 
While in Gunme the African Commission clearly used the phrase “progressive 																																																								
517 Endorois para 196. In this communication the respondent state argued that preferential treatment in 
favour of the Endorois can be perceived as discriminatory. 
518 Ssenyonjo “Economic, social and cultural rights” in The African Regional Human Rights System 84. 
519 Winkler The Human Right to Water 113. 
520 CESCR General Comment 20 para 9. 
521 Para 9. 
522 Purohit para 84. See also Gunme para 205. 
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realisation”, in Purohit the African Commission stated that the State’s obligation to 
ensure the full realisation of the right to health entailed taking “concrete and targeted 
steps”.523 In this regard, the African Commission held that: 
“The African Commission would however like to state that it is aware that millions of 
people in Africa are not enjoying the right to health maximally because African 
countries are generally faced with the problem of poverty which renders them 
incapable to provide the necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that 
facilitate the full enjoyment of this right. Therefore, having due regard to this 
depressing but real state of affairs, the African Commission would like to read into 
Article 16 the obligation on part of States party to the African Charter to take 
concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advantage of its available resources, to 
ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all its aspects without discrimination 
of any kind.”524 
Chenwi notes that whether the obligation “to take concrete and targeted steps” 
requires States to implement their obligations regarding the right to health immediately 
remains unclear.525 However, it can be argued that the obligation “to take concrete and 
targeted steps” incorporates the obligation to take immediate steps towards the 
progressive realisation of the right to health. This argument is based on the fact that not 
all requirements regarding the right to health can be realised immediately. Based on the 
scarcity of resources as mentioned by the African Commission and as argued in chapter 
three,526 right to health should be realised progressively. It was demonstrated in chapter 
three that the object and purpose of the African Charter to protect requires States 
through the provisions of article 1, to take legislative and other measures to realise 
socio-economic rights. The African Commission’s decision requiring States to take 
“concrete and targeted steps while taking full advantage of its available resources to 
ensure the right to health is fully realised” steps can broadly be argued to be 
incorporated in the provisions of article 1 that require States to take legislative and other 
measures. The African Commission reasoned that poverty prevents States from 
realising the right to health. This reasoning resonates with the argument of resource 
scarcity which makes the full realisation of all aspects of the right immediately 
impossible for many African states. As argued in chapter three, object and purpose of 
article 1 requires measures, taken for realisation of socio-economic rights, to be realised 
																																																								
523 Purohit para 84. 
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525 Chenwi (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 695. 
526 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 3. 
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progressively. In this way it can be argued that obligation “to take concrete and targeted 
steps” in Purohit implies an obligation of progressive realisation.  
However, it should be noted that progressive realisation should not be considered as 
an excuse to delay taking immediate, relatively inexpensive steps such as designing a 
plan of action for the realisation of the rights. As such, if the relevant rights cannot be 
realised immediately, immediate and concrete steps must be taken towards full 
realisation. As the CESCR stated in its General Comment 3, “progressive realisation” in 
article 2 does not relieve States from realising the minimum essential levels527 of the 
socio-economic rights in the ICESCR.528  
Commenting on the decision of the African Commission in Purohit Ssenyonjo notes 
that by the phrase “take concrete and targeted steps”, the African Commission read into 
article 16 the obligation to progressive realisation.529 While reviewing Purohit Mbazira 
notes that the African Commission’s statement that States should take concrete and 
targeted steps mindful of the availability of resources, denotes the inclusion of the 
obligation of progressive realisation towards full realisation of the right to health in the 
African Charter.530 However, as discussed above, States bear an obligation to take 
immediate steps towards full realisation of the relevant socio-economic rights. 
Viljoen argues that the obligation “to take concrete and targeted steps” is only 
applicable to the right to health. Viljoen’s argument that the obligation to “take concrete 
and targeted steps” is relevant in the context of the right to health is valid. However, I 
contend that this obligation extends to other socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter. It has been demonstrated above that the obligation to take concrete and 
targeted steps is incorporated in the obligation to realise socio-economic rights 
progressively embodied in the provisions of article 1 of the African Charter. The essence 
of “progressive realisation” in article 1, as it was discussed in chapter three, takes into 
account the fact that, based on their dependence on resources and scarcity of such 
resources, socio-economic rights in the African Charter cannot be realised immediately. 
It can therefore be argued that it is the object and purpose of the African Charter to 																																																								
527 The notion of minimum essential levels is analysed in chapter six, part 6 4 2. 
528 CESCR General Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations UN Doc. E/1991/23 (‘General 
Comment 3’). 
529 Ssenyonjo (2011) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 387. 
530 C Mbazira Case Review: The right to health and the nature of socio-economic rights obligations under 
the African Charter: The Purohit case (2005) 6 ESR Review, available at 
<http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/socio-economic-rights/research-and-publications/esr-review/Volume 
%206%20%204%20November%20%2005> (accessed 15-05-2017). 
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realise socio-economic rights progressively towards their full realisation. This means the 
obligation in Purohit, as it is an obligation to progressive realisation is not restricted to 
the right to health but rather it is applicable to the positive duty to fulfil all the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter. Moreover, as discussed in chapter two, the 
principle of effectiveness requires provisions to be interpreted in a manner that renders 
their meaning effective and practical rather than theoretical and illusory. It will be 
defeating the object and purpose of the African Charter and render the provisions of 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter theoretical and illusory if “progressive 
realisation” is restricted to the right to health only. Mbazira notes while the obligation to 
“take concrete and targeted steps” was applied to the right to health it is also applicable 
to all socio-economic rights in the African Charter.531  
As discussed in chapter 3, progressive realisation requires States to take positive 
measures towards the full realisation of individuals’ socio-economic rights.532 States 
Parties should be able to show that sufficient measures are being taken for the 
realisation of the human rights of individuals within the shortest period in accordance 
with the maximum available resources.533 It is worth noting that, as demonstrated in 
chapter 3,534 the inclusion of “progressive realisation” in the African Commission’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence is significant in two respects. Firstly, it allows States to 
protect such rights on a progressive basis towards their full realisation. Secondly, 
“progressive realisation” provides the claimants of socio-economic rights violations with 
an opportunity to demonstrate the State’s failure to realise their rights within a 
reasonable period of time.  
As is the case with the typology of obligations, the African Commission failed to 
construe the obligations to progressive realisation and available resources through the 
provisions of article 1. It should be noted that chapter three of this dissertation 
demonstrated that the formulation of the provisions of article 1 includes the obligation to 
progressive realisation.535 In Purohit the African Commission failed to use this possibility 
found in the African Charter to develop the scope of States’ obligations, imposed by the 																																																								
531 C Mbazira Case Review: The right to health and the nature of socio-economic rights obligations under 
the African Charter: The Purohit case. See also Ssenyonjo  (2011) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 388. 
532 See chapter three, 3 3 3 3. 
533 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (1995) 330-331. 
534 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 3. 
535 See chapter, three, part 3 3 3 3. 
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right to health, in relation to progressive realisation and availability of resources in the 
realisation of socio-economic rights. In this communication the African Commission 
relied exclusively on the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness. 
This position demonstrates the African Commission’s inappropriate application of the 
teleological approach to interpretation, to engage the provisions of the African Charter in 
generating the normative content of the socio-economic rights and their scope of 
obligations.  
5 5 4 Model of review 
The discussion in chapter 3 showed that article 1 of the African Charter requires 
Member States to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the socio-
economic rights and their concomitant obligations.536 It is important for supervisory 
organs, after interpreting the scope and content of socio-economic rights and their 
related obligations, to establish whether the legislative or other measures adopted by 
States give effect to such obligations. A model of review is required to enable the 
supervisory organs assess the measures adopted by States. Through a model of review 
supervisory organs can ascertain States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights 
obligations. Writing on constitutional context Pieterse notes that, having established the 
scope and content of socio-economic rights and their related obligations, supervisory 
organs must establish whether measures adopted by States to realise the rights comply 
with these obligations.537 According to Pieterse, this requires supervisory organs to 
assess such compliance by using a model of review.538  
The analysis has shown that the African Commission has applied different models of 
review in its jurisprudence, for example in SERAC, Purohit, COHRE, and Endorois. 
However, the African Commission has been inconsistent regarding the model of review 
it applies. In SERAC and Endorois the African Commission applied the reasonableness 
model of review. 539 It stated in SERAC that States are required to take reasonable and 
other measures to give effect to the obligations imposed by article 24 of the African 
																																																								
536 See chapter, three, part 3 3 3 3. 
537 M Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 South 
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Charter.540 In Endorois it held that States’ interference with the enjoyment of rights must 
be reasonable.541  
In SERAC the African Commission also applied the minimum core obligation.542 
According to the African Commission, at the minimum, the right to shelter requires 
States to desist from destroying housing of the people, as well as their efforts to re-
construct the demolished homes.543 It further stated that the minimum core of the right to 
food obliges States to refrain from destroying and polluting food sources. 544 
Furthermore, this obligation requires States to ensure that third parties do not destroy or 
pollute food sources as well as peoples’ efforts to feed themselves.545  
In Purohit the African Commission required States Parties to take “targeted and 
concrete” steps in the compliance with their obligations imposed by the right to health.546 
In COHRE547 and Endorois548 the African Commission applied the proportionality test 
stating that limitation of rights in the African Charter must be “proportionate and 
necessary” for achieving “public need”. This inconsistency is problematic, as it does not 
offer a clear guidance as to the appropriate model of review to be applied. Moreover, the 
African Commission does not elaborate the content of these models of review. It 
therefore fails to correspond with the teleological approach to interpretation. 
Scholars have criticised the African Commission regarding its application of these 
models. For example, Chirwa,549 Chenwi550 and Yeshanew551 respectively challenge the 
African Commission for its inconsistency and its failure to elaborate the contents of 
these standards in its jurisprudence. 552  In SERAC and in Purohit the African 
Commission failed to state the ingredients of the reasonableness review standard.553 
Moreover, the meaning of “targeted and concrete” steps as applied in Purohit is not 
clear.554 The African Commission failed further to relate the “targeted and concrete” 																																																								
540 SERAC para 52. 
541 Endorois para 172. 
542 SERAC paras 61 and 65. 
543 Para 61. 
544 Para 65. 
545 Para 65. 
546 Purohit para 84. 
547 COHRE para 188. 
548 Endorois para 172. 
549 Chirwa “African regional human rights system” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 326-327. 
550 Chenwi (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 694. 
551 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 314 and 321. 
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steps in Purohit with its earlier decision in SERAC.555  Owing to this inconsistency 
regarding the precise model of review in its jurisprudence it is difficult to identify a 
specific model that the African Commission follows.556  
Scholars’ concerns about the uncertainty of the African Commission regarding the 
model of review it applies and its failure to develop the content of such models are valid. 
Their concerns indicate the need to develop a specific model of review for the 
supervisory organs to apply when monitoring States’ compliance with their socio-
economic rights obligations. In an attempt to address this need, Yeshanew developed a 
model of review that combines minimum core and reasonableness.557 However, as will 
be shown in the next chapter the notion of minimum core does not sufficiently 
correspond with the teleological approach to interpretation. 
I argue in the next chapter that a teleological model of review is required to assess 
States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights’ obligations. The viability of 
reasonableness integrated with minimum core and proportionality as an appropriate 
model of review for the supervisory organs to use is considered in the next chapter. This 
model can be applied to review States’ compliance in a manner that furthers the object 
and purpose of the African Charter relating to socio-economic rights. The teleological 
model of review is vital for the effective realisation of socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter.  
5 5 5 Remedial recommendations 
During the limited phase, the African Commission failed to advance the object and 
purpose regarding remedial recommendations sufficiently. As shown in the analysis 
above the African Commission during the limited phase issued mainly broad and 
unspecific undetailed declaratory remedial recommendations. It issued restitutionary 
remedies only in Mazou and Malawi African Association. It issued compensatory 
remedial recommendations only in Malawi African Association. These vague remedial 
recommendations are problematic in the sense that they fail to protect socio-economic 
rights effectively in a manner that advances the object and purpose of the African 
Charter. They also fail to guide States clearly on how to implement the remedies 
effectively.  																																																								
555 327. 
556 Chenwi (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 694. See also Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, 
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In some communications the victims were not sufficiently redressed. For example in 
communications where the African Commission issued only undetailed declaratory 
remedies the victims were left without other effective remedies such as compensation or 
restitution. As Ssenyonjo notes, in some communications the African Commission did 
not order any remedial recommendations to benefit the victims directly.558 In Mazou 
where the African Commission issued restitutionary remedies it did not elaborate what 
the respondent State should do to re-instate Mr Mazou. In communications where the 
African Commission issued compensatory remedies it failed to clearly state how States 
should compensate. Furthermore, in all remedial recommendations the African 
Commission failed to apply the provisions of the African Charter to elaborate its remedial 
mandate as well as the remedial recommendations it issued.  
The failure to apply the provisions of the African Charter does not correspond with 
the teleological approach that requires the African Charter to be applied holistically in 
elaborating the remedies. Ssenyonjo notes that the African Commission’s priority on the 
amicable resolution was the reason for its failure to issue effective remedies.559 It can 
also be argued that the failure to engage the teleological approach that would have 
assisted it to apply various provisions of the African Charter to specify effective remedies 
also contributed to the African Commission’s failure to issue effective and legally 
reasoned remedies. 
In the expansive phase, as shown in the analysis above, the African Commission 
issued in some communications detailed declaratory, restitutionary and compensatory 
remedial recommendations to redress the victims of the violations effectively. For 
example, in COHRE the African Commission expansively elaborated the remedial 
recommendation that required the respondent State to “take all necessary and urgent 
measures” to protect the victims of the violations.560 Moreover, as shown in the analysis 
above, the reasoning of the African Commission on remedies during the expansive 
phase was more elaborate than in the limited phase. However, the African Commission 
failed to use aspects of the teleological approach to specify the remedies. The 
application of the teleological approach would have helped the African Commission to 
apply various provisions of the African Charter, as discussed in chapter four,561 to issue 
effective remedies for the violations. In this way, the African Commission would have 																																																								
558 Ssenyonjo (2015) International Human Rights Law Review 158 
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used the provisions of the African Charter to elaborate the object and purpose of the 
African Charter regarding remedial orders.  
5 6 Conclusion 
The African Commission has developed remarkable socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence between 1995 and 2013. Significantly, the limited phase confirms that 
socio-economic rights, as their counterpart civil and political rights, are justiciable. 
However, the application of the textual approach to interpretation in the limited phase 
restricted the African Commission from elaborating the scope and content of socio-
economic rights and their related obligations effectively. Moreover, the absolute 
application of the narrow and literal textual approach to interpretation during the limited 
phase restricted the possibility of the African Commission to expand the scope of socio-
economic rights. Therefore, the African Commission failed to include the implicit rights to 
food, water and housing in the African Charter. The approach also inhibited the African 
Commission from issuing sufficient and detailed remedial recommendations to the 
victims of socio-economic rights violations. These weaknesses led to the ineffective 
protection of socio-economic rights and defeated the object and purpose of the African 
Charter.  
In the expansive phase, the jurisprudence shows a shift in the approach to 
interpretation from the narrow and literal textual approach to the teleological approach. 
Through this approach, the jurisprudence in the expansive phase establishes the 
normative scope and content of various broadly formulated socio-economic rights in a 
more elaborate manner. Importantly, the jurisprudence expands the scope of socio-
economic rights in the African Charter. The jurisprudence confirms that the African 
Charter incorporates implicit socio-economic rights to food, water and housing. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence establishes in the African Charter the States’ typology of 
obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil. It also shows that socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter impose upon States obligations to progressive realisation 
and non-discrimination. Significantly, the jurisprudence in the expansive phase 
demonstrates the African Commission’s detailed remedial orders.  
The major challenge facing the African Commission is the inconsistencies in the 
application of these aspects of the teleological approach. There are some 
communications where the African Commission relied exclusively on the ICESCR, for 
example, in its decision in SERAC. In some communications like Purohit and Gunme it 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
301 
 
mixed the teleological approach and the narrow and literal textual approach. In some 
communications such as Endorois it made a good use of the relevant provisions of the 
African Charter and the relevant international and regional human rights instruments. 
Moreover, the use of preparatory work of the African Charter is minimal.  
The African Commission has also failed to make use of the principle of effectiveness 
in interpreting the socio-economic rights. Even a holistic use of the African Charter is 
insufficient as the African Commission failed to apply the provisions of article 1 to 
elaborate the nature of States’ obligations, and the values of equality, dignity; freedom 
and justice have not been applied to elaborate the scope and content of the socio-
economic rights. In chapters two and three, this study identified the significance of these 
provisions of the African Charter in interpreting socio-economic rights. The analysis of 
the jurisprudence in this chapter has shown that the African Commission does not have 
a consistent methodology for applying the teleological approach. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of the African Commission clearly shows the 
inconsistencies regarding the model of review that the African Commission applies to 
assess States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations. These 
weaknesses confirm that the jurisprudence of the African Commission on socio-
economic rights has not been in line with the teleological approach in a manner that 
ensures effective protection of socio-economic rights. These inconsistencies in the 
application of the teleological approach also fail to advance the object and purpose of 
the African Charter. The following chapter will suggest a more coherent approach that 
may help the supervisory organs to align their socio-economic rights jurisprudence with 
the teleological approach to interpretation. 
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Chapter 6 
Aligning the jurisprudence of the African Commission with the 
teleological approach 
6 1 Introduction 
The analysis and evaluation of the jurisprudence in the previous chapter has 
demonstrated that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African 
Commission’)1 developed both the scope and content of socio-economic rights and the 
nature and scope of obligations imposed by these rights more extensively in the 
expansive phase than in the limited phase. Moreover, the previous chapter has shown 
that in its jurisprudence the African Commission, during the limited phase, relied 
exclusively on the narrow and literal textual approach that is not consistent with the 
teleological approach to interpretation. In the expansive phase the African Commission 
applied the elements of the teleological approach in its jurisprudence to interpret the 
socio-economic rights.  
The application of certain aspects of the teleological approach to the interpretation of 
the rights was, however, inappropriate. I pointed out in the previous chapter that the 
African Commission lacks a consistent methodology for applying the teleological 
approach to interpretation. Moreover, the previous chapter showed the inconsistencies 
regarding the model of review that the African Commission applies.  
This chapter recommends a methodology that can assist the supervisory organs to 
align its socio-economic rights jurisprudence with the teleological approach to 
interpretation. The chapter also develops a teleological model of review as part of the 
recommendations and explores the viability of reasonableness as a model of review 
capable of advancing the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-
economic rights. The development of a teleological model of review is significant for 
assessing States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations. It is vital that 
States take into consideration the object and purpose of the African Charter while 
implementing their socio-economic rights obligations. 
																																																								
1 The African Commission is established by art 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 I.L.M 58 (1982) was adopted on 27th June 1981 and entered 
into force on 21st October 1986. 
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6 2 Towards an appropriate and coherent interpretation of socio-economic rights 
in the African Charter 
6 2 1 Adoption of a methodology for the application of the teleological approach 
The failure to apply the teleological approach systematically confirms that the African 
Commission lacks a methodology for applying the teleological approach. In chapter two, 
this dissertation developed the methodology that can assist the supervisory organs of 
the African Charter to apply the teleological approach to interpretation systematically.2 It 
is recommended that the supervisory organs adopt this methodology. This part proceeds 
to elaborate on the steps of the methodology. 
6 2 1 1 Interpreting socio-economic rights in light of the object and purpose of the 
African Charter 
The discussion in chapter two demonstrated that the object and purpose of a treaty is 
a vital interpretative tool of a teleological approach to interpretation. 3  Thus, the 
supervisory organs should interpret the socio-economic rights enshrined in the African 
Charter in the light of its object and purpose. This implies that they should take into 
account the object and purpose of the African Charter relating to these rights throughout 
the interpretative process. It should be noted that the articles of the socio-economic 
rights can be interpreted effectively only when the object and purpose of the African 
Charter regarding these rights is ascertained. 
As shown in chapter two the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding 
socio-economic rights is to protect such rights in a manner that guarantees and 
improves the socio-economic conditions of the people and enable them to live a 
dignified life. An enquiry regarding the goal that the African Charter aims to achieve 
needs to be at the centre of the interpretative process. Through this enquiry supervisory 
organs should be able to identify and engage significant interpretative tools.  
Debates about whether the object and purpose in the teleological approach to 
interpretation is a single or two distinct notions and whether the notion requires a 
specific or general meaning should be avoided. I demonstrated in chapter two that the 
notion “object and purpose” referred to in the teleological approach is a single notion 
																																																								
2 See chapter two, part 2 5. 
3 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2. 
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with a general definition.4 As such “object and purpose” elaborates the teleological 
approach to interpretation and the application of its tenets collectively and flexibly. 
Considering the fact that the African Charter is a human rights treaty its interpretation 
should focus on embracing its object and purpose. The concept of object and purpose of 
the African Charter appears, in the analysis, to be a benchmark which supervisory 
organs can use to achieve an effective interpretation of socio-economic rights. As such, 
the analysis shows the need for the supervisory organs to adopt an object and purpose-
centred approach to interpretation for the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. Supervisory organs should see the object and purpose of the African 
Charter regarding socio-economic rights as a yardstick that they should embrace and 
use in the interpretative process. The discussion in chapter five confirms that the African 
Commission has not yet been able to appropriately consider this notion and develop an 
object and purpose-centred jurisprudence of socio-economic rights.  
6 2 1 2 Considering the text of the African Charter holistically 
As discussed in chapter two the teleological approach to interpretation interprets a 
treaty as a whole to develop the scope and content of such treaty’s provisions.5 As 
demonstrated further in chapter three the African Charter as a whole sufficiently offers a 
broad potential to develop the meaning, scope and content of socio-economic rights. 
Supervisory organs should start the interpretative process of the socio-economic rights 
in the African Charter by considering the text of the African Charter holistically. An object 
and purpose-centred interpretation of socio-economic rights requires the engagement of 
all relevant provisions of the African Charter and its interpretive potentials. The African 
Commission has not been able to engage the African Charter as a whole in its 
jurisprudence hence it has failed to engage the interpretative tools available within the 
African Charter in the interpretative process. Significantly supervisory organs should 
interpret socio-economic rights in the African Charter by showing the nexus between 
socio-economic rights and other substantive provisions in the African Charter such as 
the provisions relating to the rights to equality, non-discrimination, life and dignity. 
Supervisory organs, when interpreting socio-economic rights, should consider the 
preamble to the African Charter. The argument that the preamble to a treaty is not part 
																																																								
4 See chapter two, parts 2 3 1 2 and 2 3 1 3. 
5 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
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of the treaty cannot be sustained.6 As shown in chapter two and three, in human rights 
treaties the preamble forms a significant interpretative tool.7 The preamble of the African 
Charter should thus be seen as a significant interpretative aspect in interpreting the 
socio-economic rights in question. Supervisory organs should be able to consider the 
preamble to the African Charter when generating the meaning, scope and content of 
socio-economic rights. As such, the African Commission’s failure to use the preamble in 
its socio-economic jurisprudence should be corrected. The use of the preamble will 
provide insight to the supervisory organs regarding the object and purpose of the socio-
economic rights in question, values to be considered and a notion of interdependence of 
rights which is significant to the object and purpose-centred interpretation of socio-
economic rights and the tenets of African philosophy. As discussed in chapter three, 
supervisory organs should take into account both senses of interdependence of the 
rights, that is, organic and related interdependence. Chenwi notes that interdependence 
of the rights should be considered to include the relationship between two categories of 
rights that is, civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights.8 It should also be 
considered to include the inter-relationship that exists in the socio-economic rights 
category.9 As such, the supervisory organs should appropriately apply the notion of 
interdependence of rights stated in the preamble to the African Charter. The supervisory 
organs’ interpretation of socio-economic rights should be able to show the link between 
such rights and other related rights within the African Charter. Writing on the 
permeability of rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission, Chenwi argues 
that the recognition of the notion of independence of the rights in the preamble to the 
African Charter confirms the mutual inter-relationship between socio-economic rights 
and civil and political rights.10 As such, the interpretative process should link socio-
economic rights with other provisions found in the African Charter. This practice of 
interdependence will help to develop the content of socio-economic rights through other 
provisions within the African Charter and confirm the existence of the relevant 
interpretative tools therein. 
Supervisory organs should be able to take into account the values of equality, dignity, 
freedom and justice stated in the preamble to the African Charter for an object and 																																																								
6 See also Fitzmaurice (1951) British Year Book of International Law 24-25. 
7 See chapter two, part 2 2 3, and chapter three, part 3 3 2. 
8 L Chenwi “Permeability of rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission” (2014) 39 Suppl SAYIL 
93 93-94. 
9 95. 
10 93-94. 
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purpose-centred interpretation of socio-economic rights. The African Commission’s 
exclusion of these values in the interpretative process is a weakness as the 
jurisprudence fails to show the nexus between the values and the socio-economic rights 
in question. The use of these values will help supervisory organs to develop the content 
of the socio-economic rights to inform the meaning, scope and content of socio-
economic rights. Moreover, the preamble to the African Charter reveals the Member 
States’ commitment to embrace African philosophy. Supervisory organs should take into 
account the notion of African philosophy in developing the meaning, scope and content 
of socio-economic rights. Significantly, supervisory organs should use the potential of 
African philosophy in interpreting peoples’ socio-economic rights as discussed in chapter 
three.11  
Apart from the preamble to the African Charter, the general obligation clause in 
article 1 of the African Charter should be seen as the underlying obligation imposed by 
each socio-economic right. Supervisory organs should apply the general obligations 
clause in order to identify the nature of a State’s obligations regarding socio-economic 
rights provisions in the African Charter. The general obligation clause recognises the 
quartet typology of obligations. The linking of this clause with socio-economic rights will 
thus mean that these rights impose the obligations to respect, protect, promote, and 
fulfil. Moreover, the general obligation clause enshrines the obligation to progressive 
realisation and within maximum available resources. Interpretation of the socio-
economic rights can benefit from this clause by incorporating these two forms of 
obligations into socio-economic rights provisions. The supervisory organs should be able 
to harness these obligations from within the African Charter rather than reading them 
through other instruments.  
The scope and content of the broadly formulated substantive socio-economic rights 
provisions of the African Charter should be developed during the interpretative process. 
These rights are formulated in broad terms and as such they afford the supervisory 
organs enough room to flexibly develop their scope and content. Considering this broad 
formulation, supervisory organs should interpret these rights by integrating them with 
other provisions within the African Charter to generate their meaning, scope and 
content. It is recommended that the supervisory organs should avoid interpreting these 
broad provisions independently from other provisions of the African Charter. Moreover, 
the supervisory organs should interpret socio-economic rights by integrating such rights 																																																								
11 See chapter three, part 3 2 4 2. 
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with other related substantive provisions such as the right to equality, life, dignity and 
non-discrimination. These provisions have the potential for developing the content of 
socio-economic rights. The interdependence of rights can be seen as a significant 
mechanism to assist the supervisory organs in the application of these related rights 
provisions.  
The reasoning of the supervisory organs in developing the scope and content of 
socio-economic rights should be developed along these lines. As Chenwi rightly argues, 
on the one hand, the interdependence of the rights should be applied to elaborate on the 
inter-relation between the categories of rights and, on the other hand, to develop the 
scope and content of the rights at stake.12 This part has elaborated on the holistic 
consideration of the African Charter regarding the substantive provisions therein. The 
holistic interpretation of the African Charter in relation to the procedural provisions is 
discussed in part 6 2 1 6 below. 
6 2 1 3 Utilising the preparatory work of the African Charter 
Both internal and external13 preparatory work to the adoption of the African Charter 
should be seen as significant interpretative tools of the African Charter’s socio-economic 
rights. The African Commission has rarely applied this significant aspect of the 
teleological approach in establishing the meaning of socio-economic rights. At the 
second step the supervisory organs should engage this interpretative tool in the 
interpretative process as demonstrated in the methodology for the application of the 
teleological approach. It is recommended that the supervisory organs avoid the 
arguments raised by scholars and institutions against the use of preparatory work as 
shown in chapter three. The arguments that preparatory work is merely the intention of 
the parties and that it is not necessary when the text of the treaty is clear should be 
avoided. The discussion in chapter two showed that the provisions of article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention recognises preparatory work as a significant interpretive tool relevant 
for the interpretation of a treaty of a human rights nature.14  																																																								
12 Chenwi (2013) 39 Suppl SAYIL 95. 
13 See chapter three, part 3 2 1. The discussion in chapter three, part 3 2 1 categorised preparatory work 
of the African Charter in two categories namely: internal and external. It further showed that internal 
preparatory work represents historical initiatives by the OAU and anti-colonial struggles to adopt the 
African Charter; while external preparatory work represents historical initiatives played by the international 
institutions such as the ILC and the UN in the adoption of the African Charter. These two categories of the 
African Charter’s preparatory work are discussed in chapter three, parts 3 2 2, 3 2 1 1 and 3 2 3. 
14 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 2. 
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This discussion showed that although the Vienna Convention places preparatory 
work as a supplementary interpretative tool it does not necessarily restrict the possibility 
of considering it as a primary interpretative tool. It was shown that the Vienna 
Convention in article 31(1) requires a treaty to be interpreted in the light of its object and 
purpose and mentions primary interpretative tools that can elaborate the object and 
purpose. Although the preparatory work is not included as a primary interpretative tool, 
the fact that the preparatory work of the African Charter elaborates its object and 
purpose renders it a primary interpretative tool. Moreover, the discussion in chapter 
three demonstrated that even when the text of the treaty is clear preparatory work can 
be deployed to ascertain the clarity of the object and purpose of the treaty regarding 
such text.15 The supervisory organs should disregard the argument that the application 
of preparatory work is unfair to the parties who did not participate in the negotiations for 
the adoption of the treaty. They should also not accept the argument that the 
preparatory work is genuinely not available. The debate should rather focus on the 
functions of the preparatory work and its relevance in the interpretative process. 
Responses to objections against the use of the preparatory work should show the 
manner in which preparatory work addresses the present day living conditions and 
provide insight into the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding the socio-
economic rights being interpreted. Supervisory organs should use the preparatory work 
effectively to obtain insight into the object and purpose of the African Charter in relation 
to socio-economic rights. These organs should ensure that they use the values of 
equality, dignity, justice and freedom and the notion of African philosophy enshrined in 
the preparatory work to elaborate the object and purpose of the African Charter.  
The responses to the arguments against the use of the preparatory work in the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter should also show the 
implications of the preparatory material of the African Charter for the interpretation of 
socio-economic provisions. The implications include promotion and protection of socio-
economic rights; promotion of African philosophies and the values of equality, dignity, 
justice and freedom; developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights and 
their related obligations, consideration of the relevant international human rights treaties 
and jurisprudence and highlighting the interpretive mandate of the supervisory organs.  
																																																								
15 See chapter three, parts 3 2 to 3 2 4 3. 
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6 2 1 4 Considering the relevant international, regional and national legal sources 
Considering the need for consistency with other relevant international, regional and 
national human rights legal sources, the supervisory organs should apply such sources 
at the third step of the interpretative process. Reference to these legal sources should 
be linked with the relevant provisions of the African Charter. As shown above,16 this 
practice is significant as it demonstrates the external coherence of the African Charter. 
As the African Charter is one of the international human rights treaties it should be 
consistent with other relevant international, regional and national human rights 
instruments and jurisprudence. 
Therefore, after establishing the scope and content of the socio-economic rights and 
their related obligations the supervisory organs can invoke the provisions of articles 60 
and 61 of the African Charter as well as article 7 of the African Court Protocol to draw 
inspiration from relevant international, regional, and national laws and jurisprudence 
regarding these rights.  
6 2 1 5 Principle of effectiveness 
The supervisory organs should apply the principle of effectiveness throughout the 
interpretative process. As demonstrated in chapter two 17  the principle in its four 
dimensions will help the supervisory organs to ensure that the meaning assigned to the 
provisions of the socio-economic rights is practical and effective. It will also assist the 
supervisory organs to interpret these rights by considering the living conditions at the 
time of interpretation. Moreover, it will assist the supervisory organs to create external 
coherence by engaging other relevant legal sources in interpreting socio-economic 
rights. Finally, it will enable the supervisory organs to interpret socio-economic 
provisions generously in a manner that guarantee their holders’ effective enjoyment. 
6 2 1 6 Effective interpretation and use of the interpretive and remedial mandate of 
the supervisory organs 
Reading the African Charter holistically also requires supervisory organs to engage 
various provisions in the African Charter in a manner that grant them an effective 
interpretative and remedial mandate. As argued in chapter four, the African Charter and 
the African Court Protocol vest the supervisory organs with an interpretive and remedial 																																																								
16 See also chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
17 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
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mandate which should be broadly interpreted. The argument that the omission of explicit 
provisions regarding locus standi to the African Commission limits individuals from 
accessing it is superfluous and should be discouraged. The African Commission should 
apply the principle of effectiveness 18  to render the African Charter, regarding 
complainants’ access, effective and practical. The African Commission can further apply 
the teleological approach to interpretation to construe other admissibility requirements 
such as exhaustion of local remedies flexibly. The discussion in chapter four showed 
that the rule regarding local remedies should in some circumstances not be interpreted 
in an overly restrictive manner, particularly where such remedies are unavailable, 
inadequate, ineffective, and insufficient.19 The African Commission should also flexibly 
interpret the requirement to submit the communication within reasonable time after 
exhaustion of local remedies. This will advance the object and purpose of the African 
Charter regarding protection of socio-economic rights.  
Furthermore, the argument that the African Commission has no jurisdiction to issue 
provisional measures, due to the African Charter’s omission of the explicit provision of 
provisional measures, cannot be sustained. The teleological approach through the 
principle of effectiveness broadly enables the African Commission to issue provisional 
measures in socio-economic rights communications. Although the African Commission 
has been issuing these measures in its jurisprudence, it has not shown the basis for its 
jurisdiction. It is recommended that the principle of effectiveness should be applied to 
establish the legal basis for the African Commission’s mandate relating to provisional 
measures. The African Commission can broadly construe the provisions of articles 30, 
45(1)(b), 45(2) and 46 of the African Charter as well as Rule 98(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Rules of 
Procedure’)20 to establish its mandate to issue provisional measures. 
Although the African Charter is silent regarding the African Commission’s remedial 
jurisdiction the teleological approach can be applied to establish that mandate. The 
African Commission can generously interpret the provisions of articles 1, 7, 21(2), 26, 
30, 45(1)(b), 45(2) and 55 of the African Charter to establish its mandate to issue 																																																								
18 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 3 and 2 5 2 4. 
19 See chapter four, part 4 3 4 1. 
20 The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights were adopted by the 
African Commission during its 2nd ordinary session held in Dakar, Senegal from the 2-13 February 1988 
and they were revised by the African Commission during its 18th ordinary session held in Praia Cabo-
Verde from the 2-11 of October, 1995. They were later approved by the African Commission during its 
47th ordinary session held in Banjul, The Gambia in 2010. 
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various remedies for the effective protection of socio-economic rights. The arguments 
that the omission renders the African Commission ineffective should be avoided. 
Furthermore, the argument that remedial recommendations as issued by the African 
Commission are non-binding and therefore should not be enforced should be rejected. 
Although by their nature recommendations are non-binding they are authoritative. 
Therefore, States’ non-compliance on the basis of the non-binding nature of 
recommendations defeats the object and purpose of the African Charter. States should 
abide by their commitment to fulfil their international obligations in good faith. It will thus 
be a lack of good faith for States to ignore the recommendations of the African 
Commission without compelling reasons. Moreover, it should be noted that it is States’ 
socio-economic rights obligations that bind them, rather than the recommendations. As 
argued in chapter four21 the African Commission’s recommendations are authoritative 
and they are meant to advance the object and purpose of the African Charter. States’ 
failure to implement these recommendations amounts to lack of good faith on their part.  
The argument that article 59 of the African Charter on confidentiality of the African 
Commission’s findings renders the Commission ineffective should be avoided. Although 
the findings are confidential the principle of effectiveness can facilitate the effective 
interpretation of article 59 and enable the publication of the findings. As shown in 
chapter four, although the African Commission has been publishing its findings, it has 
failed to elaborate the mechanisms that enable it to do so.22 The African Commission 
can apply the principle of effectiveness to justify the publication of its findings. Moreover, 
reading the text of the African Charter as a whole allows the use of articles 60 and 61 to 
draw inspiration from other legal sources to justify the publication of its findings. 
It is recommended that the African Commission should reject the argument that the 
omission of the express provision in the African Charter, regarding the African 
Commission’s mandate to follow-up States compliance with its decisions, renders the 
Commission ineffective. The African Commission can apply various provisions of the 
African Charter and its Rules of Procedure to establish this mandate. Thus the argument 
that the African Commission lacks jurisdiction to follow up States’ compliance with its 
decisions should be avoided. The African Commission should use articles 30, 45(1)(b), 
45(2), 46, 55, 60, 61 and 62 to establish its jurisdiction. This is facilitated by the 
																																																								
21 See chapter four, part 4 3 7. 
22 See chapter four, part 4 3 8. 
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teleological tenet, which allows interpreting a treaty as a whole, as well as the principle 
of effectiveness. 
Furthermore the argument that the establishment of the African Court diminishes the 
relevance of the African Commission is without foundation.23 The African Commission is 
still relevant and the provisions regarding the complementarity between the African 
Commission and the African Court can be applied to demonstrate the relevance of the 
African Commission.24 For example, as demonstrated in chapter four, Rule 118 of the 
Rules of Procedure recognises the African Commission as a party before the African 
Court with a mandate to refer cases to it. By recognising the African Commission as a 
party with locus standi before the African Court, Rule 118 of the Rule of Procedure 
renders the African Commission relevant machinery in the protection of the socio-
economic rights. Exploring the complementarity arrangements between the African 
Commission and the African Court Rudman notes that the provisions of Rule 118 are 
relevant in demonstrating the inter-relationship between the African Commission and the 
African Court.25 
Regarding the African Court, its establishment gives it a contentious mandate to 
interpret all international human rights instruments.26 This broad contentious mandate is 
problematic as it allows the African Court to potentially extend its contentious jurisdiction 
to other treaty bodies. As argued in chapter four, by this broad contentious mandate the 
African Court intrudes upon the interpretive mandate of other supervisory organs 
established by such instruments.27 This broad contentious mandate should be restricted. 
The most effective way to restrict it is by using the principle of effectiveness. The African 
Court should use this principle to restrict the contentious mandate in a manner that 
renders such mandate effective and practical. As discussed in chapter 228 the principle 
of effectiveness in its general dimension allows the interpretation of provisions of a treaty 
in a manner that renders such provisions practical and effective rather than theoretical 																																																								
23 Ankumah notes the debate among the participants of the fifth ICJ workshop on the establishment of the 
African Court whereby some participants in support of the African Court argued that the African Court 
should be established in order to replace the African Commission as, according to those participants, it 
was ineffective. See Ankumah EA The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and 
Procedures (1996) 194. 
24 See the preamble to the African Court Protocol and arts 2, 5(1)(a), 6(1) and (3), 8, and 33 of the African 
Court Protocol as well as Rule 118 of the Rules of Procedure and Rule 29 of the African Court Rules. 
25 A Rudman “The Commission as a party before the Court – Reflections on the complementarity 
arrangement” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 4. 
26 See art 3 of the African Court Protocol as well as the discussion in chapter four, part 4 4 1. 
27 See chapter four, part 4 4 1. 
28 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
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and ineffective. As argued in chapter four,29 through this principle the phrase “relevant 
human rights instruments” can be restricted and construed to mean relevant African 
human instruments that acknowledge the jurisdiction of the African Court, as well as 
protocols to the African Charter. This understanding enables the African Court to 
interpret and apply African human rights instruments that acknowledge its competence. 
As such, this restricted approach will save the African Court from encroaching on the 
interpretive mandate of other international, regional and sub-regional supervisory 
organs.30  
Regarding the locus standi to the African Court two major raised arguments should 
be avoided. Firstly, the criticism that the African Commission and States can be reluctant 
to submit cases to the African Court, as per article 5 of the African Court Protocol should 
be avoided. States are obliged by the provisions of article 1 of the African Charter to 
protect human rights. Moreover, the African Commission is also obliged to protect 
human rights through articles 30, 45 and 46. The word “protect” should be broadly 
interpreted to ensure these institutions submit to the African Court cases relating to the 
violations of socio-economic rights. The African Court can also use its mandate that 
allows it on its own initiative to issue provisional measures with the aim of protecting 
violations of socio-economic rights. As shown in chapter four31 the African Court in 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya (‘Libya’)32 issued provisional 
measures on its own initiative.  
In its recent judgment in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The 
Republic of Kenya (‘The Republic of Kenya’),33 the African Court issued provisional 
measures after a request was made by the applicant. In this case the applicant 
requested the African Court to issue provisional measures in order to avoid irreparable 
harm to the Ogiek Community of the Mau Forest regarding their socio-economic rights to 
culture, property, and development enshrined in articles 14, 17(2)(3) and 22 of the 
African Charter. 34  The applicant submitted the request for provisional measures 
pursuant to article 27(2) of the African Court Protocol and Rule 51 of the African Court 
Rules.35 The African Court was satisfied that there existed a risk of irreparable harm to 																																																								
29 See chapter four, part 4 4 1. 
30 See chapter four, part 4 4 1. 
31 See chapter four, part 4 4 4. 
32 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application No 004/2011 para 25. 
33 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012. 
34 The Republic of Kenya paras 4 and 9. 
35 Para 11. 
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the Ogiek Community regarding their socio-economic rights to property, culture and 
development.36 It therefore issued provisional measures pursuant to the provisions of 
article 27(2) of the African Court Protocol.37 
 Secondly, the argument that the provisions of article 5(3) and 34(6) of the African 
Court Protocol limit the access of individuals to the African Court is not valid. Although 
the declaration by States is required other avenues can still be used to ensure individual 
access to the African Court. The African Commission can be used as an effective 
avenue to ensure individual’s access to the African Court. Furthermore the argument 
that this indirect access of individuals to the African Court is ineffective should be 
discounted. This argument undermines the application of other avenues such as the 
African Commission, which can enable individuals to access the African Court. The 
African Court should apply the principle of effectiveness, which requires restrictions to 
be narrowly construed, to allow effective enjoyment of rights. This approach may allow 
the individuals, whose cases have been submitted by the African Commission, to be 
considered as parties and witnesses to the litigations, that is, independent procedural 
standing. Moreover, Rule 29(3) read in conjunction with Rule 45(1) of the African Court 
Rules should be interpreted generously to allow individuals as parties and witnesses to 
the socio-economic rights litigations. 
With regard to admissibility criteria the provisions of article 6(2) of the African Court 
Protocol allow the African Court to “take into account” the provisions of article 56 of the 
African Charter. The African Court should construe the phrase “take into account” in a 
manner that allows flexibility in interpreting admissibility requirements. This approach 
may allow the African Court to ensure that, in circumstances where the complainants of 
socio-economic rights violations cannot fulfil all admissibility requirements for legitimate 
reasons, strict application is avoided. The provisions of Rule 40 that require strict 
application of admissibility requirements in article 56 should be interpreted in a manner 
that guarantees flexibility and advances the object and purpose of the African Charter 
regarding socio-economic rights. This can be done through the principle of effectiveness 
that requires restrictions of the rights to be narrowly interpreted in order to ensure 
effective and practical enjoyment of the rights. 
The argument that the binding nature of the African Court’s provisional measures is 
uncertain is not valid. Provisional measures issued by the African Court bind the 																																																								
36 Para 20. 
37 Para 21. 
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respondent State in a case. The African Court should broadly interpret the phrase “shall 
adopt” in a manner that gives its provisional measures binding force thereby nullifying 
the argument that the binding nature of the African Court’s provisional measures is 
uncertain. Moreover, it would be lack of States’ good faith to ignore the provisional 
measures that the African Court issue to advance the object and purpose of the African 
Charter regarding socio-economic rights. As such the provisional measures by the 
African Court should also be enforced in good faith. 
It is recommended that the African Court give reasons for its decisions in order to 
ensure effective interpretation of socio-economic rights. The legal reasoning is important 
as it establishes the legitimacy and credibility of the African Court. It also demonstrates 
the relevant legal sources that the African Court has taken in its judgments and it helps 
to develop the scope and content of the socio-economic rights.  
6 2 1 7 Conclusion 
This part has developed and elaborated on an appropriate and coherent 
methodology that can assist the supervisory organs to align their jurisprudence with the 
teleological approach to interpretation and the methodology of its application as 
developed in chapter two. It is recommended that the supervisory organs adopt the 
teleological approach developed in chapter two and apply it in line with the methodology 
developed in chapter two. The adoption of the teleological approach will assist the 
supervisory organs in interpreting the socio-economic provisions in the African Charter 
based on its object and purpose. Interpretation based on the object and purpose of the 
African Charter will assist the supervisory organs to start the interpretative process by 
considering the text of the African Charter holistically. In this regard, the supervisory 
organs will interpret the provisions of the supervisory organs in the African Charter by 
taking into account the relevant provisions in the African Charter as a whole. This 
approach will enable the African Charter to take into account the preambular statements 
relating to values of equality, dignity, freedom and justice, as well as the notions of 
African philosophy and interdependence of the rights when interpreting the socio-
economic rights. The supervisory organs will also be able to interpret the socio-
economic rights by applying other relevant provisions such as article 1 of the African 
Charter regarding the general obligations, as well as those provisions relating to the 
rights to equality, non-discrimination, life and dignity. These should inform the 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights.  
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The supervisory organs should apply the preparatory work of the African Charter in 
the interpretative process to garner insight regarding the meaning of the provisions of 
the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. Moreover, the supervisory organs 
should also use the provisions of articles 60 and 61 in the African Charter as well as 
article 7 of the African Court Protocol to draw inspiration from other relevant 
international, regional and national laws and jurisprudence. They should also take into 
account the principle of effectiveness throughout the interpretative process. It has been 
recommended that the supervisory organs should also interpret the provisions relating to 
their interpretive and remedial mandate broadly for effective interpretation of socio-
economic rights. Importantly, the supervisory organs should apply the teleological model 
of review in assessing States’ obligations imposed by the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. The following part discusses different models of review with a view of 
developing a teleological model of review that is significant for supervisory organs to 
align their jurisprudence with the teleological model of review.  
6 3 Models of review 
6 3 1 Introduction  
Monitoring States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations is the vital 
role of the supervisory organs for effective protection of these rights. Supervisory organs 
should ensure that the model of review they apply to assess States’ compliance 
advances the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-economic 
rights. The discussion in chapter five demonstrated that in its jurisprudence, the African 
Commission has been inconsistently applying different models of review, including the 
reasonableness review, minimum core obligation and proportionality. The chapter 
showed further that the African Commission failed to develop the content of these 
standards. These shortcomings regarding models of review failed to guide States’ to 
effectively enforce their socio-economic rights’ obligations. The inconsistent application 
of these models of review should be avoided. As stated above, this chapter develops a 
teleological model of review and recommends that supervisory organs consistently apply 
this model in reviewing States’ measures regarding the implementation of their socio-
economic rights obligations.  
Since this chapter aims at developing a teleological model of review, the analysis of 
different models of review as applied by supervisory organs is required. This analysis is 
vital as it helps to identify the strengths and weaknesses of different models of review. 
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The discussion will further help the development of a teleological model of review. The 
following part analyses the models of review. It starts by showing the nexus between a 
model of review and the teleological methodology. 
6 3 2 The link between models of review and the teleological methodology 
Chapter two showed that the teleological approach to interpretation requires the 
supervisory organs to interpret socio-economic rights by using the object and purpose of 
the African Charter.38 The methodology for application of the teleological approach to 
interpretation developed in chapter two requires supervisory organs to interpret the 
socio-economic rights in the light of the object and purpose of the African Charter 
regarding these rights.39 It further requires the supervisory organs to apply the principle 
of effectiveness throughout the interpretative process. This principle aims at ensuring 
that the provisions of the African Charter are interpreted in a manner that renders socio-
economic rights effective and practical rather than theoretical and illusory.40 Chapter four 
showed that the supervisory organs have the mandate to interpret the socio-economic 
rights enshrined in the African Charter and their obligations.41 Moreover, chapter five 
showed that after establishing the normative scope and content of the socio-economic 
rights and their concomitant obligations the supervisory organs are required to assess 
States’ compliance with their established obligations.42 The chapter showed further that 
the supervisory organs achieve this assessment process by using a model of review.43 It 
can therefore be argued that there is a direct link between a model of review and the 
teleological methodology. Since the elaboration of the normative scope and content of 
the socio-economic rights and their related obligations advances the object and purpose 
of the African Charter, a model of review is a vital mechanism to ensure that States 
advance the object and purpose of the African Charter relating to the socio-economic 
rights by implementing their obligations. The object and purpose of the African Charter 
regarding socio-economic rights is a vital tenet of the teleological approach. It should 
also be applied to the model of review which the supervisory organs apply in developing 
the scope and content of socio-economic rights and assessing States’ compliance with 
the obligations imposed by these rights. As Pieterse (writing on assessing States’ 																																																								
38 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
39 See chapter two, parts 2 5 and 2 5 2. 
40 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 4. 
41 See chapter four, parts 4 3 1 and 4 4 1. 
42 See chapter five, part 5 5 4. 
43 See chapter five, part 5 5 4. 
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compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations) notes, supervisory organs rely 
on the nature, scope and content of the obligations imposed by these rights. 44 
Furthermore, the principle of effectiveness can be applied to ensure that the interpretive 
mandate of the supervisory organs are generously interpreted to include a model of 
review that can effectively ensure States comply with their socio-economic rights 
obligations 
Having established the link between model of review and the teleological 
methodology the following part discusses the reasonableness model of review. 
6 3 3 Reasonableness review: Meaning, application and implications  
Writing in the context of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the South African 
Constitution, Liebenberg considers reasonableness as a model of review that takes into 
consideration the historical, economic and social contexts of these rights. 45  This 
understanding of the reasonableness model of review is important in the sense that it 
enables a supervisory organ applying this model of review to apply a wide range of 
factors to assess States’ measures. This broad meaning of reasonableness renders it a 
model of review that takes into account the purpose and values of socio-economic rights 
that are affected by the violations of these rights.46 In this way, the reasonableness 
model of review inquires into the object and purpose as well as the scope and content of 
the rights that are at stake.47 It therefore applies such object and purpose, as well as the 
scope and content of the socio-economic rights, to assess States’ measures.48 
Liebenberg’s understanding of the reasonableness model of review is significant in 
the context of interpretation and protection of socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter. It allows the supervisory organs to consider the object and purpose of a State’s 
obligations regarding socio-economic rights and assess a State’s measures in the light 
of such object and purpose. This approach enables the supervisory organs to assess 
whether a State’s measure furthers the protection of socio-economic rights which is the 
object and purpose of the African Charter. As discussed in chapter two, consideration of 
the object and purpose of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter requires 
supervisory organs to interpret the African Charter holistically. The holistic interpretation 																																																								
44 M Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 383 407.  
45 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 174. 
46 223. 
47 223. 
48 223. 
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of the African Charter enables the supervisory organs to take into account the values of 
equality, dignity, justice and freedom to elaborate the meaning of socio-economic rights. 
It also requires supervisory organs to take into account the notions of African philosophy 
and interdependence of the rights in interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter. A broad meaning of the reasonableness review enables the supervisory organs 
to consider all these contexts in assessing Member States’ compliance with their socio-
economic rights obligations in the African Charter.  
Hershkoff, writing on socio-economic rights in the context of State constitutions in the 
United States, notes that when a State’s constitution establishes a human right the 
courts should inquire whether a challenged State’s measure fosters such constitutional 
right.49 Bilchitz notes that the reasonableness of a State’s measures should be assessed 
in the light of the object and purpose of the constitution.50 Writing on reasonableness in 
the context of article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol, Porter argues that in interpreting 
socio-economic rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (‘ICESCR’), 51  the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘CESCR’)52 should apply the reasonableness review in article 8(4) in light of the object 
and purpose of the Optional Protocol.53 
Griffey defines a reasonableness review as a standard that imposes limits on a 
State’s discretion as well as guides supervisory organs to assess a State’s measures to 
implement their legal obligations. 54  Griffey’s definition demonstrates that the 
reasonableness model of review also has the potential to limit States’ discretion if the 
measures adopted do not give effect to the socio-economic rights and advance their 
object and purpose. In this regard, the reasonableness review creates space for the 
supervisory organs to assess States’ measures regarding the negative and positive 																																																								
49 H Hershkoff “Positive rights and State Constitutions: The limits of federal rationality review” (1999) 112 
Harvard Law Review 1131 1137 and 1184. 
50 D Bilchitz “Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its importance” (2002) 119 South 
African Law Journal 484 496. 
51 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and 
entered into force on 3 January, 1976. 
52 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was established by the Economic and Social 
Council resolution 1985/17. The CESCR is composed of 18 experts who are competent in the human 
rights field. 
53 B Porter “The reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating claims from the margins” (2009) 27 Nordic 
Journal of Human Rights 39 53. 
54 B Griffey “The ‘reasonableness’ test: Assessing violations of State obligations under the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2011) 11 Human Rights 
Law Review 275 304. 
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obligations imposed by the socio-economic rights. The supervisory organs applying this 
model of review can scrutinise States’ measures to establish whether they uphold the 
object and purpose of the socio-economic rights at stake. Griffey’s definition of the 
reasonableness model of review also enables the supervisory organs to apply the 
content of the socio-economic rights to assess whether States’ measures comply with 
the obligations imposed by these rights in a manner that advances the object and 
purpose of the African Charter. As Hershkoff posits in the American context, States’ 
constitutions elaborate the object and purpose to be achieved regarding socio-economic 
rights.55 Socio-economic rights in these constitutions not only limit the States’ discretion 
regarding their realisation but also impose upon States an obligation to further the object 
and purpose of the constitution regarding these rights.56  
As such, Griffey’s understanding of the reasonableness links with Liebenberg’s 
understanding of this model in that they both enable supervisory organs to apply socio-
economic rights and other related provisions to ensure States’ measures further the 
object and purpose of such rights. Thus, the question in assessing the reasonableness 
of a State’s measures will basically consider whether such State’s measures foster the 
object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-economic rights. Furthermore, 
reasonableness considers whether the limitation of socio-economic rights reasonably 
fosters the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-economic rights. 
As Hershkoff notes, courts with a mandate to review State’s measures should assess 
whether such measures achieve the constitutional object and purpose regarding the 
protection of human rights.57  
This dissertation adopts these definitions by Liebenberg and Griffey since they 
demonstrate two significant aspects. Firstly, the reasonableness model of review should 
place the object and purpose of States’ socio-economic rights obligations as central to 
the assessment of a State’s measures. As demonstrated in chapter two the object and 
purpose of the African Charter is to protect socio-economic rights.58 It was shown that in 
order to advance this object and purpose the supervisory organs are required to 
interpret these rights by taking into account various interpretive tools. These tools 
include the African Charter as a whole, the preparatory work of the African Charter, 
relevant international, regional and national human rights laws and jurisprudence, and 																																																								
55 Hershkoff (1999) Harvard Law Review 1138 and 1156. 
56 1138 and 1156. 
57 1169-1170 and 1184. 
58 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 4 and 2 5 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
321 
 
the principle of effectiveness. The reasonableness model of review enables the 
reviewing supervisory organs to generously consider these significant elements of the 
object and purpose of the African Charter in assessing States’ measures.  
Secondly, reasonableness is flexible in that it allows other considerations, which are 
in line with the object and purpose of socio-economic rights, to play a role in the 
assessment of the State’s measures. 59  This element of taking into account other 
considerations is important in interpreting socio-economic rights in the African Charter 
as it allows the supervisory organs to engage the values of equality, dignity and freedom 
in the reasonableness review. Engaging these values enables the supervisory organs to 
assess how State’s measures have taken into account the values and object and 
purpose of the African Charter.  
Writing on South Africa’s constitutional context, Liebenberg and Goldblatt argue that 
for the reasonableness model of review to incorporate the content of socio-economic 
rights in a manner that advances the object and purpose of the Constitution it is 
important for the courts to elaborate on the significant role of the overarching values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.60 Commenting on South Africa’s jurisprudence, 
Liebenberg argues that the failure to engage these values implies that these values and 
violations of the rights are given less priority in the assessment of States’ measures.61 
Moreover, chapter three demonstrated the manner in which these values can be 
interpreted in developing the scope and content of the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter.62 The content of the socio-economic rights can be linked with the 
reasonableness review to assess whether States’ measures reasonably advance such 
content. Liebenberg notes that courts have the task of developing the substantive 
commitments and values socio-economic rights impose. 63  The development of the 
values and purposes relating to socio-economic rights allows the courts to assess 
whether the State’s adopted measures reasonably give effect to the enjoyment of the 
rights.64  
																																																								
59 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 174. 
60 S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt “The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under 
South Africa’s transformative constitution” (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 335 355. 
61 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 176-177. 
62 See chapter three, part 3 3 2 1. 
63 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 183. 
64 183. 
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The Constitutional Court of South Africa (‘South African Constitutional Court’) held in 
Grootboom v Government of the Republic of South Africa (‘Grootboom’), 65  the 
assessment of a State’s reasonable measures considers social, economic and historical 
context of such rights.66 Moreover, the South African Constitutional Court stated in 
Grootboom that the assessment of a State’s reasonable measures considers the Bill of 
Rights as a whole, particularly the values of human dignity and equality. 67  These 
elements are significant as they can assist supervisory organs to identify the factors 
relevant to the reasonableness model of review and to link them appropriately to the 
normative content, values and purposes of the relevant socio-economic rights.  
6 3 4 Application of reasonableness review by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and its 
implications  
It was shown in chapter two that the teleological approach to interpretation requires 
the text of the African Charter to be applied holistically in interpreting the socio-economic 
rights.68 The methodology for application of the teleological approach developed in 
chapter two demonstrated that the supervisory organs should apply the African Charter 
holistically by engaging various provisions of the African Charter.69 The provisions of 
articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter and article 7 of the African Court Protocol were 
identified as relevant in assisting supervisory organs to draw inspiration from other 
relevant international, regional and national laws and jurisprudence in interpreting the 
socio-economic rights.70 In this regard the discussion on the judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies’ application of the reasonableness model of review fits in with the teleological 
methodology. It reveals the relevant laws and jurisprudence that the supervisory organs, 
through the provisions of articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter and article 7 of the 
African Court Protocol as well as the notion of “object and purpose” of the African 
Charter and the principle of effectiveness as tenets of the teleological approach, can be 
used to establish a model of review relevant for assessing States’ compliance with their 
socio-economic rights obligations. 
Various judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have applied the reasonableness model of 
review. The Constitutional Court applies the reasonableness model of review in 																																																								
65 Grootboom and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 SA 46 (CC). 
66 Para 43. 
67 Para 44. 
68 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
69 See chapter two, parts 2 5 and 2 5 2 1. 
70 See chapter two, parts 2 5 2 1 and 2 5 2 3. 
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assessing a State’s compliance with its socio-economic rights obligations. According to 
the Constitutional Court, the reasonableness model of review concerns an enquiry as to 
whether a State’s legislative and other measures for the protection of socio-economic 
rights are reasonable.71 In this regard, the South African Constitutional Court stated in 
Grootboom that a court reviewing the reasonableness of a State’s measures should only 
inquire whether measures taken are reasonable. 
In Grootboom, Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (‘TAC’), 72  Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 
(‘Mazibuko’),73 and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others (‘Olivia Road’)74 the South African Constitutional Court elaborated on various 
factors that a supervisory body can apply in assessing the reasonableness of a State’s 
measures. According to the South African Constitutional Court, reasonable measures 
should demonstrate that the State has allocated appropriate financial and human 
resources to realise socio-economic rights. 75  Moreover, measures must be 
comprehensive, coherent and co-ordinated. 76  Measures must also be capable of 
facilitating the realisation of the socio-economic rights in question.77 The conception and 
implementation of the measures must be reasonable.78 Furthermore, such measures 
must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for short, medium and 
long-term needs.79 Measures must give priority to those who are in urgent need of the 
realisation of their rights.80 They must demonstrate respect for human dignity, freedom 
and equality.81 They must be transparent and made known effectively to the general 
public.82 Furthermore, the reasonable measures of a State must guarantee meaningful 
engagement particularly with the poor, vulnerable or illiterate people.83  
These elements of the South African Constitutional Court’s reasonableness model of 
review are relevant for the protection of socio-economic rights in the African Charter. As 																																																								
71 C Courtis “Standards to make ESC rights justiciable: A summary exploration” (2009) 2 Erasmus Law 
Review 379 391. 
72 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No.2) 2002 SA 721 (CC). 
73 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 SA 1 (CC). 
74 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 SA 1 (CC). 
75 Grootboom para 39. 
76 Paras 40-41. 
77 Para 41. 
78 Para 42. 
79 Para 43. 
80 Para 44. 
81 Paras 44, 83. 
82 TAC para 123, Mazibuko para 71. 
83 Olivia Road para 15. 
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mentioned above, the teleological approach to interpretation developed in chapter two 
requires the African Charter to be interpreted holistically. This holistic application of the 
African Charter, as was shown in chapters two and three, enables the supervisory 
organs to apply the values of dignity, equality, justice and freedom, as well as the notion 
of African Philosophy to elaborate the provisions of the reasonableness model of review 
as incorporated in the African Charter, as will be shown below. Through the provisions of 
articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter and article 7 of the African Court Protocol the 
supervisory organs can draw inspiration from the South African Constitutional Court 
regarding these important elements of the reasonableness model of review. As 
Yeshanew argues, the reasonableness model of review in the socio-economic rights’ 
provisions entrenched in the South African Constitution of South Africa is an ideal model 
that can be applied in other human rights systems.84 
The CESCR elaborated on reasonableness earlier in its statement regarding the 
review of States’ obligations in the context of “maximum available resources”. 85 
According to the CESCR, in dealing with socio-economic rights communications alleging 
a State’s failure to take steps to the maximum of available resources the CESCR will 
assess whether a State’s measures are reasonable.86 According to the CESCR, to be 
reasonable a State’s measures must be deliberate, concrete and targeted towards 
realisation of socio-economic rights. 87  Measures must not be discriminatory or 
arbitrary.88 Measures should demonstrate that resources are allocated in accordance 
with international human rights standards.89 A State should adopt the least restrictive 
policies.90 Measures should indicate the time-frame when steps were taken for the 
realisation of the rights. 91  Measures should take into consideration the most 
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals or groups in society.92 Measures should 
prioritise individuals in urgent need or at risk.93 Other measures include a State’s level of 
development, severity of the breach, a State’s current economic condition, existence of 																																																								
84 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 315. 
85 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps 
to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant UN Doc E/C. 
12/2007/1 (adopted 10 May 2007). 
86 Para 8. 
87 Para 8(a). 
88 Para 8(b). 
89 Para 8(c). 
90 Para 8(d). 
91 Para 8(e). 
92 Para 8 
93 Para 8(f). 
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other human rights claims on the State’s scarce resources, a State’s efforts to identify 
low-cost options and whether the State had sought international assistance or rejected 
the international community’s support for the purposes of implementing the ICESCR.94 
Moreover, a State’s measures must be transparent and engage people in decision-
making at a national level.95  
The CESCR also applies the reasonableness model of review through the provisions 
of article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (‘Optional Protocol’)96 to monitor States’ compliance with their socio-
economic rights obligations in the ICESCR. The Optional Protocol is applicable to 
determine the complaints of individuals whose States are members to the Optional 
Protocol.97 It should be noted that the Optional Protocol is the only international human 
rights instrument that explicitly specifies the reasonableness review as a means to 
monitor States’ compliance with the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. As 
Griffrey points out, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is the first international human 
rights instrument to establish a model of review to be applied by the CESCR.98 Article 
8(4) reads: 
“When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall 
consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance 
with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the 
State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of 
the rights set forth in the Covenant.” 
In its early jurisprudence99 under the Optional Protocol, the CESCR has elaborated 
the reasonableness model of review. For example, in IDG v Spain (‘IDG’) the CESCR 
had to decide whether the complainant’s right to housing recognised in article 11(1) of 
the ICESCR was violated by the respondent State as a result of a mortgage 
enforcement proceeding that the complainant argues the respondent State had failed to 
notify her.100 The CESCR held that the right to housing in the ICESCR imposes upon 																																																								
94 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps 
to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant UN Doc E/C. 
12/2007/1 (adopted 10 May 2007) para 10 (a-f). 
95 Para 11. 
96 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly through its resolution A/RES/63/117 on 10 December, 2008. 
97 Art 1 of the Optional Protocol. 
98 Griffey (2011) Human Rights Law Review 277.  
99 See IDG v Spain Communication No. 2/2014. 
100 Para 10.6. 
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States an obligation to adopt measures that guarantee its full realisation.101 According to 
the CESCR, every person possesses security of tenure that incorporates protection 
against forced evictions.102 The CESCR further noted that States are therefore required 
to ensure that actions that can result into evictions take into account procedural 
protections. This includes meaningful consultation with the affected parties as well as 
“adequate and reasonable” notification to the affected persons before the eviction is 
carried out.103 The CESCR held further that the provisions of article 2(1) of the ICESCR 
impose upon States an obligation to adopt legislative measures that give effect to the 
enjoyment of the rights enshrined therein.104 According to the CESCR, this obligation 
incorporates States’ duty to guarantee effective judicial remedies.105 As such, article 2(1) 
requires States to guarantee persons, whose right to housing is likely to be affected by 
forced evictions or mortgage enforcements, access to effective judicial remedies.106 
Referring to its General Comment 7 the CESCR held that “appropriate procedural 
protection and due process” are vital elements of all rights in ICESCR and they are more 
significant in issues relating to forced evictions.  
According to the CESCR, as an element in the right to housing, procedural protection 
requires States to provide the affected persons with the “adequate and reasonable” 
notification regarding the evictions before the time that the eviction is scheduled. 
According to the CESCR, this requirement also applies to mortgage proceedings which 
also affect the right to housing.107 States are therefore, obliged to adopt all reasonable 
measures to ensure that persons likely to be affected by evictions or mortgage 
proceedings are duly notified of any administrative and judicial orders in order to allow 
them an opportunity to defend their housing rights.108 The CESCR held that insufficient 
notification regarding an application of mortgage enforcement, in a manner that 
precludes the affected persons from defending their rights, constitutes a violation of the 
right to housing.109  
It can be argued that reasonableness of States’ measures under article 8(4) of the 
Optional Protocol incorporate elements similar to the elements identified in the 																																																								
101 Para 11.1. 
102 Para 11.2. 
103 Para 11.2. 
104 Para 11.3. 
105 Para 11.3. 
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“maximum available resources” context above. Writing on reasonableness in the context 
of the Optional Protocol, Porter posits that the CESCR’s approach in assessing 
reasonableness of States’ measure in article 8(4) can differ from how it elaborated on 
reasonableness in other contexts such as “periodic reviews and General Comments”.110 
However, the content of a reasonable measure in these documents can inform the 
CESCR’s approach in elaborating the reasonableness of States’ measures under article 
8(4) of the Optional Protocol. 
The elaboration of the elements of the reasonableness review by the South African 
Constitutional Court and the CESCR in its statement indicates, despite their different 
contexts, similarities in how these two organs approach the question of reasonableness. 
Both consider the time-frame for progressive realisation, budgetary allocation, planning, 
monitoring and impact assessment, meaningful engagement, transparency, and 
consideration of the most vulnerable victims. While the South African Constitutional 
Court considers the values of dignity, freedom and equality the CESCR considers the 
principle of non-discrimination. As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation the 
values of dignity, equality and non-discrimination are interrelated. 111  As such, the 
CESCR can use the values of dignity and equality to elaborate non-discrimination. 
Porter argues that the CESCR can use the values of human dignity and equality as used 
in South Africa’s reasonableness in interpreting article 8(4).112 It can also use the socio-
economic and historical contexts of socio-economic rights as well as the focus on both 
reasonable conception and implementation of a State’s measures. 113  According to 
Porter, the formulation of article 8(4) of the ICESCR Optional Protocol emanates from 
the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court in the 
Grootboom case.114  
However, despite these similarities, scholars argue that the reasonableness model of 
review in article 8(4) is different from South Africa’s reasonableness model of review 
discussed above. For example, Griffey notes that although there are similarities between 
reasonableness in Grootboom and the Optional Protocol, the two standards of review 
																																																								
110 B Porter “Reasonableness and Article 8(4)” in M Langford, B Porter, R Brown & J Rossi (eds) Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (2016) 
194 218. 
111 See chapter three, part 3 3 2 2. 
112 Porter (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 51. 
113 51. 
114 49-51. See also Griffey (2011) Human Rights Law Review 302. 
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are distinct.115 According to him, South Africa’s reasonableness does not focus on other 
measures that a State could have adopted which would be more likely to advance the 
goals of the rights.116 To the contrary, reasonableness in the Optional Protocol assesses 
a wide range of available measures that a State can adopt.117 It therefore allows the 
CESCR to assess whether the measure adopted by the State, out of the wide range of 
possible measures to realise socio-economic rights, is reasonable.118 Moreover, writing 
on the comparison between the reasonableness model of review in the South African 
context and the CESCR, Coomans notes the concern that since the CESCR is a quasi-
judicial body, it cannot be compared to the South African Constitutional Court which is a 
judicial organ.119 According to Coomans, the concern refers to the fact that CESCR as a 
quasi-judicial body has the mandate to only issue recommendations as opposed to 
binding decisions issued by the judicial body such as the South African Constitutional 
Court.120  
However, it was argued in chapter four that recommendations by quasi-judicial 
bodies are authoritative and that it is an international obligation of States to implement 
them with the utmost good faith. Moreover, the mandate of the supervisory organs to 
protect socio-economic rights should be generously interpreted to include the mandate 
to assess States’ compliance with the obligations imposed by these rights. With this 
similar mandate to assess States’ measures it can be argued that quasi-judicial bodies 
can be compared with judicial bodies regarding the model of review applied. As 
Coomans argues, since the CESCR has the mandate to assess the implementation of 
States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations in the ICESCR it can 
therefore be compared to the South African Constitutional Court.121 In particular the 
supervisory organs in the African Charter can apply the provisions of articles 60 and 61 
of the African Charter, as well as article 7 of the African Court Protocol to draw 
inspiration from judicial bodies as argued above. Yeshanew, commenting on the South 
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African Constitutional Court’s reasonableness, notes that South Africa’s reasonableness 
review can be applied by other international and national human rights bodies.122 
Based on the discussion above regarding the meaning of reasonableness, this 
dissertation departs from the argument that the reasonableness review by the South 
African Constitutional Court and that of CESCR are inherently distinct concepts. Rather, 
I argued that the manner, in which these two bodies have applied the reasonableness 
model of review is distinct. The South African Constitutional Court’s application of 
reasonableness is narrow in the sense that it confines itself to the question of only 
whether a State’s measure under scrutiny is reasonable. This narrow approach of the 
South African Constitutional Court has led scholars to criticise its reasonableness model 
of review. Bilchitz posits that the notion of a reasonableness review is vague in the 
sense that it lacks meaning and does not clearly state the limits of the courts’ powers to 
assess the reasonableness of a State’s measures. 123  According to Bilchitz, a 
reasonableness review does not establish the means to clarify a State’s general 
obligations relating to socio-economic rights.124  
Particularly, Bilchitz, 125  Iles,126  Brand,127  and Liebenberg 128  argue that the South 
African Constitutional Court’s reasonableness review focuses on establishing the 
reasonableness of States’ measures, but neglects developing the substantive content of 
the rights. This narrow approach is not effective for the interpretation of socio-economic 
rights as it limits the power of the supervisory organs to develop the content of the socio-
economic rights before assessing States’ compliance with the obligations. Supervisory 
organs will merely focus on the reasonableness of the measures adopted by the State, 
instead of assessing whether those measures are capable of progressively realising the 
normative goals of the socio-economic rights in question. Although identifying whether 
States’ measures are reasonable is important, if the content of the rights are unknown it 																																																								
122 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 315. 
123 D Bilchitz “Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying foundations for future socio-
economic rights jurisprudence” (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 10. See also Bilchitz 
(2002) South African Law Journal 495. 
124 Bilchitz (2003) South African Journal on Human Rights 10. See also Bilchitz (2002) South African Law 
Journal 495. 
125 Bilchitz (2002) South African Law Journal 496.  
126 K Iles “Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal limitations clauses” (2004) 20 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 448 454. 
127 D Brand “The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or what are 
socio-economic rights for?” in H Botha, A Van der Walt & J Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 45. 
128 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175. 
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becomes difficult for the supervisory organs to establish the criteria to assess the States’ 
measures. The content of the rights is an important criterion for assessing States’ 
measures. Writing on reasonableness in the context of the Optional Protocol, Porter 
similarly argues that the content of the socio-economic rights in the ICESCR should be 
the basis for assessing the reasonableness of States’ measures. 129  As such, the 
question of the supervisory organs should be whether a State’s measures can 
reasonably foster the constitutional objects and purposes as well as constitutional 
values. This form of approach would allow the South African Constitutional Court to first 
elaborate the normative content of socio-economic rights being interpreted and then use 
these rights to assess the reasonableness of a State’s measure.  
If this approach to the reasonableness review is adopted it would enable the 
supervisory organs of the African Charter to consider two significant aspects during the 
interpretative process. Firstly, they would interpret and elaborate on the scope and 
content of the socio-economic rights in question and their related obligations. Secondly, 
the supervisory organs would use such content as a normative benchmark against 
which to assess whether measures adopted by the State are reasonably capable of 
realising the identified content of socio-economic rights. This approach corresponds with 
the definitions of reasonableness discussed above and adopted in this study.  
6 3 5 Reasonableness as a two-stage model of review 
Development of the normative scope and content of the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter and their related obligations is a vital aspect for the effective protection 
of these rights. The methodology for the application of the teleological approach 
developed in chapter two requires supervisory organs to develop the scope and content 
of the socio-economic rights in the light of the object and purpose of the African Charter 
relating to these rights. The discussion on the meaning of the reasonableness model of 
review identified that this model considers the object and purpose of the rights at stake 
to assess States’ measures. The reference to the object and purpose of the rights in the 
reasonableness model of review enables it to ascertain the content of the rights and 
then assess whether States’ measures takes into account such content to advance the 
object and purpose of the rights at stake. This understanding shows the nexus between 
the teleological methodology and the reasonableness model of review. 																																																								
129 Porter “Reasonableness” in Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 218. 
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Based on the fact that scope and content of the socio-economic rights is a vital 
element of the teleological methodology the discussion on how the reasonableness 
review is capable of developing the scope and content of the socio-economic rights is 
relevant. 
Scholars’ criticism regarding South Africa’s reasonableness model of review 
demonstrates that it is a single-stage model of review in that it does not start with the 
development of the scope and content of the rights. It only focuses on assessing the 
reasonableness of States’ measures. Although scholars’ criticisms are valid regarding 
the narrow approach of the South African Constitutional Court’s reasonableness it does 
not necessarily mean that reasonableness as a model of review is incapable of 
developing the scope and content of the socio-economic rights. It can be argued that the 
reasonableness model of review is a two-stage model of review. It can be applied to 
develop the content of socio-economic rights and then engage such content as the 
assessment criteria to scrutinise States’ measures. As Liebenberg similarly notes, the 
reasonableness model of review enables the supervisory organs to apply the object and 
purpose of the socio-economic rights, as well as the values on dignity, equality, justice 
and freedom, for the development of the socio-economic rights. 130  The developed 
content can then be applied to monitor States’ compliance with the obligations imposed 
by the socio-economic rights.131 The content can further assist the supervisory organs in 
assessing whether the measures adopted by States further the object and purpose of 
socio-economic rights. As Brand notes, the reasonableness model of review requires 
adjudicative bodies to inquire whether States’ measures can reasonably achieve the 
object and purpose of the rights.132 Writing on equality as a value, which is also an 
element of reasonableness that can promote the interpretation of socio-economic rights, 
Liebenberg notes that equality can assist in the understanding of the object and purpose 
of socio-economic rights.133 
The discussion above on the definition of the reasonableness review has shown that 
supervisory organs must inquire whether States’ measures advance the object and 
purpose of socio-economic rights. The reference to the object and purpose of the socio-
economic rights assists supervisory organs to ascertain how they should apply the 																																																								
130 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 183. 
131 183. 
132 Brand “The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence” in Rights and 
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reasonableness review. It renders the elements of object and purpose significant 
elements of the reasonableness review. In this regard, the supervisory organs should 
consider the object and purpose of the African Charter as vital elements of the 
reasonableness model of review to be applied to the positive duties imposed by socio-
economic rights. These elements include: the values of dignity, equality, justice and 
freedom; the interdependence of the rights; African philosophies, the rights to equality, 
life and dignity as well as other relevant provisions of the African Charter.134  This 
approach would require the supervisory organs to inquire whether the States’ measures 
to give effect to socio-economic rights are consistent with the values of human dignity, 
equality, justice and freedom. As the Constitutional Court held in Grootboom, the dignity 
of a human person is central to assessing the reasonableness of the State’s 
measures.135 This inquiry enables the supervisory organs to ascertain the content of the 
socio-economic rights at stake and apply that content to assess States’ measures.  
Moreover, as discussed in chapter three the object and purpose of the African 
Charter also requires supervisory organs to take into account the notion of African 
philosophy.136 It was shown in chapter three that African philosophy is relevant to 
elaborate the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding peoples’ socio-
economic rights.137 As such, supervisory organs should consider this element of the 
object and purpose of the African Charter as a crucial element of the reasonableness 
model of review. Supervisory organs applying the reasonableness model of review can 
therefore apply African philosophy to develop the content of peoples’ socio-economic 
rights and then assess States’ measures if they take into account this vital element for 
the protection of peoples’ socio-economic rights. 
Moreover, although the South African Constitutional Court focused on developing the 
necessary elements that should be used to assess the reasonableness of the State’s 
measures, some of the elements are also useful in elaborating the normative scope and 
content of socio-economic rights. As Griffey notes, some of the factors developed by the 
South African Constitutional Court to assess the reasonableness of a State’s measures 
can be used to develop the substantive content of socio-economic rights.138  Thus 
supervisory organs are able to elaborate the content of socio-economic rights being 																																																								
134 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 5 and chapter three, part 3 3 2 1. 
135 Grootboom para 83. 
136 See chapter three, parts 3 2 3 5 and 3 2 4 2. 
137 See chapter three, part 3 2 4 2. 
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interpreted by using these identified elements. The elements can further assist the 
supervisory organs to assess whether the measures adopted by States further the 
object and purpose of socio-economic rights.  
Therefore, regarding the criticisms relating to vagueness of the concept of the 
reasonableness review, it can be argued that the interpretation of this concept by 
Liebenberg, and Griffey as elaborated above, help one to understand the context in 
which the reasonableness review is to be applied. These interpretations identify the 
reasonableness review as a broad concept that considers socio-economic rights to 
assess a State’s measures in a manner that fosters the object and purpose of such 
rights. As mentioned above, the reference to object and purpose incorporates in the 
reasonableness review the elements of a teleological approach to interpretation. This 
way the reasonableness review relates to the teleological approach to interpretation, 
based on the object and purpose of the treaty, which interprets a treaty holistically by 
using the historical background and the treaty as a whole. As such, object and purpose 
can be used to first develop the content of socio-economic rights. 
The discussion above has established reasonableness as a two-stage model of 
review that develops the content of the socio-economic rights during the first stage, and 
applies such content to determine the States’ measures at the second stage. The 
following part discusses reasonableness as a model of review applicable to both 
negative and positive obligations. 
6 3 6 Reasonableness as a model for reviewing negative and positive socio-economic 
rights obligations 
The application of the reasonableness model of review by the institutions discussed 
above, that is the South African Constitutional Court and the CESCR, confines the 
reasonableness review to exclusively positive obligations and leaves the negative 
obligations outside its scope.139 Porter notes that the debates surrounding the adoption 
of the Optional Protocol centred on how the CESCR would review alleged violations of 
the positive obligations imposed by the rights in the ICESCR.140 Supporters of the 																																																								
139 As discussed in chapter three negative obligations require states to refrain from interfering with the 
individuals’ and groups’ enjoyment of already existing socio-economic rights. Positive obligations require 
states to adopt measures for realising the socio-economic rights. See also D Bilchitz Poverty and 
Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 157, Liebenberg 
& Goldblatt (2007) South African Journal on Human Rights 353. 
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Optional Protocol argued for an adoption of the reasonableness review as an 
appropriate mechanism to assess States’ measures regarding positive obligations to 
adopt legislative and other measures for realising socio-economic rights.141 This narrow 
approach limits the possibility of applying reasonableness to review States’ measures 
regarding negative socio-economic rights’ obligations. It should be noted that States can 
also violate the already existing socio-economic rights of individuals and groups. Writing 
on reasonableness in the context of the Optional Protocol, Porter notes that violations of 
socio-economic rights are not entirely based on the States’ failure to enforce their 
positive obligations but also on States’ conduct of interfering with individuals’ right to 
housing through forced evictions as well as discriminatory practices in the enjoyment of 
socio-economic rights. 142 
The reasonableness review may be applied to assess States’ compliance with their 
socio-economic rights obligations, both negative and positive. With regard to the 
negative obligations, the failure of States to refrain from interfering with people’s existing 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights amounts to a violation of such rights. The South 
African Constitutional Court held in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz (‘Jaftha’)143 
that the deprivation of the applicants’ existing right to housing amounts to the limitation 
of the right enshrined in article 26 of the Constitution. 144  As argued above, the 
reasonableness review should be focused on ascertaining the object and purpose of the 
relevant rights as a basis for assessing the justifiability of the State’s acts or omissions in 
relation to the right. The reasonableness review can be applied to assess States’ 
measures both to realise and restrict the enjoyment of the socio-economic rights.  
As discussed in chapter two, a consideration of the object and purpose of rights 
considers the African Charter holistically. 145  The holistic application allows the 
supervisory organs to apply a number of provisions of the African Charter to provide a 
legal framework for assessing limitations of rights. It was discussed in chapter three that 
the African Charter does not expressly incorporate a limitation clause.146 However, the 
provisions of article 27(2) of the African Charter can be generously interpreted to include 
a limitation clause.147 The reasonableness review allows the supervisory organs to 																																																								
141 195-196. 
142 196. 
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assess whether the restriction of socio-economic rights as a result of States’ interference 
with individual’s or groups’ enjoyment of their socio-economic rights is justified under the 
conditions laid down in article 27(2). Through the provisions of article 27(2) of the African 
Charter the reasonableness model of review, as will be demonstrated below, 148 
incorporates a proportionality model of review. 149  The following part discusses 
reasonableness as a model of review that takes into consideration immediate socio-
economic needs of people in society. 
6 3 7 Reasonableness as a model capable of considering immediate socio-economic 
rights needs 
As demonstrated above, the definition of the reasonableness model of review 
requires supervisory organs to ascertain whether States’ measures realise the object 
and purpose of the relevant socio-economic rights. As discussed in chapters two and 
three object and purpose requires the holistic interpretation of the African Charter to give 
effect to the socio-economic rights at stake. The element of object and purpose in the 
reasonableness model of review provides the supervisory organs with the opportunity to 
engage the provisions of article 1 of the African Charter that require States to adopt 
legislative and other measures for the realisation of socio-economic rights. Through the 
provisions of article 1, supervisory organs applying the reasonableness model of review 
can assess whether legislative and other measures adopted by the State take into 
account the immediate socio-economic needs of individuals and groups.  
It is the object and purpose of the African Charter to fulfil the socio-economic rights of 
the people who are in desperate socio-economic circumstances as well as to take steps 
to progressively realise their rights. Writing on reasonableness in the South African 
context, Sunstein notes that a guaranteed constitutional right to housing requires the 
State to formulate policies that ensure the realisation of this right as well as urgent relief 
regarding housing to people in desperate housing need.150 Responding to Bilchitz’s 
argument,151 Steinberg notes that failure of the State to include in its measures the 																																																								
148 See part 6 6 1 3 below. 
149 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 214-220 and Liebenberg and Goldblatt (2007) South African 
Journal on Human Rights 352. 
150 CR Sunstein “Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2000-2001) 11 Constitutional 
Forum 123 131. 
151 Bilchitz (2002) South African Law Journal 499. Criticising reasonableness in the South Africa’s context, 
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immediate socio-economic needs of the desperate people renders such measures 
unreasonable.152 Liebenberg notes that the reasonableness review is flexible in the 
sense that it enables a State to adopt appropriate measures to respond to the nature of 
the particular obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. 153  It thus enables 
supervisory organs to assess the reasonableness of the measures adopted to meet the 
urgent socio-economic needs of the most vulnerable individuals in society.154 
The values of dignity, equality and freedom are appropriate to assess States 
measures regarding the urgent socio-economic needs of the desperate people in 
society. It allows supervisory organs to inquire whether the measures reasonably take 
into account the immediate socio-economic needs of the people in a manner that 
enables them to live a dignified life and a life of equality without distinction from other 
sections or members of the society. As Steinberg notes, the values of equality and 
dignity as important elements of reasonableness provide effective protection to the 
socio-economic needs of the most vulnerable individuals in society.155  As Wesson 
argues while commenting on reasonableness as developed in Grootboom: 
“How then might the ratio of Grootboom best stated? To my mind, it is that such 
programs should not exclude a ‘significant sector of society’. This, it is submitted, 
underpins and precedes the Court’s finding that those whose needs are most basic 
should not be excluded in the sense of not being specifically, or adequately, catered 
for from the state’s housing program; they, in the view of the Court, constitute a 
‘significant sector of society’. What, however, is meant by a ‘significant sector of 
society’? Clearly, this cannot be taken to mean any group in South African society. 
After all, certain groups such as the wealthy are simply not in need of assistance. 
Rather, it must be taken to include groups of people who cannot be expected to 
meet their socio-economic needs independently, on the basis of their own resources. 
If such a group is excluded, the legality of the state’s socio-economic program will be 
thrown into doubt. The mere fact that a group is vulnerable, or unable to meet its 
needs independently, does not, however, mean that it automatically has a claim to 
public resources. What is required, therefore, is a contextual examination of whether 
the group in question… has a legitimate claim to inclusion in a socio-economic 
program from which others already, benefit. This, it is submitted, is the paradigm 
form in which socio-economic claims will be brought before the courts.”156 
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Bilchitz objects to the approach argued by Wesson.157 According to him, Wesson’s 
“equality approach” misconstrued reasonableness in Grootboom. Bilchitz argues that the 
problem in Grootboom is not that measures adopted by the State excluded the 
Grootboom community but rather the measures failed to take into account the urgent 
housing needs of the Grootboom community.158 Bilchitz notes that Wesson’s equality 
approach relies on equality and non-discriminatory provisions of the Constitution to 
develop reasonableness.159 He argues that non-discriminatory provisions are narrowly 
confined to specific groups such as race, sex and sexual orientation.160 He argues 
further that these provisions are comparatively-oriented in a sense that they require a 
comparison between the “benefits and burdens of groups in society with one another”.161 
According to him, socio-economic rights cases are different.162 They are not necessarily 
comparative in nature but rather they focus on the nature of the socio-economic rights 
and the States’ obligations they impose.163  That is what the State is obliged to realise in 
order to give effect to the rights rather than who the right-holder is.164 He argues 
therefore that the content of the rights should first be identified as they can assist the 
supervisory organs to know the beneficiaries of the rights.165 He asserts that Wesson’s 
approach implies that a needy group is defined independently from the content of the 
rights.166 
It is important to discuss the critique by Bilchitz as it implies that equality and non-
discrimination are less relevant in a reasonableness inquiry. As discussed above, 
through the object and purpose of the treaty, equality and non-discrimination are vital 
elements of reasonableness. It should be noted that the grounds for discrimination in the 
South African Constitution are similar to those in provisions of the right to non-
discrimination in the African Charter.167 The discussion in chapter three demonstrated 
that the grounds for discrimination are not exclusive. As elements of the reasonableness 
review, equality and non-discrimination can be applied to develop the content of the 
socio-economic rights, as well as assess the measures taken by States.  																																																								
157 Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights 167. 
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The following part demonstrates the place of the reasonableness review in the 
African Charter. 
6 3 8 Reasonableness review in the African Charter 
Unlike the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘Optional Protocol’), the African Charter does not explicitly provide for 
reasonableness as a model of review to monitor States’ compliance with their 
obligations. According to Chenwi, the model of review in the Optional Protocol is clearer 
than in the African Charter. 168  The omission does not necessarily mean that the 
reasonableness model of review is not recognised in the African Charter. The principle 
of effectiveness as a tenet of the teleological approach requires a treaty to be construed 
in a manner that renders its provisions practical and effective. Through this principle the 
preparatory work, various statements and provisions of the African Charter can broadly 
be construed in a manner that supports the reasonableness model of review.  
Chapter two identified the preparatory work of the African Charter as a vital 
interpretative tool for effective protection of the socio-economic rights. Chapter three 
identified the aspects of the preparatory work of the African Charter that can give 
insights in the interpretation of the socio-economic rights and their related obligations. 
The chapter showed that the preparatory work of the African Charter identifies protection 
of the socio-economic rights as an object and purpose of the African Charter. The fact 
that the preparatory work gives insights to the object and purpose of the African Charter 
links with the reasonableness model of review that applies the object and purpose of the 
rights to assess States’ measures. Moreover, chapter three also identified that the 
preparatory work contains provisions relating to the general obligations of the Member 
States. The general obligations contain positive and negative obligations imposed by the 
rights provisions upon States.  
The preparatory work also identifies values of dignity, equality, justice and freedom 
as well as the notion of African philosophy. Moreover, the preparatory work requires the 
supervisory organs to effectively interpret broadly formulated socio-economic rights. All 
these aspects can generously be construed to incorporate reasonableness as a model 
of review. Through the principle of effectiveness, as a tenet of the teleological approach, 
that requires provisions of the treaty to be construed in a manner that renders their 
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meaning effective and practical, the reasonableness review can be included in 
interpreting these aspects. 
The principle of effectiveness can be invoked to ensure that States’ measures for the 
implementation of general obligations, imposed by the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter, are reasonable. This principle can be applied to ensure that although 
the Member States should realise the socio-economic rights progressively, it does not 
necessarily mean that States are exempted from realising immediate socio-economic 
needs of the people. The discussion above has shown that as a model of review 
reasonableness can effectively be applied to develop the scope and content of the 
socio-economic rights and their obligations and apply such content to assess States’ 
measures. It was shown above that as a model of review reasonableness can be 
applied to assess both negative and positive obligations as well as immediate socio-
economic needs.  
This understanding is vital in the interpretation of socio-economic rights in two 
respects. Firstly, it incorporates the reasonableness review as a significant content of 
socio-economic rights and their concomitant obligations. Secondly, it incorporates 
reasonableness as a model of review for assessing States’ measures. The teleological 
approach interprets a treaty as a whole and enables the identification and the 
engagement of various provisions of the African Charter that enshrine elements of the 
reasonableness review. Reasonableness is enshrined in two statements of the preamble 
to the African Charter. As demonstrated in chapter two,169 the preamble identifies the 
object and purpose of the African Charter to protect human rights (including socio-
economic rights). It was demonstrated above, 170  that to be reasonable, a State’s 
measure must show the object and purpose to be achieved by the relevant measure. 
The preambular statement can thus be used to elucidate the object and purpose to be 
achieved by the State’s measure regarding socio-economic rights. Any measure 
adopted by the State regarding socio-economic rights should be able to protect and 
achieve the realisation of these rights. Furthermore, the preamble recognises the values 
of freedom, equality, justice and dignity as part of the object and purpose of the African 
Charter. It was demonstrated above,171  that in order to be reasonable the State’s 
measures must promote the values of equality and dignity. Thus, the values recognised 
																																																								
169 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 1. 
170 See part 6 3 3 above. 
171 See part 6 3 3 above. 
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in the preamble to the African Charter can be applied to help assess the reasonableness 
of a State’s measures.  
The reasonableness model of review is implicitly incorporated in the African Charter 
through the preamble, articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 30, 45(2), 55, 60 and 61 as well as the socio-
economic rights provisions. It is also included in articles 2 and 3 of the African Court 
Protocol and article 28(c) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. Article 1 of the African 
Charter incorporates the requirement for a reasonableness review. It was demonstrated 
in chapter three 172  that this article requires States to adopt legislative and other 
measures to give effect to socio-economic rights in the African Charter. As 
demonstrated in chapter two173 the principle of effectiveness requires the provisions of 
the African Charter to be construed in a manner that renders their meaning practical and 
effective. The phrase “to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to socio-
economic rights” can broadly be construed to require States to adopt reasonable 
measures for the realisation of these rights. Thus the obligation to adopt measures in 
article 1 effectively requires States to adopt reasonable legislative and other 
administrative and policy measures. Liebenberg rightly notes that the reasonableness 
review is premised on an obligation that the State adopts legislative and policy 
measures to give effect to the relevant human rights.174 
The provisions of articles 2, 3, and 5 of the African Charter regarding non-
discrimination, equality and dignity can be broadly elaborated to include the 
reasonableness review. As demonstrated above175 a reasonable measure must take into 
account human dignity, equality and non-discrimination. As such equality, dignity and 
non-discrimination as analysed in chapter three,176 can be applied by the supervisory 
organs to inform the content of reasonableness. These contents can then be used in the 
interpretative process to assess the reasonableness of a State’s measures. 
The reasonableness model of review can also be derived from the socio-economic 
rights’ provisions of the African Charter. As demonstrated in chapter three, the socio-
economic rights’ provisions are formulated in broad, general terms.177  The general 
formulation allows the supervisory organs, through the principle of effectiveness as an 
element of the teleological approach to interpretation, to construe these provisions in a 																																																								
172 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 1. 
173 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
174 Liebenberg (2015) South African Law Journal 413. 
175 See parts 6 3 3 and 6 4 below. 
176 See chapter three, parts 3 3 3 4 and 3 3 3 5. 
177 See chapter three, part 3 3 4. 
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manner that render their protection practical and effective. The broad interpretation 
enables the supervisory organs to include reasonableness as a content of socio-
economic rights and their related obligations. It was shown in the discussion above that 
reasonableness as a model of review places the object and purpose of the rights at 
stake at the centre of the assessment process. In this regard, the reasonableness model 
of review can be invoked to ensure that States’ measures advance the object and 
purpose of these rights as envisaged in the African Charter. As shown above, the model 
can be invoked to review both the negative and positive obligations imposed by the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. Moreover, reasonableness can be invoked 
to ensure that the content of the socio-economic rights that require immediate realisation 
are taken into account by States’ measures. In SERAC the African Commission 
endorsed this interpretation by, for example, holding that the provisions of article 24 of 
the African Charter oblige States to adopt “reasonable measures” to prevent 
environmental pollution.178 
Provisions regarding the protective mandate of the supervisory organs and the 
mandate to determine cases can be broadly construed to incorporate the 
reasonableness review. Articles 30 and 45(2) of the African Charter, as demonstrated in 
chapter 4,179 and article 2 of the African Court Protocol grant the African Commission 
and the African Court a protective mandate through the determination of complaints. It 
should be noted that the discussion above identified reasonableness as a model of 
review that on the one hand, allows States latitude to formulate the necessary policies 
and legislation for realising socio-economic rights and on the other hand, mandates the 
supervisory organs to assess whether such policies and legislation fall within the bounds 
of a reasonable measure to realise socio-economic rights. It can therefore be argued 
that the provisions relating to the supervisory organs’ mandate to determine cases in 
article 55 of the African Charter, article 3 of the African Court Protocol, and article 28(c) 
of the African Court of Justice Protocol broadly enshrine the reasonableness model of 
review. These provisions can effectively be construed in a manner that requires the 
supervisory organs, when determining claims relating to socio-economic rights, to 
consider the reasonableness of a State’s legislative, administrative and policy measures.  
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179 See chapter four, part 4 3 1. 
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Moreover articles 60 and 61, as analysed above,180 as well as article 3 of the African 
Court Protocol and article 28(c) of the African Court of Justice, allow the supervisory 
organs to draw inspiration and apply other relevant instruments in the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights. Through these provisions the supervisory organs can draw 
inspiration from the application of the reasonableness model of review of the CESCR in 
interpreting article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol as well as the South African 
Constitutional Court in its socio-economic rights jurisprudence. The following part 
discusses the minimum core as another approach to the model of review applicable to 
socio-economic rights. 
6 4 Minimum core obligations 
6 4 1 Introduction 
Another potential model of review is one premised on the concept of minimum core 
obligations. This model of review is reflected in the African Commission’s decisions on 
the rights to housing and food in SERAC. In relation to the right to housing the African 
Commission held that at a very minimum this right requires the respondent State to 
refrain from destroying individuals’ houses and from hindering their efforts to rebuild their 
destroyed houses.181 With regard to the right to food the African Commission stated that: 
“The minimum core of the right to food requires that the Nigerian Government should 
not destroy or contaminate food sources. It should not allow private parties to 
destroy or contaminate food sources, and prevent peoples’ efforts to feed 
themselves.”182 
Chirwa argues that the African Commission misunderstood the notion of “minimum 
core” obligation by interpreting it in a manner similar to the negative obligation to respect 
socio-economic rights.183 This misapplication of minimum core obligation raises the need 
to analyse this concept clearly.  
																																																								
180 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
181 SERAC para 61. 
182 Para 65. 
183 DM Chirwa “African regional human rights system: The promise of recent jurisprudence on social 
rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative 
law (2008) 323 326. A similar approach was taken by the South African Constitutional Court in Grootboom 
paras 46 & 95 and in TAC para 32. In Grootboom the South African Constitutional Court held that the 
provisions of articles 26 and 28 do not require the state to realise the socio-economic right to housing 
immediately. According to the South African Constitutional Court, this right is to be realised progressively 
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6 4 2 Minimum Core: Meaning and implications 
Scholars and institutions have defined and elaborated the notion of a minimum core 
obligation. The African Commission in its Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Principles and Guidelines’) 184  identifies that socio-
economic rights enshrined in the African Charter impose upon Member States a 
minimum core obligation which is immediate in nature.185  According to the African 
Commission, a minimum core obligation imposes upon Member States of the African 
Charter to guarantee the minimum essential levels of each socio-economic right 
enshrined in the African Charter.186 The African Commission stated further that minimum 
core obligation is meant to ensure that individuals and groups are not denied enjoyment 
of the essential levels enshrined in each socio-economic right.187 The CESCR in its 
various General Comments188  earlier on introduced minimum core as a significant 
component in interpreting socio-economic rights in the ICESCR. In its General Comment 
3 on the nature of States’ Parties obligations (‘General Comment 3’)189 the CESCR 
stated that socio-economic rights in the ICESCR impose upon States a minimum core 
obligation to guarantee the enjoyment of the minimum essentials of these rights.190 
However, it does not define the minimum essential levels. 191  Commenting on the 																																																																																																																																																																																			
within available resources. In TAC the South African Constitutional Court held that the socio-economic 
rights to housing, health, food, water and social security are not immediate, they should be realised 
progressively. 
184 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted at the Forty Seventh Ordinary Session held in Banjul, 
The Gambia, from 12 to 26 May 2010 and formally launched at the Commission’s Fiftieth Ordinary 
Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 24 October to 7 November 2011). 
185 Para 16. 
186 Para 17. 
187 Para 17. 
188 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations UN Doc. E/1991/23, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education (Article 14 of the Covenant), 10 May 1999, 
E/1992/23, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12, The right to 
adequate food, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 13, The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant), UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 14, The Right 
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 19, The Right to Social Security (art. 19) UN Doc 
E/C.12/GC/19. 
189 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.3, The nature of States 
parties obligations (Art. 2, para. 1) (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23. 
190 Para 10. 
191 See also Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights 189. 
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minimum core obligation introduced by the CESCR, Bilchitz notes that the degree of the 
levels of realising socio-economic rights varies in the sense that some levels of 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights are more urgent than others.192  
Craven notes that minimum core obligations help to ensure States realise the basic 
socio-economic needs of individuals.193 Craven, in commenting on General Comment 3, 
posits that the minimum core concept requires States to achieve individuals’ basic socio-
economic needs irrespective of their economic hardships.194 According to him, in times 
of economic hardship, the minimum core requires States to make use of resources 
obtained through international assistance to realise individuals’ minimum levels of socio-
economic rights.195 In its Guidelines, the African Commission notes that the minimum 
core obligation requires States to realise minimum essential levels of socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter irrespective of the availability of resources.196 For a State to 
rely on the failure to realise the minimum essential levels of the socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter it must prove that it has allocated all the available resources at its 
exposal for the realisation of the core content of these rights.197 States are required to 
ensure the minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights of the most disadvantaged 
members of society are realised.198  
As Langford notes, the minimum core obligation allows available resources in a State 
to be used to determine whether States will be able to realise the minimum essential 
levels of socio-economic rights. 199  However, such State must prove the lack of 
resources.200 It should be noted that in General Comment 3 the CESCR requires an 
assessment of States’ realisation of its minimum core obligations to take into 
consideration resource constraints facing the State in question.201 When a State fails to 
realise its minimum core obligation it must be able to show that it exhausted its available 
																																																								
192 Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights 185-186. 
193 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (1995) 141. 
194 141. 
195 141. 
196 Principles and Guidelines para 17. 
197 Para 17. 
198 Para 17. 
199 M Langford “Substantive obligations” in M Langford, B Porter, R Brown and J Rossi (eds) Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (2016) 
227 262. 
200 262. 
201 General Comment 3 para 10. 
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resources. 202  While the CESCR took a lenient approach regarding the resource 
constraints defence in its General Comment 3, in the subsequent General Comments it 
took a stringent approach and omitted this defence in some General Comments.203 For 
example, although the right to education is not qualified by resource constraints, the 
CESCR in its General Comment 11 on plans of action for primary education (‘General 
Comment 11’)204 urges states not to rely on a lack of resources to justify their failure to 
adopt a plan of action regarding primary education in article 14 of the ICESCR.205 It 
requires States to consider international co-operation as a mechanism to secure 
necessary resources needed for the realisation of this right.206 Moreover, it requires the 
international community to assist States facing resource constraints to realise this 
right.207 In its General Comment 12 on the right to adequate food (‘General Comment 
12’)208 the CESCR stated that a Member State that relies on the resource constraint as a 
reason for its failure to realise the right to adequate food, of the most vulnerable people 
in the society that cannot afford to access food on their own, must prove that it deployed 
all the resources at its disposal to realise the minimum obligations of the right to food.209  
The CESCR stated in its General Comment 14 on the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (‘General Comment 14’)210 that States are obliged to realise the 
minimum essentials of this right.211 It then proceeded to urge Member States that are in 
a position, through “international assistance and cooperation”, to help developing States 
to realise this obligation.212 It stated further that States cannot use resource constraints 
as a means to justify their failure to realise the right to health.213 In its General Comment 
19 on the right to social security (‘General Comment 19’)214 the CESCR required States 																																																								
202 Para 10. 
203 See also Langford “Substantive obligations” in Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 261-262. 
204 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 11, Plans of Action for 
Primary Education (Article 14 of the Covenant), UN Doc. E/1992/23 
205 Para 9. 
206 Para 9. 
207 Para 9. 
208 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12, The right to adequate 
food, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999). 
209 Para 17. 
210 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 14, The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4. 
211 Para 43. 
212 Para 45. 
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to realise the minimum essential levels of this right.215 It required States relying on 
resource constraints to demonstrate that it deployed all its efforts to use the resources at 
its disposal for the realisation of the minimum obligation imposed by this right.216 It also 
urges economically rich States to assist developing States to meet its minimum 
obligations.217  
Bilchitz argues that the minimum core obligation of socio-economic rights takes into 
account the fact that essential levels of socio-economic rights are important and require 
a higher standard of protection for the survival of the rights’ holders.218 Writing in the 
context of articles 26 and 27 of the South African Constitution, Bilchitz further notes that 
the “minimum core” obligation is designed to ensure individuals’ basic socio-economic 
rights are protected for their survival.219 He notes further that the minimum core takes 
into consideration the fact that socio-economic rights contain some basic elements that 
should be realised urgently for individuals’ survival.220 He also notes that socio-economic 
rights also incorporate a secondary threshold that requires States to provide individuals 
with conditions that enable them to enjoy these rights.221 According to Bilchitz, in this 
way the minimum core requires States to provide, without delay, individuals with the 
basic socio-economic services necessary for their survival.222 Bilchitz posits that the 
delay in protecting individuals’ survival rights renders all other rights meaningless. In a 
similar vein, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that the objective 
of States’ legal obligation regarding realisation of socio-economic rights is to ensure 
priority is given to such rights for individuals’ survival.223 
Young notes that the concept of a minimum core is based on three broad 
approaches. She describes the first category as an “essence approach” that establishes 
the minimum legal contents of the right that should be prioritised for the protection of 
individuals’ survival, life and dignity.224 According to Young, the essential levels of socio-
economic rights, through the essence approach, are determined by their close link with 																																																								
215 Para 59. 
216 Para 60. 
217 Para 61. 
218 Bilchitz (2003) South African Journal on Human Rights 12. 
219 11. 
220 11. 
221 11. 
222 12. 
223 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1979-1980) OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 50, 
doc.13 rev 1 2.  
224 KG Young “The minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search of content” (2008) 33 
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the foundational norms such as survival and life.225 The essence approach takes into 
account the “basic needs” of the beneficiary of the right.226 It also incorporates the 
values of equality, dignity and freedom. 227  The second category is the “minimum 
consensus” approach that focuses on States’ agreement on the elements constituting 
universal core content of socio-economic rights rather than the core contents of the 
rights themselves.228 The third approach focuses on the “minimum obligations” imposed 
by socio-economic rights rather than the rights themselves.229 
Some aspects of the minimum core obligation as identified above undermine the 
object and purpose of the African Charter relating to socio-economic rights. For 
example, greater emphasis is placed on realising the minimum elements of socio-
economic rights. Young notes that the minimum core focuses on establishing a minimum 
legal content of important socio-economic rights.230 Liebenberg notes that a conception 
of the minimum core that focuses exclusively on the aspect of survival ignores other 
values which are integral to socio-economic rights such as “participatory democracy, 
equality, freedom and human dignity”.231 
Moreover, the notion of a minimum core as identified above creates a dichotomy of 
socio-economic rights by establishing important and less important thresholds of socio-
economic rights realisation. Wesson notes that the objective of the minimum core 
obligation is to prioritise some socio-economic rights over others.232 Young notes that 
the proponents of the minimum core direct their attention to the severest socio-economic 
rights violations only as against less-severe violations.233 This dichotomy is problematic 
for the protection of socio-economic rights in two respects. Firstly, States can give more 
emphasis to the minimum levels of the rights and less emphasis to the extensive levels 
of the enjoyment through progressive realisation. Secondly, it can cause States to ignore 
the realisation of these rights progressively and focus only on meeting the minimum core 
obligations. Writing in the context of the right to health, Toebes argues that “minimum 
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core” renders some content of such socio-economic right less important, as well as 
undermines the progressive realisation of such right.234 
Liebenberg argues that “minimum core approach is in danger of encouraging 
minimalism in social provisioning when the context in fact renders such minimalism 
unnecessary and inappropriate.”235 She notes further that the minimum core obligation 
excludes or marginalises the socio-economic needs of various groups that do not fit in 
the requirements of the minimum core.236 According to her individuals’ socio-economic 
needs vary.237 She notes that the survival-based approach of minimum core fails to 
effectively respond to diverse socio-economic needs of different groups of people in 
society. The approach for example fails to accommodate the object and purpose of 
significant socio-economic rights that are not directly related to life such as the right to 
education.238 Sen challenges the survival-based approach that is not exclusive since 
individuals can survive even with minute nutrition or in situations where dietary 
standards are high.239  
Another shortcoming of the minimum core concept is that it stresses the prioritising of 
socio-economic rights of the individual rather than the collective socio-economic rights. 
This is evidenced in Bilchitz’s statement where he notes that: 
“Even if housing could be achieved for most people in a reasonable time, it would 
never be acceptable for some to have to suffer the dire effects of not being protected 
from elements or not having their other basic needs met. This is one of the prime 
reasons for the protection of socio-economic entitlements in the form of rights. 
Collective goals cannot outweigh protections for the most basic interests of 
individuals. The effect of not protecting people from the elements can have a dire 
impact on their lives, and affect their basic ability to live and be free from 
impairments of their physical functioning and freedom.”240 
This individualistic understanding of the minimum core needs to be balanced with the 
collective socio-economic rights in the African Charter that are formulated and based on 
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the African philosophy of collectiveness as discussed in chapter 3 of this study.241 The 
supervisory organs would be able to strike a balance through the limitation clause in 
article 27(2) of the African Charter. As will be discussed below the supervisory organs 
may apply the proportionality standard to assess States’ limitation of the socio-economic 
rights.242 
The South African Constitutional Court rejected the notion of minimum core in three 
significant cases. These cases are: Grootboom, TAC, and Mazibuko. In Grootboom the 
Constitutional Court stated that determination of socio-economic rights’ minimum 
content requires sufficient information regarding the needs of such rights. The court held 
that variations in individuals’ socio-economic needs and opportunities render the 
determination of the minimum core of socio-economic rights complex.243 For example, 
regarding the right of access to adequate housing the court stated some individuals 
need land, some land and houses, while others need financial support to enable them to 
build houses.244 
In TAC the South African Constitutional Court stated that the formulation of article 26 
does not oblige the State to implement the rights of access to housing, health care, 
sufficient food and water, and social security immediately. The article requires the State 
to implement its socio-economic rights obligations based on its available resources.245 
According to the South African Constitutional Court, it is difficult to realise the minimum 
core of socio-economic rights for every individual immediately.246 Moreover, the court 
held that courts do not have the mandate to inquire and order the minimum content of 
socio-economic rights.247 
The minimum core as an independent model of review is insufficient to achieve the 
protection of socio-economic rights. Firstly, it encourages States to focus on 
implementing only the minimum elements of socio-economic rights. Secondly, it 
exclusively prioritises essential levels of the socio-economic rights. Thirdly, it lacks the 
elements to achieve socio-economic rights progressively but rather focuses on 
immediate realisation of socio-economic rights. Finally, it undermines collective socio-
economic rights.  																																																								
241 See chapter three, parts 3 3 4 6, 3 3 4 7 and 3 3 4 8. 
242 See part 6 5 below. 
243 Grootboom para 32. 
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Thus, the minimum core concept should be supplemented by another model of 
review that can guarantee the development of the normative content of all socio-
economic rights in the African Charter and their progressive realisation. Liebenberg 
notes that opponents of minimum core do not argue for a total disregard of this notion 
since it helps States to ensure their measures prioritise the socio-economic needs of 
marginalised individuals. 248  Lehmann, while commenting on the minimum core as 
elaborated by the CESCR, also notes that the notion guides States in developing their 
measures.249 In a similar vein Young, while commenting on the concept of minimum 
core, notes that this concept helps States to prioritise the socio-economic rights of the 
most vulnerable individuals in society. 250  Yeshanew argues that the best way to 
accommodate minimum core is to incorporate it in the reasonableness review. 251 
According to Yeshanew, the minimum core obligations will assist the supervisory organs 
to assess States’ negative and “basic level” positive obligations.252 It can therefore be a 
useful tool to establish the minimum content of the socio-economic rights as well as 
assess the measures taken by States to implement such minimum content of these 
rights.253 Both, minimum core and the reasonableness review take into account the 
basic and immediate socio-economic needs of the most vulnerable groups in society.254 
He further notes that as a combined model these two models of review can be a useful 
tool to monitor States’ implementation of their socio-economic rights obligations 
effectively.255 As shown above, the reasonableness review incorporates the minimum 
core to the extent that it includes immediate socio-economic needs. Writing on the 
reasonableness in the South African context Liebenberg notes that as a model of review 
reasonableness lacks justification for immediate needs.256 She suggests that in this 
regard it can be combined with the minimum core concept that justifies the immediate 
needs.257 
This dissertation adopts the model of review that merges reasonableness with 
minimum core as suggested by Yeshanew and Liebenberg respectively. However, this 																																																								
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model lacks a mechanism to assess States’ measures that limit the enjoyment of 
existing socio-economic rights. It should be noted that the discussion in chapters three 
and five showed that the socio-economic rights in the African Charter are not absolute; 
they can be limited through the provisions of article 27(2) of the African Charter. The 
following part analyses proportionality as a model of review applied by the supervisory 
organs to assess the limitation of rights by supervisory organs. The teleological 
methodology developed in chapter two of this study demonstrated that supervisory 
organs should engage the text of the African Charter as a whole in interpreting the 
socio-economic rights. Chapter three showed that provisions of article 27(2) can be 
applied to limit the socio-economic rights for the effective interpretation of socio-
economic rights. It was further shown in chapter five that the African Commission has 
invoked the provisions of article 27(2) to assess States’ measures that limit socio-
economic rights. As such, the discussion on proportionality as a model of review to 
assess the limitation of the rights by States links with the teleological approach 
methodology and is therefore relevant. The following part analyses the proportionality 
model of review. 
6 5 Proportionality 
6 5 1 Proportionality: Meaning and implications 
The proportionality model of review is centred on the understanding that human 
rights are not absolute; they can be restricted for the protection of the human rights of 
others or for public interest.258 In COHRE the African Commission stated that human 
rights enshrined in the African Charter can only be restricted for reasons of protecting 
the “rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”.259 In Ashingdane 
v The United Kingdom (‘Ashingdane’)260 the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) 
held that the right of access to the courts is not absolute, it can be restricted provided 
the restriction does not render the right illusory.261 Craig elaborates on proportionality as 
a standard of review that enables supervisory organs to assess whether a State’s 																																																								
258 AV Dolzhikov “The European Court of Human Rights on the principle of proportionality in ‘Russian’ 
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259 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Human Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan 
Communications no. 279/03-296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009). para 165. See also Centre for the 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya Communication no. 276/2003 (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009) para 172. 
260 Case of Ashingdane v The United Kingdom App no 8225/78 (ECtHR, 28 May 1985). 
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limitation measures are appropriate to achieve the intended purposes.262 Craig posits, in 
relation to human rights enshrined in various treaties, proportionality is appropriate in 
assessing the limitations of such rights by States.263 According to Craig, courts assess 
whether a State’s measures relates to the intended goals, as well as whether such 
measures are disproportionate and impair the object and purpose of the rights.264 Möller 
defines proportionality as a “doctrinal tool” applied by the supervisory organs to 
determine whether a State’s restriction of individuals’ rights is justified and proportionate 
to the purpose of such restriction.265 As a model of review proportionality assists the 
supervisory organs to establish whether a State’s limitation measures are appropriate to 
achieve the intended purposes.266 It guides the supervisory organs to resolve a conflict 
between human rights as well as between rights and public interests.267  
In common the above definitions demonstrate that human rights are not absolute; 
their enjoyment can be subjected to some limitations. Significantly, States must be able 
to justify the limitation of the rights. In Constitutional Rights Project and Others v Nigeria 
(‘Constitutional Rights Project’)268 the African Commission held that States’ justification 
for the limitation of human rights entrenched in the African Charter should be “strictly 
proportionate and absolutely necessary” for the purpose aimed to be achieved.269 The 
African Commission further emphasised that the limitation must not render the limited 
right illusory.270 Writing in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘European Convention’), Gerards notes that States are allowed to restrict the rights in 
the European Convention provided they reasonably justify such restrictions. 271  As 
mentioned above, the African Commission held in COHRE that Member States to the 
African Charter can justify the limitation of the rights if the limitation aims at protecting 
the “rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”.272 In Endorois 																																																								
262 P Craig “Proportionality, rationality and review” (2010) New Zealand Law Review 265 268. 
263 269. 
264 270. 
265 K Möller “Proportionality and rights inflation” in G Huscroft, BW Miller & G Webber (eds) Proportionality 
and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (2014) 155 155. See also K Möller “Proportionality: 
Challenging the critics” (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 709 709.  
266 Craig (2010) New Zealand Law Review 268. 
267 Möller “Proportionality” in Proportionality and the Rule of Law 156. 
268 Constitutional Rights Project and Others v Nigeria Communication nos. 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999) 
AHRLR 227 (ACHPR 1999). 
269 Para 42. 
270 Para 42. 
271 J Gerards “How to improve the necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights” (2013) 11 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 466 466. 
272 COHRE para 165. 
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the African Commission held that the limitation of the rights in the African Charter should 
not render such rights illusory and ineffective.273 This aspect of proportionality links with 
the teleological methodology, particularly with the principle of effectiveness that requires 
supervisory organs to interpret the socio-economic rights in a manner that renders such 
rights practical and effective rather than theoretical and ineffective.274 
This dissertation adopts the above discussed definitions of the proportionality model 
of review based on their relevance to the understanding of proportionality in the context 
of the African Charter. The dissertation invokes proportionality as a relevant model for 
reviewing the limitations of the enjoyment of the existing socio-economic rights by the 
Member States of the African Charter. Writing on the proportionality standard in the 
context of the ECHR, Rivers posits that the concept of proportionality helps supervisory 
organs to scrutinise a State’s justification for restricting individuals’ rights.275  
Scholars have identified four elements of proportionality namely legitimate aim, 
suitability, necessity, and balancing.276Legitimate aim focuses on ensuring that the 
measures adopted by the State to restrict the rights of the individuals and groups are in 
line with the law and the values of a democratic society. For States to restrict human 
rights they must prove to have a “legitimate aim”.277 Limitation of the enjoyment of the 
rights by States should be strictly based on legitimate aims.278 The African Commission 
applied this element of proportionality in Endorois where it stated that restriction of the 
rights in the African Charter must be established by law.279 Writing in the context of the 
European Convention Eissen notes that legitimate aim of a State is justified when the 
																																																								
273 Endorois para 172. 
274 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 4. 
275 J Rivers “Proportionality and variable intensity of review” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174 176-
177. 
276 See Möller “Proportionality and rights inflation” in Proportionality and the rule of law 155-156, Dolzhikov 
(2012) Teisės aktualijos 218, Gerards (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 469, Rivers 
(2006) Cambridge Law Journal 181 and Craig (2010) New Zealand Law Review 271-272. These elements 
of proportionality model of review are analysed in depth by S Van der Berg A capabilities approach to the 
judicial review of resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch (2015) 238-241. However, the context within which Van der Berg discusses these elements 
is in relation to resource allocation decisions in South Africa. The current dissertation however, analyses 
and discusses the elements of proportionality with regard to assessing the level of states’ compliance with 
their socio-economic rights obligations in the African Charter. 
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limitation is “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society”.280 Dolzhikov 
notes that the legitimate goals of the State to limit the rights are also expressed in 
different phrases281 but is mainly expressed in the phrases “to the protection or the rights 
of other persons or public interests”.282 These two phrases are the basis for restricting 
human rights.283 In Prince v South Africa (‘Prince’)284 the African Commission held that 
the individual’s right to “hold religious beliefs” is absolute, however, the right to exercise 
such religious beliefs is not absolute.285  
According to the African Commission, the manner in which an individual practices his 
or her religious beliefs must be in line with the “interests of society”.286 The African 
Commission did not define the phrases “public interest”, “public need” or “interests of 
society” in its jurisprudence. However, in its Guidelines it has interpreted the phrase 
“public interest” to mean the “common well-being or general welfare of the 
population”.287 It has also elaborated the phrases “public need” and “interest of the 
society” in the provisions of the African Charter to include “legitimate public interest 
objective such as economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social 
justice”.288  
Suitability determines whether the measures adopted to limit the rights are capable of 
achieving the legitimate purpose of the limitation.289 Significantly, suitability requires 
States’ measures to be reasonable in a manner that does not provide absurdity in the 
enjoyment of the rights.290 The reasonable link between the limitation and the purpose of 
the limitation is established when the measures taken are capable of achieving the 
aim.291 If a measure fails to achieve the legitimate purpose then it does not pass the 
suitability test.292 As such suitability requires States to develop a mechanism capable of 																																																								
280 M Eissen “The principle of proportionality in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights” in 
RSt.J Macdonald, F Matscher & H Petzold (eds) The European System for the Protection of Human 
Rights (1993) 125 126. 
281 Dolzhikov (2012) Teises aktualijos 218. See also Eissen “The Principle of proportionality” in The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights 126. 
282 Dolzhikov (2012) Teisės aktualijos 219. 
283 219. 
284 Prince v South Africa Communication no. 255/2002 (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004).  
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achieving the legitimate aim of the limitation.293 In Prince the African Commission held 
that the effect of the State’s restriction of the rights should be “strictly proportionate” with 
the legitimate goal aimed to be achieved.294 In the case of Éditions Plon v France 
(‘Plon’)295 the ECHR had to decide whether banning of the publication of the book that 
revealed the medical information of the late former President Mitterrand of France was 
suitable to achieve a legitimate aim to protect the rights of President Mitterrand and his 
family.296 The ECHR held that based on the fact that the book has already been sold 
and the information disseminated on the internet it was no longer confidential.297 As 
such the requirement for medical confidentiality was irrelevant. According to the ECHR 
the measures adopted by the State to ban the book was disproportionate to the 
“legitimate aim” to protect the rights of President Mitterrand.298  
Necessity requires States, in limiting the rights, to adopt the least restrictive 
measures. States should ensure that there is no other less restrictive measure that could 
achieve the purpose equally well.299  In Endorois the African Commission held that 
restriction of the rights in the African Charter must be necessary for achieving the 
desired purpose and they should also be least restrictive.300 In Fedesa (‘Fedesa’)301 the 
ECHR held earlier that proportionality requires States to show that limitations are 
necessary and that States have pursued the least restrictive measures.302 In Prince the 
African Commission held that the effect of the State’s restriction of the rights should be 
necessary for achieving the legitimate aim.303  
The fourth element of proportionality is balancing. Contrary to suitability and 
necessity that are concerned with the link between the purpose of the measures and the 
means to achieve such purpose, balancing determines the inter-relation between the 
limited rights and the rights that the State aims to protect.304 Möller notes that at the 
balancing stage a supervisory organ establishes which of the two categories of rights at 																																																								
293 Gerards (2013) International Journal of Constitutional Law 473. 
294 Prince para 43. 
295 Case of Éditions Plon v France App no 58148/00 (ECtHR, 18 May 2004). 
296 Para 53. 
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302 Para 13. See also Case of Daróczy v Hungary App no 44378/05 (ECtHR, 1 July 2008) paras 3, 26-28 
and 33, Case of Üpper and Others v Turkey App nos 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 
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stake should be prioritised.305 According to him, the inquiry at this stage is whether 
State’s limitation of the right can assist the protection of the “competing right or 
interest”.306 The balance between the limited right and the right aimed to be protected by 
the State should be reasonable. 307  In the Principles and Guidelines the African 
Commission while interpreting the principle of proportionality, stated that the principle 
aims at “striking a fair balance” between the individual’s socio-economic rights and the 
interest of the society. 308  A State’s limitation of socio-economic rights are not 
proportional in circumstances where the State fails to prove that it balanced the 
competing socio-economic rights of the individual with those of the general public before 
taking the limitation steps.309 The element of balancing was applied by the ECHR in 
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (‘Mathieu’).310 The ECHR stated that human 
rights are not absolute in the sense that States enjoy the discretion to restrict them.311 
However, courts have the role to monitor such States’ discretion.312 Courts must assess 
the measures taken by States to ensure that they do not render the rights illusory and 
ineffective.313 The measures must aim to pursue a legitimate purpose and must be 
proportional.314 Particularly, the restriction of the rights by States should not frustrate the 
rights for the protection of rights of the legislature.315 
These elements of proportionality are relevant to the interpretation of socio-economic 
rights. Firstly, they assist the supervisory organs to establish whether the measures 
adopted by the State fulfil the legitimate aim. However, it should be noted that exclusive 
legitimate aim is not sufficient justification for States to restrict socio-economic rights. 
Secondly, supervisory organs must ascertain the suitability of the measure. They should 
establish whether the measure adopted is suitable for achieving the legitimate aim. 
Thirdly, supervisory organs must ascertain that there is no other less restrictive measure 
that a State could adopt in order to lessen the effects of the limitation to the victims. 
Writing in the context of Europe, Craig argues that in relation to human rights, such as 
the rights to property and work, proportionality allows the courts to order that the 																																																								
305 Möller (2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 713. 
306 713. 
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limitations of such rights should be less restrictive.316 According to him, through a 
proportionality standard the courts ascertain whether the goals could be attained by less 
restrictive measures. 317  In a similar vein, Liebenberg notes that a proportionality 
assessment should aim at requiring States to demonstrate there are no less restrictive 
measures for achieving the required goals.318 Finally, supervisory organs should balance 
the rights restricted and the rights protected by the measure and establish if justification 
is established. 
6 5 2 Proportionality in the African Charter 
The notion of proportionality is recognised in the African Charter. It should be noted 
that the discussion in chapter three of this study showed that socio-economic rights in 
the African Charter are not absolute. States can limit these rights through the provisions 
of article 27(2) of the African Charter. The African Commission held in COHRE that the 
human rights enshrined in the African Charter can only be limited by the provisions of 
article 27(2).319 Moreover, the provisions of article 14 of the African Charter can be used 
to restrict socio-economic rights. These provisions provide an internal limitation clause. 
As Tsakyrakis posits, rights provisions in a treaty incorporate limitation clauses which 
are necessary restrictions for the protection of human rights of a larger community of 
people in the society.320 
It can thus be argued that the conditions identified in the limitation provisions of 
articles 14 and 27(2) namely “interest of public need” or “general interest of the 
community” “rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest” implicitly 
incorporate the model of proportionality. Tsakyrakis writes that underlying assumptions 
regarding proportionality are twofold. Firstly, public interests override an individual’s 
interests. Secondly, a State’s measures to foster such public interests prevail only to the 
extent that they do not impose excessive restrictions on individuals.321 
However, the African Charter does not explicitly identify the elements of the 
proportionality model of review as enshrined in the provisions of article 27(2). The 																																																								
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omission of express provisions regarding the elements of the proportionality model of 
review does not necessarily mean that these elements are excluded in the provisions of 
article 27(2). It can be argued that these elements are implicitly included in article 27(2) 
of the African Charter. It was demonstrated in chapter two that the teleological approach 
to interpretation through the principle of effectiveness requires provisions of the African 
Charter to be interpreted in a manner that renders such provisions effective and 
practical. This principle can thus be applied to include within article 27(2) the four 
elements of proportionality as identified by scholars, namely legitimate aim, suitability, 
necessity and balancing. In Prince the African Commission clearly stated that the right to 
freedom of religion in the African Charter is not absolute and that the provisions of article 
27(2) of the African Charter provide a legitimate restriction of this right.322 According to 
the African Commission, the justification for the limitation of the rights in article 27(2) is 
based on the general principle that enjoyment of one’s right should not violate other 
human rights entrenched in the African Charter.323 Reasons for the limitation of the 
rights recognised in the African Charter should be justified by the “legitimate State 
interest”.324 
Having discussed the different models of review, the following part develops the 
teleological model of review by considering the viability of reasonableness, incorporating 
minimum core and proportionality.  
6 6 Towards a model of review grounded in the teleological approach: 
Reasonableness incorporating minimum core and proportionality  
6 6 1 Inter-relation between teleological approach and reasonableness review 
The effective protection of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter will 
require an assessment of the States’ compliance with the obligations imposed by these 
rights. The model of review suitable for assessing States’ compliance with their socio-
economic rights obligations must be able to correspond with the teleological approach 
and advance the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding these rights. The 
discussion above on the models of review identified reasonableness as a model of 
review that considers the object and purpose of the rights to assess States’ compliance 
with the obligations imposed by such rights. The element of object and purpose of the 																																																								
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rights in the reasonableness review corresponds with the teleological approach to 
interpretation, developed in chapter two of this dissertation.  
The discussion in chapter two argued for a teleological approach as an appropriate 
approach to interpreting socio-economic rights in the African Charter. The discussion 
demonstrated that the appropriateness of the teleological approach centres on its use of 
the object and purpose of the treaty regarding socio-economic rights. The element of 
object and purpose as demonstrated in chapter two enables the supervisory organs to 
engage various interpretative tools to develop the meaning, scope and content of socio-
economic rights and their related obligations. Supervisory organs are able to engage the 
text of the African Charter holistically to interpret socio-economic rights. Holistic 
interpretation of the African Charter allows them to apply the values of equality, dignity, 
freedom and justice in the interpretative process. It also allows the supervisory organs to 
take into account the relevant provisions in the African Charter, the preparatory work of 
the African Charter, relevant international, regional and national laws and jurisprudence, 
as well as the principle of effectiveness to interpret socio-economic rights and their 
concomitant obligations.  
The above discussion has demonstrated the interrelation between the 
reasonableness review and the teleological approach to interpretation. Based on this 
interrelation between the reasonableness review and the teleological approach it can be 
argued that reasonableness can be developed as a teleological model of review. The 
aspect of object and purpose of the rights as an element of reasonableness can be 
applied in a manner that incorporates in this model of review the elements of the 
teleological approach identified above which are vital in elaborating the object and 
purpose of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter.  
6 6 1 1 Identifying the scope and content of socio-economic rights at stake 
As argued above, the object and purpose of the rights is a vital element of the 
reasonableness review. This element as elaborated above, as well as in chapter two, 
engages various interpretative aspects to develop the scope and content of the rights at 
stake. The element therefore renders reasonableness as a two-stage model of review in 
the sense that it first develops the scope and content of the socio-economic rights and 
then applies such content to assess states’ measures. 
As demonstrated above, the reference to the object and purpose enables a reviewing 
supervisory organ, applying reasonableness, to engage the values of dignity, equality, 
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justice and freedom to elaborate the content of the rights that the States must take into 
account when they develop measures to realise the rights. Furthermore, as shown 
above, the reference to the object and purpose enables reviewing supervisory organs to 
engage the provisions of the African Charter holistically to generate the scope and 
content of the socio-economic rights that States’ measures must take into consideration. 
6 6 1 2 Minimum essentials of socio-economic rights 
Effective protection of socio-economic rights requires States to be able to give effect 
to these rights progressively as demonstrated in chapter three. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that States should ignore the immediate socio-economic needs of 
individuals and groups. The object and purpose of the African Charter as elaborated in 
chapter two requires that the socio-economic rights of the individuals and groups should 
be realised. The object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-economic 
rights will be defeated when States’ measures fail to give effect to the minimum 
essentials of socio-economic rights. As such, object and purpose as an element of the 
reasonableness review creates space for a reviewing supervisory organ to assess the 
manner in which States’ measures take into account the individual’s and peoples’ 
immediate socio-economic needs. In this regard, the measures of a State will be 
unreasonable when they leave the immediate socio-economic needs out of their scope. 
As Liebenberg similarly notes, in situations where immediate socio-economic needs of 
the people are not realised by the State, it exposes people to live an undignified life and 
fail to engage equally in society. 325  She notes further that minimum core in the 
reasonableness model of review enables supervisory organs to place a heavy burden of 
justification in circumstances where individuals are denied their immediate socio-
economic needs. 326  In a similar vein, Yeshanew argues that if merged with the 
reasonableness model of review, the minimum core would help in establishing the 
content of immediate socio-economic needs and enable the supervisory organs to 
assess how States’ measures have taken into account such needs.327 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter two, the object and purpose of rights 
incorporates the principle of effectiveness that ensures rights’ provisions are assigned 
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meaning that is effective and practical.328 In this regard, a reviewing supervisory organ, 
applying reasonableness, can apply the principle of effectiveness as an element of 
object and purpose to construe the provisions of socio-economic rights in a manner that 
renders their meaning effective and practical. This generous interpretation requires that 
the minimum essential of these rights are protected. 
The incorporation of the minimum essential of socio-economic needs is significant in 
that it engages in the reasonableness review the minimum core model of review. It 
should be noted that the analysis of the minimum core obligation above identified that 
this model of review cannot independently advance the object and purpose of the 
African Charter regarding socio-economic rights. The discussion demonstrated the need 
to integrate minimum obligation with the reasonableness review. The integration of the 
reasonableness and minimum core models of review is vital in that it enables the 
supervisory organs to assess how States realise the immediate socio-economic needs 
of the most vulnerable people in the society while giving effect to the progressive 
realisation of these rights. As Yeshanew notes the minimum core obligation is useful for 
establishing the basic content of the socio-economic rights and the reasonableness 
review helps in establishing the content of the rights for progressive realisation.329 
6 6 1 3 Reviewing positive and negative obligations 
As demonstrated in chapter three, the provisions of article 1 of the African Charter 
incorporates both the negative and positive obligations imposed by the socio-economic 
rights. Positive obligations require States to adopt measures that realise socio-economic 
rights.330 It was argued above that the reasonableness review is implicitly incorporated in 
the provisions of article 1 of the African Charter. In this regard, the reasonableness 
review can be applied to review the positive obligations imposed by the socio-economic 
rights. As demonstrated above, a reviewing court can inquire as to whether the 
measures adopted by the State reasonably realise the obligations imposed by the socio-
economic rights. In this regard, reasonableness sufficiently reviews the positive 
obligations. 
Regarding the negative obligations, it was demonstrated above that the State is in 
breach of its negative obligation when it violates the enjoyment of the existing socio-																																																								
328 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3 and 2 5 2 4. 
329 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural rights 321. See also Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 223. 
330 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 1. 
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economic rights. When the enjoyment of existing rights is limited States should justify 
the limitation. It was demonstrated in chapter three that the object and purpose requires 
restriction of rights to be narrowly interpreted. Object and purpose of the rights as an 
element of reasonableness enables this model of review to assess States’ restrictive 
measures. In this regard, reasonableness integrates the proportionality model of review. 
In the analysis regarding the proportionality model of review it was demonstrated that it 
cannot effectively review the obligations imposed by the socio-economic rights in a 
manner that advances their object and purpose. The need to integrate it with the 
reasonableness review was demonstrated. Writing on the model he developed that 
combines the reasonableness review and minimum core, Yeshanew notes that this 
model is not exclusive other models of review can be developed for the effective 
protection of the socio-economic rights.331 
6 7 Conclusion 
In order to align the jurisprudence of the supervisory organs with the teleological 
approach this chapter recommended various mechanisms to be taken into account in 
the interpretative process. First and foremost is the adaption and application of the 
teleological approach to interpretation. This approach allows the supervisory organs to 
engage different interpretative tools to interpret socio-economic rights. These tools 
include the object and purpose of the African Charter regarding socio-economic rights, 
the text of the African Charter as a whole, its preparatory work, relevant international, 
regional and national human rights laws and jurisprudence, as well as the principle of 
effectiveness. 
Significantly, the supervisory organs should apply the identified interpretative tools 
systematically. It is important for the supervisory organs to adapt and consistently apply 
the methodology for application of the teleological approach as developed in chapter 
two. In addition the supervisory organs, when interpreting the African Charter holistically, 
should generously interpret and apply their interpretive and remedial mandate for 
effective interpretation of the socio-economic rights. Finally, it is important for the 
supervisory organs to adopt and apply the teleological model of review as developed in 
this chapter for effective protection of the socio-economic rights.  
When assessing States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations 
supervisory organs must be able to ascertain the scope and content of the socio-																																																								
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economic rights at stake and then use such content as a mechanism to assess states’ 
measures. Where the immediate socio-economic needs are at stake States’ measures 
should be assessed to establish how they take such needs into account. Moreover, 
where the existing socio-economic rights are limited States’ restrictive measures must 
be assessed. This chapter demonstrated that the reasonableness review integrating 
minimum core and proportionality as a teleological model of review can be applied by 
the supervisory organs to assess States’ measures relating to the obligations imposed 
by the socio-economic rights. 
The reasonableness model of review incorporating minimum core obligation and 
proportionality as a teleological model of review focuses on advancing the object and 
purpose of the socio-economic rights. It enables supervisory organs to develop the 
scope and content of socio-economic rights. It also requires supervisory organs to use 
such scope and content to limit States’ discretion regarding their mandate to adopt 
measures and policies for realising these rights. Moreover, it helps supervisory organs, 
through the object and purpose of the rights, to develop the minimum essentials of the 
socio-economic rights that should be realised by Member States. Finally, it allows the 
supervisory organs, in circumstances where States limit the socio-economic rights, to 
assess the restrictive measures of States. The following chapter concludes the 
dissertation. 
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Postscript 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya (‘Republic 
of Kenya – Judgment on Merits’),1 a judgment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (‘African Court’), 2  was decided a few days after submitting this 
dissertation for examination, but before the examiner’s comments were finalised. I 
consider it appropriate to include this brief postscript on the case as it demonstrates 
elements of the teleological approach advocated in this dissertation to the interpretation 
of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
The applicant in the Republic of Kenya – Judgment on Merits alleged that the Ogiek 
Community (‘the Ogieks’)3 in the respondent State are an indigenous minority ethnic 
group residing in the greater Mau forest complex.4 The applicant submitted that the 
State, through its agency the Kenya Forestry Service, issued the Ogieks and other 
settlers with a 30-day notice to vacate the Mau forest on the grounds that it is a reserved 
water catchment zone and “government land”, as stipulated in section 4 of the 
Government Land Act.5 The applicant further argued that the eviction notice failed to 
consider the importance of the Mau forest for the Ogieks’ survival.6 The applicant, 
therefore, alleged a violation of articles 1, 2, 4, 14, 17(2)-(3), 21, and 22 of the African 
Charter. 
The African Court started by deciding on its material jurisdiction. It held that its 
establishment in article 3 of the African Court Protocol, and the principle of 
complementarity in article 2, enabled the applicant to submit before it any case alleging 
a violation of African Charter rights, including cases that reveal a series of serious or 
massive human rights violations. 7  The African Court’s decision resonates with the 
teleological approach, which requires (through the principle of effectiveness) that 
restrictions to the enjoyment of socio-economic rights be narrowly interpreted. However, 
the Court failed to broadly interpret articles 2 and 3 in a manner that upholds the African 
Charter’s object and purpose. It did so by its omission to elaborate on how and when the 																																																								
1 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012. 
2 The judgment on merits of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the case of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya was issued on 26 May 2017 being a 
few days after the cut-off date 24 May 2017 for the analysis of the new jurisprudence of the supervisory 
organs. 
3 Para 6. 
4 Para 6. 
5 Paras 7-8. 
6 Para 8. 
7 Para 53. 
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Commission should submit a case before it as argued in chapter four of this 
dissertation.8  
Regarding admissibility, the respondent State argued that the applicant failed to 
comply with the requirement to exhaust local remedies, as provided for in Rule 40(5) of 
the Rules of the Court.9 In this regard, the Court held that exhausting local remedies 
reinforces the importance of domestic judicial systems in safeguarding human rights and 
must, therefore, be complied with.10 The African Court further noted that both article 
56(5) of the African Charter, and Rule 40(5) of the Rules of the Court, require local 
remedies to be available and sufficient, while not being unduly prolonged.11 According to 
the Court, Rule 40(5) mainly requires the applicant to prove that the case has passed 
through the domestic judicial system. 12  This decision aligns with the teleological 
approach, as it interprets restrictions to the enjoyment of socio-economic rights narrowly. 
The African Court subsequently had to consider whether the Ogieks constitute 
indigenous peoples.13 It noted the African Charter’s omission regarding the meaning of 
indigenous peoples.14 Through articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, the Court drew 
inspiration from the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities, as well as the work of the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Minorities, which establish criteria to identify indigenous populations.15 According to 
the African Court, three factors must be taken into consideration when identifying 
indigenous peoples: (1) the presence of priority in time with respect to the occupation 
and use of a specific territory; (2) a voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness 
including, aspects of language, social organisation, religion and spiritual values, modes 
of production, laws and institutions, self-identification as well as recognition by other 
groups or by State authorities that they are a distinct collectivity; and (3) an experience 
of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination.16 The Court 
further held that the most relevant factor regarding the identification of indigenous 																																																								
8 See chapter four, part 4 3 10. It was argued in chapter four, part 4 3 10 that although the African 
Commission can submit cases to the African Court at any time, the object and purpose of the African 
Charter requires the African Commission to submit cases after the consideration of the admissibility of the 
particular case. 
9 Para 90. 
10 Para 93. 
11 Para 93. 
12 Para 94. 
13 Para 102. 
14 Para 105. 
15 Paras 105-106 and 108. 
16 Para 107. 
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populations is their strong connection with nature, particularly land and the natural 
environment. 17  It found that the survival of indigenous populations hinges on 
“unhindered access to and use of their traditional land and the natural resources 
thereon”. Satisfied that the Ogieks possess all these requirements, the Court held that 
they are an indigenous people.18 This decision resonates with the teleological approach 
by applying articles 60 and 61 to draw inspiration from other relevant human rights 
sources to define the term “indigenous peoples”. Indigenous peoples are therefore 
legally identified as holders of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
Regarding the right to property in article 14 of the African Charter, the African Court 
found that this right is both individual and collective in nature.19 The right includes three 
elements namely the “right to use the property (usus)”; the “right to enjoy the property 
(fructus)”; and the “right to dispose the property or transfer it (abusus)”.20 Drawing 
inspiration from the United Nations General Assembly Declaration 61/295 on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, the Court held that the Ogieks have the right to occupy, use, and 
enjoy their traditional lands.21 Furthermore, the court held that the right to property under 
article 14 establishes conditions upon which this right can be limited. It may be limited in 
the public interest and only when necessary and proportional.22 The African Court held 
that, by failing to engage the Ogieks before evictions and by failing to take into 
consideration the conditions of expulsion in the public interest, the respondent State 
violated their right to property.23 
This decision is significant for the scope and content of the right to property, as it 
clarifies both the holders and content of this right. It also recognises indigenous peoples’ 
rights to their traditional land. Upholding indigenous peoples’ property rights embraces 
the African Charter’s approach, which draws on African realities and philosophical 
perspectives regarding peoples’ rights. As demonstrated in chapter three, the African 
Charter not only recognises the socio-economic rights of individuals, but also peoples’ 
socio-economic rights.24 The recognition of collective socio-economic rights is justified 
by the notion of African philosophy entrenched in the African Charter’s preamble and 
elaborated on in its provisions. This dissertation also advanced that the notion of African 																																																								
17 Para 109. 
18 Paras 110-112. 
19 Para 123. 
20 Para 124. 
21 Paras 125-128. 
22 Para 129. 
23 Para 131. 
24 See chapter three, parts 3 3 4 6 to 3 3 4 8. 
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philosophy centres on the understanding that African societies are collective in nature.25 
The African Court did not, however, invoke the notion of African philosophy to develop 
the unique and important scope and content of indigenous peoples’ rights to property. 
Regarding the right to non-discrimination in article 2, the African Court held that it 
guarantees the enjoyment of all the rights in the African Charter and that it is directly 
related to the right to equality in article 3.26 The scope of the right to non-discrimination 
extends, however, beyond the right to equality in that it practically enables individuals’ 
enjoyment of their rights without distinction.27 According to the Court, the phrase “any 
other status” in article 2 includes any form of distinction that was not foreseen during the 
Charter’s adoption.28 The Court explained that it considers the African Charter’s object 
and purpose when establishing the forms of distinction covered in the phrase “any other 
status”. It noted that not all forms of distinction are discriminatory. A distinction is 
discriminatory when it is not objective, reasonably justifiable, necessary, or 
proportional.29 The African Court held that denying the Ogieks their rights (which are 
recognised as similar to indigenous peoples in that their survival depends on their 
traditional lands) amounts to a distinction based on ethnicity and/or another status 
provided in article 2.30 
On the right to life in article 4, the African Court stated that this right guarantees the 
realisation of all rights in the African Charter.31 It held that the right to life prohibits the 
arbitrary deprivation of life and establishes a link between the right to life and the 
inviolable nature and integrity of human beings.32 The Court further found that violating 
socio-economic rights through evictions does not necessarily violate the right to life, but 
rather engenders conditions unfavourable to a decent life.33 According to the Court, the 
right to life in article 4 refers to a physical right to life, rather than an existential 
understanding of the right.34 It held further that the Ogieks’ eviction negatively affected 
their decent existence of a group.35 The African Court, however, held that the applicant 
failed to prove the direct link between the evictions of the Ogieks and the death of some 																																																								
25 See chapter three, part 3 2 4 2. 
26 Para 137. 
27 Para 138. 
28 Para 138. 
29 Para 139. 
30 Paras 142 and 146. 
31 Para 152. 
32 Para 152. 
33 Para 153. 
34 Para 154. 
35 Para 155. 
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members of their community.36 It, therefore, held that the respondent State did not 
violate article 4.37 This decision does not resonate with the teleological approach, as it 
interprets restrictions to the enjoyment of socio-economic rights broadly. The African 
Court applied a literal and narrow textual approach to the interpretation of article 4. As 
argued in this dissertation, based on the principle of interdependence, the right to life 
can be interpreted broadly to guarantee socio-economic rights protection.38 The right 
entails more than a physical right to life. As such, the African Court is inconsistent in its 
application of the teleological methodology. 
Regarding the right to freely dispose of wealth, the African Court started by defining 
the notion of “peoples”. It noted the African Charter’s ommission regarding the meaning 
of this term. According to the Court, the omission was deliberate in order to allow 
supervisory organs the necessary flexibility to define it.39 The African Court explained 
that, during anti-colonial struggles, the term “peoples” meant populations in countries 
struggling for their independence and national sovereignty.40 In the independent States, 
the Court had to decide whether the term extends to ethnic groups or communities 
within a State.41 It held that, provided that such groups do not challenge the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of a State, they should be recognised as peoples.42 The Court 
then held that the violation of the Ogieks’ right to property also amounts to a violation of 
their right to freely dispose of their wealth in article 21 of the African Charter.43 
With respect to the right to development, the African Court held that peoples are 
entitled to the socio-economic right to development in article 22 of the African Charter.44 
According to the Court, the respondent State’s eviction of the Ogieks without 
consultation violated their socio-economic right to development, as well as their rights to 
health, housing, and other socio-economic programmes related to the right to 
development.45 
Finally, regarding the violation of article 1 of the African Charter, the African Court 
held that this article imposes on States an obligation to take legislative and other 
																																																								
36 Para 155. 
37 Para 156. 
38 See chapter two, parts 2 5 2 1 and chapter three, part 3 3 2 2. 
39 Para 196. 
40 Para 197. 
41 Para 198. 
42 Para 199. 
43 Para 201. 
44 Para 208. 
45 Paras 210-211. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
369 
 
measures to give effect to the rights in the African Charter.46 Accordingly, the Court 
found that the respondent State’s failure to take adequate legislative and other 
measures to give effect to the rights in articles 2, 8, 14, 17(2)-(3), 21, and 22 of the 
African Charter violated article 1 of the African Charter.47 
The Republic of Kenya – Judgment on Merits is a significant case as the African 
Court largely applies certain aspects of the teleological approach to interpret the 
collective socio-economic rights set out in articles 14, 17(2) and (3), 21, and 22 of the 
African Charter. These aspects include relevant international human rights instruments 
through an application of articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter. The Court also links 
the rights to non-discrimination and equality with the socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter. However, it provides a narrow interpretation of the right to life.  
Whilst a very promising judgment in terms of the teleological approach, the future 
jurisprudence could benefit from a rigorous and consistent application of this approach. 
This dissertation has sought to provide a methodology which could usefully guide the 
Commission and Court in applying the teleological approach to the interpretation of the 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter.  
																																																								
46 Para 215. 
47 Para 217. Regarding remedies the Court held that it will issue its ruling in a separate decision after 
additional submissions from the parties. See para 223. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7 1 Need for a coherent approach to interpreting socio-economic rights 
The protection of socio-economic rights is one of the major underlying objects and 
purposes of the African Charter. However, poverty, foreign direct investments, as well as 
other factors1 curtail the enjoyment of socio-economic rights of many communities in 
Africa. States’ failure to regulate most of the foreign investors has largely contributed to 
violations of socio-economic rights.2 These socio-economic rights include the rights to 
health, work, education, adequate standard of living including water, food and adequate 
housing, as well as the rights to social security, development, and a healthy 
environment. Violations of these rights have rendered the enjoyment of the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter a distant dream for many people in Africa. The 
violations have a serious impact on the economic conditions and the dignity of the 
African people. For example, as noted in chapter one, more than 220 million people in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are denied their right to food.3 While States have failed to effectively 
protect socio-economic rights, non-state actors do not consider themselves accountable 
for the violations of these rights.  
The supervisory organs of the African Charter can play an important role in helping to 
elaborate on the scope and content of States Parties’ obligations through their 
interpretation of the relevant articles protecting socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter. Interpretation can be appropriately used for improving the socio-economic 
conditions of the people in Africa. Interpretation may help to develop the normative 
scope and content of socio-economic rights, and identify the nature of States’ obligations 
imposed by such rights. The aim of this dissertation has been to contribute to research 
regarding the manner in which interpretation can be used as a mechanism for advancing 
the object and purpose to protect socio-economic rights in the African Charter. It does 
																																																								
1 Udombana identifies corruption as one of the factors that contributes to the violation of socio-economic 
rights. See NJ Udombana “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than 
never” (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45 51. 
2 See also D Kinley and J Tadaki “From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights responsibilities for 
corporations in international law” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931 933. According to 
Kinley and Tadaki, deregulation of the direct foreign investors contributes to the violation of human rights. 
3 See chapter one, part 1 1. 
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this by suggesting a theoretically appropriate and coherent approach for interpreting 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
7 2 Need for adoption of a teleological approach to interpretation  
In situations where States and non-state actors violate the socio-economic rights 
guaranteed in the African Charter their protection through supervisory organs’ effective 
interpretation is required. In chapter two it was argued that effective interpretation 
require the adoption and application of an appropriate approach to interpretation.4 It was 
further argued that the teleological approach to interpretation is appropriate for the 
interpretation of the rights in the African Charter, including socio-economic rights.5  
I demonstrated in chapter five that the African Commission has been applying 
various approaches in an inconsistent manner to interpret the socio-economic rights 
articles in the African Charter. Moreover, it does not always apply the teleological 
approach appropriately in its jurisprudence. By applying a textual approach to 
interpretation the African Commission has failed to develop the normative scope and 
content of socio-economic rights and their related obligations effectively. The failure to 
apply the teleological approach appropriately has caused the African Commission’s 
failure to engage all the tenets of this approach to develop the normative content of 
socio-economic rights. 
The normative content of socio-economic rights can be developed by inquiring to the 
object and purpose of the African Charter relating to such rights. This inquiry allows the 
supervisory organs to apply various tenets of the teleological approach to establish the 
object and purpose of the African Charter in a manner that develops the normative 
scope and content of these rights. It was demonstrated in chapter two that the 
teleological approach to interpretation engages various interpretive aids within and 
outside the treaty to generate the meaning of the provisions of the treaty.6 The text of 
the African Charter as a whole can shed light on the normative scope and content of 
socio-economic rights and elaborate its object and purpose on these rights. The 
historical background to the adoption of the African Charter can provide insight 
regarding the object and purpose of the African Charter on socio-economic rights. 
International, regional and national relevant human rights instruments and jurisprudence 																																																								
4 See chapter two, parts 2 1. 
5 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
6 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
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may also be applied to develop the normative content of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter and establish external coherence. The principle of effectiveness can 
assist the supervisory organs in interpreting the socio-economic rights articles in the 
African Charter effectively.7 
7 3 Need for a methodology for the application of a teleological  
The supervisory organs of the African Charter’s application of the teleological 
approach also requires that they put in place a systematic methodology for its 
application. The teleological approach to interpretation is feasible only when it is applied 
systematically rather than through a random application of its tenets. I argued in chapter 
two that there is a pressing need for a methodology for the application of the teleological 
approach. 8  A significant contribution of this dissertation is the development of a 
methodology for the application of the teleological approach. The methodology aims at 
ensuring that the teleological approach is applied appropriately as well as enabling the 
supervisory organs to justify their decisions relating to socio-economic rights.  
According to the methodology proposed, the supervisory organs should first interpret 
the text of the African Charter based on its object and purpose. An interpretation based 
on the object and purpose of the African Charter will enable the supervisory organs to 
interpret the provisions of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter holistically. 
The holistic interpretation of the socio-economic rights in the African Charter can assist 
the supervisory organs to engage various interpretative tools within the African Charter 
to generate the scope and content of these rights and their relevant obligations 
effectively. It should be noted that scholars argue that the provisions of the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter are insufficiently formulated. 9  According to 
scholars the insufficient formulation renders the scope and content of these rights 
unclear.10 
Based on the holistic application of the text of a treaty chapter three demonstrated 
that consideration of the text of the African Charter as a whole confirms that the socio-
economic rights provisions in the African Charter are appropriately formulated.11 It was 
demonstrated that socio-economic rights are formulated in general terms and their 																																																								
7 See chapter two, part 2 2 3. 
8 See chapter two, part 2 5. 
9 See chapter three, part 3 3 4. 
10 See chapter three, part 3 3 4. 
11 See chapter three, parts 3 3 4 1 – 3 3 4 8. 
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scope and content can be ascertained through interpretation by considering the text of 
the African Charter holistically. The development of the scope and content of socio-
economic rights should not be considered in isolation from the rest of the provisions of 
the African Charter. Consideration of the provisions of the African Charter as a whole is 
essential in order to ascertain the normative scope and content of such rights. Chapter 
three showed that the text of the African Charter as a whole provides various interpretive 
avenues, through the preamble to the African Charter, its operative provisions, the 
substantive content of the socio-economic rights articles and other related provisions, to 
develop the scope and content of the socio-economic rights.12  
The preamble to the African Charter may help to identify its object and purpose and 
the values as well as principles that the supervisory organs should consider in the 
interpretative process. The values of equality, freedom, justice and dignity, as well as the 
preambular statements regarding the principles of African philosophy and 
interdependence of rights can effectively enrich the scope and content of socio-
economic rights in the African Charter. Furthermore, the holistic reading allows the 
consideration of the provisions of article 45(1)(b) of the African Charter that requires the 
African Commission to formulate principles to elaborate the scope and content of the 
rights protected, including socio-economic rights. Through the provisions of article 
45(1)(b) the African Commission developed Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Principles and Guidelines’)13 The African Commission 
should take into consideration its Principles and Guidelines that provide a detailed scope 
and content of the socio-economic rights. The consideration of the Guidelines is in line 
with the holistic reading of the African Charter for the development of the scope and 
content of the socio-economic rights articles.  
The holistic consideration of the African Charter will also allow supervisory organs to 
apply both the provisions governing the general obligations of Member States and the 
duties provisions14  in order to develop the nature of states’ socio-economic rights 
obligations. It was argued that the African Commission can also apply the Principles and 
Guidelines to elaborate the typology of obligations entrenched in the African Charter’s 																																																								
12 See chapter three, parts 3 3 – 3 3 6. 
13 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted at the Forty Seventh Ordinary Session held in Banjul, 
The Gambia, from 12 to 26 May 2010 and formally launched at the Commission’s Fiftieth Ordinary 
Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 24 October to 7 November 2011). 
14 See chapter three, parts 3 3 3 1 and 3 3 5. 
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general obligations’ clause.15  Furthermore, provisions relating to the rights to non-
discrimination, equality, life, and dignity in the African Charter can be applied to establish 
the scope and content of socio-economic rights.16 The Principles and Guidelines provide 
a detailed scope and content of these provisions that the African Commission can apply 
to interpret the socio-economic rights provisions. These provisions can assist the 
supervisory organs to interpret socio-economic rights articles in a manner that 
guarantees a dignified life and equality in the enjoyment of these rights. Engaging the 
text of the African Charter as a whole may further help the supervisory organs to create 
internal coherence and harmony among all the provisions of the African Charter. 
Supervisory organs should then ascertain the object and purpose by engaging the 
preparatory work of the African Charter. It was argued that the text is not the exclusive 
means of identifying the object and purpose regarding the socio-economic rights. Once 
the text has been consulted the preparatory work of the African Charter should be 
applied to clarify and ascertain the scope of the object and purpose embedded in the 
socio-economic rights provisions. In chapter five it was demonstrated that the African 
Commission has had no sufficient recourse to the preparatory work of the African 
Charter in the interpretation of socio-economic rights. By not using the preparatory work, 
the African Commission has failed to engage a significant interpretative tenet of the 
teleological approach in the interpretative process. By failing to explore the historical 
context upon which socio-economic rights were formulated, this has rendered the 
African Commission incapable of developing the scope and content of socio-economic 
rights in a manner that resonates with the teleological approach to interpretation. If a 
teleological approach to interpretation is adopted, the preparatory work of the African 
Charter should be applied to garner insights into its object and purpose regarding socio-
economic rights, as well as their normative scope and content. The teleological 
approach to interpretation broadly allows the consideration of both external and internal 
preparatory work of the African Charter in the interpretation of socio-economic rights.17  
By using the preparatory work, supervisory organs can elaborate the object and 
purpose of the African Charter to protect the rights protected, including socio-economic 
rights, effectively. As shown in chapter three the preparatory work of the African Charter 
emphasises the values of freedom, equality, justice and dignity.18 These values can help 																																																								
15 See chapter three, part 3 3 3 1. 
16 See chapter three, part 3 4. 
17 See chapter three, parts 3 2 2 and 3 2 3. 
18 See chapter three, part 3 2 4 2. 
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supervisory organs to develop the scope and content of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. I demonstrated in chapter three that the preparatory work emphasises 
the notion of African philosophical approaches.19 This notion can contribute to the 
development of the scope and content of collective socio-economic rights as well as 
States Parties’ obligations.  
It was shown in chapter two that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(‘Vienna Convention’)20 identifies the preparatory work of a treaty as a supplementary 
interpretive tool.21 It was, however, further argued that various circumstances may allow 
the supervisory organs to consider it as a primary interpretive tool.22 It was particularly 
argued that the preparatory work of the African Charter should be applied as a 
fundamental tool to interpret the socio-economic rights articles for three major reasons.23  
Firstly, the preparatory work of the African Charter gives insights into the object and 
purpose of the African Charter regarding the scope and content of socio-economic rights 
enshrined therein.24 It should be noted that article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
requires the treaty to be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose. Although the 
preparatory work is not included in the category of primary interpretive tools in article 
31(1), but rather as a supplementary interpretive tool, it does not mean that the Vienna 
Convention strictly restricts the consideration of the preparatory work of the treaty as a 
vital interpretive tool in the interpretative process. Yeshanew notes that the primary 
interpretive tools recognised in article 31(1) should not be construed to render 
preparatory work an irrelevant interpretive tool.25 The fact that the Vienna Convention 
requires a treaty to be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose renders the 
preparatory work of the African Charter, that explains its object and purpose a primary 
rather than a mere supplementary interpretive tool. Yeshanew rightly argues that 
preparatory work of the treaty is vital in elaborating the purpose of the treaty in relation 
to the provisions in question.26 It was further argued that the provisions of article 31(1) of 
																																																								
19 See chapter three, part 3 2 4 2. 
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8I.L.M 679 (1969) was adopted on 23rd May 1969 and 
entered into force on 27th January 1980. 
21 Art 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
22 See chapter two, part 2 3. 
23 See chapter two, part 2 3. 
24 See chapter three, parts 3 2. 
25 SA Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human 
Rights System: Theories, Laws, Procedures and Prospects (2011) 52. 
26 52. 
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the Vienna Convention implicitly enshrine the principle of effectiveness.27 The inclusion 
of this principle enables these provisions to be construed in a manner that renders 
interpretation of a treaty effective and practical. The inclusion of the principle of 
effectiveness in article 31(1) creates space to generously construe these provisions in a 
manner that allows the interpretation of the African Charter to consider its preparatory 
work as a primary interpretative tool. 
Secondly, the broad formulation of the socio-economic rights articles in the African 
Charter makes it necessary for the supervisory organs to consider the preparatory work 
of the African Charter, which provides insights into the scope and content of these rights, 
a primary interpretive tool.28 Yeshanew argues that preparatory work of a treaty enables 
the supervisory organs to elaborate the content of the provisions of the treaty. 29 
According to Yeshanew, the supervisory organs may consider the preparatory work as a 
significant part of the treaty.30 Thirdly, preparatory work, as argued in chapter three, may 
provide the supervisory organs with the insight into other relevant legal sources that can 
assist them in interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter.31 
Once the scope and content of the socio-economic rights has been established 
through the historical context of the African Charter, then relevant international, regional 
and national human instruments and jurisprudence should be consulted. It was argued 
in chapter two that these sources are relevant in the interpretative process for drawing 
inspiration and establishing external coherence.32 Chapter two showed further that these 
legal sources are recognised in articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, and article 7 of 
the African Court Protocol.33 In this way it will assist the supervisory organs to avoid 
interpreting the socio-economic rights of the African Charter in isolation with other 
relevant international, regional and national standards. These standards are helpful in 
ascertaining international, regional and national acceptance of the decisions of the 
supervisory organs regarding the scope and content of socio-economic rights. They also 
indicate external coherence for harmonising the scope and content of socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter and the scope and content of such rights in other 
international, regional and national laws and jurisprudence.  																																																								
27 See chapter two, part 2 3. 
28 See chapter three, part 3 2. 
29 Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 52. 
30 52. 
31 See also Yeshanew The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 52. 
32 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
33 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
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It is important that throughout the interpretative process, the supervisory organs 
consider and apply the principle of effectiveness. It was demonstrated in chapter two 
that the principle of effectiveness requires the interpretation to ensure the meaning 
assigned to the provisions renders them effective and practical.34  The principle of 
effectiveness should be integrated throughout the interpretative process in order to 
ascertain that the interpretative aids in each stage of the interpretation promote the 
practical and effective meaning of socio-economic rights provisions.  
7 4 Interpretive and remedial mandate of the supervisory organs 
As argued in chapter four, the interpretive and remedial mandates of the supervisory 
organs of the African Charter are significant for effective interpretation and protection of 
socio-economic rights.35 For practical and effective interpretation and protection of socio-
economic rights in the African Charter supervisory organs must have autonomous 
interpretive and remedial jurisdiction. Chapter four identified scholars’ criticism that the 
supervisory organs’ interpretive and remedial mandates are ineffective.36 Scholars argue 
that the ineffectiveness of the interpretive and remedial mandates limit effective 
interpretation and protection of socio-economic rights.  
This dissertation argued in chapter four that the African Charter and the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Court Protocol’) grant the supervisory 
organs a broad interpretive and remedial jurisdiction for interpreting socio-economic 
rights and redressing their violations.37 It showed that the strengths of supervisory 
organs’ interpretive and remedial mandates are enshrined in their contentious mandate, 
locus standing provisions, admissibility, provisional measures, legal status of the 
decisions, remedial powers, and the power to enforce these remedies.  
The African Charter grants the African Commission a contentious mandate to 
interpret all provisions of the African Charter, including socio-economic rights. Further it 
was shown that the African Court Protocol provides the African Court with a mandate to 
interpret and apply the African Charter and any other human rights instruments ratified 
by the States concerned. 38  Similar provisions are formulated for the contentious 																																																								
34 See chapter two, parts 2 2 3, 2 3, and 2 5 2 4. 
35 See chapter four, part 4 1. 
36 See chapter four, parts 4 3 2, 4 3 3, 4 3 5, 4 3 6, 4 3 7, 4 3 8, & 4 3 9. 
37 See chapter four, parts 4 1, 4 2, 4 3 – 4 4 6. 
38 Art 3(1) of the African Court Protocol. 
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mandate of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 39  (‘African Court of 
Justice’).40 It was demonstrated that this mandate is broad in the sense that it extends 
the jurisdiction of the African Court to other instruments, potentially interfering with the 
mandate of other treaty bodies. It was argued in chapter four that the principle of 
effectiveness, as a tenet of the teleological approach to interpretation, can be used to 
restrict this broad contentious mandate in a manner that renders the mandate practical 
and effective rather than theoretical and illusory. The restriction may then enable the 
African Court to consider other relevant human rights instruments as guidance to its 
interpretation of the African Charter and the instruments that acknowledge its mandate. 
In this context “relevant human rights instruments” refer to the international and regional 
human rights instruments as well as general international treaties recognised by the 
Member States of the African Charter. It also includes African practices that are in line 
with international human rights standards, the customs recognised as laws, the general 
principles of law applicable to African States, the Constitutions of the African States, and 
the legal precedents.41 
Provisions relating to contentious jurisdiction in the African Charter, the African Court 
Protocol and the African Court of Justice Protocol allow the supervisory organs to 
determine complaints from individuals as victims of violations or from individuals or 
NGOs in actiones populares.42 This broad mandate can help supervisory organs to 
determine socio-economic rights cases submitted by individuals in their own capacity or 
cases submitted by individuals or NGOs in the public interest. The actio popularis 
mandate may further help supervisory organs to determine the socio-economic rights of 
people who by reason of poverty lack the means to access supervisory organs. A 
mandate to determine actio popularis can help supervisory organs to develop the scope 
and content of socio-economic rights in the African Charter in a manner that protect the 
general public. Chapter four showed scholars’ concerns regarding the collision of 
contentious jurisdiction vested in the African Commission and the African Court. 
However, it was argued in chapter four that complementarity between these adjudicative 
bodies can be applied to resolve the collision. It was argued that Rules 118(3) – (4) and 
121(1) of the African Commission Rules as well as Rule 29(3)(a) of the Rules of the 																																																								
39 The African Court of Justice is established by the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights. 
40 Art 28 (c) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
41 See chapter two, part 2 5 2 3. 
42 See chapter four, parts 4 3 2, and 4 4 2. 
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Court (‘African Court Rules’) regarding complementarity of these supervisory organs 
should be applied to solve the collision regarding their jurisdictions.43 It was further 
argued that the principle of effectiveness should be applied to ensure that these Rules 
are applied in a manner that renders these supervisory organs’ protection of the socio-
economic rights practical and effective. 
It was demonstrated in chapter four that the African Charter does not contain explicit 
provisions relating to locus standi to the African Commission. It was however argued 
that the omission should not be construed narrowly. The teleological approach to 
interpretation through the notion “object and purpose” that interprets a treaty as a whole, 
as well as through the principle of effectiveness, can be applied to establish provisions 
relating to locus standi in the African Charter. It was demonstrated that the teleological 
approach to interpretation allows various provisions to be construed in a manner that 
recognises the locus standi of individuals or their representatives to the African 
Commission. Moreover, the African Commission should take into account its Rules of 
Procedure to elaborate its mandate regarding locus standi. It was shown in chapter four 
that Rules 93(2)(a), 93(2)(e), and 94(2) elaborate the mandate of the African 
Commission regarding locus standi appropriately. 
Chapter four also analysed the provisions relating to locus standi to the African Court 
where it was shown that the African Commission, States, African Intergovernmental 
Organisations, NGOs and the individuals have locus standi to the African Court.44 It was 
demonstrated in chapter four that individuals can access the African Court directly and 
indirectly.45 Direct individual access refers to the circumstances where an individual, 
whose State has deposited a declaration acknowledging the competence of the African 
Court to determine the case in accordance with article 34(6) of the African Court 
Protocol, files a case to the African Court. Indirect individual access refers to situations 
where the African Commission files a case to the African Court on behalf of an individual 
whose State has not deposited the declaration stated in article 34(6) of the African Court 
Protocol.46  
Chapter four showed that scholars are sceptical regarding both direct and indirect 
individual access to the African Court. The scepticism of scholars regarding direct 
access given to the African Commission and States, but not to individuals and NGOs, 																																																								
43 See chapter four, parts 4 3 10, and chapter six, part 6 2 1 6. 
44 See chapter four, part 4 4 2. 
45 See chapter four, part 4 4 2. 
46 See chapter four, part 4 4 2. 
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except where States parties have made a declaration in terms of article 5(3) read in 
conjunction with article 34(6) of the African Court Protocol, was discussed. Their major 
concern is that this approach is ineffective since these institutions are not bound to 
submit cases to the African Court. However, I argued in chapter four that the teleological 
approach to interpretation can be used to broadly construe the provisions relating to the 
mandate of the African Commission and States to protect socio-economic rights in a 
manner that incorporates their obligation to submit cases to the African Court.47  
Scholars’ concern regarding the direct access of individuals to the African Court is 
that this approach is limited due to the requirement that States deposit the declaration 
acknowledging the competence of the African Court. The chapter also demonstrated the 
African Court’s rejection of cases submitted by individuals whose States have not 
deposited the identified declaration in accordance with article 34(6) of the African Court 
Protocol. Chapter four argued that while the lack of a declaration limits individual’s direct 
access to the African Court, the indirect access route can be effectively applied to 
enable them access to the African Court. It was argued that the teleological approach to 
interpretation, through the principle of effectiveness, can be used to ensure that the 
restriction of an individual’s access to the African Court is narrowly interpreted in order to 
enable them to appear before the African Court as parties, or witnesses in situations 
where their cases are submitted by the African Commission. This interpretation will give 
the complainants and victims procedural standing before the African Court. Being a 
party to a case is significant as it enables an individual to participate actively, directly or 
through his legal representatives, in the entire proceedings of the case. In this regard it 
was argued that the African Court should apply its Rules of Procedure particularly Rule 
29(3)(c) read together with Rule 45. The African Court of Justice Protocol explicitly gives 
the African Court of Justice the mandate to hear cases submitted by individuals.48  
Chapter four showed that the provisions regarding admissibility in the African Charter 
are formulated in a manner that requires conformity with all admissibility requirements. It 
was argued, however, that the provisions do not restrict a broad and flexible 
interpretation of such requirements in circumstances where individuals cannot genuinely 
conform to all admissibility requirements. It was expressly argued that for effective 
interpretation and protection of socio-economic rights, a flexible interpretation of such 
requirements is required. If an appropriate application of the teleological approach to 																																																								
47 See chapter four, part 4 4 2. 
48 Art 30(f) of the African Court of Justice Protocol. 
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interpretation is adopted supervisory organs can apply the principle of effectiveness to 
broadly and flexibly interpret the admissibility requirements.  
It was further argued in chapter four that a broad and flexible interpretation allows 
supervisory organs to consider each case on its merits. This broad interpretation may 
further embrace the object and purpose of the African Charter in the sense that it 
enables the supervisory organs to determine socio-economic rights of complainants who 
could not fulfil admissibility requirements for genuine reasons. It was argued that this 
flexible interpretation should also be applied in the interpretation of Rule 40 of the 
African Court Rules that requires strict application of all the admissibility requirements 
regardless of the flexibility provided by article 6(2) of the African Court Protocol. Article 
6(2) implicitly provides an avenue for flexible consideration of the admissibility 
requirements in situations where the complainants genuinely fail to conform to all the 
requirements. 
Particularly, it was argued in chapter four that the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies should be construed broadly in a manner that ensures their adequacy.49 
Adequacy of local remedies helps to ensure that remedies are available, sufficient and 
effective. It was demonstrated in chapter four that various provisions of the African 
Charter can be interpreted and applied to ensure adequacy of local remedies.50 It was 
further argued that the requirement to exhaust local remedies should be construed 
flexibly in a sense that where such remedies are not available, effective or sufficient the 
complainant should not be strictly required to exhaust them.51 The complainant should, 
however, demonstrate that local remedies are unavailable, inadequate and insufficient.52 
The complainant should not raise a mere allegation or suspicion that such remedies are 
unavailable. 
Furthermore it was argued in chapter four that the admissibility requirement to submit 
a communication within a reasonable time after exhaustion of local remedies should be 
construed flexibly. The broad and flexible interpretation of this requirement may help 
supervisory organs to consider various conditions in determining what constitutes a 
“reasonable time”. It enables the supervisory organs to consider the communications 
submitted by complainants who, for reasons of financial hardship, fail to get copies of 
																																																								
49 See chapter four, part 4 3 4 1. 
50 See chapter four, part 4 3 4 1. 
51 See chapter four, parts 4 3 4 1, and 4 4 3. 
52 See chapter four, part 4 3 4 1. 
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judgments from the local courts immediately after the determination of their cases or 
poor infrastructure in their countries that delay their movements. 
In circumstances where there is a violation that can cause irreparable harm while the 
matter is being determined, provisional measures are required to protect or prevent the 
irreparable harm pending the final determination of the case.53 Chapter four showed that 
the African Charter does not explicitly provide for the mandate of the African 
Commission to issue provisional measures.54 It was however argued that the teleological 
approach to interpretation through tenets of the treaty as a whole and the principle of 
effectiveness could be used to incorporate provisions relating to provisional measures in 
the African Charter.55 Particularly it was argued that the omission should be construed 
broadly by engaging various provisions in the mandate of the African Commission to 
issue provisional measures in socio-economic communications. 56  Moreover, it was 
argued that the African Commission should apply the provisions of Rule 98(1) of its 
Rules of Procedure to elaborate its mandate to issue provisional measures effectively.57  
Regarding the African Court’s mandate to issue provisional measures, chapter four 
highlighted scholars’ concerns regarding uncertainties relating to the binding nature of 
such a mandate on States. However, I argued in chapter four that when the provisional 
measures are issued States’ compliance is significant. It was argued that the object and 
purpose to protect socio-economic rights includes the obligation on the part of states to 
comply with the provisional measures issued by the supervisory organs. I argued that it 
would be lack of good faith on the part of the States if they refuse to implement the 
African Court’s provisional measures.  
With regard to the legal status of the African Commission’s recommendations, it was 
argued in chapter four that recommendations of the African Commission are highly 
authoritative interpretations of the African Charter in the context of a communication 
procedure. These recommendations help to further the object and purpose of the African 
Charter and it constitutes a lack of good faith for Member States to ignore them without 
very compelling reasons. It was argued further that it is States’ socio-economic rights 
obligations that bind rather than the recommendations. 
																																																								
53 See chapter four, parts 4 3 5 and 4 4 4. 
54 See chapter four, part 4 3 5. 
55 See chapter four, part 4 3 5. 
56 See chapter four, part 4 3 5. 
57 See chapter four, part 4 3 5. 
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When the supervisory organs determine the matter to its finality the findings should 
be published for effective protection of socio-economic rights. While the African Court 
and the African Court of Justice can publish their findings, it was demonstrated in this 
dissertation that the findings of the African Commission remain confidential until they are 
approved by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (‘AHSG’). It was also 
demonstrated that although the African Commission in practice has been publishing its 
findings it has not shown the basis for such publication. It was argued in this dissertation 
that the principle of effectiveness as an element of the teleological approach can be 
applied to justify the publication of the reports. 
When the supervisory organs determine the case to its finality and order remedies 
the follow-up mechanisms are essential. In order to ensure States enforce the remedial 
decisions of the supervisory organs the mandate of such organs to follow-up states’ 
compliance is vital. However, it was demonstrated in chapter four that the African 
Charter does not explicitly provide the African Commission with a follow-up mandate.58 
Therefore, it was suggested that the teleological approach to interpretation could be 
applied to incorporate such a mandate to the African Commission.59  Through this 
approach, various provisions of the African Charter can be engaged to establish that 
mandate.60 The African Commission should also apply the provisions of Rule 112 of its 
Rules of Procedure to elaborate its follow-up mandate.61 
7 5 Need for a coherent model of review in the supervisory organs’ jurisprudence 
There is no coherent model of review of the socio-economic provisions in the African 
Charter based on the object and purpose of the African Charter. Supervisory organs, 
particularly the African Commission, have been inconsistently applying various models 
of review to monitor States’ compliance with their socio-economic rights obligations. 
These models include the reasonableness review, minimum core obligations and 
proportionality. The failure to adopt a particular model of review and apply it consistently 
renders it difficult to analyse the jurisprudence of supervisory organs regarding States’ 
compliance with their obligations. In all three models of review the African Commission 
has failed to demonstrate how it uses them to develop the normative content of socio-
																																																								
58 See chapter four, part 4 3 9. 
59 See chapter four, part 4 3 9. 
60 See chapter four, part 4 3 9. 
61 See chapter four, part 4 3 9. 
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economic rights in a manner that ensures their effective protection. It was argued in 
chapter five that there is a pressing need to develop a teleological model of review.  
7 6 A teleological model of review 
Chapter six argued for a coherent model of review based on the object and purpose 
of the African Charter that can help the supervisory organs to have a consistent and 
appropriate model of review to monitor States’ compliance with their socio-economic 
rights obligations. It analysed the three models of review applied by the African 
Commission with the aim of developing a teleological model for reviewing States socio-
economic rights obligations.  
A teleological model of review would commence with identifying the object and 
purpose of the rights. It was shown that the reasonableness model of review identifies 
the object and purpose of the rights by asking two significant questions. Firstly, whether 
States’ measures foster the object and purpose of the socio-economic rights in question. 
Secondly, whether steps taken to realise socio-economic rights reasonably fosters the 
object and purpose of these rights. By placing the object and purpose of the socio-
economic rights at the centre of the assessment process, the reasonableness model of 
review performs three functions. Firstly, it develops the scope and content of these rights 
and applies that content to assess States’ measures. Secondly, it reviews States’ 
negative and positive socio-economic rights obligations. Thirdly, it is capable of 
reviewing measures relating to immediate socio-economic needs.  
Supervisory organs applying reasonableness as a teleological model of review 
should ensure the object and purpose of the African Charter as a key tenet of the 
teleological approach to interpretation is a determinative factor in scrutinising the States’ 
measures. This implies that supervisory organs should ensure that States’ measures 
advance the protection of socio-economic rights. In this regard, supervisory organs must 
satisfy themselves that States are knowledgeable of the normative scope and content of 
socio-economic rights. Finally, the supervisory organs must be satisfied that States have 
used such content in developing the measures for implementing socio-economic rights.  
7 7 Aligning the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the African Charter with 
the teleological approach  
Chapter six of this dissertation demonstrated the implications of aligning the socio-
economic rights jurisprudence of the African Charter’s supervisory organs with the 
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teleological approach to interpretation. In an effort to contribute to scholarship this 
dissertation developed in chapter six, a coherent methodology that could assist 
supervisory organs to align their socio-economic rights’ jurisprudence with the 
teleological approach to interpretation.  
A significant characteristic of this methodology developed is to emphasise the key 
aspects that should be taken into account by the supervisory organs in the interpretation 
of socio-economic rights. A significant element of the coherent interpretation is to clearly 
identify and consistently apply an appropriate approach to interpretation that can 
effectively develop the normative scope and content of socio-economic rights. They 
should start by considering the text of the African Charter as a whole, apply the 
preparatory work of the African Charter, international, regional and national relevant 
human rights instruments and jurisprudence, and apply the principle of effectiveness 
throughout the interpretative process.  
The proposed interpretative approach developed in chapter six emphasises the 
application of the African Charter as a whole when supervisory organs interpret socio-
economic rights. The supervisory organs should engage the preamble to the African 
Charter, particularly the values of equality, freedom, justice and dignity as well as the 
principle of the interdependence of rights and the notion of African philosophy to develop 
the normative content of socio-economic rights and their concomitant obligations. 
Furthermore supervisory organs should engage other substantive rights provisions in the 
African Charter as well as the provisions relating to rights to equality, dignity, life and 
non-discrimination to ensure that the content of socio-economic rights enshrine these 
standards. Moreover, I demonstrated the application of the general provisions of article 1 
and the duties provisions of the African Charter to generate the typology of obligations 
and other duties imposed on States by socio-economic rights.  
The coherent approach for interpreting socio-economic rights in the African Charter 
also emphasises the utility of its preparatory work. Preparatory work can provide 
supervisory organs with insight into the object and purpose of the African Charter 
regarding socio-economic rights. Supervisory organs should use preparatory work to 
establish, ascertain, and confirm the object and purpose of the African Charter. 
Supervisory organs should use the values of equality, dignity, justice and freedom as 
well as the notion of African philosophy enshrined in the preparatory work to elaborate 
the scope and content of socio-economic rights and their related obligations. 
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The proposed coherent interpretative approach further emphasises the consideration 
of the relevant legal sources. The approach requires the application of the provisions of 
articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter as well as article 7 of the African Court Protocol 
thereby assisting the supervisory organs in drawing inspiration from other relevant 
international, regional and national human rights instruments and jurisprudence. This 
approach will guarantee and develop external coherence. 
The proposed coherent interpretation emphasises the use of the principle of 
effectiveness throughout the interpretative process. Supervisory organs should use the 
principle to ensure that the interpretation of socio-economic rights is effective and 
practical rather than theoretical and illusory.  
The coherent interpretation developed in chapter six also emphasises the effective 
interpretation and utilisation of the interpretive and remedial mandate of supervisory 
organs.62 The effective reading of these mandates provides the supervisory organs with 
sufficient powers to effectively interpret socio-economic rights and remedy their 
violations.63  
Another aspect that the coherent interpretation of socio-economic rights requires is 
the application of a teleological model of review developed in chapter six. Supervisory 
organs should assess States’ implementation of their socio-economic rights obligations 
by engaging the reasonableness model of review combined with minimum core and 
proportionality. 
7 8 Areas for further research 
This dissertation intends to stimulate debate and research pertaining to the 
significance of the teleological approach to interpretation and the methodology for its 
application in the interpretation of socio-economic rights and human rights in general. 
While the dissertation confined itself to the use of the teleological approach to the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights, this approach can also be applied in the 
interpretation of the civil and political rights in the African Charter.  
Furthermore, this dissertation was confined to an analysis of the socio-economic 
jurisprudence of the African Commission. Based on the non-existence of socio-
economic rights inter-state communications and, for the time being, socio-economic 
jurisprudence by the African Court this dissertation did not focus on an analysis of these 																																																								
62 See chapter six, part 6 2 1 6. 
63 See chapter six, part 6 2 1 6. 
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types of jurisprudence. There is scope for research in these areas as the jurisprudence, 
particularly of the African Court, in the area of socio-economic rights evolves. 
Furthermore, this dissertation was strictly confined to the existing supervisory organs 
and highlighted their implications for the African Court of Justice. Therefore there is 
scope for research regarding the interpretation of socio-economic rights by the African 
Court of Justice when it enters into force.  
The dissertation has also applied relevant international, regional and national 
instruments to draw inspiration from regarding the interpretation of socio-economic 
rights. These sources were applied based on their relevance to the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. The dissertation did not confine itself to 
detailed comparative analysis of particular instruments or jurisprudence. There is scope 
for in-depth comparative research between African regional human rights systems and 
other regional human rights systems, such as the Inter-American human rights system. 
This dissertation focused on the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African 
Charter. It laid a foundation of how possibly socio-economic rights in other African 
regional human rights instruments should be interpreted. There is therefore a need for 
further research in this regard on other specific African regional human rights 
instruments such as the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (‘Women’s Protocol’),64 and the African Charter on the 
Rights and the Welfare of the Child (‘Children’s Charter’).65  
7 9 Significance of the dissertation 
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that the teleological approach to interpretation 
is appropriate for interpreting the socio-economic rights in the African Charter effectively. 
However, it warns that this approach is only feasible if the supervisory organs apply its 
tenets systematically rather than randomly. It argues that systematic application of the 
teleological approach will assist the supervisory organs to establish the object and 
purpose of the African Charter in relation to these rights. The dissertation therefore 
develops the methodology for the application of the teleological approach to enable the 
supervisory organs to apply this approach systematically.  
																																																								
64 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
CAB/LEG/66.6 was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 25 November 2005. 
65 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1999) was adopted on 11 
July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
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The dissertation further seeks to demonstrate that the interpretive and remedial 
mandate of the supervisory organs can crucially contribute in the effective interpretation 
of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the African Charter. The dissertation 
therefore argues that the teleological approach to interpretation and the methodology for 
its application can enable the supervisory organs to develop the scope and content of 
these rights and their concomitant obligations in a manner that advances their object 
and purpose. 
Moreover, the dissertation seeks to show that an appropriate model of review, that 
can assist the supervisory organs to review States’ compliance with their socio-
economic rights’ obligations, is required. It contends that a model of review that is in line 
with the teleological approach to interpretation can allow the supervisory organs to 
review States’ measures in a manner that embraces the object and purpose of the 
African Charter regarding these rights. Particularly, it develops the reasonableness 
model of review integrating minimum core obligations and proportionality as a 
teleological model of review to enable the supervisory organs to review States’ 
measures adopted to give effect to the socio-economic rights.  
It contends that the developed teleological model of review can allow the supervisory 
organs to first and foremost develop the scope and content of the socio-economic rights 
and apply such content to assess States’ measures. The proposed model can therefore 
allow the supervisory organs to assess measures adopted for the realisation of the 
socio-economic rights progressively, the minimum essentials of these rights in 
circumstances where States experience resource hardships, as well as the States’ 
measures that limit the enjoyment of these rights in situations where States argue that 
such limitation is necessary. 
The supervisory organs should interpret their interpretive and remedial mandate 
generously to effectively interpret these rights and the obligations they impose in order 
to advance their object and purpose. They should adopt the teleological model of review 
to assess States’ measures adopted to give effect to the socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter. Through the teleological approach to the interpretation of the socio-
economic rights in the African Charter, the supervisory organs can make a meaningful 
contribution to protecting socio-economic rights on the continent. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
389 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Alston P (ed) Non-state Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
Ankumah AE The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and 
Procedures (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
An-Na’im AA & Deng FM (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-cultural Perspectives 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990). 
Aust A Modern Treaty Law and Practice (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
2000).  
Baderin MA & McCorquodale R (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Bosl A & Diescho J (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection 
and Promotion (Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 2009). 
Botha H, Van der Walt A & Van der Walt J (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 2003). 
Brownlie I Principles of Public International Law 6 ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
Bruinsma F & Nelken D (eds) Explorations in Legal Cultures (Gravenhage: Reed 
Business BV, 2007). 
Buergenthal T International Human Rights: In a Nutshell 2 ed (United States of America: 
West Publishing Co., 1995). 
Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
Clapham A Human Rights in the Private sphere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Clapham A Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
Cohen R, Hyden G & Nagan WP (eds) Human Rights and Governance in Africa (United 
States of America: University Press of Florida, 1993). 
Craven M The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on its Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
390 
Dixon M Textbook on International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Doyle CM (ed) Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Access to Remedy: Case Studies 
from Africa, Asia and Latin America (Chiang Mai, Madrid, Coppenhagen: AIPP, 
Almaciga, & IWGIA, 2015). 
Eide A, Krause C & Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 
ed (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
Elias OT The Modern Law of Treaties (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing 
Company B. V, 1974). 
Elkind JB Interim Protection: A Functional Approach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1981). 
Emiliou N The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study 
(United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International, 1996). 
Evans M & Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
System in Practice 1986-2006 2 ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Evans MD & Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
System in Practice 1986-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Gardiner R Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Heyns C (ed) Human Rights Law in Africa 1999 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002). 
Hountondji PJ African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (London: Hutchinson & Co. 
Publishers Ltd, 1983). 
Huscroft G, Miller BW and Webber G (eds) Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, 
Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
Josselin D & Wallace W (eds) Non-state Actors in World Politics (New York: Palgrave 
Publishers, 2001). 
Kelsen H Principles of International Law 2 ed (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1966). 
Korowicz MS Introduction to International Law: Present Conceptions of International Law 
in Theory and Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1959). 
Krause C & Scheinin M (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed 
(Turku/Abo: Abo Akademi University Institute of Human Rights, 2012). 
Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
391 
Langford M, Porter B, Brown R and Rossi J (eds) Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria: 
Pretoria University Press, 2016). 
Liebenberg S Socio-economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(Claremont: Juta & Co, Ltd, 2010). 
Linderfalk U On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as 
expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Springer, 2007). 
Macdonald RSt.J, Matscher F and Petzold H (eds) The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 
Makinde MA African Philosophy, Culture, and Traditional Medicine (Ohio: Ohio 
University Center for International Studies, 1988).  
Mbiti JS African Religions and Philosophy 2 ed (Oxford: Heinemann Educational 
Publishers, 1990). 
McNair L The Law of Treaties (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
Mugwanya GW Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African 
Regional Human Rights System (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2003).  
Murray R The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and international Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
Nmehielle VO The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
Olowu D An Integrative Right-based Approach to Human Development in Africa 
(Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2009). 
Omi EAR & Anyanwu KC (eds) in African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main 
Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1984). 
Orakhelashvili A The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Ougurgeouz F The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive 
Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003). 
Pasqualucci JM The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 2 ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
Rehman J International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (England: Longman, 
2003). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
392 
Rieter E Preventing Irreparable Harm: Provisional Measures in International Human 
Rights Adjudication (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010). 
Senden H Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System: An 
Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (United Kingdom: Intersentia, 2011). 
Sepulveda MM The Nature of Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003). 
Shelton D Remedies in International Human Rights Law 2 ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
Shivji IG The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (London: Codesria Book Series, 1989). 
Shue H Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980). 
Sinclair MI The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: The University 
Press, 1973). 
Ssenyonjo M (ed) The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2012). 
Umozurike UO The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1997). 
Vanneste F General International Law before Human Rights Courts: Assessing the 
Specialty Claims of International Human Rights Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010). 
Viljoen F International Human Rights Law in Africa 2 ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
Welch Jr. CE & Meltzer RI (eds) Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1984). 
Winkler IT The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications for 
Water Allocation (United Kingdom: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2012). 
Wright RA (ed) African Philosophy: An Introduction 3 ed (Boston: University Press of 
America, 1984). 
Yeshanew SA The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Regional Human Rights System: Theories, Laws, Practices and Prospects (Abo: Abo 
Akademi University Press, 2011). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
393 
Chapters in books 
Akonumbo AN “Indirect Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Cameroon” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National 
Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 527-549. 
Alston P “The ‘not-a-cut’ syndrome: Can the international human rights regime 
accommodate non-state actors?” in Alston P (ed) Non-state Actors and Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 3-36. 
Anyanwu KC “The African world-view and theory of knowledge” in Omi EAR & Anyanwu 
KC (eds) in African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in 
Contemporary Africa (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1984) 77-99. 
Atupare PA “Ghana’s Hybrid Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 476-500. 
Baderin MA “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights in Africa” in Baderin MA & 
Mccorquodale R (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 139-166. 
Baricako G “The African Charter and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” in Evans M & Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006 2 ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 1-19. 
Bodunrin PO “The question of African philosophy” in Wright RA (ed) African Philosophy: 
An Introduction 3 ed (Boston: University Press of America, 1984) 1-23. 
Brand D “The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or 
what are socio-economic rights for?” in Botha H, Van der Walt A & Van der Walt J 
(eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (Stellenbosch: SUN 
Press, 2003) 33-56. 
De Schutter O “The status of human rights in international law” in International 
Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (Turku/Abo: Abo Akademi University 
Institute of Human Rights, 2012) 39-58. 
Chirwa DM “African regional human rights system: The promise of recent jurisprudence 
on social rights” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
394 
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
323-338. 
Cohen R “Endless teardrops: Prolegomena to the study of human rights in Africa” in 
Cohen R, Hyden G & Nagan WP (eds) Human Rights and Governance in Africa 
(United States of America: University Press of Florida, 1993) 3-38. 
Diallo F “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Francophone Legal Systems: Senegal” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The 
Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional 
and National Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 396-422. 
Doyle CM “Business and human rights: Indigenous peoples’ experiences with access to 
remedy: An introduction” in Doyle CM (ed) Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with 
Access to Remedy: Case Studies from Africa, Asia and Latin America (Chiang Mai, 
Madrid, Coppenhagen: AIPP, Almaciga, & IWGIA, 2015) 1-10. 
Eide A “Economic, social, and cultural rights” in Eide A, Krause C & Rosas A (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001) 9-28. 
Eissen M “The principle of proportionality in the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights” in Macdonald RSt.J, Matscher F and Petzold H (eds) The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993) 125-146. 
Fernyhough T “Human rights and precolonial Africa” in Cohen R, Hyden G & Nagan WP 
(eds) Human Rights and Governance in Africa (United States of America: University 
Press of Florida, 1993) 39-73. 
Fitzmaurice M “Interpretation of human rights treaties” in Shelton D (ed) International 
Human Rights Law (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013) 739-771.  
Hansungule M “African courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” in Bosl A & Diescho J (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in 
their Protection and Promotion (2009) 250-271. 
Harrington J “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Evans MD & Murray 
R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 
1986-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 305-334.  
Heyns C “Civil and political rights in the African Charter” in Evans MD & Murray R (eds) 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-
2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 137-177. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
395 
Howard RE “Group versus individual identity in the African debate on human rights” in 
An-Na’im AA & Deng MF (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-cultural Perspectives 
(Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1990) 159-183. 
Josselin D & Wallace W “Non-state actors in World politics: A framework” in Josselin D 
& Wallace W (eds) Non-state Actors in World Politics (New York: Palgrave 
Publishers, 2001) 1-20. 
Keep H & Midgley R “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual 
South African legal culture” in Bruinsma F & Nelken D (eds) Explorations in Legal 
Cultures (Gravenhage: Reed Business BV, 2007) 29-51. 
Keetharuth SB “Major African legal instruments” in Bosl A & Diescho J (eds) Human 
Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection and Promotion (Windhoek: 
Macmillan Education Namibia, 2009) 163-231. 
Krause C “The right to property” in Eide A, Krause C & Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 
191-209. 
Langford M “Substantive obligations” in Langford M, Porter B, Brown R and Rossi J 
(eds) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2016) 227-279. 
Langford M “The justiciability of social rights: From practice to theory” in Langford M (ed) 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 3-45. 
Liebenberg S “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
South Africa” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 305-337. 
Mandlate AC, Nhampossa J, & Chirwa DM “Direct Constitutional Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Lusophone Legal Systems: Angola and 
Mozambique” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 372-395. 
Marasinghe L “Traditional conceptions of human rights in Africa” in Welch Jr. CE & 
Meltzer RI (eds) Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1984) 32-45. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
396 
Maurier H “Do we have an African philosophy?” in Wright RA (ed) African Philosophy: 
An Introduction 3 ed (Boston: University Press of America, 1984) 25-40. 
Mbazira C “Uganda’s Hybrid Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 447-475. 
Melish T “Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond progressivity” in Langford M 
(ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 372-408. 
Melish TJ “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights” in Langford M (ed) Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 339-371. 
Merkouris P “’Third party’ considerations and ‘corrective interpretation’ in the 
interpretative use of travaux preparatoires: Is it fahrenheit 451 for preparatory work?” 
in Fitzmaurice M, Elias O & Merkouris P (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 30 Years On (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010) 75-95. 
Möller K “Proportionality and rights inflation” in Huscroft G, Miller BW and Webber G 
(eds) Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 155-172. 
Nderitu W “The United Nations and the advancement of human rights in Africa” in Bosl A 
& Diescho J (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection and 
Promotion (Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 2009) 81-103. 
Nwauche ES “Indirect Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in Nigeria” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 501-526. 
Odinkalu CA “Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Evans MD & Murray R (eds) The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2000 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 178-218.  
Odongo GO & Musila GM “Direct Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights under Kenya’s 2010 Constitution” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) 
The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
397 
Regional and National Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 
338-371. 
Okoth-Ogendo HWO “Human and peoples’ rights: What point is Africa trying to make?” 
in Cohen R, Hyden G & Nagan WP (eds) Human Rights and Governance in Africa 
(United States of America: University of Florida, 1993) 74-86. 
Pityana NB “The challenge of culture for human rights in Africa: The African Charter in a 
comparative context” in Evans MD & Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 219-245. 
Porter B “Reasonableness and Article 8(4)” in Langford M, Porter B, Brown R and Rossi 
J (eds) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2016) 194-226. 
Riedel E “Economic, social and cultural rights” in Krause C & Scheinin M (eds) 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (Turku/Abo: Abo Akademi 
University Institute of Human Rights, 2012) 131-152. 
Scheinin M “Characteristics of human rights norms” in Krause C & Scheinin M (eds) 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (Abo: Abo Akademi 
University, 2012) 19-37.  
Ssenyonjo M “An introduction to the development of the African regional human rights 
system: 30 years after the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” in Ssenyonjo M (ed) The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years 
after the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012) 3-25. 
Ssenyonjo M “Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter” in Ssenyonjo 
M (ed) The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 
55-100. 
Ssenyonjo M “Non-state actors and economic, social and cultural rights” in Baderin MA 
& McCorquodale R (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural rights in Action (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 109-135. 
Toebes B “The right to health” in Eide A, Krause C & Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 
169-190. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
398 
Viljoen F “The African regional human rights system” in Krause C & Scheinin M (eds) 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (Abo: Abo Akademi 
University, 2012) 551-580.  
Wright RA “Investigating African philosophy” in Wright RA (ed) African Philosophy: An 
Introduction 3 ed (Boston: University Press of America, 1984) 41-55. 
Yeshanew SA “Ethiopia’s Hybrid Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights” in Chirwa DM & Chenwi L (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 423-446. 
 
Journal articles 
Acheampong AK “Reforming the substance of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Civil and political rights and socio-economic rights” (2001) 1 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 185-204. 
Aguirre D “Multinational corporation and the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights” (2005) 35 California Western International Law Journal 53-82. 
Albertyn C “Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 248-276. 
Alston P & Quinn G “The nature and scope of States Parties’ obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 Human 
Rights Quarterly 156-229. 
Antkowiak TM “Remedial approaches to human rights violations: The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and beyond” (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 351- 419. 
Anyangwe C “Obligations of States Parties to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights” (1998) 10 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
625-659. 
Appiagye-Atua K “A rights-centred critique of African philosophy in the context of 
development (2005) 2 South African Human Rights Law Journal 335-357. 
Arato J “Subsequent practice and evolutive interpretation: Techniques of treaty 
interpretation over time and their diverse consequences” (2010) 9 The Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 443-494.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
399 
Benedek W “The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: How 
to make it effective” (1993) 11 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25-40. 
Bennett TW “Ubuntu: An African equity” (2011) 4 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
29-61. 
Bernhadt R “Evolutive treaty interpretation, especially of the European Convention of 
Human Rights” (1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 11-25. 
Bhagwati PN “Judicial activism and public interest litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 561-577. 
Bilchitz D “Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its importance” 
(2002) 119 South African Law Journal 484-501. 
Bilchitz D “Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying foundations for 
future socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2003) 19 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 1-26. 
Brownlie I “The right of peoples in modern international law” (1985) 9 Bulletin of the 
Australian Society of Legal Philosophy 104-119. 
Buergenthal T “The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities 
and differences” (1981) 30 American University Law Review 155-166. 
Buffard I & Zemanek K “The “object and purpose” of a treaty: An enigma?” (1998) 3 
Austrian Review of International and European Law 311-343. 
Bulto ST “The utility of cross-cutting rights in enhancing justiciability of socio-economic 
rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2010) 29 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 142-176.  
Callavaro LJ & Schaffer JE “Less as more: Rethinking supranational litigation of 
economic and social rights in the Americas” (2005) 56 Hastings Law Journal 217-
282.  
Chenwi L “Permeability of rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission” (2014) 
39 Suppl SAYIL 93-110. 
Chenwi L “An appraisal of international law mechanisms for litigating socio-economic 
rights, with a particular focus on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African Commission and Court” 
(2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 683-705. 
Chenwi L “Unpacking ‘progressive realisation’, its relation to resources, minimum core 
and reasonableness, and some methodological considerations for assessing 
compliance” (2013) De Jure 742-769. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
400 
Cobbah JAM “African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective” 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 309-331. 
Coomans F “Reviewing implementation of socio-economic rights: An assessment of the 
‘reasonableness’ test as developed by South African Constitutional Court” (2005) 65 
ZaöRV 167-196. 
Courtis C “Standards to make ESC rights justiciable: A summary exploration” (2009) 2 
Erasmus Law Review 379-395. 
Craig P “Proportionality, rationality and review” (2010) New Zealand Law Review 265-
301. 
Craven M “Legal differentiation and the concept of the human rights treaty in 
international law” (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 489-519.  
Dankwa EVO “Working paper on Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 230-249.  
De Vos P A new beginning? The enforcement of social, economic and cultural rights 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2004) 8 Law, Democracy 
& Development 1-24. 
Dolzhikov AV “The European Court of Human Rights on the principle of proportionality in 
‘Russian’ cases (2012) 82 Teisės aktualijos 215-224. 
Duruigbo E “Multinational corporations and compliance with international regulations 
Relating to the petroleum industry” (2001) 7 Annual Survey of International and 
Comparative Law 101-146. 
Dzehtsiarou K European consensus and the evolutive interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1730-1745. 
Ebobrah ST “Towards a positive application of complementarity in the African Human 
Rights System: Issues of functions and relations” (2011) 22 The European Journal of 
International Law 663-688. 
Elsheikh IAB “The future relationship between the African Court and the African 
Commission” (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 252-260. 
Eno R “The place of the African Commission in the new African dispensation” (2002) 11 
African Security Review 63-74. 
Eno RW “The jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 223-233. 
Enonchong N “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Effective remedies 
in domestic law?” (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 197-215. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
401 
Fachiri AP “Interpretation of treaties” (1929) 23 American Journal of International Law 
745-752. 
Fennelly N “Legal interpretation at the European Court of Justice” (1996) 20 Fordham 
International Law Journal 656-679. 
Fiss OM “The Supreme Court 1978 term foreword: The forms of justice” (1979) 93 
Harvard Law Review 1-58. 
Fitzmaurice GG “The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
interpretation and certain other treaty points” (1951) 28 British Year Book of 
International Law 1-28.  
Fitzmaurice GG “The law and procedure of the international court of justice 1951-4: 
Treaty interpretation and certain other treaty points” (1957) 33 British Year Book of 
International Law 203-293. 
Forster CM & Jivan V “Public interest litigation and human rights implementation: The 
Indian and Australian experience” (2008) 3 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1-32. 
Frost LE “The evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections of 
present and former Judges” (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly 171-205. 
Gerards J “How to improve the necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights” 
(2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 466-490. 
Gittleman R “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A legal analysis” 
(1982) 22 Virginia Journal of International Law 667-714. 
Goedhuis D “Some recent trends in the interpretation and the implementation of the 
Rules of international space law” (1981) 19 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
213-233. 
Griffey B “The ‘reasonableness’ test: Assessing violations of State obligations under 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights” (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 275-327. 
Hassan P & Azfar A “Securing environmental rights through public interest litigation in 
South Asia” (2004) 22 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 215-247. 
Helmersen ST “Evolutive treaty interpretation: Legality, semantics and distinctions” 
(2013) 6 European Journal of Legal Studies 126-148. 
Henkin L “The Universal Declaration at 50 and the challenge of Global markets” (1999) 
25 Brooklyin Journal of International Law 17-25. 
Hershkoff H “Positive rights and State Constitutions: The limits of federal rationality 
review” (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1131-1196. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
402 
Heyns C “The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?” (2001) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 155-174. 
Hoexter C “The future of judicial review in South African administrative law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519. 
Iles K “Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal limitations clauses” (2004) 20 
South African Journal on Human Rights 448-465. 
Jacobs GF “Varieties of approach to treaty interpretation: With special reference to the 
draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna diplomatic conference” 
(1969) 18 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 318-346.  
Jochnik C “Confronting the impunity of non-state actors: New fields for the promotion of 
human rights” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56-79. 
Jonas DS & Saunders TN “The object and purpose of a treaty: Three interpretive 
methods” (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 565-609. 
Joyner CC “Legal implications of the concept of the common heritage of mankind” 
(1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190-199. 
Juma D “Provisional measures under the African human rights system: The African 
Court’s order against Libya” (2012) 30 Wisconsin International Law Journal 344-373. 
Killander M “Interpreting regional human rights treaties” (2010) 7 International Journal on 
Human Rights 144-169.  
Kinley D & Tadaki J “From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights responsibilities 
for corporations at international law” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 
931-1023. 
Kiwanuka RN “The meaning of ‘people’ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” (1988) 82 The American Journal of International Law 80-101. 
Klabbers J “International legal histories: The declining importance of travaux 
preparatoires in treaty interpretation?” (2003) Netherlands International Law Review 
267-288.  
Klabbers J “Some problems regarding the object and purpose of treaties” (1999) 8 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 138-160. 
Langford M “Expectation of plenty: Response to Stephen Tully” (2006) 24 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 473-479. 
Larschan B & Brennan CB “The common heritage of mankind principle in international 
law” (1983) 21 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 305-337. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
403 
Lauterpacht H “Restrictive interpretation and the principle of effectiveness in the 
interpretation of treaties” (1949) 26 British Year Book of International Law 48-85. 
Lauterpacht H “Some observations on preparatory work in the interpretation of treaties” 
(1935) 48 Harvard Law Review 549-591.  
Lehmann K “In defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating socio-economic rights and 
the myth of the minimum core” (2007) 22 American University of International Law 
Review 163-197. 
Levinson DJ “Rights essentialism and remedial equilibration” (1999) 99 Columbia Law 
Review 857-940. 
Liebenberg S & Goldblatt B “The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic 
rights under the South Africa’s transformative constitution” (2007) 23 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 335 355. 
Liebenberg S “The value of freedom in interpreting socio-economic rights” (2008) Acta 
Juridica 149-176. 
Liebenberg S “The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights” (2005) 
21 South African Journal of Human Rights 1-31. 
Liebenberg S “Toward an equality-promoting interpretation of socio-economic rights: 
Insights from the egalitarian liberal tradition” (2015) 132 South African Law Journal 
411-437. 
Mapulanga-Hulston KJ Examining the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights 
(2002) 6 The International Journal of Human Rights 29-48. 
Mbazira C “Enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Twenty years of redundancy, progression and 
significant strides” (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 333-356. 
Mbazira C “The right to health and the nature of socio-economic rights obligations under 
the African Charter: The Purohit case” (2005) 6 ESR Review 1-5. 
McCrudden C “Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights” (2008) 19 
European Journal of International Law 655-724. 
McLachlan C The principle of systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279-319. 
Mechlem K “Treaty bodies and the interpretation of human rights” (2009) 42 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 905-947. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
404 
Melish TJ “Rethinking the ‘less as more’ thesis: Supranational litigation of economic, 
social and cultural rights in the Americas” (2006) 39 New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics 171-342.  
Metz T “Toward an African moral theory” (2007) 15 The Journal of Political Philosophy 
321-341. 
Metz T “Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa” (2005) 2 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 532-559. 
Möller K “Proportionality: Challenging the critics” (2012) 10 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 709-728. 
Moloo R “When actions speak louder than words: The relevance of subsequent party 
conduct to treaty interpretation” (2013) 31 Berkeley Journal of International Law 39-
88.  
Mortenson DJ “The travaux of travaux: Is the Vienna Convention hostile to drafting 
history?” (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 780-822. 
Mubangizi JC “The constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in selected African 
countries: A comparative evaluation” (2006) 2 African Journal of Legal Studies 1-19. 
Muchlinski PT “Human rights and multinationals: is there a problem?” (2001) 77 
International Affairs 31-47. 
Murray R & Mottershaw E “Mechanisms for the implementation of decisions of the 
African Commission on Human Rights” (2014) 36 Human Rights Quarterly 349-372. 
Murray R & Viljoen F “Towards non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: 
The normative basis and procedural possibilities before the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Union” (2007) 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly 86-111. 
Murray R & Wheatley S “Groups and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 213-236. 
Murray R “Decisions by the African Commission on individual communications under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 412-434. 
Musila GM “The right to an effective remedy under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights” (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 442-464.  
Mutua M “The African human rights court: A two-legged stool?” (1999) 21 Human Rights 
Quarterly 342-363.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
405 
Mutua M “The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the 
language of duties” (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339-380. 
Naldi GJ & Magliveras K “Reinforcing the African system of human rights: The Protocol 
on the establishment of a regional court of human and peoples’ rights” (1998) 16 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 431-456. 
Naldi GJ & Magliveras K “The proposed African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Evaluation and comparison” (1996) 8 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 944-969. 
Naldi GJ “Interim measures of protection in the African system for the protection of 
human and peoples’ rights” (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 1-10. 
Naldi GJ “Reparations in the practice of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights” (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 681-693. 
Ncube LB “Ubuntu: A transformative leadership philosophy” (2010) 4 Journal of 
Leadership Studies 77-82. 
Neuman GL “Import, export, and regional consent in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights” (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 101- 
Nhlapo TR “International protection of human rights and the family: African variations on 
a common theme” (1989) 3 International Journal of Law and the Family 1-20. 
Odinkalu CA & Christensen C “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
The development of its non-state communications procedures” (1998) 20 Human 
Rights Quarterly 235-280.  
Odinkalu CA “The individual complaints procedures of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: A preliminary assessment” (1998) 8 Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems 359- 405. 
Okafor O “Have the norms and jurisprudence of the African human rights system been 
pro-poor?” (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 396-421. 
Okere BO “The protection of human rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: A comparative analysis with the European and American 
Systems” (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 141-159. 
Oloka-Onyango J “Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the struggle for economic and 
social rights in Africa” (1995) 26 California Western International Law Journal 1-73. 
Oloka-Onyango J “Human rights and sustainable development in contemporary Africa: A 
new dawn, or retreating horizons?” (2000) 6 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 39-
76. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
406 
Oloka-Onyango J “Reinforcing marginalised rights in an age of globalisation: 
International mechanisms, non-state actors, and the struggle for peoples’ rights in 
Africa” (2003) 18 American University International Law Review 851-913. 
Orakhelashvili A “Restrictive interpretation of human rights treaties in the recent 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2003) 14 European Journal 
of International Law 1-40.  
Pasqualucci JM “Interim measures in international human rights: Evolutive and 
harmonisation” (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1-49. 
Paust JJ “The Other Side of Right: Private duties under human rights law” (1992) 5 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 51-63. 
Pedersen MS “Standing and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 407-422. 
Pieterse M “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 
20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383-417. 
Porter B “The reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating claims from the margins” 
(2009) 27 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 39-53. 
Ramcharan BG “Human rights in Africa: Whither now?” (1975) 12 University of Ghana 
Law Journal 88-105. 
Rhyne CH “A report on the Lagos Conference” (1961) 47 American Bar Association 
Journal 685-688. 
Rietiker D “The principle of “effectiveness” in the recent jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Its different dimensions and its consistency with public 
international law – No need for the concept of treaty sui generis” (2010) 79 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 245-277.  
Rievers J “Proportionality and variable intensity of review” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law 
Journal 174-207. 
Ris M “Treaty interpretation and the ICJ recourse to travaux preparatoires: Towards a 
proposed amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties” (1991) 14 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 111-
136. 
Roberts A “The power and persuasion in investment treaty interpretation: The dual role 
of States” (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 179-225.  
Rudman A “The Commission as a party before the Court – Reflections on the 
complementarity arrangement” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
407 
1-29.  
Rudman A “The protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation under the 
African human rights system” (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 1-27. 
Sager LG “The legal status of underenforced constitutional norms” (1978) 91 Harvard 
Law Review 1212-1264. 
Schachter O “Human dignity as a normative concept” (1983) 77 American Journal of 
International Law 848-854. 
Scott C & Macklem P “Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social 
rights in a new South African Constitution” (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review. 1-148.  
Scott C “The interdependence and permeability of human rights norms: Towards a 
partial fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights” (1989) 27 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 769-878. 
Sohn BL “The new international law: Protection of the rights of individuals rather than 
States” (1982) 32 American University Law Review 1-64.  
Ssenyonjo M “Analysing the economic, social and cultural rights jurisprudence of the 
African Commission: 30 years since the adoption of the African Charter” (2011) 29 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 358-397. 
Ssenyonjo M “Analysing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Jurisprudence of the 
African Commission: 30 Years since the Adoption of the African Charter” (2011) 29 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 358-397. 
Ssenyonjo M “The development of economic, social and cultural rights under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2015) 4 International Human Rights Law Review 147-193. 
Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264 – 284. 
Stone J “Fictional elements in treaty interpretation – A study in the international judicial 
process” (1955) 1 Sydney Law Review 344-368. 
Sunstein RC “Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2000-2001) 
11(4) Constitutional Forum 123 – 132. 
Swart M “Is there a text in this Court? The purposive method of interpretation and the ad 
hoc Tribunals” (2010) 70 ZaoRV 767-787. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
408 
Tardu ME “The Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Inter-American System: A study of co-existing petition procedures” (1976) 70 
American Journal of International Law 778-800. 
Tobin J “Seeking to persuade: A constructive approach to human rights treaty 
interpretation” (2010) 23 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1-50. 
Tsakyrakis S “Proportionality: An assault on human rights?” (2009) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1-26. 
Tshoose IC “The emerging role of the constitutional value of Ubuntu for informal social 
secirity in South Africa” (2009) 3 African Journal of Legal Studies 12-19. 
Udombana NJ “So far so fair: The local remedies rule in the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2003) 97 American Journal of 
International Law 1-37. 
Udombana NJ “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late 
than never” (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 45-111. 
Umozurike UO “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1983) 77 
American Journal of International Law 902-912. 
Umozurike UO “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Suggestions for 
more effectiveness” (2007) 13 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 
179-190. 
Van Damme I “Treaty interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body” (2010) 21 European 
Journal of International Law 1-49. 
Vargas MD “Individual Access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” (1984) 1 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 601-617. 
Viljoen F & Louw L “State compliance with recommendations of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004” (2007) 101 American Journal of 
International Law 1-34.  
Viljoen F & Louw L “State compliance with the recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1993-2004” (2009) 7 International 
Journal of Civil Society 22-59. 
Viljoen F & Louw L “The status of the findings of the African Commission: From moral 
persuasion to legal obligation” (2004) 48 Journal of African Law 1-22. 
Viljoen F “A human rights court for Africa, and Africans” (2005) 30 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 1-66. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
409 
Viljoen F “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The travaux 
preparatoires in the light of subsequent practice” (2004) 25 Human Rights Law 
Journal 313-326. 
Wachira GM & Ayinla A “Twenty years of elusive enforcement of the recommendations 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A possible remedy” 
(2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 465-492. 
Wesson M “Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of 
the South African Constitutional Court” (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 284-308. 
Winks BE “A covenant of compassion: African humanism and the rights of solidarity in 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2011) 11 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 447-464. 
Yeshanew AS “Approaches to the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights in 
the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Progress and perspectives” (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 317-340. 
Young GK “The minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search of 
content” (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113-175. 
 
Theses and dissertations 
Van der Berg S A capabilities approach to the judicial review of resource allocation 
decisions impacting on socio-economic rights LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015). 
Broodryk J Ubuntu in South Africa LLD thesis UNISA (1997). 
 
Reports, addresses and decisions 
African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos, Nigeria January 3-7, 1961: A Report on 
the Proceedings of the Conference 9: Lagos Nigeria (1961). 
An agenda for development report of the Secretary-General UN Doc. A/48/935 6 (1994). 
Annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 50, 
doc.13 rev (1979-1980). 
Conference of African Jurists on ‘The African legal process and the individual’ 
E/CN.14/521 of 5 July 1971: Addis Ababa Ethiopia (1971). 
Decision of the African Union Executive Council on the Decision of the Thirty-Eighth 
Activity of the African Commissionon Human and Peoples’ Rights AU 
DOC.EX.CL/Dec.887 (XXVII). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
410 
Decision on human and peoples’ rights in Africa AHG/Dec. 115 (XVI) Rev. 1 (1979). 
International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of international law: Difficulties arising 
from the diversification and expansion of international law’, report of the study group 
of the International Law Commission, 58th session A/CN.4/L.682 (2006). 
Kodjo E “Address of H.E. Mr. Edem Kodjo Secretary General of the Organisation of 
African Unity at the opening of the Meeting of African Experts preparing the draft 
African Charter in Dakar, Senegal 28 November to 8 December 1979” CAB/LEG/67/4 
OHCHR, strengthening the United Nations human rights treaty body system: A report by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay (2012). 
Rapporteur’s Report CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt. Rpt(II) Rev.4. 
Report of the African Commission Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities submitted in accordance with “Resolution on the Rights of 
Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa” AU DOC/OS(XXXIV)/345 49 (2005). 
Report of the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for the Twentieth and 
Twenty-First sessions, Consideration of Reports of States Parties: Solomon Islands, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/11 (1999). 
Report of the Rapporteur, OAU Ministerial meeting on the Draft African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Draft RPT.rpt (II): Banjul The 
Gambia (1980). 
Report of the sessional working group on the working methods and activities of 
transnational corporations on its fourth session, Sub-Commission 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13 (2002). 
Second report on the law of treaties by Mr. GG Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur YBILC 
vol. II (1957) A/CN.4/107 
Seminar on the study of new ways and means for promoting human rights with special 
attention to the problems needs of Africa, UN Doc. ST/TAO/HR/48: Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania (1973). 
Senghor LS “Address of Leopold Sedar Senghor at the opening of the meeting of 
African Experts preparing the draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 
Dakar, Senegal from 28 November to 8 December 1979” OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/5. 
Seventh Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
1993-1994, Thirtieth Ordinary Session: Tunis, Tunisia (1994).  
Study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.4 (1983). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
411 
Thirty-Eighth Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AU DOC.EX.CL/921 (XXVII). 
 
Treaties, international and regional instruments 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 27 June 1981, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/rev5. 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 11 July 1990, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49.oc6. 
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica (B-32) 22 
November 1969, OAS TS 36 (UN Reg. 17955). 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 25 May 1963, 479 UNTS 39. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 
December 1979, UN Doc A/34/46. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, UN Doc A/44/49. 
Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 195. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, ETS 35. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171.  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
10 December 2008, A/RESE/63/117. 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa 11 July 2003, CAB/LEG/66.6. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) 39 AJIL Supp. 215. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 10 December 1948, GA Res 217A (III) UN Doc 
A/810. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969 UN Doc A/Conf.39/27. 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 25 June 1993. 
 
Drafts of the international and regional instruments 
Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights CAB/LEG/67/1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
412 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) 29 AJIL Supp 971. 
ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966). 
Preliminary draft of the African Charter prepared during the Dakar Meeting of Experts at 
the end of 1979 CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev1. 
 
General Comments and Concluding Observations  
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 9 The domestic 
application of the Covenant (1998) UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 20 Non-
Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para 2) (2009) UN Doc 
E/C.12/GC/20. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 4 The right to 
adequate housing (1991) UN Doc E/1992/3. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 12 The right 
to adequate food (1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No.13 The right 
to Education (1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 14 The right 
to the Highest Standard of Health (2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 19 The right 
to Social Security (art. 9) (2008) UN Doc E/C. 12/GC/19. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 15 The right 
to water (2002) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 3 The nature 
of States Parties’ obligations ( art 2, para.1) (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 13 The right 
to education (art 13) (2003) UN Doc E/C 12/1999/10. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 7 Forced 
evictions and the right adequate housing (1997) UN Doc E/1998/22 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Uzbekistan 24 January 2006, UN DOC. E/C.12/UZB/CO/1. 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Cambodia 12 June 2009, UN DOC. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
413 
Human Rights Committee General Comment 24 General Comment on issues relating to 
reservation made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or Optional Protocol 
thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant (1994) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6. 
Human Rights Committee General Comment No 6 The right to life (1982) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1. 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19 Art 23 (The Family) Protection of the 
Family, the right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses (1990) UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1/28. 
 
Declarations, Resolutions, Principles, Guidelines, Rules and 
Statements 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Rules of Court, 2 June 2010. 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, OAS Doc OE A/Ser 
L/V/II.65 Doc 6. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights An Evaluation of the Obligations to 
Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an Optional Protocol to 
the Covenant (2007) UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1.  
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement in the Context of the 
Rio+20 Conference on “the Green Economy in the Context of Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Eradication” (2012) UN Doc. E/C.12/2012/1. 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 26 January 
1997. 
Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 17 September 2004. 
Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’, 24 October 2011. 
Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to Implement the Endorois Case 
ACHPR/Res.257, 5 November 2013. 
Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (2004) ACHPR/Res.73 
(XXXVI) 04. 
Resolution on Protection against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against 
Persons on the Basis of Their Real or Imputed Sexual Orientation (2014). 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26 May 
2010. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
414 
State Party Reporting Guidelines for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2011. 
United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, 4 December 1986 UN Doc 
A/RES/41/128. 
United Nations General Assembly Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental 
Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, 17 December 1991 
A/RES/46/119. 
 
Unpublished papers and Internet sources 
5th Pan-African Congress Resolutions and Declarations 
www.13.+5th+PAC++resolutions+and+declarations,+1945pdf (accessed 03-11-
2015). 
Africa hunger and poverty facts 2012 
(http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn_africa_hunger_facts.htm) (accessed 11-
08-2013). 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “history” (2016) African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights http://www.achpr.org/about/history (accessed 12-09-
2016). 
Arbour L “Freedom from want – From charity to entitlement” http://www.icc-
icc.ca/en/lbs/LouiseArbour2005EN.pdf (accessed 18-06-2015).  
Broodryk J “Ubuntu: African life coping skills” A paper delivered at CCEAM Conference 
in Lefkosia (Nicosia) Cyprus from 12-17 October 2006. 
Joseph S & McBeth A (eds) Research handbook on international human rights law 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438555 (accessed 03-11-2015). 
Juma D “Access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A case of the 
poacher turned gamekeeper?” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1391482 (accessed 11-05-
2015) 1-21. 
Khoza S “The link between development, social and economic rights: Are socio-
economic rights development rights?” (2002) Socio-Economic Rights Project, CLC, 
University of Western Cape 1-7 aihr-
resourcescenter.org/administrator/upload/documents/link.pdf (accessed 06-05-2017). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
415 
Killander M “African human rights law in theory and practice” in Joseph S & McBeth A 
(eds) Research handbook on international human rights law (2010) 388-413 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438555 (accessed 03-11-2015). 
Mokgoro JY “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” A paper delivered at first Colloquium 
constitution and law held at Potchefstroom on 31 October 1997 
(http://www.puk.ac.za/opencms/export/PUK/html/fakulteite/regte/per/issues/98v1mok
g.pdf) (accessed 19-04-2017).  
Pan-African Congress in 1919 www.diaspora.northwestern.edu (accessed 21-10-2015). 
Pan-African Congress in 1921 www.diaspora.northwestern.edu (accessed 21-10-2015). 
Pan-African Congress in 1923 www.diaspora.northwestern.edu (accessed 21-10-2015). 
Pan-African Congress in 1927 www.diaspora.northwestern.edu (accessed 21-10-2015). 
Pan-African Congress in 1945 www.aaprp-intl.org (accessed 03-11-2015). 
Resolution on imperialism and colonialism, Accra, December 5-13, 1958 
www.v1.sahistory.org (accessed 21-10-2015).  
Schaffer RP “Current trends in treaty interpretation and the South African approach” 
AYBIL 129-173. (http://www.austlii.edu/journals/AUYrBkIntLaw/1977/7.pdf) 
(accessed 01-04-2014). 
The state of food insecurity in the World: Meeting the 2015 international hunger targets: 
Taking stock of uneven progress 2015 (http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf) (accessed 
17-02-2016). 
 
Constitutions 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
 
Table of cases 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Amnesty International & Others v Sudan Communication nos.48/90, 50/91, 52/91, and 
89/93 (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999). 
Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon Communication no. 
39/90 (2000) AHRLR 57 (ACHPR 1997). 
Antoine Bissangou v Republic of Congo Communication no. 253/2002 (2006) AHRLR 80 
(ACHPR 2006). 
Article 19 v Eritrea Communication no. 275/03 (2007) AHRLR 73 (ACHPR 2007). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
416 
Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & INTERIGHTS v Cameroon 
Communication no. 272/03. 
Centre for the Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication no. 
276/2003 (2009) AHLRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009)  
Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria Communication no. 129/94 (1995). 
Commission Nationale des Drits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad Communication no. 
74/92 (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995). 
Constitutional Rights Project (on behalf of Wahab Akamu, Globan Adeaga and Others) v 
Nigeria Communication no. 60/91 (1995). 
Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v Sudan Communication no. 310/05 (2009) 
AHRLR 193 (ACHPR 2009). 
Dawda Jawara v The Gambia Communication nos. 147/95 & 149/96 (2000) AHRLR 107 
(ACHPR 2000). 
Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda Communication no. 
227/99 (2004) AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2004). 
Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo Communication no. 286/2004 (2012). 
Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire Communications nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 
(2000) AHRLR 74 (ACHPR 1995). 
Ilesanmi v Nigeria Communication no. 268/03 (2005) AHRLR 48 (ACHPR 2005). 
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola Communication no. 
292/2004 (2008) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2008). 
Interights (on behalf of Safia Yakubu Husaini and Others) v Nigeria Communication no. 
269/03 (2005) AHRLR 56 (ACHPR 2005).  
Interights et al (on behalf of Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v Botswana Communication no. 
240/01 (2003) AHRLR 55 (ACHPR 2003).  
INTERIGHTS, Institute for Development and Human Rights in Africa, and Association 
Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Mauritania Communication no. 373/09 
(2010) AHRLR 90 (ACHPR 2010). 
International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria Communication nos. 137/94, 
139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1999). 
John K. Modise v Botswana Communication no. 97/93 (2000) AHRLR 30 (ACHPR 
2000). 
Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana Communication no. 313/05 (2010). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
417 
Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon Communication no. 266/03 (2009) AHRLR 9 
(ACHPR 2009). 
Krishna Achutan (on behalf of Aleke Banda) v Malawi Communication no. 64/92, 68/92, 
and 78/92 (2000) AHRLR 144 (ACHPR 1995). 
Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland Communication no. 251/02 (2005) AHRLR 66 
(ACHPR 2005). 
Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia Communication 211/98 (2001) AHRLR 84 
(ACHPR 2001). 
Lisbeth Zegveld v Eritrea Communication no. 250/02 (2003).  
Louis Emgba Mekongo v Cameroon Communication no. 59/91 (2000) AHRLR 56 
(ACHPR 1995). 
Malawi African Association v Mauritania Communications nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 
164/97, 196/97 & 210/98 (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000). 
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria Communication nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96 
(2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998). 
Mouvement Ivorien Droits de l’Homme (MIDH) v Cote d’Ivoire Communication no. 
262/02 (2008). 
Prince v South Africa Communication no. 255/2002 (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004). 
Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication no. 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 
(ACHPR 2003). 
Rencontre africaine pour la defence des droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) v Zambia 
Communication 71/92 (2000) AHRLR 321 (ACHPR 1996). 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria Communication no.  
155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v Nigeria Communication no. 
300/2005 (2008) AHRLR 108 (ACHPR 2008). 
Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Human Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
v Sudan Communications no. 279/03-296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009). 
Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola Communication no. 159/96 (2000) 
AHRLR 18 (ACHPR 1997). 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe Communication no. 245/2002 (2006) 
AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2006). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
418 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v 
Republic of Zimbabwe Communication no. 284/03 (2009) AHRLR 235 (ACHPR 
2009). 
 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application no. 004/2011. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application no. 002/2013. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya 
Application no. 006/2012. 
Femi Falana v The African Union Application no. 001/2011. 
In the Matter of: Request for Advisory Opinion by the African Committee of Experts on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child on the Standing of the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Request No. 002/2013. 
Michelot Yogogombaye v The Republic of Senegal Application no. 001/2008. 
 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
IDG v Spain Communication No. 2/2014 UN Doc E/C. 12/55/D/2 2014, 13 October 2015. 
 
United Nations Committee Against Torture 
Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v Yugoslavia Communication NO. 161/2000 UN Doc No 
CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, 2 December 2002. 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECtHR, 9 October 1979). 
Akdivar and Others v Turkey App nos 99/1995/605/693 (ECtHR, 1 April 1998). 
Ashingdane v The United Kingdom App no 8225/78 (ECtHR, 28 May 1985). 
Belilos v Switzerland App no 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988). 
Daróczy v Hungary App no 44378/05 (ECtHR, 1 July 2008). 
Dogan and Others v Turkey App nos 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02 
(ECtHR, 29 June 2004). 
Éditions Plon v France App no 58148/00 (ECtHR, 18 May 2004). 
Engel and Others v The Netherlands App nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 
5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 June 1976). 
Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, Sozialamt Case 29/69 (ECtHR, 12 November 1969). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
419 
Golder v The United Kingdom Appl no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975). 
Handyside v United Kingdom App nos 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976). 
Johnston and Others v Ireland App no 9697/82 (ECtHR, 18 December 1986).  
Klass and Others v Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR, 6 September 1978). 
Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996). 
Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v Turkey App nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (ECtHR, 6 
February 2003).  
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium App no 9267/81 (ECtHR, 2 March 1987). 
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 10 May 2010). 
Scoppola v Italy (No 2) App no 10249/03 (ECtHR, 17 September 2009). 
Soering v The United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) 
Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (ECtHR, 10 December 2007). 
Üpper and Others v Turkey App nos 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 
36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07 (ECtHR, 20 October 2009). 
Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland (No.2) App no 32772/02 
(ECtHR, 30 June 2009) 
Vlastimir Bankovic & Others v Belgium & Others App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 
December 2001) 
Wemhoff v Germany App no 2122/64 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968). 
 
Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights 
 “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American 
Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-1, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series A No 1 (24 September 1982). 
Acevedo Jaramillo et al v Peru (Interpretation of Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 
157 (24 November 2006). 
Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Ser C No 15 (10 September 1993). 
Blake v Guatemala (Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Series C No 48 (22 January 1999). 
Capital El Rodeo I and Capital El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center (Venezuela) 
Provisional Measures, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (8 February 2008).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
420 
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of 
Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory 
Opinion OC-5, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 5 (13 November 
1985). 
Four Ngobe Indigenous Communities and Their Members (Panama), Provisional 
Measures, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (28 May 2010). 
Godinez-Cruz v Honduras (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 5 
(20 January 1989). 
Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin v Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 9 (21 June 2002). 
International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of 
the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights) 
Advisory Opinion OC-14, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 14 (9 
December 1994). 
Ituango Massacres v Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 148 (1 July 2006) 
La Cantuta v Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No 162 (29 November 2006). 
Las Palmeras v Colombia (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 
90 (6 December 2001). 
Mapiripan Massacre v Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No. 134 (15 September 2005. 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Judgment) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No 79 (31 August 2001). 
Natera Balboa (Venezuela) Provisional Measures, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (1 February 2010). 
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica 
Advisory Opinion OC-4, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 4 (19 
January 1984). 
Saramaka Case (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 185 (12 
August 2008). 
Serrano-Cruz Sisters v El Salvador (Preliminary Objection) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No 118 (23 November 2004). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
421 
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of 
the Due Process of Law Advisory Opinion OC-16, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series A No 16 (1 October 1999). 
The Right to Information on Consular in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due 
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Series A No 16 (01 October 1999). 
Urso Branco Prison (Brazil) Provisional Measures, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (7 July 2004). 
Velasquez Rodriguez case (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C 
No 4 (29 July 1988). 
Viviana Gallardo et al (Advisory Opinion) No 101/81 Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Ser A) (1984). 
Yakye Axa Case (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 125 
(17 June 2005). 
 
ICJ, ECJ, PCIJ and ICSID CASES 
Banro American Resources, Inc. and Societe Aurifere du Kivu et du Maniema S.A.R.L v 
Democratic Republic of the Congo ICSID Case No ARB/98/7 Award of the Tribunal 
(September 1, 2000).  
Case Concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras), 
Judgment ICJ Rep 1988. 
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 17 (13 September 1928). 
Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), Judgment ICJ 
Rep 1994. 
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations 
of 3 March 1950, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950. 
Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour PCIJ (1922) Advisory Opinion, 
Series B, Nos.2 & 3. 
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 Advisory 
Opinion ICJ 57. 
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 2009. 
Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, Sozialamt ECJ Judgment of the Court 12 November 1969. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
422 
Fedesa and Others Case C-331/88 [1990] ECR 1-4023. 
Herman Schrader HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollant Gronau ECJ case No. 
265/87. 
International Status of South-West Africa Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950 ICJ Reports 
1950. 
Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning the Employment of Women 
Working During the Night PCIJ Rep Series A/B No. 50. 
La Grand case (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ, (27 June 
2001). 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory 
Opinion of 21 July 1971 ICJ Judgment 16. 
Metronome Musik v Musik Point Hokamp Case C-200/96 [1998]. 
Nottebohm (Leichtenstein v Guatemala) (1955) Preliminary Objection (Second phase) 
ICJ Judgment of 06 April 1955. 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, ICJ Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951. 
RSM Production Corporation v Grenada ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14 Award 383 (Mar. 
13, 2009). 
The Queen and Others v H. A Standley and Others and D. G. D Metson and Others 
Case C-293/97 [1999]. 
Wachauf v Bundesamt Fur Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft ECJ Case 5/88 [1989]. 
 
South Africa  
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 1 
SA 46 (CC). 
Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 78 
(CC). 
Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another 
v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). 
Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No.2) 2002 SA 
721 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
423 
Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 5 
SA 721 (CC). 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). 
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 CC. 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
